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Abstract 
_________________________________________ 
 
This thesis focuses on the problem of incivility within the domains of citizen politics and 
civil society by exploring the proclivity for popular protest in Jamaica and the 
intersections between popular citizen protest, civil society and governance in this 
context. It scrutinizes the tenor of contemporary civilian politics and assesses the 
consequent impact on the quality of civil society more broadly. The thesis challenges the 
assumption within accepted definitions of civil society that civic participation is always 
positive. It does so by examining the manner in which citizens engage collectively to 
defend their interests and make claims upon the state, as well as the extent to which this 
model of political participation serves the agenda and promise of civil society.  
 
Through an in-depth, country-specific, empirical case study, the thesis examines micro 
social processes of power at community level to raise questions about who should be 
represented in civil society and how the voices of the marginalized are to be heard. In 
this regard, it explores the role of social inequality, feelings of social injustice and political 
exclusion as contributory factors in the existing tenor of citizen politics in Jamaica. It also 
examines the challenges facing the contemporary state and the impact of violent protests 
on state engagement, public action and political performance. The study analyses the 
lived experiences, observations and perspectives of a wide cross section of Jamaican 
citizens, gleaned from face-to-face interviews, focus group discussions, as well as a range 
of secondary material, including audio-visual data, to illuminate this process of struggle 
and underscore the factors which drive violent protests in this political context.  
 
The thesis concludes that maximum disruption, including violence, has not only become 
the basis of civil protest in Jamaica, but that the varied and contradictory responses of the 
state bureaucracy and political actors (Members of Parliament, activists, other political 
 iii
officials), as well as the mass media, have directly contributed to the style and tenor of 
protest politics in Jamaica. This state of affairs reduces popular citizen participation over 
genuine concerns to mob-style incivility and undermines civil society as a source of 
positive and responsible citizenship. The growing political importance of grassroots-based 
citizen participation and community building—within the context of a global imperative 
to forge ‘democracy from below’—lends theoretical and normative credence to emerging 
concerns about the current character of popular citizen mobilizations and protest. This 
study thus establishes the basis for a presumption in favour of civility, civil discourse and 
civil action as fundamental to the construction of civil society. In doing so, it extends 
current scholarly understandings of civil society to Third World contexts, with a specific 
emphasis on Jamaica.   
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Preface 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
When I was an undergraduate student at the Mona Campus of the University of the West 
Indies (UWI) between 1994 and 1998 I was, in Jamaican idiom, the head cook and bottle-
washer in a fair share of student mobilizations and protest-demonstrations. For example, I 
was one of several West Indian students who (with support from a network of popular 
Jamaican reggae artistes) led a massive student march through the streets of Kingston to 
protest against the passage of a shipment of plutonium through Caribbean waters in 1994. 
‘No plutonium, blow your horns’ was our rallying cry as we implored motorists and other 
Jamaicans to join our collective resistance and to pressure Caribbean governments to act 
in line with our wishes. I also actively supported a succession of student blockades of the 
UWI, Mona to protest against increases in tuition fees in 1995. I participated in student 
marches around the Mona campus on a number of other occasions such as when police 
shot and killed a food and drink vendor, and when we tried to force the University 
administration to improve campus security or to open a newly-built wing of the library 
for student use.  
 
These student mobilizations pale into near insignificance when compared to the radical 
student and black power movements on the Mona Campus of the UWI in the 1960s and 
the political protests that engulfed the Jamaican society in the 1970s. Nonetheless, I felt 
that I was among a large network of civically-engaged students who were politically 
aware, concerned, involved, driven and empowered to defend and pursue causes that we 
felt were just. We subscribed intensely to ‘action, not a bag ‘o mouth’, a maxim borrowed 
from a popular song of the day. Petitions, letters or dialogue, although used, seemed to be 
feeble tools against a robust University administration. Massive disruption, such as 
blockading the gates of the University, shutting out staff and suspending all academic and 
administrative activity, were therefore assumed in instances as the most viable route to 
obtaining redress to our grievances. The negative repercussions of our actions such as 
 xvii
interruption of classes and loss of productivity for University workers rarely occurred to 
us. If they did, we did not care. To protest was our definition of freedom and thus far too 
exciting to be burdened by such concerns.  
 
Looking back now with a new and informed understanding and with the benefit of time 
and academic distance, it is clear to me that although we were fervent, organized and 
armed with reasonable and relevant agendas, our activism suffered from youthful 
exuberance, intemperance and short-sightedness. Although we were not expected to burn 
down the University and carry on in a barbaric fashion to get what we wanted, in many 
instances, we acted in ways which departed from our standing and power as young 
intellectuals. University students in Jamaica still, by and large, adopt and subscribe to 
many of the established strategies (protests, lockdowns, blockades and mob violence)1 in 
addition to retaining more resourceful tools at their disposal.  
 
Although Caribbean activism is rooted in a long-standing tradition of active resistance 
against British slavery, colonialism and the plantation system, the contemporary desire 
for civil society obliges us to assert the importance of civility for the conduct of politics 
and the formation and/or revival of civil society even while we take stock of our specific 
contextual circumstances and conditions – social, economic, political, cultural and 
historical. In other words, in light of the search for civil politics and civil society, the 
contemporary models of popular protestation assumed at all levels of the Jamaican society 
require rethinking and new theoretical vistas. This thesis is my contribution to the 
beginnings of this process.  
                                                          
1 See The Jamaica Gleaner. (2006) ‘Alleged Homosexual Attacked at UWI’. Available at: 
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20060405/lead/lead3/html  
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2006) ‘Barbarous bloodlust at UWI’. Available at: http://www.jamaica-
gleaner.com/gleaner/20060406/cleisure/cleisure1.html
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2004) ‘Marching for Peace – Students denounce violence in Spanish Town’. 
October 4. Available at: http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20041004/lead/lead1.html
The Jamaica Gleaner. (2004) ‘Students versus violence’. October 5. Available at: 
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20041005/cleisure/cleisure1.html
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CHAPTER 1 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction  
 
1.1    OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
In an intriguing assessment of the quality of Jamaican democracy at the end of the 
twentieth century, noted political scientist Trevor Munroe (1999: ix) contends that the 
competing forces of ‘deepening democracy and anarchic disorder’ are struggling for 
dominance in Jamaica and in one form or another in many countries across the world. In 
Jamaica, he declares that: 
The race is advanced, and it is neck and neck…. Democratic renewal can and 
must win, otherwise the man in the street is going to turn to his own devices. If 
democratic renewal is slow and is overtaken by anarchy, sooner or later, there 
will be a backlash to authoritarianism (1999: ix). 
 
This quotation goes to the heart of this study which explores the character of citizen 
politics and civil society in Jamaica. First, the quotation points to the possibility of a 
dangerous deficit in democratic revitalization in Jamaica embodied in the ostensible 
weaknesses in the institutions, structures and processes of representative government and 
civil society. Second, it predicts that in the absence of renewed procedures and practices 
of democratic strengthening, ordinary citizens will have little option but to install 
autonomous and alternative modes of governance and devise their own means to obtain 
redress or solve their problems.  
 
Although not a panacea, it is the promise of civil society which is touted everywhere as 
sine qua non to building and consolidating democracy. It is now a truism that democracy 
requires a civic organization characterized by voluntarism, independent associations and 
a balance of powers between the state and society. Indeed, the theoretical consensus is 
that the more active, pluralistic, institutionalized and democratic civil society is and the 
more effectively it balances the tensions in its relationship with the state – between 
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autonomy and cooperation, vigilance and loyalty, scepticism and trust, assertiveness and 
civility – the more likely it is that democracy will emerge and endure. Democracy also 
requires a civic culture and civic virtues where the habits of participation and 
deliberation as well as dispositions of tolerance, civility, non-violence, decency and trust 
can be learned and reproduced (Putnam, 2002; 1995; 1993; Swift, 1999; Barber, 1998; 
Keane, 1988b; Fine & Rai, 1997; Foley & Edwards, 1996; Held, 1995; Diamond, 1994). It 
follows therefore that civil society’s mediating role as a buffer between citizens and the 
state and as a social value founded on civility renders it crucial to any notion of renewing 
democracy and, in accordance with Munroe’s grim prediction, what may be called 
‘anarchy-deterrence’ in Jamaica.  
 
At the same time, although often ignored in the scholarship on civil society, it is 
important to recognize that not all citizen organizations carry equal potential to perform 
democracy-building functions. This is because their ability to do so depends significantly 
on their character, that is, what type of group they are and what kind of activities they 
engage in. Consequently, while bowling leagues, Rotary clubs, church groups, charities 
and consumer lobbies are held up as ideal models of the value of civic association, it is 
noteworthy that some civil societies comprise groups (such as drug dealers, street gangs, 
hate groups and vigilantes) which uphold values contrary to civility and civicness. 
Instead, for many groups, criminality, violence and intolerance are their mandate. Other 
groups in civil society boast undemocratic goals and methods, may seek to annex the state 
or other competitors, reject the rule of law and/or undermine the authority of the 
democratic state (Boyd, 2004; Shils, 1992; Whitehead, 1997; Diamond, 1994). In other 
words, some civil organisations and processes exemplify chronically uncivil features, 
which immediately negate their possibility as real, participatory and functioning civil 
societies and their potential usefulness in advancing democratic processes, principles and 
aspirations. It is this kind of ambivalence which besets citizen politics and civil society in 
Jamaica. 
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1.1.1 ‘Roadblock Democracy’? 
Popular protest is perhaps the most central of the democratic tools available to and 
employed by civilians globally to pursue rights-based causes, advance democracy and 
draw attention to the daily struggles they confront. In Jamaica, frequent nationwide 
protests and demonstrations - featuring massive road blocks, burning of tyres on major 
roadways, littering, looting, vandalism and violent citizen-police clashes, including at 
times, fierce gun battles - are tantamount to what may be seen as a ‘roadblock 
democracy’. Further, it may be fair to say that the existing forms such popular protests 
take are not only ‘glaring signals of the man in the street turning to his own devices’ 
(Munroe, 1999: ix) in contemporary Jamaica but the manifestation of uncivil politics. 
Violence and disruptive behaviour, as methods of popular resistance, are indeed 
becoming a norm rather than the exception in the existing landscape of citizen politics in 
Jamaica, as perhaps elsewhere (see chapter 6).  
 
The manifest cost of such violent protests to the economy are by now well-established – 
massive losses in productivity occasioned by extensive interruptions to commerce and the 
transportation sector – as well as the human consequences, measured in the virtual 
shutdown of the  education system and, at times, loss of life. More serious still is the 
considerable impact upon social stability, civic life and the rule of law, the concern over 
which have, in recent years, catapulted protest politics and the notion of good governance 
(UNDP, 1997) and civil society atop the Jamaican public’s agenda. This development finds 
broad contextual basis in a plethora of studies (Santos & Nunes, 2004; Dalton, 2000; 
Norris, 1999: 257-263; Inglehart, 1999; van Deth, 1997; Hann & Dunn, 1993; Barber, 
1984, 1998; Putnam, 1993, 1995) which examine the mutual interaction between the 
quality of democratic government and popular citizen participation. Such theoretical 
contributions suggest that growing cynicism about the performance of government and 
elected political representatives worldwide is resulting in a manifest decline in voter-
participation at the polls while provoking and/or fuelling support for unconventional and 
elite-challenging forms of political participation and activism such as protest politics.  
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This kind of citizen activism is usually embodied in a variety of social movements, 
community projects and collective action – signing petitions, writing letters, attending 
community meetings, joining local initiatives and symbolic protests1 (cf. Guha, 1997; 
Escobar & Alvarez, 1992; Foweraker, 1995) to more forceful mobilisations and 
confrontational demonstrations such as street marches and blockades.2 Some scholars 
acknowledge that this aspect of civil society-in-practice may also feature potentially 
dangerous tendencies, involving actions as fanatical as ‘support for anti-state extremist 
movements and even occasional cases of urban terrorism’ (Norris, 1999:262). Scholars 
such as Keane (1996:14) contend that in certain circumstances, civil society may 
‘haemorrhage to death’, degenerate into civil war and looting, in short, lead to the 
destruction of normal daily life. Whereas explosive protests and demonstrations in 
Jamaica often capture significant grassroots interest and media headlines, there has been 
little corresponding curiosity at the levels of scholarship. Where there has been scholarly 
interest (Gray, 2004; Charles, 2002; Meeks, 2000; Munroe, 2000; 1999; Dunn, 1999; 
Miller, 1999), the focus has principally been on the extent to which the structural power 
                                                 
1 Guha (1997), through extensive case studies, highlights the relevance, usefulness and power of 
these forms of citizen activism and protest in India. Non-violent direct action is a vital plank of 
India’s environmental movement aided and abetted by a sympathetic media and the people’s 
creative use of the wider political and legal system. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, 
see Guha (1997). See also Foweraker (1995) for examples from Latin America.  
 
2 For nine consecutive nights in November 2005, deprived immigrants, along with the poor 
working classes and the unemployed in Paris (and other cities), protested their demeaned social 
and economic status by engaging in coordinated acts of vandalism and arson. Protestors used 
home-made petrol bombs to torch some 900 cars and buildings while gangs of youths participated 
in fierce clashes with Parisian police. The French government likened this eruption of protest to 
‘genuine guerrilla warfare’ (see International Herald Tribune, Europe, 2006; Agency France-Press, 
2005). Far from France in the so-called ‘periphery’, thousands of pro-democracy activists and 
supporters, in April 2006, converged in the Nepalese capital of Kathmandu for 14 straight days, in 
forceful opposition to the autocratic reign of King Gyanendra. Blocked roads, burning tyres, brick-
throwing, police-citizen clashes, anti-government poetry, peaceful marches and the police 
resorting to tear gas, rubber bullets, live rounds and savage beatings were the dominant themes of 
this citizen mobilization (see Aljazeera.net, 2006). Likewise, angry mobs took to the streets of the 
Solomon Islands in April 2006 to force the resignation of newly-elected Prime Minister, Synder 
Rini. These protests also had as their backdrop intensive violence – arson, vandalism and looting 
(The Waikato Times, 2006, April 27, p. 9). 
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and conditions of the Jamaican state as well as the perceived (under) performance of 
elected political actors propel (and perhaps justify) popular citizen action. However, 
existing negative currents in popular protest in Jamaica, as elsewhere, suggest that we are 
obliged to also account not only for the levels of citizen political participation but the 
nature and brand of popular citizen activism and the extent to which it contributes to the 
stock of civility required for civil society, properly and normatively constituted. It is upon 
this basis that this thesis ‘When citizen politics become uncivil’ finds significance. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH THEMES AND OBJECTIVES 
I begin this study with this caveat. Popular protest is no stranger to West Indian society. 
It is rooted in a long-standing history of resistance to slavery and colonialism. Jamaica, 
the largest island in the English-speaking Caribbean, was the seat of much of this 
resistance. In fact, popular protest has been the dominant mode of struggle in the 
evolution of modern Jamaica and in the search for change in this postcolonial society (see 
chapter 4). Today, the country still lays claim to intense and frequent episodes of popular 
citizen mobilizations abetted by a highly democratic tradition where freedom of 
expression and assembly have strong bases. In 2005 alone, there were some 236 
roadblock-demonstrations on record (Police Statistics, 2005). Popular protest is, in 
significant respects, liberatory. It represents triumph, particularly for a significant 
subaltern who have declared their socio-political power and ascending autonomy (cf. 
Gray, 2004; Price, 2004; Charles, 2002; Meeks, 1996; 2000). More importantly, it is a 
powerful and immediate means by which people convey their growing disenchantment 
with their government and conversely expose the inadequacies in the quality of 
governance on offer to them. The gist of the current challenge confronting civilian 
politics in Jamaica today is thus clear. In a context of widespread grievance over social 
and political conditions, personal standards of living and perceived government 
underperformance, ‘citizens have no sense of being able to exercise effective control over 
the direction of the state except through vigorous and sometimes violent protest’ (Baker, 
2001:56).  
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This phenomenon symbolizes the dramatic collision between political governance, 
(including political decision-making, political accountability and political inclusion) and 
the strategies by which citizens elect to express their discontent. It also illuminates the 
unmistakable linkages between the character of civil society (embodied in popular 
protest) and the performance of representative democracy. Popular protest, as one mode 
of citizen political participation and activism is, then, a sort of litmus test of the nature of 
citizen politics and civil society as well as the quality of political governance. It is this 
problematic interplay between seemingly failing governance, popular protest and the 
construction (or deconstruction) of civil society within the Jamaican setting that this 
study focuses on. I seek answers to the following questions: 
• What is the nature of popular protest and demonstrations in Jamaica?  
• How far do Jamaica’s grassroots protests reflect and reproduce the existing quality 
of governance, including the existing mechanisms of political representation and 
the performance of elected political actors? 
 
• How effective are these protests in securing for (the especially disadvantaged 
classes of) citizens their political demands?  
 
• What can the characteristics and temperament of such protests tell us about the 
quality of citizen politics and civil society in this context? 
 
Through an empirical case study of protest politics, including the socio-cultural, political, 
historical and economic features at work in Jamaican society, this study seeks to 
understand and explain the nature and tenor of popular protest in this context. It offers 
critical, relevant and timely insights into the reasons eruptions of protest occur, why they 
occur with such frequency, why they take the forms they do, how the state responds and 
the impact of that response on the subsequent tenor of citizen action. The fundamental 
goal is to uncover the extent to which the existing models of protestation adopted in 
Jamaica represent a negation or a retreat of civil politics and civil society in Jamaica. 
Importantly, it is hoped that this country-specific study will offer a broad understanding 
of how the existing theoretical and empirical perspectives of civil society may be 
expanded to make them more relevant and useful to contemporary contexts and the 
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specific (socio-economic, political, cultural and historical) conditions of different societies 
facing similar challenges.  
 
It is useful here to also say what the study is not about. The research is not about 
stigmatizing protest campaigners and participants. In this regard, it does not presume or 
suggest that forceful social protest is intrinsically uncivil. Neither does it equate civility 
with the failure of people to protest. Instead, the study recognizes the episodic 
mobilizations of Jamaican citizens, particularly of people on the margins, as an often 
useful, autonomous and emancipatory aspect of civil society without romanticizing it or 
extracting it from its counterpoint to the state and its quest to maintain social order and 
the rule of law. The study, in other words, aims to locate the moral principle in protest 
politics – to establish the basis for a presumption in favour of civility, civil discourse, civil 
action and civil society – and undermine the authority of claims about the futility of civil 
protest in this context. Similarly, it seeks to foreground the values that can rebut this 
assumption.  
 
The study of popular protest and citizen politics in Jamaica is important because it reveals 
much about the possibilities and limitations for power by the poor in this context, as well 
as informs and/or lends support to a vision of governance and civil society more in line 
with its normative ideal.  On this basis, I wish to introduce some theoretical 
considerations regarding civil society which have not been fully appreciated in 
contemporary writings on the subject. The goal here is to briefly highlight some 
conceptual deficits in current theorizing on civil society and the reason its newer 
outgrowths must be taken into account. Since the nature and conduct of civil society 
cannot be divorced from the performance of the state and its representatives, I also make 
some preliminary observations about the notion of governance and the existing nature of 
civil society and citizen activism within the specific context of Jamaica.  
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CIVIL SOCIETY: ITS HIDDEN TRANSCRIPT 
Civil society is commonly understood as a vast public realm of voluntary, self-generating 
and self-supporting organisations and/or associations which stands outside the control of 
the state (Keane, 1988a; Diamond, 1994; Cohen & Arato, 1992). Typical examples include 
churches, charities, independent media, volunteer initiatives, lobby groups, interest 
groups, sports clubs, fraternal, cultural educational and developmental organisations. In 
this regard, civil society denotes society voluntarily organizing itself and/or citizens 
acting collectively in a public sphere – to exchange ideas, express interests, achieve 
mutual goals, make demands or seek concessions from the state and hold political 
representatives accountable (Deakin, 2001; Swift, 1999; Keane, 1988a; Diamond, 1994: 
Cohen & Arato, 1992). Civil society is then, for all intents and purposes, a good and 
positive development and hence eagerly embraced by all. For political officials and 
ordinary citizens concerned with the quality of public life and social relations (Buddan, 
2003; Boyne, 2002; Blunkett, 2001; Patterson, 2004; Robotham, 1998; Stone, 1992), 
political theorists and empirical social scientists disturbed by the maladies of democracy, 
declining associational life and social capital (Putnam, 2000; 1995; 1993; Munroe, 1999; 
Barber, 1998; 1984; Etzioni, 1996; Diamond, 1994; Shils, 1992), and development agencies 
(e.g. United Nations and World Bank) seeking accessible and structured organs through 
which to distribute aid and plan development projects, civil society is the solution. 
 
Contemporary politics and political theory have predominantly focused on the virtues of 
civil society. Scholars such as Putnam (1995; 1993), for example,  ignore the Marxian 
tradition which reduces civil society to a sphere of self-interest, instrumentality and 
conflict and instead advocate a more Tocquevillean order which posits a kinder, gentler 
understanding of civil society where bowling leagues, boys scouts and women’s groups 
are full (Boyd, 2004). Others (Deakin, 2001; Swift, 1999; Robotham, 1998) focus on the 
work of voluntary organisations and the impact of voluntarism in society, largely 
positioning civil society as a realm of civic generosity and citizenship where everyone is 
working towards a common good. These theorists are not alone. Images of massive 
popular mobilisations and collective action, including the civil rights movement and 
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global student uprisings of the 1960s, the populist movements against the abuses of  
totalitarian regimes throughout Eastern Europe and Latin America in the late 1980s and 
anti-globalisation and trade protests of the mid 1990s, have essentially led to a 
romanticisation of people power in which civil society became an unmitigated blessing 
for democracy and a sort of cure-all for weaknesses in the democratic state and society 
(Keane, 1988; Tempest, 1997; Hann & Dunn, 1996).  
 
But civil society is clearly not all virtuous. In the first place, its network of associations is 
cast so wide, it automatically and unwittingly embraces individuals and groups such as 
criminals, hate groups and extremists as well as values, tendencies and practices that 
constitute everything civility is not. Munroe (1999), for example, admits that there are 
groups in Jamaica which skirt the boundaries between legal and extra-legal behaviour. 
Swift (1999:6) posits that if civil society is a catch-all category encompassing an 
assortment of groupings and a diversity of social forces and interactions, then 
unquestionably it also includes ‘fascists, terrorists, racketeers, criminal elements as well as 
individuals and groups committed to democracy and the much fancied neighbourhood 
organizations’. It would therefore appear, as Diamond (1994) suggests, that the image of a 
noble, vigilant and organized civil society checking at every turn the predations of a self-
serving state is highly romanticised and is of little use to the construction of a viable 
democracy.  
 
In other words, it is clear that civil society contains both civil and uncivil actors, and legal 
and extra-legal practices, processes and dimensions. In short, not all constituents of this 
public space rendered civil society are civically engaged for a common good. Much of the 
scholarly literature disregards this reality. Whereas affectations of legality as well as civil 
attitudes and practices are, at times, powerfully acknowledged as part and parcel of what 
constitutes civil society (Munroe, 1999; Whitehead, 1997; Foley & Edwards, 1996; Hall, 
1995; Diamond, 1994), these notions are rarely foregrounded and given theoretical or 
empirical precedence in the existing debates on civil society. That civil society’s uncivil 
side has been theoretically ignored, pushed away or deliberately underplayed is perhaps 
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the major conceptual deficit of the contemporary writings on the subject. This has led to 
confusion over its meaning and, in contexts such as Jamaica, may trigger doubts over its 
usefulness as a force for societal transformation. This is because, as Boyd (2004:5) 
maintains: 
In the absence of any shared agreement about the nature and character of civil 
society, what emerges is a strictly terminological definition that, consciously or 
unconsciously, seeks to avoid addressing questions about civil society’s moral 
character (cf. Fine, 1997). 
 
This study addresses this conceptual deficit and the extent to which it has implications for 
the positive value of civil society in the Jamaican society. Focusing on the actual character 
and conduct of civil processes such as protests and demonstrations and the extent to 
which they constitute and reflect civil society should go a long way in explaining the 
limits of current efforts to conceptualise and establish civil society. In this regard, I find 
Boyd’s (2004:7) conceptual stance particularly useful. He argues that: 
Rather than thinking of civil society as a morally neutral space between the 
individual and the state, looking instead at associations [and citizen-level political 
action and processes] in terms of whether they are conducive to the virtue of 
civility may give us a better moral lens for reckoning with [its] value. Focusing on 
the civil designation of the term civil society, rather than on the domain of 
society, as opposed to the state, may help us to mediate these conceptual 
confusions about what counts as civil society and why (emphasis in the original). 
 
This thesis suggests that if civil society is to be politically worthwhile not only in Jamaica 
but in any context, it must acknowledge and competently straddle what is clearly its twin 
role as a social value and as a set of actually functioning, participatory social institutions. 
In other words, civil society must embrace both its call for civil conduct as well as 
collective engagement. This means we are obliged, as social science scholars, to take 
a more comprehensive view of the concept, including its potentially uncivil aspects. This 
conceptual stance is important as it not only exposes us to the real nature of civil society 
but gives us a good yardstick by which to assess its usefulness in society. This is even 
more important today, especially as the normative requirements of good governance 
increasingly collide with the complexities of governance in real world contexts such as 
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Jamaica.  It is to a discussion of the basic theoretical parameters of this notion that I now 
turn in the following section. 
 
1.4 GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENTALITY: SOME CONSIDERATIONS 
Discussions of governance often take as their point of reference an assessment of the 
failure or success of contemporary governments of states (developed and developing) to 
meet the fundamental expectation of their citizens (UNDP, 1997). Conceptually, the 
notion is akin to the Foucauldian notion of pastoral power which ‘links the individual to 
the state through an obligation to preserve the well-being of the citizen and attend to the 
needs of the population, in order to, in turn, assure a strong state’ (Packer, 2003:136). 
Embedded in expectations of governance for poor and marginalized citizens in many 
countries is the fulfilment of immediate survival needs – water, food, health, housing, 
employment, education and (good) roads. In other words, citizens expect the state to be 
the provider of economic security and ensure that all citizens have access to regular, 
reliable and efficient basic services. There is also an expectation that the state guarantees 
appropriate legal protection, respects human rights by allowing civil freedoms and 
demonstrates the capacity to resolve conflicts without force or violence. Citizens also 
count on the state to guarantee political stability, eliminate corruption, ensure 
accountability and transparency, protect the environment and create room for greater 
citizen participation3. By definition then, the capacity of a state to adequately meet these 
expectations is what defines good governance in the minds of the average citizen.  
 
Although these variables represent a good yardstick by which to assess the performance 
(and non-performance) of the state, they are essentially limited on two counts. Firstly, by 
virtue of this list of expectations which privileges the state as provider, it is assumed that 
                                                 
3 See, for example, The Commonwealth Foundation (2001) Citizens and Governance: Regional 
Perspectives which outlines the findings of a large scale research done with ordinary citizens in 47 
countries throughout the Commonwealth. Citizens gave their views on what constitutes a good 
society and what roles are best played by citizens as well as the state. Refer to the discussion on the 
Caribbean, pp.43-54. A more theoretical perspective on this subject is provided by Amitai Etzioni 
in his 1995 work entitled The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic 
Society. Refer to chapter 1 – ‘The Elements of a Good Society’, pp 3-33.  
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governance resides exclusively with the state and its institutions. In its most generic 
interpretation, governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative 
authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels (UNDP, 1997:5). Here 
political management accords monopoly power to the state but insinuates that 
governance is also taking place at other levels besides the state. Indeed, drawing on the 
pluralist paradigm of world order, the territorial state is today increasingly seen as just 
one among many sites of social relations and authority (Rapley, 2006; Mason, 2005; 
Collins, 2004; Ferguson, 2003; Strange, 1996; Rosenau, 1990). Based on this notion of 
‘scattered hegemonies’ (Grewal and Kaplan, 1994),  institutions as wide ranging as those 
of global governance to the trans-national third sector – religious movements, social 
movements, civic associations, indigenous or tribal groups and criminal organizations – 
represent public and private alternatives to sovereign state authority. In short, authority 
alternatives can be located just about anywhere that human groups interact and make 
rules.  
 
Secondly, this perspective too has been challenged by the UNDP. The recent 
incorporation by the United Nations of the private sector (the market) and civil society in 
contemporary processes of governance or in power sharing arrangements with the state 
also reflects the current widening of the definition of governance (UNDP, 1997). 
Governance is hence understood as the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions, 
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and 
exercise their legal rights and obligations (UNDP Policy Document, 1997:2-3) viz. a. viz. 
the state. On the basis of this fluid interaction between citizens and the state in the 
process of governance, the UNDP’s stated prerequisites of good governance are worthy of 
note. These include participation, transparency, accountability, effectiveness, equity and 
the rule of law. Of course, no society can ever fully satisfy the requirements of this highly 
conditional and idealized model of governance. But, in applying this model of governance 
to Jamaica, it is undeniable that the Jamaican state retains a highly consolidated 
democracy in which there are high levels of political rights and civil liberties (Meeks, 
2000; Munroe, 1999) even while more recent observation suggest that it has increasingly 
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lost its vigour (Gray, 2004). In many respects, the state has also succeeded in fulfilling 
some of its responsibilities, particularly with its massive programmes of infrastructure and 
technological developments in recent years (see Patterson, 2000).  
 
Notwithstanding the enviable levels of freedom, Jamaica appears to fall short on the 
comprehensive measures used to calibrate the health, strength and stability of democratic 
governments. In fact, persistent economic stagnation has created conditions of social 
decay and instability which leads to a display of symptoms that democratic theorists 
consider disquieting. These symptoms manifest themselves in widespread acts of 
indiscipline, escalating levels of crime and violence and frequent civil disorder (Meeks, 
2000; Munroe, 1999. Indeed, current citizen conduct leads some commentators to 
acknowledge the emergence of a new type of Jamaican citizen who is not so quietly 
pushing governability to its limit (Munroe, 2002; Meeks, 2000; Patterson, 1999; Stone, 
1992). Shaped by the historical forces of de-colonization and ‘postcoloniality’ (Scott, 
1999), and later moulded by the technological, socio-cultural, political and economic 
forces of liberalization and globalization, this so-called new Jamaican  is proud, more 
informed,  assertive and more demanding and resentful of authority across a range of 
social and political institutions (cf. Norris, 1999; Inglehart, 1999). The central argument 
here is that Jamaicans today are demanding more from their government but are finding 
the existing structures of (representative) governance unresponsive and in some instances 
irrelevant. Former Jamaican Prime Minister PJ Patterson put it candidly when he 
remarked that: 
The crisis is national in character, because it affects not only the institutions of 
the state, but the private sector and civil society as well. The old, non-inclusive, 
often undemocratic methods of power-sharing and managing power that evolved 
in post-Independence Jamaica can be found across the entire spectrum of the 
society. We find them in political parties, the Parliament, the Cabinet, church 
organizations, the bureaucracy, organs of the state, private sector firms, 
community groups. We must change our approach to governance, or we will 
become part of the problem to be swept aside by the emerging new social order 
(Patterson, 1999 in Franklyn, 2004:278). 
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The Jamaican populace, often angered by what many construe as political indifference 
and insensitivity, respond with violent expressions of popular protest. While political 
dissatisfaction is also reflected in voter-downturn, it is increasingly and explicitly 
expressed through popular protest – roadblocks, picketing, arson, vandalism, police-
citizen clashes, mushrooming levels of crime, particularly homicides, the lyrical 
verbalizing by a multitude of reggae artistes and the almost constant maligning of the 
political class in the popular press (Gray, 2004; Meeks, 2000; Munroe, 1999). As 
seemingly contending forces unable to co-exist comfortably with each other, the overall 
picture of the state and civil society in Jamaica can look discouraging enough to trigger 
doubts as to whether the country is governable at all (The Jamaica Gleaner, 2006, March  
17; The Jamaica Gleaner, 2005, November 1). Whereas the current scholarly focus seems 
to end with the nature of state governance, this recognition suggests that citizen 
behavioural norms are necessarily implicated in the construction of new theoretical 
contours of governance and therefore warrant both empirical and theoretical attention. 
For example, the extent to which criminal actors and other uncivil citizens are affecting 
the less tangible aspects of statehood such as authority and legitimacy is the current trend 
in existing political writing on Jamaica (Rapley, 2006; 2003; Gray, 2004; Harriot, 2003; 
2000; Figueroa & Sives, 2003; Charles, 2002).  
 
Such theorizing, while worthy of critical exploration, ignores the equally deleterious 
impact of such actors on the stability and quality of civil society. In order to fully 
understand the political significance of this shift in governance in the Jamaican context 
and the increased focus on its character and quality, the whole notion of governance must 
be problematized in line with changing political conditions. The conceptual deficit has, 
until now, seen the state dominating discussions on governance and an overwhelming 
disinclination by Jamaican scholars to give equal play to activities within the non-state 
realm inhabited by civil society. For analytical purposes, I therefore appropriate as my 
philosophical reference point, the Foucauldian notion of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 
1991). Governmentality essentially provides us with an expanded definition of 
governance. It is an analytic perspective addressing a formation of power, which 
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recognizes that a strong state depends both on the proper disposition of human beings 
and things (wealth, resources, means of subsistence, territory and its climate, irrigation 
and fertility) as well as the conduct of conduct (habits, customs, ways of acting and 
thinking) (Foucault, 1991:93). In other words, it is an attempt to reformulate the 
governor-governed relationship, one that does not make the relation dependent upon 
‘administrative machines, juridical institutions or other apparatuses that usually get 
grouped under the rubric of the state’ (Bratich, Packer & McCarthy, 2003:4). It is, instead, 
a new governmental and political rationality where the process of governance becomes 
other than the sole preserve of the state but increasingly depends upon a pluralization of 
forms of governing. Rather than governance occurring through domination and coercion, 
governmentality allows for self-responsibility and self–discipline - ‘an ongoing process of 
governing oneself, properly applying oneself and acting responsibly in every sphere of 
life’ (Hay, 2003:166-167). Governmentality rests upon investing power and capacity in its 
population and generating mechanisms for governing through society. Of course, the 
success of technologies of management which lie exclusively outside the purview of the 
state depends on new kinds of citizen-subjects and their responsible everyday conduct 
(ibid, 2003). In this process, the state as provider of an enabling environment for the 
empowerment of citizens and as the focal point for governance is not diminished but 
governmentality accords attention to a whole set of relations of ‘institutions, procedures, 
analyses, practices and discourses which may or may not centre upon the state’ (Foucault, 
1991:93). Instead, it recognizes that the conduct of conduct takes place at innumerable 
sites and hence requires rules of conduct across different spheres of society.  
 
Inherently implicated here is the character of both the governor (the state) and the 
governed (citizens).  In this sense, whereas governability incorporates and requires of 
citizens ‘an ongoing process of governing oneself, properly applying oneself and acting 
responsibly’ (Hay, 2003:166), it equally demands responsibility and accountability from 
the state and its political actors. The conduct of Jamaican citizens and, in this sense, the 
character and functioning of civil society, cannot therefore be appreciated in the abstract 
or divorced from the practices, discourses and political rationality of the Jamaican State. 
 16
This study, then, does not simply argue from a twin-level perspective – the macro level of 
the state and the micro level of civilian politics and civil society but, importantly, 
considers the interplay between them. Within the context of Caribbean studies, 
historically dominated by the analytical and theoretical impositions of structure (state, 
institutions, economy), the study therefore rescues people politics from the peripheral 
status to which it is customarily relegated. Whereas the thesis is not about letting the 
state off the hook by a thematic focus on the negative outgrowths of civilian politics, it 
provides a corrective to those who would assert that civil protest (no matter how uncivil) 
is the democratic and constitutional right of the citizen, with no consequences for the 
overall desire for civil society, and that any notion of civility and civil politics is strictly a 
function of state obligation. The following overview of the existing nature of civil society 
in Jamaica underscores the relevance of this empirical exploration. 
 
1.5 CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAMAICA – THE CURRENT DILEMMA 
In Jamaica, the culture of civility is vulnerable and incomplete. Persistent civil unrest, 
including mob action, killings, (and other violent crime) on an unprecedented scale, 
violent clashes between citizens and the police,  a generalized breakdown in behavioural 
norms, a deteriorating economic situation and an ineffective local government (Gray, 
2004; Harriot, 2003; Meeks, 2000; Munroe, 1999; Robotham, 1998; Stone, 1992) 
exacerbate concerns over social order and civil society. A heightened exasperation with 
the indiscipline and violence characterizing everyday social relations and popular 
political action is manifested in opinions voiced on talk back radio programmes as well as 
articles and letters to the national newspapers, for example, where many Jamaicans 
deplore what they see as a culture of violence and incivility. Many maintain that a 
decline in moral values and discipline has rendered the country at risk for anarchy (The 
Jamaica Gleaner, 2006, March 17; The Jamaica Gleaner, 2002, July 4; The Jamaica 
Gleaner, 2001, February 28; The Jamaica Gleaner, 2001, July 9; cf. Meeks, 2000; Munroe, 
1999). Widespread concern with this gradual corrosion in civil relations led former 
Jamaican Prime Minister PJ Patterson to convene a historic National Consultation on 
Values and Attitudes in 1994 involving the whole spectrum of civil society (Patterson, 
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1994). The result was the introduction of a national strategic programme of action 
designed ‘to promote attitudinal change and social renewal’, in short, to instil a sense of 
civility in the society. The Prime Minister’s rationale, summed up in what became a well-
known quotation, was that: 
The fight for scarce benefits and spoils has contributed to a polarized society in 
which we operate like hostile tribes which seem to be perpetually at war, rather 
than working to realize a common goal.4 
 
More than a decade later, in March 2006, incumbent Jamaican Prime Minister Portia 
Simpson Miller, in her swearing-in speech, similarly pledged ‘to recapture the nation’s 
cultural roots in terms of traditional courtesy, decency and good manners as well as break 
the power of criminals and restore power to communities’ (Jamaica Observer, 2006, 
March 31, p. 1A). It is therefore clear that at a time when civil society is being flaunted as 
the most promising alternative to the maladies of public life, the virtue of civility is at risk 
in Jamaica. In order to understand the complex character of civil society in contemporary 
Jamaica, it is important to examine the norms and values at work in this society, which 
are grounded in the country’s socio-economic, political and institutional arrangements as 
well as its historical and cultural trajectory. The Jamaican society has, in other words, 
managed to preserve several distinctive features which tell a definitive tale about the 
character of civil society in this context: (1) the beginnings of grassroots activism and civil 
society in Jamaica within profoundly anomic demonstrations of resistance against slavery 
and an oppressive colonial administration and the continuing struggle for better social 
conditions throughout the post war and post-independence periods; (2) a decline in 
confidence in the organized organs of civil society; and (3) a highly centralized state 
bureaucracy which, on the one hand, pays lip service to citizen participation and, on the 
other hand, stands as an obstacle to it.  I discuss these in some detail here.  
 
                                                 
4 For a full text of this speech, see ‘Promoting Better Values and Attitudes’ Address by Prime 
Minister, P.J. Patterson, National Consultation on Values & Attitudes. National Conference 
Centre. 1994. February 15 (Patterson, 1994). 
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1.5.1 The Beginnings of Civil Society in Jamaica 
In the first place, while prevailing accounts (Robotham, 1998; Sherlock & Bennett, 1998; 
Beckles & Shepherd, 1996) locate civil society in Jamaica within the multiplicity of 
welfare organizations and initiatives that emerged after slavery to assist the newly freed 
slaves, this study identifies the beginnings of grassroots activism and the organization of 
civil society within the vigorous political rebellions and revolts mounted by Afro-
Jamaican slaves to resist slavery and confront the oppression of colonial government. The 
struggle for freedom and rights continued into the post-war period. Although this 
resistance featured careful and covert organisation, planning and structured leadership 
among the slave community, the protestation models employed were fierce and violent – 
featuring brutal murders of plantation owners, acts of arson and sabotage, running away 
or escapes from the plantation as well as intense guerrilla warfare (see chapter 4).  
 
The proliferation of protests and demonstrations in contemporary Jamaica thus appears to 
fall in line with a clear historical trajectory of successful political resistance. The study 
argues that, in many respects, the strategy, tone and tenor of current popular citizen 
action reflects this history. However, to simply explain the contemporary manifestations 
of protest at work in the Jamaican society and the nature of civilian politics more broadly 
purely in terms of a linear historical continuity would be to misunderstand and diminish 
the importance of the complex, conflicting and interrelated set of issues – social, political, 
economic and cultural – which simultaneously propel and delimit it. As I argue in chapter 
4, the current approaches and models of political rebellion employed by Jamaican citizens 
radically deviates from, even while it reproduces some elements of, the earlier epoch of 
plantation and post-slavery colonial society. For one thing, the Afro-Jamaican slaves were 
contending with an oppressive plantation system and later an inflexible colonial 
administration. The violent uprisings and revolts of the period reflected the nature of the 
power structure. Of course, even a subliminal awareness of the political, discursive and 
analytic parallels is crucial in coming to terms with the character of civil society and 
anxiety over its existing expressions.  
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What therefore can the emergence of civil society within anomic demonstrations tell us 
about the existing form and tenor of civil society and civil relations in Jamaica?  While 
acknowledging the historically salient issues of rights (social, economic and human) for 
which Afro-Jamaicans fought and the extraordinary context in which those struggles took 
place, it is also critical to highlight the values and political norms espoused during those 
periods and what impact, if any, these may have on the tenor of contemporary popular 
struggles and expressions. As a point of departure, I rely heavily here on noted Jamaican 
political scientist, Carl Stone’s (1992) groundbreaking work entitled ‘Values, Norms and 
Personality Development in Jamaica. I restate aspects of Stone’s thesis here because it 
continues to hold enormous relevance to understanding and making sense of the 
complexities of citizen politics viz. a. viz. state power in Jamaica.  
 
Stone (1992:4) identifies three main historical periods in Jamaica – slavery, post-
emancipation and post-war modernization – which are characterized by what he calls 
‘core values, norms regulating behaviour, institutional roles, functions and tasks in the 
major domains of social space and behavioural traits that derive from these underlying 
values and norms’.  Macro changes occurring over these periods, he argues, helped to 
shape and reshape values and consequently norms of behaviour. For example, he 
maintains that the social ideology of plantation society which defined black people as 
worthless as important to the current struggle by many blacks in Jamaica to assert their 
self-worth through different means. Popular protest is, unquestionably, one of the 
primary means by which Afro-Jamaicans struggle against the constricting socio-economic 
conditions in which they live (cf. Hope, 2006; 2004; Johnson, 2006; Gray, 2004). 
Likewise, the core values and norms of post-emancipation plantation society in Jamaica, 
embodied in a body of social ideology, legitimized and reinforced the power structure of 
that society. The emerging civil society served a twin role. It was an acceptable channel 
for the articulation of grievances and to confront the constraining social, economic and 
political framework that constituted the Jamaican society (e.g. through the trade unions 
and later the political parties) and it also functioned to support the state in maintaining 
systems that contributed to social stability.  
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Through the multitude of charitable and welfare organizations that emerged since post-
emancipation, benevolence and voluntarism were among the values that came to be 
regarded as legitimate and worthwhile since different actors could identify the benefits 
that would accrue to the society and by extension themselves from any philanthropic 
activities in which they are engaged (Robotham, 1998)5.  It is Stone’s (1992:11-13) thesis, 
however, that profound changes in values, norms and modes of behaviour in all domains 
of social space have undermined the old authority systems without giving birth to a 
strong new social order. The old is still crumbling but no new and coherent authority 
systems have emerged to replace it. In addition, strong residual influences from the old 
Jamaica persist and not only create a climate of competing old and new values and norms 
but also a contradictory mix of positive and negative norms and values as embodied in the 
following: 
• Behavioural styles of deference and docility have been replaced by aggression, 
assertiveness and competitiveness. 
 
• Rampant individualism has replaced and weakened strong family bonds and 
community ties of the past, thereby weakening the traditional mechanisms of 
social control. 
 
• Violence and aggression are increasingly justified as legitimate responses to 
injustice and social oppression, resulting in increased social violence. 
 
• Rigid codes of behaviour have given way to great diversity of behaviour modes 
and styles and a tendency towards experimentation and deviant behaviour. Taken 
to extremes, this syndrome manifests itself in a drift towards lawlessness and 
indiscipline and a refusal to conform to rigid standards and rules of behaviour 
(Stone, 1992:11-13).  
 
Many of these values and behavioural norms have found ready home in social processes 
such as protests and demonstrations. At the same time, the economic and political 
transformations that swept Jamaica over the last thirty years, most notably Structural 
Adjustment and economic liberalization during the early 1980s and 1990s, have also 
tested the economic mettle of the state and ruptured the social consensus that held the 
                                                 
5 See Robotham, D. (1998) ‘Vision and Voluntarism: Reviving Voluntarism in Jamaica’. Grace 
Kennedy Foundation Lecture. Kingston: Grace Kennedy Foundation. 
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society together (see chapter 5). Noteworthy is the considerable impact of globalization 
which has occasioned unprecedented levels of cultural penetration viz. a. viz. mass media, 
the consequences of which include intense materialism, consumerism, exhibitionist 
displays of status, crass individualism and inflated expectation, especially among the 
youth (Hope, 2006; 2004; cf. Inglehart, 1999; Norris, 1999). The effects of this revolution 
in values are most exemplified in the culture of the Jamaican inner city where young 
unemployed youth as well as low-income or poor working class men and women clamour 
to partake in the global consumer culture, adopt its values and lifestyles and parade its 
products – brand-name shoes, clothing and jewellery. This kind of conspicuous 
consumption not only reinforces the hierarchies of status which inform postcolonial 
Jamaican society but also exposes the profound gap between citizen expectation and 
intense material deprivation and impoverishment (Hope, 2004).  
 
It is this gap between expectation and the failure of elites to fulfil these that contributes 
to an intensification of crime and other manifestations of social deviance, including civil 
disorder. Aggravating this situation is the romanticisation of crime, the mushrooming of 
drug use, as well as narcotics and weapons trafficking, the folk hero status applied to its 
emissaries, particularly by young poor boys, the glorification of Mafia overlords and other 
criminal actors in the lyrical outpourings of many popular reggae artistes and a laissez-
faire attitude to the rule of law by large numbers of citizens added to a malfunctioning 
justice system (Boyne, 2003; Charles, 2002; Harriot, 2003; 2001). These developments all 
encroach on the civil sphere and thereby hold serious implications for the character and 
tenor of popular citizen action such as popular protest (see chapter 9). They not only 
paint a bleak image of the public sphere in Jamaica, but the breakdown of the social 
system and the values inherent here also mean a disintegration of civil society as a force 
for social stability. Indeed, a failure to break the clash of competing values at work in the 
society is predicted to result in a gradual shift towards social anarchy where raw power, 
including mob violence, rather than legitimate authority holds sway (Stone, 1992). 
Although scholarly reference is often made to this picture of uncivil values (Boyne, 2003; 
Meeks, 2000; Munroe, 1999; cf. Boyne, 2003; 2002), since Stone’s (1992) work on Values, 
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Norms and Personality Development in Jamaica more than a decade ago, comprehensive 
look at political behaviour and the values which underpin it is yet to be undertaken. This 
thesis offers some insights into this arena of colliding values and how they play out 
within popular citizen politics in Jamaica. It however suggests that it is the weaknesses 
and ambivalent tendencies inherent within structured civil society (civic groups, 
associations and initiatives) in Jamaica which has also created room for the problematic 
tenor of citizen politics here. I look briefly at this issue below. 
  
1.5.2  Contemporary Civil Society: Between Renewal and Decline? 
The spread of civic organizations in Jamaica in recent years, including the impressive 
number of active and partially active community organizations ostensibly portrays a very 
positive image of social capital and civic engagement. Research confirms a density of 
some 5,700 community-based organizations (CBOs) in Jamaica, of which more than 50 
percent are either active or partially active (See Box 1.1 below; cf. IDB Report, Jamaica, 
2003). In fact, Munroe (2000; 1999) contends that having grown considerably in the 
1990s, the presence and concentration of civic organizations in Jamaica signals an 
empowered and renewed civil society, a natural boost for democracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1.1 Jamaican Community Based Organizations (CBOs) 
Comm. 
Council 
Citizens 
Assoc. 
Youth 
Clubs 
Sport 
Clubs 
Police 
Youth 
Clubs 
Neigh. 
Watch 
PTA NGO 4H Total 
180 636 1336 220 287 533 654 777 778 5401 
3.3% 11.8% 24.8% 4.1% 5.3% 9.8% 12.1% 14.4% 14.4% 100% 
Total CBOs  - 5401 
Status 
Active  - 2824  - 52.3% 
Partially Active -   305 - 5.5% 
Unknown - 1852 - 34.3% 
Dormant  -   375 -   6.9% 
Defunct  -     45 -    .8% 
Source: Munroe, T. (2000) Voice, Participation and Governance in a Changing Environment: The Case 
of Jamaica. University of the West Indies: Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic  
Development.
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These figures however reveal nothing about the membership and/or attendance levels 
recorded by each organization or give much indication of the types and levels of activism 
engaged in by these groups, which leads to the somewhat paradoxical perspective that 
‘Jamaica has a diverse civil society and myriad civic organizations but a dulled capacity 
for vigorous civic involvement in the social and political realm’ (Gray, 2004:350). A 2003 
IDB Civil Society Report on Jamaica blamed a stunted civic life in Jamaica on, among 
other things, weak community leadership, a lack of community spirit in some 
neighbourhoods, lack of unity and the desire to network, insufficient involvement of 
communities in the work of civil society organizations (CSOs) and, significantly, an 
unawareness of communities of the existence of CSOs and their services (IDB, 2003). 
This, of course, is not to diminish the significance of the vibrant associations and 
networks formed around sport and entertainment in Jamaica as embodied in the 
multiplicity of events and institutions dedicated to athletics, football, cricket as well as 
the unparalleled production and consumption of Jamaican popular culture (Munroe, 
1999; cf. Hope, 2006; Stolzoff, 2000). Also of note is the establishment of the citizen 
observer organization, Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), the impact of 
the human rights lobby, Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ) and the Peace Management Initiative 
(PMI), the growing significance of talkback radio as an avenue of complaint and criticism 
and the increasing desire for the Church to play a more active role in public life (Munroe, 
1999; Clarke, 2002).  
 
For Boyd (2004:12-14) and Shils (1992:15), however, the density of associations and a 
spirit of voluntarism do not equal civility. Instead, they contend that the value of 
associations ought to be determined by the contribution that they render to the stock of 
civility in a society. Of course, whereas the institutions of civil society are sustained not 
only by their civility but also by the benefits they confer on the society, these authors 
nonetheless maintain that it is the ingredient of civility which makes the difference 
between their survival and decay. In this regard, I posit that part of the challenge facing 
civil society in Jamaica is the ambivalence and the perceptions of ineffectiveness which 
attends many of these organizations and initiatives. The consequence has been a lack of 
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confidence in their role as civic ambassadors or mediators between the citizenry and the 
state. Although the study is not concerned with the politics and functioning of civic 
organisations per se, I wish to briefly highlight the prevailing concerns about them as 
they not only offer useful insights into the quality of civil society in Jamaica, but also help 
explain the existing resort to episodic protests and demonstrations by loosely organised 
bands of citizen-protestors as a means to access the state and seek redress to grievances. 
 
For example, despite the imposing presence of popular human rights lobby, Jamaicans for 
Justice (JFJ), as a pillar of citizen governance with a fresh approach to advocacy and 
activism within Jamaican civil society, the group, at times, suffers strong public criticism. 
Formed after the violent social upheavals in Jamaica in April 1999, occasioned by the 
nationwide protests over increases in the price of petrol, JFJ manages to hold the Jamaican 
state to account for state abuse embodied in its police force through peaceful and 
purposeful citizen action6. Observers, however, argue that the JFJ is linear in its thinking 
and orientation (perceived as anti-state and anti-police), does not represent a consensus as 
to what justice is and how it should be issued in Jamaica and, as a result, have squandered 
their opportunity to engender trust among the citizenry (see for example, Hope, 2000). 
There are also overt and covert suggestions of the group’s partisan political alignment 
(with the country’s political opposition, the Jamaica Labour Party) and a strong sense that 
it is synonymous with the brown-skinned middle class who traditionally enjoy public 
prestige and positions at the higher levels of the society (Hope, 2000:11). On balance 
however, JFJ has played a very positive role, impacting enormously on how the state 
responds to cases of police misconduct. Its ambivalent stance of seeking justice for the 
poor while retaining its middle class character and orientation is part of its current 
challenge. 
                                                 
6 For further details of the work and approaches to advocacy and protest of JFJ, see 
http://www.jamaicansforjustice.org  
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Similarly, although the roots of the Christian Church7 are deeply and firmly entrenched 
in the Jamaican society, serving as a significant force in the movement for abolition and 
emancipation, the building of an education system and providing a bedrock of support for 
the poorest in the society (Dick, 2002; Munroe, 1999; 1991; Espuet, 1991), some observers 
argue that it performs inadequately in its role as a civic actor in contemporary Jamaica. 
Despite its evident popularity, accessibility and presence in Jamaica, the Church has been 
hibernating for more than two decades, overly preoccupied with biblical teaching and 
becoming indifferent to the ills plaguing the society (see The Jamaica Gleaner, 2006, April 
9; The Jamaica Gleaner, 2001, January 19; The Jamaica Gleaner, 2004, August 1). If the 
Church is to fulfil its role as an essential pillar of Jamaican civil society, then it ‘should be 
in solidarity with the nation and therefore must be involved [more actively] with the 
state [and with the social issues and challenges that are of concern to the state]’ (Dick, 
2002: xv).8 Recent appointments of members of the Church community to government 
boards and committees by the Jamaican state suggest that the role of the Church is being 
asserted as an important element of civil society and public governance (The Jamaica 
Observer, 2006, April 2). Impelling the Church into service may help to engender a 
renaissance of civility at all levels of the society. This view finds basis in the pressing 
desire to install enabling values and attitudes within the social domain and a moral 
sensitivity to discussions of public policy (see Ritch, 2006; Boyne, 2006). Further research 
would be required to give strengthen the validity of these claims. 
 
Likewise, the Jamaican media, as media elsewhere in democratic states, play an imposing 
role in organising the images and discourses through which people make sense of the 
world (Dahlgren, 1995). In this regard, mediated representations and discourses are often 
the subject of much debate and controversy in Jamaica. The extensive use of the radio 
talk show to make claims upon the state, issue complaints or to advocate is, for instance, 
                                                 
7 The term ‘the Church’, in its established Jamaican usage, refers to the collective Christian 
presence in the society (see Dick, 2002) 
 
8 For an interesting discussion on the significance of the Church as an element of civil society and 
civic engagement, see Schmidt (2003). 
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set against the intense negativism and abuse of power evident in the medium. It is this 
inclination which challenges its role as a civilizing force in the Jamaican society. For 
instance, former Jamaican Prime Minister, P.J. Patterson maintained that ‘the prevailing 
norms in mass communication facilitate a constant barrage of negativism which serves to 
erode national confidence and self esteem’ (Patterson, 1994).  This is while Munroe 
(1999:94) writes that ‘the media have helped to discredit government and to a lesser 
extent the private sector, often without concern for alternatives, thereby fostering 
tendencies to alienation and anarchy’. It is noteworthy that the television medium has 
also emerged as a powerful tool in popular protest in Jamaica. How television frames 
and/or represents civilian protests as well as the manner in which citizens’ manoeuvre 
within the television spotlight remains an issue of critical public concern (see chapter 7). 
Academic scholarship in this context is, however, yet to account for the role and 
influence of media as a force for civil society. In this study, I tackle this gap in the 
scholarship by looking at the potential and limits of the medium as an avenue of civic 
action.   
 
On the whole, it is fair to reiterate Munroe’s (1999) conclusion that civil society in 
Jamaica appears to be remodelling itself in that it shows elements of renewed vigour in 
the emergence and imposing strength of lobby organisations such as JFJ and the 
increasing use of the radio medium for public talk and complaint. This is even while it 
shows manifest trends of decline, and is yet to produce any noteworthy and discernable 
improvements in civic conduct. It is this conflicting disposition which has contributed to 
declining confidence in civil society’s effectiveness by large sections of the citizenry. This 
decline in confidence in civil society has coincided with a remarkable increase in loosely 
organized, episodic mobilizations and protest. Most, if not all of these demonstrations, are 
directed against the state and hence the nature of the relationship between citizen-
protestors and the Jamaican state is also theoretically salient. I summarize the broad 
contours of this nexus that the study deals with. 
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1.5.3  The State and Civil Society 
The current Jamaican political system is, in the main, a highly consolidated democratic 
regime and the state is widely perceived to be not only tolerant of protests but, in many 
respects, highly accommodating and conciliatory towards citizen participation, broadly 
interpreted (Franklyn, 2002; Munroe, 1999).  In this context, the nature of state power 
and the uses to which it is put within protest politics, as well as the relationship between 
protests/protestors and politicians are central to this analysis. For example, state policy 
and state response to protest politics, including the role of Members of Parliament and 
political party activists, have an enormous influence on the strategies undertaken 
particularly by the poor and marginalised to demand concessions and/or seek redress 
from the state, particularly the resort to violence. For one thing, like the media, the 
nature of state response to citizen protest (variously manifested as non-response, delayed 
response, sham response or state repression) holds far reaching implications for the tenor 
of citizen politics and the consequent quality of civil society (chapters 6 & 9). The acute 
absence of this analysis in current theorizing of contemporary citizen action also robs 
especially lower class groups and those who align themselves with these sectors of the 
wisdom that critical stock taking of their own struggles may provide. It is worth noting 
that the changing nature of the state and the emergence of newly powerful citizen actors 
such as criminals and dons further complicate the state/civil society nexus in Jamaica. 
These dynamic changes are being reproduced within street-level citizen activism and the 
extent to which these developments affect the tenor of civil society is of central 
importance in this study.  
 
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
A study focusing on popular protest, civil society and governance is, for all intents and 
purposes, broad. However, the study is not about the officially recognised organs of civil 
society (Church, media, community organizations, charities, human rights lobbies etc.). I 
only make reference to these bodies for analytical purposes and in as far as they impact 
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upon the conduct and tenor of popular protest, strictly defined9. Popular protest is 
conceptualized in this study as a political strategy or technique of political participation at 
the citizen level and hence construed as a subset of or a manifestation of civil society. The 
term is often used to encompass a wide range of political dissent – symbolic and material.  
However, for the purposes of this study, I use it to refer mainly to direct street-level 
action – marches, blockades (roadblocks), burning debris on roadways, stone-throwing, 
placard-picketing, vandalism, gun battles, looting and boisterous displays (issuing threats, 
screaming, shouting and disrobing) as well as rioting. While the scope of the study 
conceptually precludes such forms of popular protest as industrial action (strikes, go-
slow), I account for the caller-complaint mechanism embodied in talkback radio because 
of its e significance within contemporary protest politics in Jamaica.   
 
In terms of time frame, it is pertinent to note that the main focus is on the contemporary 
manifestations of protest in Jamaica. By contemporary, I mean the period stretching from 
the latter half of the 20th century to 2006, although the study does draw on the historical 
evolution of protest in Jamaica since the 17th and 18th centuries for contextual and 
analytic purposes. It does not examine specific protest incidents per se but instead calls 
attention to particular examples in an attempt to make sense of the overall theme of the 
study – the reality of incivility within the domain of citizen politics and its impact on the 
construction of civil society in the context of Jamaica. 
 
1.7 A NOTE ON METHOD 
An empirical investigation into the character of Jamaican popular protest and the 
meanings and implications it holds for good governance, citizen politics and civil society 
renders this research, of necessity, a qualitative enterprise. Qualitative research 
undertakes studies about ‘persons’ lives, lived experiences, behaviours, emotions and 
feelings as well as about organizational functioning, social movements and cultural 
                                                 
9 See Robotham, D. (1998) ‘Vision and Voluntarism: Reviving Voluntarism in Jamaica’. Grace 
Kennedy Foundation Lecture. Kingston: Grace Kennedy Foundation for an expansive account of 
the evolution of the formal structure and development of civil society in Jamaica. He also discusses 
some of the challenges and struggles over the construction of its moral framework. 
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phenomena’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:11). In this study, this qualitative process required 
that I effectively enter the informants’ world, and through ongoing interaction, solicit 
their ‘perspectives and meanings’ (Creswell, 1994: 161; cf. Creswell, 2003; Myers, 1997; 
Merriam, 2002) on the ways in which they express their discontent about social 
problems, why they elect to conduct their politics the way they do and their reflexive 
feelings about those actions. The study uses multiple research methods – observation, 
interviews, audio-visual materials, documents, and my impressions and reactions. I 
conducted a total of 30 interviews and three focus groups comprising a cross-section of 
Jamaican citizens – the unemployed, gangsters, taxi-drivers, students, human rights 
activists, religious groups, police officers, university lecturers, Members of Parliament, 
reporters, radio talk show hosts and disc jockeys as well as reggae artistes and music 
producers. I employ aspects of structuration theory and discourse analysis in order to 
make sense of popular protest and citizen politics in the Jamaican context. This analytic 
framework acknowledges the role of structure (political and social institutions) in shaping 
political behaviour but extends beyond structure to take stock of individual agency and 
citizen responsibility in shaping the character of civilian politics and the quality of civil 
society (see chapter 3). 
 
1.8 THESIS ORGANIZATION  
There are several critical tasks that this study (through ten chapters) will undertake in 
order to elucidate the nature of protest politics and its effects on citizen politics and civil 
society in Jamaica. The first examines the received portrayal of civil society and attempts 
to invest it with fresh conceptual meaning and socio-political significance. The main 
objective here is to draw attention to a central but often neglected theoretical theme in 
contemporary civil society scholarship: the problem of incivility within the civil sphere 
(Chapter 2). The second attempts to gain crucial insights into contemporary 
manifestations of popular citizen action by examining the historical trajectory of citizen 
activism and civil society in Jamaica through the lens of the slavery resistance movement.  
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The study fills in significant gaps in the historical-political scholarship by taking into 
account the manner in which the Jamaican people organized themselves and mobilized 
politically to confront the oppressive conditions of slavery and post-emancipation socio-
economic conditions viz. a viz. an inflexible colonial administration. It argues that these 
events are to be seen as more than just a precursor to the emergence and formation of 
particular classes of Jamaican citizens with differing levels of power, wealth and status. 
These circumstances also led to the emergence of a variegated public sphere outfitted 
with massive numbers of poor, marginalized and powerless citizens with varying 
responses to their condition and certainly divergent approaches to political protestation 
and negotiation. In this regard, the study asks whether the existing tenor of protest 
politics in Jamaica represents signs of continuity or change (Chapter 4).  
 
Another important element of this study is the interplay between political performance, 
the functioning of citizen politics and the nature of civil society. Within the context of 
the inescapable theoretical interaction between state governance and citizen politics, the 
thesis explores, in Chapter 5, the challenges facing the contemporary state and the extent 
to which it is able (or unable) to provide good governance by sufficiently fulfilling the 
expectations and needs of its citizens. 
  
Analysing the predominant ways in which Jamaican citizens are reacting to the perceived 
failings of their government and their overall marginalized status is the task of Chapter 6. 
Emphasizing dominant political economy of the poor approaches (Gray, 2004; Scott, 
1976; 1985; 1990; Piven & Cloward, 1977) and highlighting the perspectives of Jamaican 
citizens, this chapter examines the circumstances which drive the poor to protest and the 
communion of feelings and attitudes which both justifies and radicalizes their struggles. 
The chapter also explores how the democratic tool of protest may be used to serve 
contradictory ends and how the poor’s seeming quest for justice can depart from genuine 
activism and civil politics, as well as obstruct the building of a real civil society. 
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Of course, contemporary popular protest can hardly be imagined without the sympathetic 
lens of the media to amplify and sustain the message and goals of protestors beyond their 
immediate environment. This intersection between popular protestation and media is 
embedded in the way the media cover protests and portray protestors and how protestors 
perform and manoeuvre themselves to secure their interests within the media spotlight. 
In the context of the political economy of media, including the enormous impact of 
increased competition and the fight for ratings and bolstered by the perspectives of media 
managers, reporters and ordinary citizens, chapter 7 examines the role of the media as a 
communicative intermediary between Jamaican citizen-protestors and the state. By 
exploring the media’s treatment of protest and protestors, including the growing 
importance and use of radio talk back as an avenue of complaint, the chapter illustrates 
how the media can both advance and delimit the goals of protestors.  
 
One of the major planks in this empirical investigation of citizen politics in Jamaica is a 
focus on the revolutionary changes of power at the community level, particularly the role 
of uncivil actors in influencing the conduct and nature of citizen politics (Chapter 8). This 
chapter analyses the emergence and political significance of a network of ‘dons’ and the 
phenomenon of ‘donmanship’ in urban Jamaica. It argues that the conduct and politics of 
dons and the character of the social organization over which they preside is not only the 
embodiment of outlaw community governance but perpetuates an urban subculture 
marked by a normalization of illegal and uncivil behavioural norms, including violent 
mobilisations and protest, and frustrates the development of civil norms and political 
values.  
 
Given that social protest has emerged as the predominant tool by which Jamaican citizens 
raise their concerns, it is important to ask if such protests actually succeed. In order to 
address this, chapter 9 examines how the state acts in response to the demands made 
upon it. Since the fundamental challenge of this study is to balance citizens’ right to 
protest their socio-economic conditions with the negative implications of disruptive 
protests for civil politics and civil society more broadly, the chapter examines how and 
 32
why state response (including the action of political officials – MPs and activists) may 
seemingly legitimize uncivil protest strategies. This chapter, in short, discloses (and 
critically examines) the possibilities and limits of the existing model of protest politics in 
Jamaica. 
 
The study concludes (Chapter 10) with reflections on the viability of uncivil citizen 
politics for the renewal of civil society. Importantly, it also argues for the refashioning of 
current theoretical perspectives to take account of uncivil manifestations and tendencies 
that stand in the way of the development of civil politics and real civil societies. It 
reiterates that a culture of civility also depends as much on the transformation of the state 
(including its own public civility, performance and accountability) as on the intervention 
and participation of the various organs of civil society.  I now take a closer look at current 
and historical theoretical theorising of civil society and the implications this may hold for 
the practice and conduct of civilian politics in Jamaica.   
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CHAPTER 2 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Bringing Back the Civil in Civil Society  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
No society is a shining model of civility. Every civil society, past and present, has 
exhibited tendencies that explicitly challenge the idyllic concept of civil society as a 
haven of openness, non-violence, solidarity and justice (see Boyd, 2004; Keane, 1996; 
Shils, 1992). In fact, in his seminal work, Reflections on Violence, John Keane writes that 
nothing calls attention more to the problem of incivility within contemporary society and 
the potential for disintegration into a totally uncivil society than the bloodletting and 
conflict – wars, genocide, ethnic cleansing, firebombed cities, concentration camps, 
terrorism, gang warfare – that have plagued the twentieth century and announced the 
start of the new millennium (1996:14-19). The threat, fear and reality of violence (and I 
add to this the breakdown in the rule of law and civil values) are acknowledged by Keane 
as extreme forms of incivility which always seem to lurk behind the concern with 
civility, thereby making incivility the ghost that permanently haunts civil society 
(ibid,1996).  
  
The nature and character of civic institutions, including social movements and other 
aspects of citizen politics, is implicated in this indictment on civil society. Yet the 
problem of incivility is almost always overlooked in the contemporary scholarly discourse 
on civil society (see for instance, Putnam, 1995; 1993; Etzioni, 1996; 1995) and by key 
development agencies – United Nations, World Bank, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) – where the presumption is of a liberal and tolerant 
order comprised of public-spirited, altruistic citizens working for the good of all. This 
study acknowledges Keane’s (1996) thesis, which suggests that actually existing civil 
societies have the potential to destroy the very civility upon which their character as civil 
society depends. The premise here is that the normative ideal of civil society is 
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inextricably bound up with various civic attitudes and practices that surround it in our 
lives (Barber, 1998:13; cf. Boyd, 2004; Swift, 1999; Hall, 1995; Shils, 1992; Elias, 1998). 
Our desire for civility must therefore take into account the complexities and ambiguities 
of social agency and human responsibility, specifically those elements that constitute 
incivility within civil society that cause real disruption in the building of a truly civil 
society.  
 
So what exactly do we mean when we use the term civil society? How useful is it to make 
a distinction between civil as opposed to uncivil society? What factors make some 
societies appear more civil than others, and attendant to this, why is the concern with 
this problem of incivility more acute in some societies than in others?  How should we 
make sense of the tendency of some civil societies towards self-destruction? To what 
extent does this predisposition exacerbate anxieties about the quality of citizen politics as 
well as the performance of the democratic state? Can political science scholarship 
continue to pay lip service to this concept without resolving these fundamental 
dilemmas? To begin with, despite civil society’s high standing as a concept in academic 
scholarship, emerging global realities now demand that we interrogate its worth and 
usefulness (Boyd, 2004; Foley & Edwards, 1996; Whitehead, 1997; McIlwaine, 1998; 
Tempest, 1997; Shils, 1992). A theoretical focus on civil society is by no means novel. The 
current predicament, however, stems from confusion over its meaning and mandate, as 
well as disillusionment with its political capabilities and actualization within different 
societies. Benjamin Barber (1998:12) convincingly captures the conceptual commotion 
surrounding this seemingly promiscuous notion: 
So important has civil society become to the conduct of politics that nearly 
everyone has his own notion of what it means. Is there a core conception or 
objective definition that we can agree on? Do not count on social science for an 
answer…. As a political phrase, civil society has both empirical and normative 
meanings. It tells us something about how we actually do behave even as it 
suggests an ideal of how we ought to behave. Efforts to extricate our ideals from 
our actual practices usually end up nullifying the meaning of both. Academic 
political science has all too often been guilty of exactly this kind of nullification.  
 
 35
Attempts to arrive at a suitable theoretical synthesis of civil society have proved to be 
difficult. Indeed as societies evolve and their politics undergo complex and dynamic 
changes, civil society itself undergoes paradigmatic shifts, thereby requiring us to look 
anew at the concept. This research recognises a deficit in the prevailing conceptual 
analyses of civil society – an over-emphasis on the associational constituent of civil 
society and a diminished consideration of the behavioural attitudes and practices, which 
incidentally comprise its name. Boyd (2004), for example, argues persuasively that: 
Focusing on the civil designation of the term civil society, rather than on the 
domain of society, as opposed to the state, may help to mediate [the] conceptual 
confusions about what counts as civil society and why. A better understanding of 
the virtue of ‘civility’ itself and the respect in which any given association [or 
social and political process] is properly speaking ‘civil’ may be the most 
satisfactory criteria to make these determinations [emphasis in original]. 
‘ 
This attempt to de-construct civil society in a way that brings the civil in its name back in 
is crucial. For example, Fine (1997), in a persuasive critique of current civil society 
theory, argues against the reactive privileging of civil society: 
The simple family remedy of identifying civil society with ethical life not only 
avoids confrontation with the uncivil nature of civil society but opens the gates to 
the hunt for the Alien or Other deemed responsible for its ‘deformations’: be it 
the system, politics, the parties, Marxism, consumerism, technology, totalizing 
discourse, and in some nationalistic versions even Jews and foreigners. This is 
why, in the end, contemporary ‘civil society theory’ does not prepare us for the 
violence of civil society but for a ressentiment which knows no peace (Fine, 
1997:25-26).  
 
I go further to suggest that if civil society is to be politically worthwhile in any context, it 
must acknowledge and competently straddle what is clearly its twin role as a social value 
and as a set of actually functioning, participatory social institutions. In other words, civil 
society must embrace both its call for civil conduct and collective engagement. In this 
chapter, I therefore examine the conventional portrayal of civil society and attempt to 
invest it with fresh conceptual meaning and moral significance. My central focus is to 
explore critically the current conceptualization of civil society embracing the notions of 
citizenship, civicness and social capital.  
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My overarching objective is to draw attention to a crucial but often neglected theme: the 
problem of incivility within the civil sphere, particularly in the domain of citizen 
activism and protest. These modes of unconventional political participation are rarely 
extractable from their counterpoint to the state and so I also examine the dynamic nature 
of civil society’s historical relationship with the state and the extent to which civil society 
can serve the requirements of democracy.  An investigation into the everyday social and 
political practices of citizens, particularly the extent to which they are conducive to the 
virtue of civility and civil society is imperative. Such discussions also assume wider 
theoretical significance as they permit valuable insights into the moral dynamics of power 
and social order in contemporary societies. Indeed, at the end of the day, debates about 
civil society lead us to a renewed awareness of the fusion of the moral, the social and the 
political in the constitution of all human communities (Hann & Dunn, 1996:3). 
 
2.2 CIVIL SOCIETY – EARLY DEFINITIONS AND DEPICTIONS  
An extensive scholarship exists, which chronicles the genealogy of civil society (see 
DeWeil, 2000; Hall, 1995; Cohen & Arato, 1992; Seligman, 1992; Keane, 1988a; 1988b) 
and so I will avoid a detailed historical account10. Rather, my preoccupation here will be 
the extent to which the early idea of civil society, at least since the Scottish 
Enlightenment, accounts for the possibility of incivility within the so-called civil sphere. 
Civil society arrives in historical thought as an apparent source of goodness – founded on 
rights, associations, the public sphere and normative assumptions (Cohen & Arato, 1992; 
Pietrzyk, 2001). Early writings on the subject from the mid-eighteenth century seem 
                                                 
10 Civil society has its roots in the classical political philosophy of Aristotle (who is credited with 
the first usage of the term) and later within the Enlightenment tradition (1750-1850) which 
emerged alongside the rise of Western capitalism and liberalism. John Locke, as well as the 
Enlightenment philosophers such as Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, 
Hume and Kant contributed to its early celebrity.  The Aristotelian tradition links civil society and 
the state as one entity and focuses almost entirely on the character of human nature and how it 
may be tamed (by the state). This is while the Enlightenment acknowledges civil society and the 
state as separate or independent realms and is generally preoccupied with the stability of the social 
order. It is important to note that post-Enlightenment writers such as Hegel and Marx positioned 
civil society as a staunch critique of bourgeois society.   
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geared towards reconciling with this normative goodness while attempting to regulate its 
potential badness, that is, its potential to become uncivil. In fact, the anxiety throughout 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was about how to create and sustain a self-
governing social order and proper or fitting conduct among and between individuals and 
groups. Indeed, the very notion of civil society acquired new fillip by virtue of attempts 
to propagate a new code of manners within civil society and establish cultures of decency 
and civility in societies where it had most conspicuously been absent (see Hall, 1995; Shils 
1992; Elias, 1988).  
 
This obsession with preserving order in society coincides with a negative view of human 
nature – given to what some saw as egoistic passions and innate liberty (see DeWeil, 
2000). Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, for instance, expresses severe pessimism about human 
nature, especially when divorced from the social unit of civil society. The condition of 
mankind outside the civil sphere was, for Hobbes, a state of nature where the character of 
life was entirely uncivilized. In his famous phrase, there was only ‘War, where every man 
is Enemy to every man…. And the life of man, solitary, nasty, brutish and short’ 
(Leviathan, 1651 in Flathman & Johnston, 1997; cf. DeWeil, 2000:14).  In other words, it 
would appear that civil society was the hypnotic required to tame the savage beast in 
human nature and to save man from himself. At the same time, however, it became clear 
that the political community that Aristotle conceptualized as ethical, free and equal, was, 
in actuality, exhibiting serious ills – inequalities, divisions and conflict – thereby exposing 
civil society’s less blissful qualities. There is theoretical acknowledgement of civil 
society’s inherent ambivalence manifested in the emergence of a Habermasian view of 
civil society as a predominantly ‘bourgeois’ public sphere that was wealthy, masculine 
and white – and the discord and inequalities attending the modern division of labour (see 
Habermas, 1989; Keane, 1988a; Fraser, 1997;  Fine, 1997; Held, 1996; DeWiel, 2000).It 
was the anxiety over such a political reality, which necessitated a system of rules to 
regulate behaviour and guarantee peace and self-preservation.  
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Hobbes’s civil society was tantamount to the state and its laws. The dramatic contrast 
between inequality, violence and civil society justified the need for a strong, powerful 
state that would foster cooperative enterprise and peace within society (Keane, 1996; 
1998b). Hobbes clearly placed little faith in the associations of civil society as we know it, 
seeing them as the foremost limiting condition on the political order. Boyd (2004:57) 
argues that the groups that most bedevil Hobbes fall into the category of ‘what we might 
consider today to be the archetype of a modern voluntary association ranging all the way 
from private clubs or religious congregations to political demonstrations, militias or street 
gangs’. The political problem, Boyd maintains, is to determine which one of these 
potentially dangerous groups should be classed as ‘lawful’ or ‘unlawful’ (ibid, 2004:57). By 
Boyd’s thesis, Hobbes’s innate pessimism about groups is tied to the broader conflicts he 
envisioned between associational liberty and sovereign power. I will discuss in further 
detail later the evolution of this (adversarial) relationship between civil society and 
sovereign state power and the implications for citizen politics.  
 
Suffice to say, however, that finding and preserving a role for the state in the context of 
the construction of a civil society is a fundamental preoccupation of modern political 
thought. For Hobbes, civil society can only flourish within the context of a strong state. 
This is while Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as Ferguson, Locke and Kant, argue 
for a view more in line with the contemporary vision of liberal democracy – a (weaker) 
state whose role is not to replace the state of nature but to protect individual rights and 
freedoms (DeWiel, 2000; Pietrzyk, 2001; Keane, 1988a; Simmons, 1997). The fundamental 
challenge here to balance the right of the citizen to act individually (giving account of his 
or her liberty) even while s/he is positioned socially (within a social contract) and 
bounded by the state and rule of law (Keane, 1988a). Confronting early civil society 
theorists was also the effect of modern capitalism on the theoretical portrayal of civil 
society. I briefly draw on the perspective of Adam Ferguson as it is his vision of 
civilization as both progress and decorum, which assumes precedence in the Anglo-Saxon 
elucidation and eventual monopolization of what constitutes a civil (civilized) society.  
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2.2.1 Civilization as Civility? 
Whereas for the early philosophers, politics was the sum of civility, and the state was the 
source of social cohesion and order in society, for the emerging modern nationalists, civil 
society was also a non-political, self-organized order with its own rules aside from those 
imposed by the state and symbolized the natural development of each society (DeWeil, 
2000). It is this new vision of civil society as unique to each polity that represents one of 
the defining accomplishments of the Scottish Enlightenment. Adam Ferguson (1723-
1816) is perhaps the first political thinker to make a critical distinction between various 
cultures and peoples. However, his theoretical and philosophical conceptualization of the 
term civilization effectively ranks societies hierarchically according to their level of 
material, social and economic progress or more precisely their civilization.  De Weil 
(2000:19) puts it with Fergusonian candour when he says the ‘principal pursuits [of 
nations] diversify their manners as well as their establishments’.  
 
Modern commercialism, including the development of private property and 
industrialization was furthermore, if problematically, added by Ferguson (along with his 
Anglo-Scottish contemporaries – Smith, Hegel and Hume) to the gauge by which to 
measure civility and civilization. To be civil was therefore to be not only mannerly but 
also wealthy, educated and industrialized. By this token, the Anglo-Scottish thinkers felt 
that under certain conditions, civility and productivity are mutually reinforcing:  
As civility develops, society becomes more orderly. This order encourages 
productivity by creating interdependence and cooperation. Through the division 
of labour, productivity flourishes and society prospers both in its wealth and 
cultural refinement. The more civil a society, the more orderly and wealthy it can 
become’ (DeWiel, 2000, 99-100 paraphrasing Adam Smith; cf. Pietrzyk, 2001).  
 
This economic rationalization resonates today in much of the literature on development, 
which suggests that economic progress will be stifled without social stability and civil 
society (UNDP, 1997) and conversely that social problems such as crime, poverty and 
unemployment cannot be resolved without sustained economic growth. As Keane 
(1996:20) argues, Ferguson’s civilization thus establishes a continuum of progress from 
‘rudeness [otherwise termed primitive barbarism] to refinement in which civil society is 
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understood as a polished and refined form of society with regular government and 
political subordination’ (Keane, 1996:20).  Specifically, if economic well-being is crucial 
to the making and unmaking of civil society, and not all governments are able to exhibit 
the economic capabilities necessary to serve civil society, then ought this idealized notion 
be expected of all societies? Ferguson’s thesis also begs answers to other critical questions: 
Is a society whose government fails to produce economic wealth and displays attributes 
opposed to Ferguson’s measure of civilization – poverty, illiteracy, violence and political 
instability – necessarily uncivil? Can the assumption of civilization neglect the historical, 
structural and institutional factors, which have undermined the progress of some 
societies? Indeed, could it not be argued that it is the coercive contact with so-called 
civilised Europe, which unleashed unprecedented violence on the ‘primitive other’, 
which has contributed to many of the problems these societies face today?  
 
Ferguson’s thesis does demonstrate that the socio-political and historical conditions that 
give rise to civil society will not be the same everywhere but his fundamental 
prerequisites for the realization of civilization appears to be based on a narrow and elitist 
view of the Anglo-Saxon experience and is therefore suspect. This is not to say that the 
whole notion of progress, particularly the ability of states to generate economic growth 
and to feed, house and protect their citizenry is not mandatory to the survival of civil 
society but assessments of the quality and character of the political community cannot 
hinge on this alone. Modern capitalism has apparently brought economic wealth to some 
societies but not the social and ethical community that Aristotle envisioned as civil 
society. Self-interest, a loss of public spirit or the ‘disinterested love of the public’, 
represented for Ferguson the most expressed manifestation of civic decline. It is this 
emphasis on the fundamental tension and contradiction between the selfish goals of 
individual actors, intrinsic inequalities, divisions and conflict and the need for some basic 
collective solidarity in a moral community that underscores one of the essential dilemmas 
preoccupying much of the historical analysis of civil society (see Fine, 1997; Keane, 
1988a:51).  
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Indeed, modern capitalism exacerbates these problems by partly fostering the stark 
inequalities among citizens as well as deep-rooted discrimination against women, the 
working class, foreigners and the poor. The failure to question the high price of liberty is 
also problematic. This is because, as DeWeil (2000) rightly argues, freedom has the 
potential to approach a kind of lawlessness, even savagery. It is in fact this recognition of 
the potential for what maybe called negative liberty that focuses early analytic attention 
on how to create and maintain order in civil society. For Keane (1988a:52), the rationale 
is apparent – ‘civil society cannot remain ‘civil’ unless it is ordered politically and /or 
subjected to the higher surveillance of the state (Keane, 1988a:52). It was also this 
preoccupation with ‘excess’ freedom that led Hobbes to install a more or less 
authoritarian state – highly visible and well-armed whose function was to permanently 
order and pacify warring, contentious, acquisitive individuals (Hobbes, 1651 in Flathman 
& Johnston, 1997; Keane, 1988a).   
 
Of course, the current concern with social order and civility, as I argue later in this study, 
must also consider the violence often perpetrated by the state and the frequency with 
which some are dogged by incivility. It is also worthy of note, however, that the 
commitment to social stability forms a fundamental aspect of civil society’s normative 
agenda but it is an objective which cannot be accomplished by any means necessary. This 
is because it erroneously elevates violence as the singular obstacle to the building of a 
truly civil society and neglects the equally essential element of ‘civic virtue’ – active 
participation by ‘public-spirited’ citizens committed to the social order. I now look at the 
current reading of civil society prevalent in scholarship and political debates to see how 
far it advances the theoretical discussion on the contemporary character of citizen 
politics. 
 
2.3 RE-INVENTING CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CONTEMPORARY VERSION 
REVISITED 
A certain degree of frustration and polemic often attend the contemporary intellectual 
pursuit of civil society and this particular study is not exempt. Many scholars engaged in 
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discussions and analyses of civil society quickly recognize its contorted theoretical 
complexion and are likely to agree that it is: 
like trying to pin multi-coloured jelly to a wall; difficult to see in its totality 
because we are all made colour blind by our own ways of looking at the world, 
while its fluid composition makes the concept hard to grasp’ (Fowler, 1996, 
quoted in Swift, 1999:13).  
 
That it is a ‘conceptual ragbag’ (Swift, 1999:01) even drives some investigators, irritated 
by its complexities and contradictions, to question the utility of the notion altogether, 
reducing it to a mere slogan and effectively dismissing it, in Marxian terms, as fraudulent 
and redundant, seductive but ultimately specious (Kumar, 1993). Keane (2004), for 
example, talks about the ‘multimodality and paradox of civil society’. This is while other 
scholars (Obadare, 2005; Boyd, 2004; Whitehead, 1997; Tester, 1992) all expound on the 
moral ambivalence of civil society. At the same time, no other concept has managed to 
capture the imagination of democratic scholars everywhere than civil society. Its 
intrinsic, albeit primitive power is acknowledged not only as a ‘shining emblem’ (Gellner, 
1994:1) but as part of the ‘magic’ and ‘hurrah’ (ibid, 1994) of democracy, especially given 
its extraordinary impact on the democratic transitions which have taken place in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America since the 1980s11.  At present, the international donor 
community maintains a hyped view of civil society as the source of people empowerment 
while the concept is becoming increasingly ubiquitous in development studies, and 
analyses of political democratization as well as efforts to gauge the health of established 
democracies. Due to its variegated history and the current attempt to ground it within 
different historical, political, economic and geographical circumstances, civil society 
carries myriad construal in scholarship.  
 
                                                 
11 The impact of civil society on political democratization was powerfully demonstrated in Eastern 
Europe in 2004 when thousands of Ukrainian citizens staged weeks of peaceful but systematic 
protests against what they felt was rigged Presidential Elections. Thanks to non-violent ‘people-
power’, Ukraine’s Supreme Court was forced to intervene and, in a landmark decision, voted to 
nullify the results of the elections and call for a fresh vote (see Time, Europe Edition, 2004, 
November 28). 
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Commonly understood, it is ‘the (public) space between the market (a non-state privately 
controlled or voluntarily organized realm) and the state (military, policing, legal, 
administrative, productive and cultural organs)’ (Keane, 1988a:1). This idea of a public 
space resonates with the thinking of the Scottish Enlightenment and particularly that of 
Alexis de Tocqueville who fastened civil society to associationalism. Civil society thus 
came to denote the existence of a vast collection of institutions (the church, independent 
mass media, community and/or action groups, voluntary organizations, professional, 
cultural and philanthropic associations, non-governmental organizations and citizen 
cooperatives). Civil society therefore rests on a complex of coordinated activities beyond 
the direct control of the state such as ‘voluntarism, charity, community organizing, 
grassroots activity, advocacy, representation, citizen engagement and service delivery’ 
(Swift, 1999: 5). The modern interpretation of civil society thus reflects the capacity and 
willingness of citizens to organize voluntarily at various levels to make the formal bodies 
of the state adopt policies and undertake initiatives consonant with their perceived 
interests. In short, civil society seeks from the state concessions, benefits, policy changes, 
relief, redress or accountability (Diamond, 1994; McIlwaine, 1998; Pietrzyk, 2001).  
 
Given that this study is about the nature of some aspects of this citizen activity and the 
manner in which they are undertaken in Jamaica, I lean towards this highly sociological 
variant of civil society because it is essentially a declaration of society organizing itself. It 
also rejects the over-reliance or dependency on the state by citizens and instead treats 
civil society as an activity in its own right, which is not reducible to the economic 
structure and merely separated institutionally from (but not necessarily designed to 
contest) the state (Pietrzyk, 2001). I will elaborate further on the kind of relationship that 
state and civil society ought to foster if interaction between both entities is to be 
beneficial when I look more closely at the role and character of the state viz. a. viz. civil 
society in Chapter 5. Usually, because the composition and character of civil society is 
taken as a given, issues relating to the constituents of civil society are rarely up for debate. 
It is thus significant to note that the Tocquevillean elucidation of civil society shows 
partiality towards the presence of a dense network of politically-efficacious citizens. 
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These citizens are charged with promoting ‘the stability and effectiveness of the 
democratic polity through both the effects of association on citizens’ ‘habits of the heart’ 
and the ability of associations to mobilize citizens on behalf of public causes’ (Foley & 
Edwards, 1996:38; cf. Putnam, 2000; 1993; 1995).  Beyond the official or recognized social 
assemblages and groupings, therefore, I also include as indicative of civil society 
‘networks and relationships, which may or may not crystallize into [formal] groups but 
which nevertheless connect individuals together in some non-coercive, reciprocally 
purposive manner’ (Munroe, 1999:78). This expanded depiction is remarkably compelling 
as it effectively captures all forms of social interaction and takes into account the whole 
notion of informality, that is,  the ‘vast arrays of often uninstitutionalised and hybrid 
social activities and ‘modes of struggle and expression’ (Bayat, 1997:55) that are deeply 
embedded in local communities. Much of the political participation undertaken by 
Jamaican citizens takes place within the ambit of this latter characterization, a 
theoretically compelling occasion for civil society scholarship to begin to account for 
these types of informal activities and groupings. Popular protest, particularly street 
demonstrations and roadblocks in Jamaica, for instance, finds conceptual place under the 
rubric of what Cohen & Arato (1992) refers to as ‘non-institutional collective action’.  
 
By virtue of this, protest activity in this context may or may not involve a dense network 
of citizens, formally organized and carrying a reliable membership such as that of the 
feminist and environmental movements. Yet, its dramatic, consistent modes of expression 
and collective ethos means that it cannot be divorced from the context and 
transformations in citizen politics as well as the very appearance and logic of civil society. 
In short, popular protest is not simply a political tool used by new social movements to 
achieve their various objectives but also a mode of struggle and expression portraying 
distinctive characteristics. Paradoxically, like social movements, protests are perceived as 
an abnormality, variously described as anomic, fragmented and irrational (Cohen & 
Arato, 1992) and do not fit comfortably in the otherwise normative, integrated, focused, 
democracy-enhancing vision of civil society. As I alluded to in the introduction and will 
argue throughout this study, popular protest in contexts such as Jamaica emerge, in part, 
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as a direct consequence of the failure and inadequacies of the institutions of interest 
mediation embodied in civil society. In Foweraker’s (1995:10) words, ‘since interest 
groups and political parties no longer respond to popular demands, social movements 
[including popular protest] arise to press these demands’12.  
 
The commonly accepted Tocquevillean characterization of civil society as a purely 
associational sphere (see for e.g. Putnam, 2000; 1993; 1995) also neglects to direct close 
attention to the potential of collectivities of citizens engaged in actions that are, in his 
own words, not necessarily ‘religious’ or ‘moral’ but, possibly, concretely ‘immoral’ or 
‘illegal’. Indeed, as Swift (1999: 6) argues: 
If by definition, civil society incorporates a miscellany of groupings and a 
diversity of social forces and interactions, then unequivocally it also includes 
fascists, terrorists, racketeers, criminal elements as well as individuals and groups 
committed to democracy and the much fancied neighbourhood organizations.  
 
In other words, despite civil society’s commitment to the democracy project and the 
common good, we cannot presuppose that it is ‘an unalloyed force for Good’ (Swift, 
1999:16; cf. Obadare, 2005; Boyd, 2004; Whitehead, 1997; Tester, 1992). Recent 
contributions to the civil society debate grapple with its highly generalized, catch-all 
definition and contested nature, with some scholars positing that the current scholarly 
and political usage unavoidably calls the very notion of civil society into question (Swift, 
1999; Foley & Edwards, 1996; Diamond, 1994; McIlwaine, 1998). Indeed, it would appear 
that all definitions of civil society require the following caveat: an overly broad 
categorization is problematic especially in light of the fact that there is little precise 
agreement as to which groups it should ideally represent.  
 
                                                 
12 For an expansive theoretical discussion on the intersections between popular protest, social 
movements and civil society, see Cohen, J. & Arato, A. (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. (Refer to chapter 10 – ‘Social Movements and Civil Society’). See also 
Foweraker, J. (1995) Theorizing Social Movements. London: Pluto Press.   
 
 46
But if civil society is therefore not to be all things to all people, then it must re-invent 
itself in a way which captures both the civil and society dimensions of its name. It is 
crucial, for instance, to retain an emphasis on, inter alia, the legality of its actions for a 
group to be deemed to function within civil society. The theoretical basis for such an 
argument finds clear groundings within Lockean Social Contract theory. For its principal 
proponent, John Locke, to be a member of a particular community is to have a prima facie 
obligation to obey its laws (see earlier discussion, section 2.2). Smith (1996:43) maintains 
that ‘our acceptance of the benefits of a civil society as indicated by our continuing to live 
in the society, using its institutions (such as courts), voting in elections, shows that we 
have accepted the social contract’ (cf. Simmons, 1993). I therefore find useful Philippe 
Schmitter’s (quoted in Whitehead, 1997:100; Munroe, 1999: 78) working definition of 
civil society, which situates it as a set or system of self-organized intermediary groups 
that: 
(1) Are relatively independent of public authorities and private units of production 
such as firms and families. 
 
(2) Are capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions in 
defence/promotion of their interests or passions but [as a matter of course]  
 
(3) do not seek to replace state agents or private (re)producers or to accept 
responsibility for the polity as a whole but  
 
(4) do agree to act within pre-established rules of a ‘civil’ or legal nature [my 
emphasis].  
 
This notion of civil society not only emphasizes the functional collaborative element of 
civil society (points 1 & 2) but also weighs in on the conduct of its members and the 
character of their activity (points 3 & 4).  Civil society is therefore much more than the 
capacity of citizens to freely organize themselves into groups to take action compatible to 
their interests but an arena where political efficacy is cultivated and positive values are 
encouraged and exhibited (Hall, 1995; Barber, 1998; Diamond, 1994).  
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Rather than a simple unit, civil society is, in effect, a compound property which rests on 
conditions or norms of autonomy, collective action, non-usurpation and civility 
(Whitehead, 1997:100). I draw particular attention on the notions of non-usurpation and 
civility because very few contemporary interpretations of civil society pay attention to 
their implications. Based on the prerequisites outlined in Schmitter’s elucidation of civil 
society, usurpation would refer to a political situation in which there is an attempt by 
independent network(s) of citizens to compete with and/or attempt to oust the state from 
its position of power. Potentially, this is in order to take full control of the governorship 
of the polis. Such a political condition, without doubt, is in radical contradiction to the 
theoretical construction of civil society. To the extent that a group seeks to supplant the 
state or other competitors and rejects the rule of the law and the higher authority of the 
state, it is not a component of civil society. Rather, it may do great damage to democratic 
aspirations (Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Munroe, 1999; Diamond, 1994). Therefore, 
whereas vigorous collective action and political negotiation are fundamental elements of 
civil society, anarchism, violence and incivility do not appear to have a place in a 
genuine construct.  
 
My reference to civility here is not necessarily as restrictive as Schmitter’s who 
effectively constrains citizen conduct only within ‘pre-established rules’ (Whitehead, 
1997:100), but rather takes into account a more exhaustive dimension of public civility 
based on behaviour within and by groups. Shils (1992:5) maintains that people’s ‘good or 
poor manners in their immediate dealings with other persons make a difference in the 
quality of daily life of the members of the society but they are not directly important in 
politics’. At the same time, Stone (1992) argues that (public) norms of behaviour 
generally have as their motivational sources values and attitudes. ‘Values are general 
guidelines which define what is important, worthwhile and worth striving for’ while 
‘norms set rules of behaviour designed to express a commitment to a society’s underlying 
values’ (Stone, 1992:1). Values are important because they are internalized, that is, they 
are driven by the agency within the individual and enforced through guilt and self-
control whereas norms must rely on external sanctions.  
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In other words, people are more likely to follow public norms when there are social and 
legal consequences for their compliance or disobedience (Hechter & Horne, 2003).  To 
render any social grouping uncivil therefore demands an appraisal of its values, attitudes, 
behavioural norms, and in light of this study’s focus on citizen politics, the character of 
its civic engagement. It is the latter which critically challenges and complicates the 
traditional definition of civil society. Indeed, this study recognises that actors in civil 
society can participate in both civil and uncivil actions. It also acknowledges that 
otherwise civil actors may, for a variety of reasons, feel compelled to act in uncivil ways. 
These actors, in my view, are not outside civil society. For example, citizens confronted 
with the denial of social justice often feel compelled to behave uncivilly. This, I believe, 
should not condemn them automatically to being cast out of civil society. So by 
renewing focus on the uncivil, some contemporary scholars (Obadare, 2005; Boyd, 2004; 
Whitehead, 1997; Tester, 1992) have begun to recognise the complexities and 
contradictions inherent in current understandings of civil society. This study builds on 
this work by recognising such ambivalence and by suggesting that civil society theory 
account for these ambiguities in contemporary political and social contexts.  
 
The table I delineate in the following section may help us to navigate, at least in broad 
terms, the boundaries between civil and uncivil society. This classification relies on the 
preceding discussion as well as the work of scholars such as Boyd (2004); Barber (1998), 
Diamond (1994), Putnam (1993:1995), Swift (1999), Whitehead (1997); Fine (1997) and 
Foley & Edwards (1996). I will use this framework to help elaborate theoretically on the 
character of civil society broadly understood as well as its existing manifestation in 
contexts such as Jamaica. 
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2.3.1 Characterizing Contemporary Civil Society 
Table 2.1  Positive and Negative Features of  Civil Society 
Characteristics of a ‘Civil’ Context Characteristics of an ‘Uncivil’ Context 
A certain degree of social/political cohesion exists 
among citizens. 
 
Civil liberties (freedom of assembly, expression, 
movement) are permitted and fully utilized. 
 
Citizens participate collectively in public affairs, 
take active interest in public issues. 
 
 
Citizens regard the authority of the state and are 
not inclined to supplant it. 
 
 
Citizens are kind, respectful, trustful and tolerant, 
display/support positive values and attitudes.  
 
Citizens generally adhere to the law.  
 
 
 
Unequal relations may exist in society but 
disadvantaged/marginalized sectors or groups are 
represented.  
 
Extensive social/political cleavages prevail. 
 
 
Civil liberties are either severely restricted or 
non-existent. 
 
Citizens rarely participate in associations, 
initiatives or projects and are more concerned 
with their own self-interest. 
 
The legitimacy of the state is constantly under 
threat as citizens undertake aggressive anti-state 
actions. 
 
Citizens display unkind, cruel behavioural  
tendencies and negative values and attitudes. 
 
Illegal / unlawful behaviour and activities 
(criminal violence, corruption, extortion, drug 
trafficking) are widespread. 
 
Unequal/ divisive relations exist among groups 
and the disadvantaged basically fall through the 
cracks (neglected). 
 
 
While this conceptualization of the characteristics of a civil and an uncivil society appears 
to be relatively straightforward, the boundaries between both sets of characteristics are 
often hazy and imperfect. It is important to acknowledge, however, that attributes found 
in contexts deemed as civil do not preclude their existence in social settings that are in 
clear contravention of some of the fundamental tenets of civil conduct and/or practices.  
At the same time, on this continuum of civil and uncivil society, contexts broadly 
satisfying the above criteria will nevertheless do so to differing degrees. This means that 
while none will achieve the highest level of civility, it is possible for some civil spheres to 
so deteriorate as to show evidence tantamount to what Keane (1996) calls a ‘totally 
uncivil society’. Indeed by Keane’s (1996) thesis, the presence of widespread violence 
without doubt pushes a society closer to the uncivil end of the spectrum. On the other 
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hand, social cleavage and civic disengagement, though characterized as attributes of an 
uncivil society, can lie somewhere on the margin of a civil and a less-civil society as the 
manifestations are present across all societies. My idea here, however, is to outline the 
characteristics that may demonstrate a tendency to civility or incivility. In other words, 
where certain variables extend beyond a particular level or where a society demonstrates 
ubiquitous negative attributes, it may ultimately render itself uncivil.  
 
I however lodge a caveat. The above table, although offering broad theoretical 
indications, is not a specific criterion to be used to measure the civility or incivility of 
democratic polities everywhere. It is rather a general guideline, which should be helpful 
in coming to terms with the real nature of civil societies and to possibly gauge the levels 
of incivility or uncivil practices in different political contexts. It is also worthy of note 
here that the delineation of grades of distinction among civil and less civil societies has a 
great deal to do with political culture and democratic customs, including norms of 
behaviour and political attitudes. Part of my concern in this study is to determine 
whether these elements only become extremely negative and problematic during periods 
of unusually intense conflict, crisis and strain (Diamond et. al, 1990) or are effectively 
normalized or normalizing elements of a society. For example, as we will see in the case 
of Jamaica, civil and uncivil characteristics not only coexist in the same societal space, 
albeit at varying degrees, but appear to actively compete for dominance (cf. Gray, 2004; 
Munroe, 1999). The weaknesses of civil society and the dangers posed by various forms of 
incivility are generally evident among particular groups within the civil sphere in many 
democracies, old and new (Boyd, 2004; Munroe, 1999; Keane, 1996; Shils, 1992).  
 
Munroe (1999:79) contends that the activities of many of Jamaica’s informal people 
(unemployed, street hustlers, squatters, vendors) ‘skirt the boundaries of civil and lawful 
behaviour’. Others, including active criminal gangs, participate in small as well as large-
scale illegal activities including drug trafficking, robberies, extortion, fraud and murder 
(Johnson, 2005; Gray, 2004; Harriott, 2000; 2003; Charles, 2002; 2003). The uncivil 
encroachments of this lumpenproletariat are not new. Neither is it exclusive to Jamaica.  
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It is worthy of note that  even some so-called law-abiding citizens also, at times, engage 
in ‘antisocial forms of individualism and group organization [such as violent street 
protests] that substitute for, or even seek to subvert, the forms of civil associationalism 
[and democratic goals] celebrated by theorists of civil society’ (Whitehead, 1997:96).  
They also often contribute to the widespread consumption and trafficking of narcotics 
and other acts of deviance plaguing many societies.  
 
In examining the survival strategies and resistance routines of the informal people in 
parts of the Middle East, Asef Bayat (1997:2000) was struck by the manner in which a 
new and more autonomous way of living, functioning and organising the community was 
in the making, Using metropolitan Iran as a frame of reference, he argues that the urban 
poor have become a collective force by virtue of their way of life which engenders 
common interests and the need to defend those interests. He coined the term ‘quiet 
encroachment’ to describe this way of life as a ‘silent, patient, protracted and pervasive 
advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in an effort to survive 
hardships and better their lives (Bayat, 1997: 57). Since criminal groups and social 
deviants are also a collective force with common interests and often a common political 
agenda, the values and political attitudes they espouse and through which their behaviour 
is conditioned are such that their practices and politics must also be scrutinized as an 
aspect of the uncivilness of the civil sphere. The rationale is that unlike organized 
workers or students, the vast networks of informal people represent groups in flux and 
structurally operate outside institutional mechanisms such as factories, schools and civil 
associations through which they can express grievance and enforce demands (Bayat, 1997; 
2000; Piven & Cloward, 1977; Scott, 1976; 1985).  
 
This attention to a lack of institutional capacities on the part of people on the margins 
signifies a deficit of what may be called bargaining capacity. In other words, these folks 
lack the power what Piven & Cloward (1977:25) see as the power of ‘disruption’. This is 
simply the application of a negative sanction such as the power to go on strike or the 
withdrawal of some crucial contribution on which others depend, a natural resource for 
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exerting power on others. While highly instructive, this conceptualization renders groups 
that fall outside official or formal collectivities as fluid and powerless, albeit agentic. 
Specifically, it ignores the presence and authority of influential groupings such as 
criminal gangs and (Mafia) dons (also called area leaders), who are a notable part of the 
informal sphere in many developing and developed countries and engage in aggressive 
political acts such as the stage-managing of hostile protests and demonstrations and 
participating in criminal activities (murder, extortion, vigilantism). It is these alternative 
sources of power, which, to my mind, translate into bargaining rights – Piven & 
Cloward’s (1977:24) ‘power of disruption’.  
 
It is for this reason, as I shall argue in this study, that the subsistence ethic alone cannot 
account for the nature of citizen politics in the context of Jamaica. Nonetheless, extra-
legal practices, although outside the boundaries of the normative view of civil society (see 
Table 2.1), assumes relevance by finding theoretical context within discussions of peasant 
resistance, social empowerment and the survival tactics of the poor (Scott, 1976; 1985; 
1990; 1998; Bayat, 1997; 2000; Gray 2004). Such arguments are remarkably useful in 
understanding the nature of the informal sphere but they ignore the grave consequences 
of violence and illegal behaviour for social stability and the rule of law and do not help in 
expanding our understanding of what is required for civilized governance. In other 
words, whereas the reality of chronic unemployment, external debt burdens and soaring 
inflation exacerbates Jamaica’s social condition and drives illegal activity, economically 
reductive arguments should not assume precedence over or obliterate the relevance of 
taking greater stock of political values, social attitudes and behavioural norms. Of course, 
this is not to say that more economically robust societies, boasting strong civil societies 
and sound democracies are exempt from the emergence/ proliferation of uncivil actors 
with anti-democratic goals and activity.  
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These ‘uncivil interstices’ assume many forms although Whitehead (1997:96) identifies 
the Mafia, which has its origins in Italy 13 as the most globally recognized symbol of this 
‘flourishing of incivility’. The Mafia aside, there is growing anxiety regarding the 
increasing incidents of sheer criminality and street violence within so-called sensitive 
locales of the post-industrial polyarchies of France, Britain and the United States. Indeed, 
this suggests that the weaknesses of civil society are no longer confined within 
conventional Third World settings and the impact of criminality on civic associationalism 
and civil society, more broadly, is of more than passing political significance. This 
recognition opens up the proverbial can of worms at the heart of this study: Can uncivil 
actors and forms of association belong in an interpretation of civil society that demands a 
more intimate examination of legality, civility and tolerance, which some scholars 
(Barber, 1984; 1998; Hall, 1995; Putnam, 2000; Whitehead, 1997) cite as an indispensable 
part of its civic and political culture?  
 
The established view in the scholarship on civil society (see Barber, 1998) assumes that all 
citizens have automatic membership in civil society, but this does not guarantee that all 
and sundry will abide by the rules governing the polity. Is there a civic boundary that 
might be drawn? The reality is that modern (jurisdictional) citizenship, under the guise of 
universality14 and inclusivism, has effectively admitted a category of ‘uncivil citizens or 
persons enjoying political rights but not submitting themselves to the constraints imposed 
by ‘civil society’, [among which] must surely include a requirement of civility’ 
                                                 
13 The term Mafia not only refers to the Italian organized crime families, embodied in the Costra 
Nostra, Ndrangheta Calabrion and Napoli Camorra but also to the more generalized and broader 
connotation of organized criminal activity, taking place globally.   
 
14 Benjamin Barber argues that if the idea of open citizenship is not to become a one-way door 
through which undesirables are continuously ejected, it must be conditioned by the premise of 
biological universality. In his thesis, grounded on strong democracy, the exclusion of  particular 
sets or classes of human beings from potential membership in the polity because they do not 
conform to a prior standard is not permitted. He, however, admits that the procedural conception 
of citizenship, which has a welcome openness and dynamism, is subject to certain dangers. Of 
course, one of the fundamental dangers is the inclusion of sets of citizens who contribute very 
little or whose actions are inimical to civil society. See Barber, B. (1984) Strong Democracy: 
Participatory Politics for a New Age. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Refer to Chapter 
9 – ‘Citizenship as Community: Politics as Social Being’. 
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(Whitehead, 1997: 95). Indeed, based on the delineation of the negative and positive 
features of a civil society in Table 2.1 above, adherence to the rule of law and to norms of 
respect, kindness and tolerance, are critical constituents of a civil context. Given, 
however, the obvious divergence between what Whitehead (1997:96) reasons is ‘our 
inclusive view of citizenship and our tacitly more restrictive view of the requirements of 
civil society’, the line between civil and uncivil actors may increasingly become blurred. 
After all, ‘human nature is compound; it is potentially both benign and malevolent, both 
cooperative and antagonistic’ (Barber, 1984:215; cf. Boyd, 2004). In this regard, a closer 
look at the construction of citizenship and the role of the citizen in civil society should 
help in differentiating between the actors and actions committed to civility and civil 
society and those inimical to it. 
 
2.4 CIVIC VIRTUE, CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL SOCIETY.  
Adam Ferguson, in his seminal work, An Essay on the history of Civil Society, (1767: 51) 
proclaims that: 
No system of laws, either of political or of natural laws itself can preserve a 
political society. Without the maintenance of civic virtue, the strength and 
vitality of political community can be easily eroded. Even the best political 
institutions are not a sufficient device to maintain liberty of individuals: the 
liberties they enjoy cannot be long preserved, without vigilance and activity on 
the part of the subject….      
 
By virtue of Ferguson’s claim, the rule of law, while fundamental, is not a sufficient 
condition for the health of civil society and the defence of civil liberties. Indeed, the very 
definition, if not stability, of civil society hinges on active fellowship among citizens. At 
the same time, the argument for citizenship demands journeying beyond its traditional 
legal and national definitions to give greater prominence to the role of civic activity, in 
essence, the duties and obligations of the citizen (Deaken, 2001; Putnam, 1993; Barber, 
1984). There is consensus as Putnam (1993:87) suggests that ‘citizenship in a civic 
community is marked, first of all, by active participation in public affairs. Interest in 
public issues and devotion to public causes are the key signs of civic virtue’. Of course, 
introducing activity as a measure of citizenship poses particular conceptual difficulties. 
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Primarily, the very nature of the activity must, inevitably, come under scrutiny. The 
various activities that take place within the arena of civil society are informed by 
different values. For example, it is commonly accepted that individuals undertake 
particular actions guided by the ‘values inculcated through their background, education 
and experience, priorities and values [which] may well include a commitment to the 
‘common good’ but are by no means certain to do so’ (Deaken, 2001:7). The concept of 
civil society favoured in this research perceives it as more than merely a set of social 
institutions but also, fundamentally, a social value. Indeed, civil society is thought of as a 
process and a state of mind – a social process that generates trust and mutual 
understanding (Hall, 1995; Deaken, 2001).  
 
I accept, however, that while the activities undertaken in its name may bear this in 
mind, in reality, political action by citizens, guided by their various value systems and 
states of mind, can and often do fall on either side of the common good. With few 
exceptions, the current scholarship emphasizing civic virtue (Barber, 1984; Putnam, 
1993; 1995: van Deth, 1997, UNDP, 1997; Deaken, 2001) affords only secondary 
attention to the values that drive behaviour generally and civic activity in particular. 
Instead, the analysis tends to restrict itself to a meagre interpretation of responsible 
citizenship, measured in terms of membership, attendance and participation in 
voluntary/civic organizations and initiatives. In other words, the essential question 
implicit here is whether the apathetic, lethargic or alienated, by virtue of their inertia, 
should ultimately face exclusion. One of the positive characteristics of a civil society is 
the collective participation of citizens in public affairs and their active interest in public 
issues (see Table 2.1). Indeed, in Barber’s view, ‘given the importance of active 
participation to the definition of citizenship itself, the autonomous individual would 
seem to enjoy the ‘right’ of citizenship that he can forfeit only by his own action – which 
is to say, by his own inaction’ (1984: 227). He goes on to argue that criminals forfeit their 
citizenship not because they revert to ‘the state of nature’ but because they have ceased 
to engage in talk, deliberation, and common action and have substituted private force for 
public thinking’ (Barber, 1984:227-228).  
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Since civic virtue (participation) is as much a part of my conceptualization of civil society 
as civility (including legality, tolerance, inclusion, non-violence, commitment to the 
common good), criminals, by virtue of both their ‘action’ and ‘inaction’, have effectively 
divorced themselves from the civic community. The conceptual problems however do 
not stop here. Civil society scholarship must also reconcile with citizens whose actions, 
on the one hand, render them as civic and public spirited but whose values and private 
actions on the other hand, depart from civicness and civility. I discuss this matter in 
detail later when I look at the case of rogue leadership at the community level in Jamaica 
(Chapter 8). Certainly, activity is crucial to (responsible) citizenship and civil society but 
in Putnam’s (1993:88) words, ‘not all political activity deserves the label ‘virtuous’ or 
contributes to the commonweal’ (cf. Boyd, 2004; Deakin, 2001; Whitehead, 1999). Any 
study which has, as its point of focus, (uncivil) citizen politics is therefore obliged to 
consider whether so-called public spirited citizens necessarily (or at all times) embody 
the kind of social capital that is beneficial to the civic community and to democracy?  It 
is within this framework that I look more closely at the nature of social capital and how 
it potentially affects civil society.  
2.4.1 The Social Capital Factor 
Since Robert Putnam (1993)15 occasioned alarm by unearthing evidence suggesting that 
there has been a widespread decline in associational life in America, a great deal has been 
made of social capital. There is, however, considerable disagreement as to its conceptual 
definition – what should be included in it, how it may be measured and whose capital – 
the individual or community – is at issue (Putnam, 1993; 1995; 2002; Offe & Fuchs, 2002; 
Inkeles, 2000; Heffron, 2000). Whether interpretations restrict social capital to a narrow 
                                                 
15 In his controversial article, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital, Putnam argues 
that by almost every measure, American’s direct engagement in politics and government has fallen 
steadily and sharply, with millions withdrawing from the affairs of their communities over the last 
two decades. This development he contends is problematic since the greater the density of 
associational membership in a society, the more trusting its citizens, as trust and engagement are 
two facets of the same underlying factor – social capital. Social capital is then the features of social 
organization such as networks, norms and social trust and which are crucial for facilitating 
cooperation among citizens for mutual benefit. For a more extensive reading on social capital and 
civil engagement, see Putnam (1993; 2002).  
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or limited range of phenomena or go for breadth and openness, it usually demands the 
same thing. For example, whenever the term ‘capital’ is used, it is reminiscent of Adam 
Smith’s economic interpretation, which saw it as inclusive of the productive abilities of 
the people in any nation. By deductive argumentation, social capital is to be understood 
as social capabilities that are derived from individuals and groups and to which these 
same folks can draw on to attain particular goals (Inkeles, 2000; Heffron, 2001). This 
social capability thus infers ‘a collectively-owned resource’ (Offe and Fuchs, 2002:189) 
that is entrenched in a range of vertical and horizontal associations, multiple ties and 
acquaintances and social behaviour within and across individuals, groups and 
associations. Although it does not spare us the conceptual difficulties, I adopt here as my 
working definition Putnam’s elucidation, which privileges the community over and 
above the individual and designates social capital as ‘the features of social organization 
such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit’ (1995:67).  
 
If a large amount of this collective capacity or resource is therefore available and widely 
dispersed throughout a society, it is felt that the benefits to that society will be economic 
performance, strong state and good government (Putnam, 1993; 1995; Offe & Fuchs, 
2002). The converse is also true – if there is a small or negligible amount of social capital 
available in a society, the effects will be poor economic performance, a weak state and a 
government unable to serve its citizens’ needs. For Putnam (1995:67): 
Life is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital. In 
the first place, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized 
reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate 
coordination and encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks 
facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations and thus allow 
dilemmas of collective action to be resolved… Finally, dense networks of 
interaction probably broaden the participants’ sense of self, developing the ‘I’ into 
the ‘we’, enhancing the taste for collective benefits. 
 
Indeed, the overwhelming contemporary concern with civic virtue and with rebuilding 
social capital is inextricably linked to the catastrophic effects of its absence on 
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community and social life. This view finds roots in Edward Banfield’s description of the 
people of Montegrano in Southern Italy in 1958: 
No one in town is animated by a desire to do good for all of the population. Even 
if sometimes there is someone apparently animated by this desire, in reality he is 
interested in his own welfare and he does his own business. Even the saints, for 
all their humility, looked after themselves. And men, after all, are only made of 
flesh and spirit (Banfield quoting the words of a Montegranesi, in Reis, 1998). 
 
Banfield described as ‘amoral familism’ this striking absence of deliberate concerted 
action to improve the impoverished conditions of the community among the people of 
Montegrano. He designated it as an ethos of backwardness in which social solidarity and 
the feeling of belonging and collaboration did not extend beyond the home environment. 
In fact, ‘amoral familism’ betrays efforts to build social capital and foster civic virtue as 
people will show concern or interest with public affairs only at the prospect of short-term 
gain (Reis, 1998). These arguments, substantially guided by Putnam’s seminal empirical 
research on social capital, while highly convincing, are theoretically inadequate. Rather 
than analytical, they tend to be descriptive and therefore cannot extend to formulating a 
theory of human behaviour (Latham, 1997). For instance, Putnam does not prepare us for 
the theoretical possibility that social capital may not possess the quality or stock 
imperative to foster the kind of collaboration and trust that is needed to bring the above-
mentioned benefits to the larger community. In any case, according to Heffron, 
(2000:252), trust and cooperation are ‘temporary and contingent, can as easily be unmade 
and the world reduced in the next instant to relative anarchy and anomie. Indeed, they 
are in constant flux, the product of unstable forces’. 
 
To what extent, then, do the social structures (institutional capital) of a society embody 
and reinforce the norms and values of the civic community, its practices and patterns of 
culture, modes of communication and association and psychosocial characteristics as 
expressed in qualities such as trust and cooperativeness (Inkeles, 2000)?  Secondly, can 
citizens foster trust and cooperation in order to serve malevolent ends?  Theoretically, 
these questions are crucial and must be answered as it is these values found in groupings 
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such as the family, clan, school, health and education systems and importantly in the 
political system, particularly the rule of law (Putnam, 1993; Inkeles, 2000), which 
determine the quality of the social capital available for citizens’ use. Whereas the civic 
community is not likely to be entirely conflict free (Putnam, 1993), the insistence of 
violence and anomie in contemporary societies such as Jamaica and the increasing 
physical aggressiveness of citizen politics demand that we look keenly at the quality of 
associational life and of social capital as a crucial aspect of mandatory requirements of 
social order. What I am hinting at here is this: is there such a thing as a negative social 
capital? I am using negative here to suggest unconstructive, unhelpful or damaging. Up to 
this point, we have been effectively forced to assume that social capital is necessarily 
constructive. Indeed, we have had no reason to suspect otherwise. Yet, it is clear that the 
very notion of associability, which is generally all-inclusive (Putnam even speaks of 
warders fraternizing with prisoners as an element of social capital formation, vertical as 
opposed to horizontal, notwithstanding) may have to become highly discriminatory, at 
least if it is to continue to constitute a reasonably safe indicator of the type of social 
capital that Putnam holds up as the model.  
 
Without question, secondary associations (churches, voluntary organizations, sports 
clubs, cultural groups) generate social capital of the sort highlighted by Putnam. However 
‘whether this “social capital” is truly a “public good” available to society at large and 
capable of producing the effects ascribed to it, is another matter’ (Foley & Edwards, 
1996:41). For example, if associations are to foster genuine cooperation and trust, they 
cannot be polarized or politicized but instead must bridge social and political divisions 
and be autonomous from political forces (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Whitehead, 1997; 
Alexander, 1998; Swift, 1999). Further, if we are to define collective action in its broadest 
possible interpretation, then the social capital (which in this context implies some form of 
collective action) generated by illegal entities such as gangs, clans, Mafias and 
conspiracies must also be accounted for and called upon as part of the resource accessed 
and used by some citizens to attain their individual goals. Indeed, although an emphasis 
on legality in my conceptualization of ‘civil’ society effectively robs these groups of a 
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place in this sphere, it does not mean that social capital is not being formed in their midst, 
used to the advantage of an increasing number of citizens and impacting on civil society, 
social order and democracy.  
 
2.4.2 A Place for Negative and Positive Social Capital 
In this regard, it is worth noting that Putnam’s later work (2000) as well as the case study 
of Eastern Europe by Paldam and Svensden (2001) distinguish between positive and 
negative social capital. The positive elements are those that strengthen community ties, 
facilitate collective action and civic engagement as well as promote social values of trust 
and norms of reciprocity. These qualities produce high social capital. Conversely, 
negative social capital includes social problems such as crime and anti-social behaviour, 
which is stark indication of low social capital.  This study acknowledges that there are 
often real and sharp conflicts among individuals and groups in civil society (squatters, 
vendors, political party-affiliated groups), which in the absence of political settlements, 
often spill over into civil disruption and violence (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Whitehead, 
1997; Alexander, 1998; Swift, 1999)16. The complexity of these kinds of social capital, 
which operate both horizontally across communities and among citizens as well as 
vertically in patron-client relationships, is uncovered and discussed in detail when I look 
at one case of informal (citizen) organization, politics and governance in Jamaica in 
chapter 8.  In this sense, I fully endorse the view, widely shared view by many scholars 
(Barber, 1984; Putnam, 1993; 1995; 2000; Latham, 1997; van Deth, 1997; UNDP, 1997; 
Swift, 1999; Deakin, 2001) that civic associations, in the main, contribute positively to the 
effectiveness and stability of democratic government.  
 
                                                 
16 For a convincing case study of the positive and negative dimensions of social capital, see 
Ogbazghi, P. (2005) ‘Features of Social Capital in the Squatter Settlements of Asmara: The Good, 
the Bad and the Ugly’. In Survival on the Edge: The State, Squatters and Urban Space in Eritrea. 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Tilburg, The Netherlands, Chapter 11, pp 227-
250. 
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A decline in citizen engagement and social capital, however, within and among 
communities is also blamed for a number of serious social problems and the impotence of 
the political system to deal with them (Putnam, 1995). Further, it is agreed that the 
successful social integration of citizens into extremist organizations (Mafia, terrorist cells, 
rebel groups and criminal gangs) can also present a major threat to the stability of the 
social and political system (Rapley, 2006; Mason, 2005; Soeters, 2005; Norris, 1999; van 
Deth, 1997). Consequently, while there is generally a positive correlation between civic 
associations and civil society, the quality and stability of civil society and of democracy 
appear to be highly contingent upon the type and quality of the associations as well as the 
manner in which they seek to attain their varied goals (Boyd, 2004; Swift, 1999). The 
Jamaican case represents an interesting political model of these theoretical complexities. 
For example, whereas there are over five thousand community-based organizations 
(CBOs) in Jamaica, of which more than 50 percent are either active or partially active (see 
Box 1.1, Chapter 1),  it is uncertain what effects, if any, membership in these groups have 
on building the norms of trust and cooperation that Putnam speaks so highly of.  
 
Although an increased density of civic organizations signals an empowered and renewed 
civil society and a natural boost for democracy in Jamaica (Munroe, 1999), the number of 
episodic, impulsive, and at times violent street demonstrations, some of which have done 
more to impinge on rather than enhance civil democracy, had also risen sharply. As I will 
argue later, when I discuss the contemporary nature of popular protest in Jamaica in 
Chapter 6, this sharp increase in street protests may itself also suggest a positive 
manifestation of collaborative action and resistance, albeit belligerent, and the emergence 
in the country of a vast network of issue-oriented protest campaigns. Yet, it may also 
suggest the retreat of civil politics and a decline in the quality of civil society. Some 
scholars (see for e.g. Foley & Edwards, 1996) argue that, although often underestimated, 
new social movements do foster aspects of civil community and advance democracy. At 
the same time, while proving useful in terms of drawing attention to the social conditions 
citizens face, the jury is still out as to whether violent grievance politics is the most 
effective way to obtain concessions from the state. I take up this issue in chapter 9. 
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Indeed, the major political concern in recent years seems to be how to stem the number 
of disruptive street protests and the need to develop appropriate mechanisms to empower 
community-based organizations as a means of strengthening Jamaican democratic 
governance (Munroe, 2000; Meeks, 2000). It is hence the rise of aggressive citizen politics, 
embodied in popular protests and the challenges it poses to democratic governance and 
civil society in Jamaica, which underscores the fundamental theoretical dilemma in this 
study.  A significant part of this dilemma rests with the prevailing view of Jamaica’s civil 
society organizations, many of which are critiqued for being ‘too limited in their focus, 
too attack minded in their style, too class bound in their leadership, too dependent for 
finances from organizations with their own agenda’ (Buddan in Sunday Gleaner, 2003). 
Their ability to press demands on behalf of marginalized sectors, foster social cohesion 
and generate positive public values and a sanguine public self, is suspect.  
 
This is not to say that the Church and the independent mass media as well as voluntary 
and intermediary/advocacy organizations in Jamaica have not witnessed an expansion of 
their roles and are emerging as legitimate competing ‘counter publics’ (Fraser, 1997), 
though weak and marginalized in particular contexts (see Munroe, 1999 – chapter 5). The 
explicit role of these publics is to form critical avenues of civic engagement and 
contribute to the integration of individuals in society and consequently to the stability of 
the system (Barber, 1998; Etzioni, 1996; Putnam, 1995; Van Deth, 1997). I put forward 
the argument in this study, however, that their inadequacies as linkages between the 
demands and needs of the population and the output of the political system, in large part, 
have an impact on the extent to which citizens resort to more aggressive modes of 
political participation, expressed in loosely organized, and episodic citizen mobilizations 
and protests. This brings me to a subject which I alluded to briefly in chapter 1, on which 
I wish to expand here. This is the observation in many quarters that a specific theoretical 
link can be identified between the problems of democratic society and the retreat of civil 
society (Boyd, 2004; Munroe, 1999; Norris, 1999; Diamond, 1994). My interest in this 
regard is the correlation between civil society and the democratic state within the context 
of the explosive nature of contemporary protest campaigns in some polities.  
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Most people would agree that popular protests are fundamental to the health of 
democracy. Indeed, some citizens jealously guard this right because, as I shall illustrate in 
subsequent chapters, aggressive protest action is seen to be vital to the progress of the 
Jamaican society, particularly within the context of the search for justice and a better way 
of life by its people. Resolving the dilemmas of uncivil citizen politics in Jamaica 
therefore obliges me to ground this discussion within the context of civil society’s 
apparent theoretical debt to democracy and the democratic state. In other words, what 
exactly is civil society’s obligation, if any, and can its apparent two-faced character 
undermine rather than advance democracy? On the other hand, what is the role of 
democracy in making society civil?  
2.5     CIVIL SOCIETY: ANTI-POLITICS OR DEMOCRATIZING THE STATE? 
Understanding civil society’s role in the construction of democracy is a much more 
complex phenomenon than the prevailing scholarship reveals. In the first place, that civil 
society and democracy are inextricably bound in their relationship with each other 
betrays the often simplistic antimony between them as locked in a zero-sum struggle (cf. 
Held, 1996; Diamond, 1994; Keane, 1988b).17 If civil society is to serve democracy and if 
the democratic state is to both empower and regulate civil society, it is unhelpful and 
misleading to portray the state/civil society nexus as predominantly adversarial or 
polarized. Secondly, given the vast variations in the character and form of civil society 
and social capital as discussed, we can no longer take for granted that the correlation 
between civil society and democracy is necessarily always positive. I look at these two 
issues in turn. The contemporary renewal of a ‘civil society versus the state’ dichotomy 
had its source in the inadequate versions of the concept unreflectively revived in 
                                                 
17 It is important to note that the matter is a bit more complicated than stated here because the 
historical construction of a relationship between civil society and the state has always been 
polarized. The early literature reveals a closing of ranks around two sharply distinct theoretical 
poles. The first represents those who embark upon a contemptuous course of attempting to, 
completely, emancipate civil society from an absolutist and paternalistic state. The second 
epitomizes those who emphasize a preference for sovereign state action and stricter state 
regulation over the conflict-filled nature of civil society. Refer to discussion on Hobbes and Locke 
as well as later Enlightenment thinkers. 
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discussions on Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa since the late 1980s 
(Cohen & Arato, 1992; Tempest, 1997). The experience of the Eastern Europeans, for 
example, against an official communist totalitarian state and party system provided the 
stimulus that drove democratization in many societies through the resurrection of civil 
society viz. a. viz. the mobilization of a variety of independent groups and so-called 
grassroots movements. The transitions from authoritarian and communist regimes, 
however, appeared to encompass two very different efforts. The first urged the 
importance of protecting and renewing a pluralistic, self-organizing civil society 
embodied in popular movements, and which were to maintain its independence from and 
resistance to the authoritarian state. The second rested in a challenge to a public-oriented 
state by neo-conservatives who saw the small state as a good state (Keane, 1988b).  
 
It was this anti-state sentiment, which commentators such as Vaclav Havel came to refer 
to as ‘anti-politics’. For example, Tempest (1997), in commenting on the evolution of civil 
society in Eastern Europe, remarked that the construction of an antagonistic parallel 
society was designed to gradually undermine the already crumbling legitimacy of the 
communist states and to install a new entity - a democratized civil society. For Hall 
(1995:1), the term civil society quickly transformed itself into the ‘opposite of despotism 
and became the space in which social groups could exist and move’. Likewise, Cohen & 
Arato (1992:86) put it bluntly when they posit that ‘where there existed a single, 
ideological pecking order which tolerated no rivals, a counter-movement had already 
began to reorganize ‘society’ against the state through associations and forms of public 
life’. This modern configuration of the state/civil society relationship is therefore, in 
Gramscian terminology, ‘the site of alternative hegemonies’ (Alexander, 1998:68). It was 
therefore no wonder that the theme, concept and spirit of the resurgent civil society, 
having been all the rage, quickly became the yardstick by which societies, especially 
those in Latin America, en bloc measured the worth and vitality of their civil society. 
Foley and Edwards (1996:46) maintain that, in such contexts, ‘civil society is treated as an 
autonomous sphere of social power within which citizens can pressure authoritarian 
regimes for change, protect themselves from tyranny and democratize from below’. Of 
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course, while it became crucial to root out state authoritarianism, install a Western-style 
democratized civil society, and assert its ascendancy, scholars ignored a most crucial 
probability. Foley and Edwards (1996:46) wrap it up in this one question, which 
represents one of the paradoxes of civil society: “If civil society is a beachhead secure 
enough to be of use in thwarting tyrannical regimes, what prevents it from being used to 
undermine democratic governments”? In other words, according to Diamond (1994:5): 
We need to comprehend not only the multiple ways it [civil society] can serve 
democracy, but also the tensions and contradictions it generates and may 
encompass. We need to think about the features of civil society that are most 
likely to serve the development and consolidation of democracy. We need to 
form a more realistic picture of the limits of civil society’s contributions to 
democracy and thus the relative emphasis that democrats should place on 
building civil society among the various challenges to democratic consolidation. 
 
We have already confirmed that not all groups contribute positively to civil governance, 
positive social capital and civil society (Boyd, 2004; Paldam & Svensden, 2001; Putnam, 
2002; Swift, 1999; Whitehead, 1997). In addition to identifying extremist organizations 
and illegal networks of citizens, Foley and Edwards (1996) add established interests who 
may detain social resources thereby blocking society’s ability to meet the demands of the 
dispossessed, as in the Southern United States up to the advent of the civil rights 
movement in the 1960s. Social blocs, they contend, may also form, each with their own 
band of associations, to battle one another for control of the state as in contemporary 
Lebanon or the plural states of Western Europe before the 19th century political 
settlements. In addition, political forces may also forge powerful ties with community 
organizations and civil associations, polarizing society and at times threatening social 
order as in post-World War II Italy and contemporary El Salvador. At the same time, as I 
will illustrate in the Jamaican case, rather than augment democracy, divisive political 
solidarities, including civic associations that follow these divisive political patterns, may 
very well sharpen social cleavages and actually undermine the capacity for effective 
governance (Foley and Edwards, 1996:46).  
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These observations underscore the importance of fully understanding the real role of civil 
society in the contemporary period. It is clear that we can no longer take for granted that 
civil society holds benefits for the democratic state. Instead, we are compelled to take into 
account civil society’s variable role and contributions, that is, discern how and under 
what circumstances a society’s organized constituents contribute to political strength or 
political failure. The common expectation throughout the West that the new 
democratized civil society is at once ‘an agent of transformation and its result’ may be ill-
conceived, resulting from ‘a common unwillingness to take an openly critical attitude 
toward the liberal model of civil society’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992: 32-33). Further, that 
there was an almost immediate withering away of civil society after the fall of 
communism is an example of the promise of civil society showing signs of weakness and 
failure from early on. Clive Tempest (1997) is among those whose scholarship critically 
examines the ‘myths’ of East European civil society.  
 
According to his thesis, so overwrought and sensational were the reports of civil society’s 
resurrection versus the political realities of other contexts that it is fair to assume that the 
Eastern Europeans may have emulated a fantasy. He goes on to argue that they 
‘overstated, idealized and misunderstood the real nature of state and civil society relations 
in the west’ [referring to societies such as the United States) (1997: 133), having failed to 
account for the incivilities, violence and apathy to be found in Western civil society. In 
other words, while Eastern Europe lauded civil society as a key explanatory variable in 
the collapse of communism, the West was expressing doom about the vitality of its own 
civil society (see Putnam, 1993; 1995). The historical platform upon which Eastern 
Europe spawned civil society and the specific socio-political context within which the 
notion was re-fashioned and re-presented, particularly as the fodder for democracy, 
hence rendered it inadequate as a model elsewhere. Indeed, Eastern Europe may have 
emulated a fantasy and romanticized the benevolence of new social movements. This is 
however not to say collective action such as those expressed in popular protest do not 
play crucial roles in new and established democracies in taking on board neglected or 
repressed demands and impelling the political system to engage with marginalized groups 
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and/or forgotten issues. As I shall argue in the case of protests and demonstrations in 
Jamaica, the actions of groupings within civil society may sometimes collapse in violence 
as frustration increases in the face of an unresponsive political system. Yet, these issue-
oriented protest campaigns, if undertaken in a coherent and cohesive manner, also have 
the potential to build trust, habits of cooperation (even in the short term) and cement 
civic action among participants.  
 
The truth is, where the political system is minimally responsive, as in Jamaica, they can 
boost the vitality of civil and political society by mobilizing people, and at the very least, 
stimulate discussion and debate. At the same time, where the state is unresponsive, its 
institutions are undemocratic, or its democracy is ill-designed to respond to citizen 
demands, the character of collective action will be decidedly different than under a 
strong and democratic system. Citizens will instead find their efforts to organize for civil 
ends frustrated by state policy or at times actively repressed or ignored (Foley and 
Edwards, 1996:48). A natural consequence of this state of affairs is the growth of 
increasingly hostile forms of civil association as well as an expanding number of citizens 
driven into either active militancy or self-protective apathy (Foley and Edwards, 1996). It 
is within this scenario that the ability of civil society to also oppose and weaken the 
democratic state is most probable. It would therefore appear that a democratic civil 
society requires a democratic state and, conversely, a strong civil society necessitates a 
strong and responsive state. At the same time, the strength and responsiveness of a 
democracy seem to rely heavily on the character of its civil society (Putnam, 2000; 1995; 
1993; Barber, 1998; 1984; Foley and Edwards, 1996). The attributes I outlined in Table 2.1 
provides a good starting point by which to determine what constitutes a civil society as 
opposed to an uncivil society.  Fundamental to this study is therefore the argument that, 
like democracy, civil society is not exportable. It cannot be copied from another society 
nor is it a plan following predictable patterns. Rather, it represents social units, which 
emerge out of the natural differences between people, spontaneous, and, also like 
democracy, it ‘grows up indigenously and in country after country, it looks different, feels 
different… it cannot be imposed top down, it grows bottom up’ (Barber, 2003:02).  
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Current analyses then ought to perceive civil society beyond mere organizations, 
associations and institutions and, instead, construe it as ‘a way of life, a set of ingrained 
attitudes, a culture of independent thinking … cooperation, of conflict as well as 
consensus’ (Dewey quoted by Barber, 2003:02). It is within this realm of shared values, 
beliefs and everyday social practices and lived experiences – the rudiments holding 
human communities together – that civil society in developing countries like Jamaica 
finds resonance. This research thus demonstrates why a focus on aberrant social and 
political behaviour, including illegality and violence within citizen political action, is 
essential to any contemporary discourse on civil society. In other words, political science 
scholarship ought to acknowledge that at the core of this esoteric normative ideal called 
civil society is a limited understanding of its ‘potential to be negative’ (Swift, 1992:05).  
 
2.6 SUMMARY 
The prevailing conditions of civil society raise important questions about its character, 
relevance and usefulness in (positively) affecting and effecting social order and 
democracy in contemporary societies. It would appear that civil society requires a novel 
interpretation which recognizes the likelihood of political values, behavioural norms as 
well as tendencies and practices that directly and openly contravene, if not ultimately 
contradict, what John Keane calls ‘the ideal concept of civil society as a haven for 
openness, non-violence, solidarity and justice’ (1996: 10). If anything, civil society has an 
organic relationship with society. This means that it mirrors not only ‘the ethnic, gender 
and class [and political] fractures that exist within every society (Swift, 1996:16), but also 
the political culture and the socio-economic conditions that prevail in every context. As 
such, any deconstruction of the concept must take into account the conflicts that such 
fractures and political culture engender and the continuing potential for a general 
breakdown in political and civil values attendant to other social problems.  
 
This chapter also forces us to consider the contrasting and, at times, overlapping contexts 
– civil and uncivil – in which some societies currently operate. Since, all societies contain 
some degree of incivility, what is it that makes this problem more problematic for some 
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than others and its impact on civil society and democracy more detrimental? A look at 
some of the constituent features of a civil and uncivil society, as reflected in Table 2.1, 
should offer a reliable theoretical framework for answering this question and assessing 
the nature of civil society in any given polity. Jamaica, for example, possesses a stable 
regime, featuring a deeply institutionalized and consolidated democracy and enjoys 
broad-based legitimacy (see Munroe, 1999; Meeks, 2000; cf. Gray 2004). However, in 
times of uncertainty and stress, such as during the April 1999 three-day nationwide riots, 
Jamaica appeared highly vulnerable to breakdown, its legitimacy substantially 
undermined, and civil values were not the norm. It is therefore clear, based on the 
arguments presented in this chapter, that civil society, with its complexity and inherent 
contradictions, comprises a diversity of social forces and interactions ‘playing both 
negative and positive roles, depending on the context’ (Munroe, 1999:80).  
 
Given also the new political realities at work in the contemporary world, particularly the 
increasing empowerment of deviant actors and the normalization of violence, we are now 
obliged, as social scientists, to re-construct, re-interpret and re-present civil society to 
accurately reflect the complexities of this sphere. It is important, for example, to begin to 
take into account, on a much wider scale, the informal politics and unconventional 
political practices undertaken by ordinary citizens and see them as an active component 
of the contemporary interpretation and character of civil society. In other words, it is 
clear that we cannot simply narrow the civil society universe only to those demonstrating 
civic norms, as both formal groups and informal networks and relationships (playing 
negative and positive roles) also impinge on the character of civil society and the tone of 
citizen politics in any context. Further, in the quest to come to terms with the real nature 
and complexity of contemporary citizen politics, we are also obliged to find answers to 
the following broad questions that underpin this study:  
(1) Is the increasing discontent of citizens with the quality of governance 
globally, including the performance of representative governments and 
official civil society, giving rise to unconventional and alternative modes of 
political engagement?  
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(2) What is the nature of these unconventional political practices and how 
effective are they in securing for (the especially disadvantaged classes of) 
citizens their political demands?  
 
(3) Based on how citizens globally now relate to the state and the state to them, 
are we witnessing a rebirth of reinvigorated citizens no longer self-interested 
and ‘bowling alone’ or a retreat of civil norms of political engagement and 
negotiation and a decent into uncivil society? 
 
It is to the answers to these questions within the Jamaican context that I turn to in the 
subsequent chapters. First, I take pause to examine the methods and procedures used to 
gather and analyze the data drawn upon in this study and the theoretical underpinnings 
upon which they are based.   
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CHAPTER 3 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Protest Politics in Jamaica: Towards A Theory of 
Method.  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is most concentrated within the sub-discipline of political behaviour and 
examines the patterns of citizen politics which fall under the rubric of unconventional 
political participation. I focus specifically on the character of popular political protest 
(riots, demonstrations, marches, and civil unrest) and its impact on the quality of civilian 
politics and civil society and the relevance it holds to the conduct of governance in 
Jamaica. An intellectual inquiry into the character of Jamaican popular protest renders 
this research, of necessity, an open-ended enterprise and thus intrinsically qualitative. 
Qualitative research instruments are most suited to this study because at its core it is an 
investigation of people’s attitudes, values, opinions, beliefs and the feelings they hold 
towards the state, their fellow citizens and their community and, significantly, also of the 
behavioural norms and lived experiences that reflect those innate values (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003:12; Strauss and Corbin, 1998:11). Qualitative research uses multiple 
research methods (observation and participant observation, interviews, questionnaires, 
documents and the researcher’s impressions and reactions) that are interactive and 
humanistic, increasingly involving active participation by participants and sensitivity to 
the participants in the study (Creswell, 2003; Myers, 1997). In the case of this study on 
the character of Jamaican popular protest, this qualitative process requires that I 
effectively enter the informants’ world, and through ongoing interaction, solicit their 
‘perspectives and meanings’ (Creswell, 1994: 161; Bryman, 1998:52; Flick 2000) on the 
ways in which they express their discontent about social problems, why they elect to 
conduct their politics the way they do and their reflexive feelings about those actions.  
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The study is therefore obliged to examine the political culture norms inherent within the 
Jamaican society which impacts on people’s beliefs and attitudes about the system and 
ultimately determines their behaviour towards the system. It also requires a critical look 
at the systems and mechanisms of state governance that organize and structure the social 
space in which citizens operate. Here, I take into account the extent to which the quality 
of governance impacts upon and/or directs the kinds of behavioural norms that become 
manifest in political protest. The political rebellion in which Jamaican citizens participate 
is therefore not alienated from the role of the state and the quality of its political 
performance. Neither is it estranged from the political culture and values evolved over a 
period of time as well as the historical circumstances, which attend to such development 
(see Ritzer, 1996:20). This task logically begs for an approach which takes into account 
both subjective meanings for the actors involved in generating, living through and 
experiencing social protest as well as the social structures which condition such meanings 
and are constituted by them. Structuration theory (Giddens, 1979; 1984) represents one 
such approach and I will discuss this in more detail later. Suffice to say, the essence of a 
good qualitative research design rests on a set of procedures that are simultaneously open-
ended and rigorous and that do justice to the nuance and complexity of the social 
situation under study (Flick, 2000). The fundamental methodological goal of this research 
is thus embedded in an interpretive understanding of human behaviour and social action. 
However, before I discuss the philosophical assumptions and theoretical orientation 
underlying the interpretive approach, I look at the possibility of a research design specific 
to studying popular protest in Jamaica. 
 
3.2 TOWARDS A RESEARCH DESIGN FOR STUDYING POPULAR PROTEST IN 
JAMAICA. 
Crafting a methodological approach for a study, according to Blaikie (1993:7) is about 
delineating ‘how research should or does proceed. It includes discussions on how theories 
are generated and tested, what kind of logic is used, what criteria they have to satisfy, 
what theories look like and how theoretical perspectives can be related to particular 
research problems. A research design therefore represents the approach of the researcher 
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and defines his or her choice of method and the way in which these choices fit the 
research study. But methodological issues involve more than just the choice of technique 
and the mechanics of its application. What is of great significance yet perhaps least 
discussed is the peculiarity of the context in which these methodological tools had 
originally been discussed (Diani & Eyerman, 1992). Indeed, ‘tools originally made 
applicable towards specifically defined scientific purposes are often uncritically applied in 
very different theoretical and empirical contexts’ (Diani & Eyerman, 1992:1). It is for this 
reason that I attempt to examine the specific methodological issues and concerns that 
may be worth noting in a study of political protest in Jamaica.  
 
As a point of departure, the study of protest is often undertaken under various labels and 
within different fields of analysis such as revolution, social conflict, deviance and 
collective behaviour (Rucht & Ohlemacher, 1992). For example, scholarly interest in 
researching collective action in general, and social movements and mobilization processes 
in particular, has grown considerably since the 1960s (Jasper, 2003; Scott, 1990; 1985; 
Castells, 1983; Piven & Cloward, 1977; Tarrow, 1994). This empirically-oriented research 
on social movements proffered new theories such as identity and resource mobilization as 
well as different ways of looking at citizen politics and direct citizen action. Within the 
Third World context, the work of Foweraker (1995), Bayat, (1997; 2000) and Escobar & 
Alvarez (1992) is some of the more instructive. However, despite the Caribbean’s 
longstanding historical relationship with political rebellion, the theoretical and empirical 
interest in the subject remains stunted in Jamaica or, at the very least, limited to a re-
investigation of protest within the context of the historical past. Notwithstanding this gap 
in scholarship, the extraordinary global rise in protest activities since the mid-1990s and 
the highly publicized nature of these events (both globally and domestically) have 
renewed scholarly interest in the contemporary aspects of the field as indicated by the 
large numbers of qualitative case studies now available (Posner, 2004; Scott, 1985, 1990; 
Bayat, 1997, 2000; Guha, 1997; Walton, 1997; Gurr, 1980).  
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Whereas, for example, comparative analyses of social movements have revealed the 
impact of national political systems and cultures on the development of collective action 
(Diani & Eyerman, 1992) and others have focused on the powerful impact of democratic 
citizen action and covert and overt resistance, very little scholarly attention is paid to the 
character and personality of contemporary political protest and its impact on the nature 
of citizen politics and the quality of the emergent civil society. It is with this latter aspect, 
within the context of Jamaica that I am preoccupied in this research. For my purposes, I 
adopt Rucht & Ohlemacher’s (1992:77) definition of a protest event as ‘a distinct 
collective action pursuing an explicit goal by the use of confrontative, disruptive and even 
violent means’. When I use the term protest and protest action, cycle, campaign, event or 
performance, I am referring to specific activities such as demonstrations, roadblocks, riots 
and general civil disturbance. I am interested in the dynamics of the protest act itself, the 
feelings it communicates and where and how it intersects with the requirements of civil 
action and civil discourse in the Jamaican context.   
 
It is generally agreed that ‘behaviour is a function of both the environmental situation in 
which actors find themselves and the psychological predispositions they bring to these 
situations’ (Greenstein, 1969, quoted by Kavanagh, 1983:4; cf. Gurr, 1980). I am therefore 
obliged to evaluate the patterns of interaction, sentiment and performance that generate, 
sustain and rationalize violent popular protest in Jamaica. This means abstracting and 
interpreting the points of view of the protest participant, other citizens and the 
institutional agent (state/state officials) at which the protests are directed. The protest 
participant in the case of Jamaica, which I will deconstruct in greater detail in later 
chapters, engages in the gamut of possible actions – bearing placards, actively mounting 
roadblocks, shouting, screaming, bawling, throwing missiles (bottles, sticks, stones), 
spurting expletives, undressing (to expose nakedness), addressing the media or political 
official, marching and singing. The protest participant also includes those who prefer to 
call radio talk back programmes or write letters/articles to the newspapers. I also include 
in this framework other citizens (non-participants or protest observers). These individuals 
may be readers, listeners and viewers of media output (including journalists who report 
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on protest activities) and academics who analyze the dynamics and power relations at 
work in the social environment,  the police who monitor or suppress protests, the 
political representatives and other state agents and public officials who often arrive at the 
scene of a demonstration to appease protestors as well as spectators or by-standers who 
just happen to be at the scene of a protest event.  
 
Although I use the term protest observer to refer to a bystander, it is worth noting that 
the bystander may also be a symbolic supporter of or covert (or passive) participant in the 
protect action. He or she may also wittingly or unwittingly become absorbed in the 
action or the mood of the event. Indeed, journalists and academics who, in their own 
sphere of activity and work, make claims upon the state on behalf of particular networks 
of citizens (such as the poor and disadvantaged) and/or engage in the debates and issues 
on the public’s agenda have an enormous impact on protest participants and are thus 
much more than mere observers. Indeed, although much of the literature on popular 
protest and social movements tends to focus almost exclusively on the actual participants, 
I wish here to broaden the focus to incorporate the views, perspectives, beliefs, values and 
motivations of the latter group whom I describe as non-protest participants or observers 
on the grounds that protest in the Jamaican context plays out as a continuous interaction 
between participant and observer groups. The Jamaican media, for example, as I discuss in 
chapter 7, by virtue of their coverage (treatment) of popular protest, are implicated in the 
construction and performance of protest and the production of meanings and perspectives 
about political rebellion in Jamaica. The mutual impact of these various groups on each 
other is thus not to be overlooked as they each have a stake in the construction and 
existence of a truly civil society outfitted with civil citizens conducting civil politics.   
 
In order to arrive at a research design for studying protest Jamaican style, I also set out to 
ascertain how each set of interviewees understand and interpret the nature of protest in 
this context, a perspective which is often automatically linked to their view of citizen 
politics and the quality of organized civil society more broadly. I therefore posed 
questions such as ‘why do Jamaicans protest’, ‘how do citizens protest’ and ‘do you 
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approve of the actions undertaken by citizens during protest’? In order to get their 
perspectives on the quality of civil society and to gauge their confidence in the organized 
systems and institutions of citizen politics and governance, I asked interviewees to rate 
the performance of or give their opinion on some popular civil society groups such as, 
among others, the Church, the media and the recognized human rights lobby group, 
Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ). It is important to note here that the historical personal 
involvement of some of my ‘protest observers’ (academics, journalists, concerned citizens, 
police, politicians) in demonstrations and the strong allegiance of some to particular 
political beliefs - impact significantly on the meanings they attach to this kind of political 
action. Having been heavily involved in protest activities as a University student in 
Jamaica, but with more critical distance now as researcher, I am also implicated in the 
production of knowledge (see Diani & Eyerman, 1992). This is often reflected in lopsided 
political analyses and academic theorizing which downplays important elements such as 
the changing nature of citizen politics and civil society by virtue of the increasingly 
aggressive and violent tactics being employed by protest participants in some contexts (cf. 
Bayat, 1997).  
 
In the case of Jamaica, there has been a pro-structural18 theoretical tendency within 
Jamaican scholarship on citizen politics. By pro-structural, I mean an over-emphasis on 
structural factors such as modes of production which define social formations and direct 
the range of actions available to social actors. Thus, the state and the market, which 
structures the nature of the economy, determines employment opportunities, and/or 
                                                 
18 The historical reliance on structural explanations in Caribbean scholarship (and even media-
driven political commentary) is driven by Marxist oriented political analysis and theory building 
and the extraordinary influence of North-American inspired political economy writings. Stone 
(1991) sees the tradition of Marxist-Leninism, dependency theory and anti-imperialist writings 
which have had a strong appeal among Third World scholars, as part of the weaknesses of the 
Caribbean’s claim to science. It is worth noting that much of the recent scholarly work from the 
Caribbean have relied less on Marxist–oriented and/or anti-imperialist approaches but have instead 
focused on a sort of economic reductionism which privileges statist and market principles in the 
search for determinants of human behaviour. See Stone, C. (1991) The Development of a 
Caribbean Political Science. University of the West Indies. Kingston: Institute of Social and 
Economic Research (ISER). 
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conditions levels of poverty and marginalization, have come to assume precedence in 
contemporary analyses and commentary of citizen action in Jamaica (see Price, 2004; 
Charles, 2002; Meeks, 2000; Munroe, 1999). As a context, the decade of the 1990s, which 
is largely marked by worldwide anti-globalization/ anti-trade protests, also saw a 
privileging in political science scholarship of the processes and structures that drive 
people to protest rather than a focus on the nature of the activity itself and its impact on 
the construction of real civil societies. Interestingly, due to the fear of mob violence and 
‘anomic democracy’ (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975, quoted by Norris, 1999),  
the 1960s and 1970s saw explanations for outbursts of protests carry a focus on the 
personality, attitudes and norms of protest participants.  
 
The fundamental problem therefore with contemplating and rationalizing popular protest 
through a purely structural lens is that structuralist arguments tend to assume a far too 
rigid causal determinism in social life. The efficacy of human action or agency tends to 
get lost in the language of structure (Sewell, 1992:2). Agency here refers to individual or 
group abilities (intentional or otherwise) to affect their environment (McAnulla, 
2002:271). In other words, the weakness of this approach lies in its overstatement of 
structural factors in guiding and directing human behaviour and under-stating the role of 
agency and praxis in also shaping those very structures. So, although a focus on the nature 
of the Jamaican state and the quality of its political performance, including the external 
factors impinging on its ability to provide good governance, offers enormous insights into 
the rationale for popular protest, this research is concerned to give adequate regard to the 
diversity of agential actions and the value frameworks that each member of the political 
and cultural community holds which drive them to behave in particular ways when 
making claims upon the state. I also account in this study for the peculiarities of the social 
context under which some citizens live, including citizen-inhabited sub-cultural systems 
operating independently of the structural power of the state with rigid rules and loyalties 
which affect the manner in which people within this sphere organize themselves and 
take collective action to defend their interests.  
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In this scenario, the metaphor of structure no longer implies permanence and stability 
and citizens are not cleverly programmed automatons who simply react to the absolute 
influence of structure. Rather, structure (which, here, represents the Jamaican State and 
social and economic structures) is not impervious to human agency, that is, the strivings 
for a better way of life embodied in the angry and frustrated voices which provide the 
motivations for popular collective action. It is these agential actions by citizens which 
cause structures to absorb change in the same way that the nature and quality of structure 
influences the types of political behaviour citizens display. One of my aims in this 
research is therefore to redirect attention methodologically by shifting the unit of 
analysis from a rigid focus on structures to individual actors. This is not to diminish the 
fact that a focus on structure ‘has had the effect of moving social movement actors from 
the margins to the centre of society’ (Diani & Eyerman, 1992:6). It is, however, important 
to reiterate that this paradigmatic shift in methodological approach is not to further 
oppress protest participants who often have genuine concerns, or downplay the 
accountability of structural factors in inducing particular behaviours. Rather, my goal is 
to examine critically the implications of disruptive direct (collective) action, as embodied 
in protest and demonstrations against the Jamaican State by citizens in pursuit of 
collective goals and in defence of collective ideals. I also examine the conflicts and issues 
that arise during these dynamic processes and their impact on the quality of citizen 
politics and civil society, more broadly.  
 
Indeed, my approach resembles closely the theoretical notion of structuration (Giddens, 
1979; 1984) whereby structure and agency closely interact and are mutually dependent. 
Here, structures shape people’s practices but it is also people’s practices that constitute 
and reproduce structure. In other words, the study recognizes that structures do enable 
(as well as constrain) what individuals do even while individuals or groups who are 
powerful or innovative enough may also affect structure and may even, in turn, lead to 
the transformation and reconstitution of the very structures that gave them the capacity 
to act (McAnulla, 2002; Sewell, 1992; Giddens, 1979; 1984). My analysis of popular 
protest, citizen politics and civil society therefore begins with what Stone (2002: xi) calls 
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a ‘model of community where individuals live in a web of associations, dependencies and 
loyalties, and where they envision and fight for a public interest as well as their 
individual interests’. So rather than assume a purely structural frame of reference which 
forces people to act in predetermined ways, this study accounts for the circumstances and 
conditions that provide Jamaican citizens with their images, conceptions and expectations 
of the state and how those images, conceptions and expectations shape their desires and 
visions as well as their actions. It is through the case study method that I hone in on the 
peculiarities of the Jamaican context. It is therefore to the issues and dimensions of this 
research method that I now turn. 
 
3.3 THE CASE STUDY METHOD: ISSUES AND DIMENSIONS. 
Yin defines the case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (1994:13). Clearly the case study design 
is particularly suited to this study since the objective is to examine the nature of one 
aspect of political behaviour (popular protest) and the political values and social norms in 
which they are grounded. The case study is a common qualitative method which allows 
for the use of multiple methods or triangulation and reflects an attempt to secure an in-
depth understanding of a phenomenon in question. In my research into the nature of 
citizen politics and the quality of civil society and governance in Jamaica, I relied heavily 
on a wide variety of qualitative instruments - focus groups, participant observation, in-
depth interviewing for gathering primary data. Secondary data was also collected from 
the gamut of sources – transcripts of national broadcasts by political officials, political 
statements, police statistics and incident reports, books, articles, taped radio and 
television interviews, discussion programmes, newspaper articles as well as radio and 
television reports and commentaries. In order to come to terms with Jamaica’s centuries-
old tradition of protest and resistance and the intensity and complexity of its 
contemporary outgrowth, no one source of evidence is likely to be sufficient (or 
sufficiently valid) to derive a fullest understanding of the character and dynamics of 
citizen politics in this context.  
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This multi-method or eclectic approach is therefore fundamental. The case study research 
design is crucial here as it allows the researcher to pull together a range of different kinds 
of empirical sources and substantiation, which has to be abstracted and collated to derive 
the best possible explanations (Gilliam, 2000). Such a research design would also need to 
account for sudden, unexpected changes in the social context that may challenge the 
conclusions drawn or, at the very least, accept that theoretical analysis of such a 
phenomenon is not static.  This kind of qualitative research is, in other words, required to 
possess what Janesick (2003:73) calls ‘an elastic quality much like the dancer’s spine’. Just 
as dance mirrors and adapts to life, she argues, ‘qualitative design is adapted, changed and 
redesigned as the study proceeds due to the social realities of doing research among and 
with the living’. Yet the case study is as much about the process of inquiry about the case 
as it is about the product of that inquiry (Stake, 2003). The bulk of case study work, 
according to Stake, is done by individuals who have only an intrinsic interest in the case 
and little interest in the advance of science. Their designs aim the inquiry towards 
understanding what is important about that case within its own world (Stake, 2003:140). 
In this study, I undertake what is called an instrumental case study (although my interest 
in the case is also intrinsic). An instrumental case is examined mainly: 
to provide insight into an issue or redraw a generalization. The case [popular 
protest and demonstrations] is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role, 
and it facilitates our understanding of something else. The case is still looked at in 
depth, its contexts scrutinized, its ordinary activities detailed, but all because this 
helps the researcher pursue external interests [quality of citizen politics, civil 
society and governance in Jamaica]. The case may be seen as typical of other cases 
or not. Here the choice of case is made to advance understanding of that other 
interest. Because the researcher simultaneously has several interests, particular 
and general, there is no line distinguishing intrinsic case study from instrumental; 
rather a zone of combined purpose separates them (Stake, 2003:137). 
 
My case study therefore aims to facilitate a holistic understanding of the complexities of 
the social phenomena under investigation (se Lincoln & Guba, 1985). But what does this 
mean in the context of my selected case, which is popular protest, and what it says about 
citizen politics and civil society in Jamaica? Here, the case study allows for an 
understanding of the simultaneous, multiple and interrelated political activities engaged 
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in by citizens, the dynamics of their interaction with each other and with official and 
unofficial channels of redress as well as how they confront the state regarding their 
concerns. Although it is important to allow the case to ‘tell its own story’, we cannot be 
sure that a case telling its own story will tell all or tell it well (Stake, 2003:143 quoting 
Carter, 1993; Coles, 1989). Since ‘we come to know what has happened partly in terms of 
what others reveal as their experience’ (Stake, 2003:145), this is where the critical eye of 
the researcher comes in to interpret and/or make sense of what the case reveals or does 
not reveal. Here, the case study thus relies on an interpretive ethos grounded on the 
premise that  interpretation, as embodied in hermeneutic analysis, is the work of thought 
which consists of deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding 
the levels of meaning implied in the meaning (Myers, 1997 quoting Ricoeur, 1974: xiv). 
 
Overall, the case study design allows people to construct their own realities and arrive at 
their own truths based on their lived experiences and on their own terms. As the case 
researcher, I must, however, emerge from the social experience – the observation or the 
in-depth interview – to choreograph another, the research report. In other words, I am 
also a part of the construction of knowledge because I am obliged to construct and 
reconstruct the details of what I have been told and what I uncover during fieldwork -
specific protest events, social processes and political activities as well as opinions and 
perspectives on these events, processes and activities. In this sense, according to Stake 
(2003:149) the case study requires: 
accurate descriptions and subjective yet disciplined interpretation, a respect and 
curiosity for culturally different perceptions of phenomena and empathetic 
representations of local settings – all blending (perhaps clumped) within a 
constructivist epistemology.  
 
At the same time, the case study method is indebted to four commitments on which it 
finds authority – to bring expert knowledge to bear upon the phenomena studied, to 
round up all the relevant data, to examine rival interpretations and to ponder and probe 
the degree to which the findings have implications elsewhere (Yin, 1994; Stake, 2003). In 
other words, part of my goal here is to decipher the extent to which an in-depth look at 
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the case of popular protest in Jamaica may allow for analytic generalizations about citizen 
politics elsewhere and/or unmask new theoretical propositions about the nature and 
quality of civil society more broadly19. Before I tackle the specific issues of sampling and 
generalizability, it is important to examine in more detail the philosophical and 
theoretical assumptions which guide my attempt to make sense of the phenomenon of 
political protest in Jamaica. 
 
3.4 INTERPRETIVISM AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM. 
I begin this discussion with a caveat. Qualitative research is not a synonym for 
interpretive research and so qualitative research may or may not be interpretive 
depending on the underlying philosophical assumptions of the researcher (Myers, 1997). 
Qualitative research may therefore be positivist, interpretive or critical. This study thus 
draws on a qualitative interpretivist framework, grounded in discourse analysis and social 
constructionism to analyze the character of protest politics in Jamaica and how it 
structures and is structured by the quality of civil society and the performance of the 
Jamaican state. Interpretive researchers start out with the assumption that access to 
reality is through social constructions such as language, consciousness and shared 
meanings. Interpretive studies thus generally understand phenomena through the 
meanings that people assign to them (Myers, 1997:4; Denzin, 1988). I adopt and apply 
here as my analytical reference frame Patton’s (1985:1) notion of qualitative 
interpretivism, which he suggests is: 
An effort to understand situations in their uniqueness as part of a particular 
context and the interactions there. This understanding is an end in itself, so that it 
is not attempting to predict what may happen in the future necessarily, but to 
understand the nature of that setting – what it means for participants to be in that 
setting, what their lives are like, what’s going on for them, what their meanings 
                                                 
19 It is to be noted that the experience of uncivil politics is by no means exclusive to Jamaica, but is 
a generalised global phenomenon. The plethora of intensely hostile citizen mobilisations across 
both developed and developing countries in 2006 – Solomon Islands, East Timor, France, Nepal – 
provides ample evidence of this. This is because disruptive social protest remains a forceful 
resource especially for minorities, the economically and socially-disadvantaged and other groups 
alienated from the established order. As a consequence, this case study on Jamaica is useful in 
coming to terms with the international dimension of this new pattern of citizen politics. 
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are, what the world looks like in that particular setting….The analysis strives for 
depth and understanding. 
 
The emergence of overly aggressive modes of protest and demand-making and the rise in 
influence of rogue actors in the local community are two aspects of the complex changes 
in the management and negotiations of power currently underway in Jamaica. The 
interpretive approach represents an attempt to transform the way in which Jamaican 
researchers think about and conduct research on civilian politics and civil society. It 
carries a powerful appeal in this study because to examine the character of popular 
protest immediately lends itself to personal beliefs, attitudes, values and interpretation. In 
other words, the researcher using the interpretive approach can never assume or achieve 
a value-neutral stance but is always implicated in the phenomena being studied. There is 
no access to reality here unmediated by language and preconception (Bryman, 2004; 
Silverman, 1993). It is on this premise of subjectivity and interpretation that I employ as 
my theoretical starting point the ideas of social constructionism.  
 
3.4.1 Social Constructionism  
Social constructionism radically challenges the positivist hegemony of objective fact and 
objective reality, that is, the view that conventional knowledge is based upon objective, 
unbiased observation of the world. Social constructionism then operates within an 
ontology that does not recognize the fact/value dichotomy and instead focuses on the 
different meanings with which our worlds have become invested (Burr, 1995). From this 
perspective, popular protest does not exist independently of the meanings people attach 
to it or the way it is socially constructed. It also cannot exist outside the existing social 
practices, processes and meanings that are operative in the Jamaican society, including 
values, ideas, culture, politics and institutions. Social constructionism is valuable to this 
study into the character of contemporary popular protest and the quality of citizen 
politics and civil society in Jamaica because it is based on the premise that our 
understandings of ourselves are constructions rather than objective descriptions, and as it 
is human beings who have built these constructions, then it is (at least in principle) 
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possible to re-construct ourselves in ways which might be more meaningful for us (Burr, 
1998).  
 
Constructions represent ‘the efforts of people to make sense of their situations, out of the 
state of affairs in which they find themselves. They are interpretations based primarily on 
experience - to ‘see it with my own eyes’ or to ‘hear it with my own ears’ is the best 
evidence that one can muster to demonstrate to him or herself the validity of his or her 
constructions’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985:70). At the same time, constructionism contains a 
relative quality whereby social phenomena and their meanings are continually being 
constructed and re-constructed (revised) by social actors through social interaction as 
they engage with the world they are interpreting. Social phenomena are produced 
through: 
the [social] interaction of a ‘constructor’ with information, contexts, settings, 
situations and other constructors (not all of whom may agree) using a process that 
is rooted in the previous experience, belief systems, values, fears, prejudices, 
hopes, disappointments and achievements of the constructor (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985:143).  
 
Indeed, constructionism is rooted in the notion that ‘the world and the objects in the 
world may be in themselves meaningless; yet they are our partners in the generation of 
meaning [and that] objectivity and subjectivity need to be brought together and held 
together indissolubly’ (Crotty, 1998: 44).  It is fair to say then that the world is being 
constituted in one way or the other as people talk, write and argue it. How Jamaican 
citizens therefore construct and ultimately re-present the social phenomena of popular 
protest is crucial to the nature of our knowledge about the nature of citizen politics in 
this context and the way civil society may be understood. Of course, ‘social 
constructionism provides us with little guidance for how we should choose a course of 
action, what ‘discourses’ we should support, which marginal voices we should allow to 
speak and this leads to a frustrating impotence’ (Burr, 1998:16). It is worth noting, 
however, that as the researcher is not objectively situated within the qualitative research 
context and is instead intrinsically implicated in the production of knowledge, he or she 
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will advance his or her own (hopefully not uncritical) interpretation of the flow of 
events.  
 
As I argued previously, value-free political phenomenon is impossible, and if the goal is to 
explore, with some profundity, people’s experiences, practices, values and attitudes and to 
establish their meaning for the actors involved, then the empirical political researcher is 
obliged to honour (although not uncritically) people’s social constructions. For example, 
my own participation in protests and demonstrations enhanced my awareness, knowledge 
and sensitivity to the challenges faced by groupings of citizens within the context of 
seemingly unbendable administrative or bureaucratic structures. However, my exposure 
to tertiary education and my fidelity to particular standards of behaviour (legality, 
tolerance, discipline) influence the perspectives I hold regarding citizen conduct. 
Although every effort is made to ensure fairness, these biases may shape the way I view 
or understand the data and the way I interpret the experiences, beliefs and opinions of 
others. Indeed, as Creswell (2004:182) suggests, the qualitative researcher ‘systematically 
reflects on who he or she is in the inquiry and is sensitive to his or her personal 
biography and how it shapes the study’. This introspection and acknowledgment of 
biases, values and interests (or reflexivity) is in recognition that ‘the personal self [is] 
inseparable from the research self’ and represents ‘honesty and openness to research, 
acknowledging that all inquiry is laden with values’ (Mertens, 2003 quoted by Creswell, 
2004:182). Many social constructivists emphasize the role of language, text and discourse 
– verbal, written, visual and performative – in the construction of the social world. It is 
therefore upon the premise of text – its uses and effects –that I examine the importance of 
discourse analysis as method of research in this study.  
 
3.4.2 Discourse Analysis 
Fairclough (2003:124) identifies discourses as ‘ways of representing aspects of the world – 
the processes, relations and structures of the material worlds, the ‘mental world’ of 
thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world’. Of course, particular aspects 
of the world may be represented differently, so he argues that we are generally in the 
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position of having to consider the relationship between different discourses. In other 
words, ‘different discourses are different perspectives on the world, and they are 
associated with different relations people have to the world, which in turn depends on 
their positions in the world, their social and person identities, and the social relationships 
in which they stand to other people’ (ibid, 2003). Discourse analysis, then, is based upon 
the assumption that ‘language is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically 
interconnected with other elements of social life, so that social analysis and research 
always has to take account of language’ (Fairclough, 2003:2).  It is clear that Fairclough’s 
work on discourse, strongly influenced by the work of Foucault (1972), tends to 
emphasize the political nature of discourse analysis, the struggles surrounding meaning 
and the interconnectedness of power and language. Here, language analysis is linked to 
social theory and is seen as a forceful social practice which sometimes produces, 
confronts, engages and changes hegemonic systems and processes. In other words, 
discourse analysis helps us to reconcile the connections between the use of language and 
the exercise of power (Fairclough, 1995:209).  
 
Discourses are therefore not analyzed in the abstract but their sense or meaning derives 
from their situated use. All of this data are filtered through personal lenses - people’s 
experience, feelings and actions - that are themselves situated in specific socio-political 
and historical moments. It is clear then that in this study, our ideas about what is 
desirable behaviour, the value choices we make and how we choose to act in particular 
circumstances are shaped by education, persuasion and the general process of 
socialization (Stone, 2002; Stone, 1992). Discourse analysis is therefore best suited for this 
study because it seeks to understand people in their social, economic and cultural 
contexts, how they respond to dynamic, complex and often sudden changes in their 
circumstances within these contexts and the way in which language in all its 
embodiments operates to create, recreate and maintain social realities. This means relying 
on strong interpretive skills and the ability to draw together many diverse bits of 
information, whether negative or positive, to present a defensible portrayal of the social 
reality under investigation. This type of research inquiry, I submit, is significant as 
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Jamaica’s experience with disruptive and violent citizen politics have highlighted the 
dangers of uncritical investigation of behavioural patterns viz. a. viz. the structural power 
of the state.  
3.5 SAMPLING CONSIDERATIONS. 
Although the issues that attend the notion of sampling are invariably encountered in 
quantitative research, it is one of the more significant issues to be confronted when 
designing even a qualitative research project (Merriam, 1998; Sarantakos, 1993). This is 
because sampling influences the trustworthiness of research findings. Trustworthiness in 
this case is the ability of the researcher to persuade his or her audience ‘that the findings 
of an inquiry are worth paying attention to, worth taking account of’ (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985: 290). It has been suggested that in order to increase the credibility of data findings 
and better understand social reality, multiple sources and respondents must be selected 
from a diverse population (Mayoux, 2002: 2; Gergen & Gergen, 2000; Selltiz et al., 1976). 
However, as Arber (1993:71) argues, ‘where the researcher’s aim is to generate theory and 
a wider understanding of social processes or social actions, the representativeness of the 
sample may be of less importance’. Having accepted this position, I adopted a more 
flexible research design which allowed me to not only identify and analyse the Jamaican 
case, but also ensure that my empirical findings contain the potential for generalizability 
to a broader, Third World context. Although there are peculiarities in terms of individual 
and institutional norms and behaviour that are specific to Jamaica, given the extent to 
which violence increasingly mars civilian politics throughout the developed and 
developing world, there are huge lessons to be learned from the Jamaican case. Secondly, 
as the units of analysis in this study encase the individual, community (civil society) and 
the state, it is important to situate the site of the study both geographically as well as 
institutionally. 
 
3.5.1 The Site of the Study 
I focus mainly on the urban and rural Jamaican community as the main research sites. 
The city of Kingston (population, 660,000), for example, embodies the complexities of 
 88
everyday urban life in Jamaica. It contains a varied mix of interests, values, ideologies, 
contrasting socio-political and economic conditions and, importantly, is most often 
playing host to the most energetic, if not most violent, political action by citizens. I call 
particular attention to Kingston’s inner city communities, particularly those labelled 
garrisons (see chapter 8). I examine the kind of organization, culture, political values and 
attitudes as well as interests that have evolved over time within these areas and how these 
norms have served to influence the type and character of citizen politics undertaken here. 
For example, the epicentre of crime in Jamaica takes place within the confines of these 
materially disadvantaged communities (Harriot, 2000; 2003). As a result, the sternest 
policing and state imposed violence tends to occur here, which sets the tone for violent 
protests over controversial police shootings and/or alleged police killings. It is also here 
that rogue citizen-actors called dons (see my discussion of this phenomenon in chapter 8) 
assume autocratic control, install their own (outlaw) system of community governance 
and directly and indirectly influence the kinds and character of the political actions 
undertaken by citizens resident here. I also incorporate in my analysis ‘outer’ Kingston 
(those who reside not in the ‘inner city’).   
 
I take account of not only their own political norms but the opinions and perspectives 
they hold about citizen politics conducted by folks located in the lower socio-economic 
strata of the Jamaican society. Given the historical stratification of the Jamaican society 
based on colour, class, race, gender and status (Stone, 1980; cf. Hope, 2004; Gray 2004), 
the study assumes a conscious awareness of how this distribution of power may influence 
how different groups define protest, interpret the actions of protestors and view the 
quality of civil society more broadly. I also include in the research field the concerns and 
actions of rural residents in parishes such as St. Catherine, St. James and St. Thomas. This 
is essential as popular protest in Jamaica is by no means a solely urban phenomenon.  
Indeed, protest activity (especially over inadequate provision of social services) is perhaps 
more frequent in rural areas given the wide range of their concerns. A focus on this 
geographical site allows me to draw pertinent comparisons about the nature of political 
action in rural as opposed to urban Jamaica, which in turn leads to important insights into 
 89
the political values, attitudes and norms which guide the behaviour of rural residents and 
the extent to which they differ from those concentrated in urban communities.  
 
3.5.2 The Sample 
Although the research site (as outlined above) is carefully delineated, the population of 
interest in this study is still fairly diverse. Before I explain the rationale behind my choice 
sample, I give a summary outline of the participants. The following sample represents a 
broad spectrum of Jamaican citizens at all levels of the society (from the state level to civil 
society). I have grouped the selected participants in the following distinct categories20: 
 
Table 3.1 – Sample of Interviewees21 
‘Informal People’: uninstitutionalized; unemployed or self-employed) people - taxi-
drivers; political activists/followers, students, vendors; hustlers; farmers; shopkeepers 
gangsters. 
Community/Civil Groups – Church leaders/members; human rights activists; Youth group 
members. 
Professionals (Employed Sector) – Lawyers, Public Relations Executives, Graphic Artists, 
Urban Planners, Teachers/University Lecturers, Police Officers, Security Guards. 
Political Officials – Cabinet Ministers (Minister of Justice), Members of Parliament, Heads 
of Political Party affiliate groups. 
Media Practitioners – News Editors, Reporters, Talk-Show hosts (radio & television), 
commentators, Radio disc jockeys and announcers (male and female; older/younger). 
                                                 
20 This categorization does not mean that participants only spoke strictly from their own sphere of 
knowledge. To the contrary, some participants played multiple roles and so were able to respond 
to the research themes from a personal, professional and political perspective. For example, I 
interviewed a cab-driver who hails from one of Kingston’s most volatile inner city communities. 
He attends (orthodox Christian) Church regularly yet he calls himself a Rastafarian. The Rastas in 
Jamaica by and large reject the teachings (though not the fundamental values) of Christianity 
while maintaining highly radical views regarding the state system which they have given the 
biblical label Babylon. The conflicting ideological stimulus which motivates this respondent had to 
be taken in account. At the same time, this overlapping of roles is not necessarily problematic, at 
least from the standpoint that, by virtue of wearing several caps, these respondents were able to 
bring the diversity of their experiences to bear on the issues discussed. At the same time, I was 
aware that the caps people wear sometimes conflict thereby impinging on the coherence of their 
narratives.  
 
21 Although most interviewees did not seek anonymity, I have elected not to identify them by 
name. Instead, I employed the symbol PN throughout the thesis to refer to Participant Number. 
Hence, the interviewees are labelled PN1, PN2 etc. In cases, such as PN18b, where I use an 
italicized letter, it is to distinguish between two speakers in a focus group setting. 
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Given the nature of the study, it became appropriate to select a research sample on the 
basis of ‘your own knowledge of the population, its elements and the nature of the 
research aims, in short based on the researcher’s judgment and the purpose of the study’ 
(Babbie, 1995:113). I employed both purposive and snowball sampling techniques to 
identify the participants involved in this study. Purposive or judgmental sampling is 
really a conscious effort to select subjects who seem to meet the study’s needs (Baker, 
1999:138).  These non-probability sampling approaches provide the researcher with the 
capacity to actively select the participant relevant to the research design and to discover, 
understand and gain more insight on issues crucial to the study (Patton, 1990; Merriam, 
1998). The initial selection of participants for this study was purposive, based on my own 
personal relationships with individuals who have in the past been involved heavily in 
protest activity, public initiatives or who either display support for activist causes or are 
known commentators on matters of public interest.  
 
In addition, I undertook an extensive literature review on the nature of governance and 
the current condition of civil society viz. a viz. the structural power of the state and how 
citizen politics (particularly popular protest) in Jamaica is constituted or configures itself 
within this process22. From that process, I was able to clearly identify various respondents 
at multiple levels of the society who could explicate the current conditions that drive 
protest and influence social order in Jamaica, as well as to make sense of the dynamic 
processes of change (in values, politics, culture) that are taking place in the country. I was 
aware however that popular protest, which although encompassing cultural forms of 
resistance such as music and performance, mainly means street demonstrations and 
blockades in the Jamaican context and takes place episodically and largely spontaneously. 
As such, there were no organized lists of protestors and very few officially recognized 
protest lobbies (e.g. human rights lobby group Jamaicans for Justice) available to be 
                                                 
22 See my theoretical discussion in chapters 2 and 5 where I deal substantively and extensively 
with the manner in which popular protest, civil society and the performance of the state intersect 
in Jamaica. 
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interviewed. In this scenario, it is unlikely that a researcher will be on the spot23 when a 
protest occurs. Indeed, in the context of Jamaica, there are no notices posted and rarely 
are there predictable signs that suggest that a demonstration will occur at a given time.  
 
The snowball sampling method became crucial as a springboard to other potential 
participants, who could be either protest participants or non-participants, including 
concerned citizens with general opinions about the conduct of civilian politics and 
quality of state governance in Jamaica.  This approach usually requires the researcher to 
make initial contact with a small group of people who are deemed relevant to the 
research topic. These respondents are then used to designate other potential informants 
who subsequently nominate other respondents and so on (Bryman, 2004; Patton, 1990; 
Sarantakos, 1993). Since the nature of this technique is inherently subjective, its 
reliability and representativeness was of some concern to me.  For instance, snowballing 
automatically lends itself to a certain bias and I found that some respondents tended to 
nominate a set of interconnected people whose ideology or socio-cultural and political 
frame of reference is complementary to theirs24. I found this tendency strongest among 
media practitioners in Jamaica who frequently nominated their colleagues and members 
of the intelligentsia who stuck with those persons within their own (professional and 
                                                 
23 On February 13, 2004, while conducting an interview in a middle class community in Upper St. 
Andrew (way above mainland Kingston), a breaking news was reported on the radio suggesting 
that a violent protest was ensuing in the Downtown Kingston business district, following a 
controversial shooting by the police. Missiles were being thrown and police vehicles were set 
ablaze. Given the spontaneity of the protest and the tense, volatile context in which it had 
occurred, it was impossible and dangerous to have presented myself at this research site. I 
nevertheless made that protest the subject of further interviews and interrogated media reportage 
and subsequent commentary and public opinion in order to gauge people’s feelings and attitudes 
towards this citizen action. 
 
24Chevannes (1995) makes reference to what he calls the ‘Barnes bias’ during his use of the 
snowballing sampling technique in his ethnographic study of social origins of the Rastafari 
movement in Jamaica. Brother Barnes was Chevannes’ first informant who rapidly mobilized his 
colleagues thereby extending the network of potential interviewees. However, the problem was 
that the informants essentially became Barnes’ network (1995, p. x). Chevannes writes that his 
reliance on Barnes’ network does not invalidate the data but cautions against faulty generalizing. 
See Chevannes, B. (1995) Rastafari, Roots and Ideology. New York: Syracuse University Press. 
(Refer to Introductory Chapter). 
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social class) rank. Fortunately, this tendency for sampling bias became less of a problem 
because of my awareness of it and my request for interviews with persons of lower socio-
economic status. Through the agency of one political activist as well as a beat reporter 
with ‘connections’ and intricate knowledge of the inner city, I was put on to several 
persons who could speak eloquently about the way of life in the slums and their attitudes 
and perspectives regarding the cause for violent protest and citizen action in these 
communities.  
 
The snowball approach also led to me engage with some Jamaican entertainers whose 
work predominantly deals with social commentary and ‘protest music’25.  It is worth 
noting also that despite their enormous wealth and improved social status, many of these 
participants grew up among the disadvantaged underclass and have maintained very 
strong emotional connections with and partiality for the concerns of the poor and 
marginalized. As such, I found they provided comments informed by an awareness of 
multiple perspectives. I constantly refined and adjusted my questions in order to fill gaps 
in the data or to look for specific bits of data in order to shed light on the emerging 
theory (Charmaz, 2006).   
 
3.6 REFLECTIONS ON DATA GATHERING -- THE PROCEDURES 
I used several steps to secure and conduct formal interviews. Firstly, I communicated 
with the participants via telephone and then sent an information pack (See Appendix A) 
to their electronic mailbox. The information pack briefed the potential participant on the 
nature of the study, solicited their willingness to participate (see example of consent form 
in Appendix B) and outlined their rights and privileges as a participant. My preliminary 
                                                 
25 It is now almost a truism that Jamaican music, which emerged organically within the Jamaican 
society, has always been a reaction to this society, a by-product of it or a violation of all it holds 
dear. The specific empirical boundaries of this study (the character of street protest and 
demonstrations as an insight in the quality of citizen politics and civil society in Jamaica), did not 
allow me to elucidate the enormous and powerful role of reggae/dancehall music as popular 
protest and account for its potential as part of the construction and /or transformation of civil 
society in Jamaica. The significance of the study is not limited or diminished by this omission but 
this subject is worth future scholarly investigation and research. 
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contact also allowed me to discuss or clarify any issues of contention, request permission 
to audio-tape the interview and establish a convenient date, time and venue for the 
interview to be conducted. Reading the information pack was not the general course of 
action taken by my participants. In fact, most participants tended to care very little about 
formal procedures such as signing consent forms or reading letters and information packs.  
This level of informality is not unusual in the Jamaican context where orality (and 
aurality) is the culturally preferred mode of exchanging information. More often than 
not, I employed a very conversational, interactive interviewing technique even while I 
still asked direct questions and, in instances, probed for further responses. Further, as 
informality and story telling is the fare of all social classes in the Jamaican society (again 
this is a legacy of an inherited oral-aural tradition carried over from the period of 
slavery), the open-ended, unstructured and conversational interview is often privileged 
by researchers conducting qualitative research in this context. (I discuss this aspect in 
greater detail below).  
 
Suffice to say, having worked in the field of journalism as a news reporter and producer 
and within the Jamaican entertainment industry as a publicist for several years, I was 
constantly aware that if I presented myself as too formal especially to the ordinarily 
(informal) Jamaican, the research would appear to them as overly official and hence they 
would speak less freely, become uncomfortable or act in a manner which suggests that 
they were being judged according to the quality of their English language and the extent 
of their eloquence. Given the heavy colour, race, class and status hierarchies at work in 
the society, the interviewer in Jamaica (whether journalist or researcher) must be able to 
speak the language of the interviewees, convey respect and essentially make them feel 
comfortable in their own skin in order to successfully derive the depth and/or 
information-rich data he/she seeks.  I tried to allay these potential problems by 
encouraging participants to speak in the language they prefer and, in instances, adopting 
and mirroring the same informality or casualness of speech and mannerism that they did. 
Most informal people (ordinary folks) responded in the Jamaican vernacular (called 
patois) while the more educated and articulate participants stuck to the more formal 
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English Language. Of course, as is the norm in Jamaica, most participants instinctively 
moved back and forth between these idioms depending on the nature of the information 
or how animated the story was that they were telling.   
 
3.6.1 Accessing and Interviewing Participants  
Gaining access to participants can be one of the frustrating challenges of conducting 
fieldwork. I therefore had to become creative and obliging, taking into account the 
informality of the Jamaican way of life and conducting almost all my interviews in the 
setting of the participants’ institutional location - offices, media houses, police stations, on 
the street, parties and recording studios. For example, one more than one occasion, I had 
to attend an entertainment event (cocktail party, artiste meeting, watch a song recording 
done, which incidentally took several hours) before the space and time was allotted to 
accommodate our discussion. On another occasion, I travelled around the city of Kingston 
for several hours in order for my interviewee (a cabdriver) to facilitate our discussion. 
Gaining access to participants whose institutional locale is the inner city proved to be the 
most problematic. This is because inner city communities in Jamaica are known sites of 
criminality, including intense gang violence and therefore tend to be unsafe for persons 
who do not reside there. Although I had garnered, through both formal interviews and 
informal conversations, the perspectives of poor Jamaicans, the point of view of the inner 
city resident was significant to the study. This is because it is here that some of the most 
violent, disruptive and aggressive protests by Jamaican citizens take place, mainly over 
alleged police brutality and controversial killings. It is also here that the response of the 
state, especially through its security orders, to popular protest most clashes with the 
desire for civil protest and civil society.   
 
Further, it is within the inner city that intense material deprivation, impoverishment, 
garrisonization, extra-legality and political corruption so compromises state governance 
that rogue citizen-actors called dons have been allowed to masquerade as civic-actors and 
install problematic values and political behaviour. Undertaking any kind of research or 
interviewing within the slums, outside the boundaries of journalist covering a story is 
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fraught with risk and usually requires obtaining permission from the local area leader or 
don who either endorses the research and/or implicitly or explicitly decides whether 
residents are allowed to speak openly about their community and its politics. The voice of 
the inner city resident was, however, not silenced or absent from the study. Through 
personal contacts acquired through the snowball network, I was able to speak at length 
with persons who were born in, reside or maintain a presence within particular 
communities. I also attended a very popular dancehall (music) event – Passa Passa  on the 
outskirts of the volatile ghettoes of Tivoli Gardens and employed the participant 
observation technique to get a sense of the general behaviour and attitudes of residents 
within their own spatial environment. I supplemented this with informal (unrecorded 
conversations) with several self-styled ‘bad-man’ (gangsters) about the organization, 
regulations and politics of their community. This conversation was a delicate process. Due 
to known instances of reprisal attacks on inner city residents who dare to speak openly or 
give information (particularly to the police and increasingly to journalists) about extra-
legal happenings in their communities, an acute level of what I describe as ‘informer-
phobia’26 has been consolidated in this context.  
 
It is worth noting that my role as a former journalist might have influenced the tenor of 
the responses given by some participants. For instance, although my questions were non-
threatening, one human rights lobbyist tended to assume a defensive stance and appeared 
to view me more as a journalist asking probing and suspicious questions rather than as an 
academic researcher seeking clarification and an elucidation of the meanings and 
interpretations it attaches to popular protest and citizen politics in Jamaica. Although I 
accept responsibility for failing to put this interviewee at ease, this stance is 
understandable and not uncommon. The Jamaican media and public opinion in general 
has maintained heavy criticism of human rights groups and these organizations have been 
forced to defend themselves in the quest to maintain their credibility and effectiveness. 
                                                 
26Informer–phobia is a fear of being classified as an ‘informer’. I will discuss the institutionalization 
of informer-phobia in the inner city and the wider cultural distaste for dispensing relevant 
information to the authorities in Jamaica in chapter 8. 
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Suffice to say, the transposition of my role as researcher for an alternate or previous 
identity (news journalist) had the unfortunate result of disallowing candid and perhaps 
more subjective (read as personal) perspectives from some participants.   
 
Tied to this is the strong allegiance that some interviewees have to either of Jamaica’s 
main political parties, the Jamaica Labour Party and the People’s National Party and the 
fact that they felt the need to both assume and defend political positions. These 
participants agreed to speak freely and openly only after being convinced of my own non-
partisanship and being persuaded that that my research would not be  detrimental to 
Jamaica’s image overseas. The opposite also proved to be true. The desire to please the 
researcher forced some respondents to offer responses they deem suitable or to provide 
uncritical commentary as if somehow this were a test or a penalty was attached to 
unsuitable responses. For example, one participant invited me to: ‘now you give me your 
opinion’ as if to match my opinion against his or to query the extent to which his 
responses were right or wrong. Finch (1984) writes extensively on this matter of 
interviewees soliciting the opinion of the researcher in order to calibrate the suitability, 
pertinence or correctness of the responses being offered. 
 
3.6.2 The Interview 
Interviews ‘capture the multitude of subjects’ views of a theme so that the researcher 
comes to see the respondents’ complex social world’ (Kvale in Baker, 1999:220-225; cf. 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Merriam et. al, 2002). I chose to employ the in-depth interview 
approach as my main data gathering technique as it allowed me to explore people’s 
subjective experiences and the meaning that they attach to those experiences. In-depth 
interviews are guided conversations utilizing open-ended questions and various forms of 
(informal) probing to facilitate a discussion of issues in a semi-structured or unstructured 
manner (Devine 2002 quoting Lofland and Lofland, 1984:9). I conducted thirty in-depth, 
open–ended, semi-structured interviews and three focus or group interviews during the 
months of January to June 2004. These interviews were taped recorded and lasted for 
approximately one hour, although several exceeded the hour.  My goal throughout my all 
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interviews was to garner detailed descriptions, feelings, attitudes and perspectives 
regarding the character of protest and demonstrations as well as the about the 
performance of the Jamaican state which motivates and rationalizes this type of political 
behaviour consistently witnessed in this context.  
 
I also inquired about specific protest incidents that sparked national interest, the extent 
and quality of the response from the state toward protest activity generally and, 
significantly, the quality of organized (official) civil society in creating a buffer between 
citizen and the state. This was important as I was concerned to explore the extent to 
which the absence or decline of credible, influential and effective civil society groups, 
initiatives and organizations in Jamaica  have resulted in the ‘man in the street turning to 
his own devices’ (Munroe, 1999: ix) by way of violent, disruptive protest and 
demonstrations. Increasingly aggressive protest activity is also reflective of the changing 
political culture (including behaviour, norms, attitudes and values) at work in the 
Jamaican society (see Hope, 2006; Stone, 1991; cf. Gray, 2004).  My goal in this study and 
throughout the fieldwork was to allow my participants to engage in the process of 
rethinking how Jamaicans perform protest and to question whether the existing approach 
has served them well.  
 
3.6.3 Assembling Secondary Data  
Given the nature of this research project – an assessment of the character of popular 
protest and civil society in Jamaica – it became imperative to collect and analyze both 
primary and secondary data. Primary data in this case represents the data which I 
generated through interviews, focus groups as well as direct and/or participant 
observation. Secondary data refers to materials (documents, archival records, audio-visual 
output) already generated and archived by other sources. I use the word ‘text’ to refer to 
the gamut of written and audio-visual materials that became relevant to this study - 
books, journal articles, speeches, reports, surveys, newspaper articles, news items and 
commentary, police statistics and incident reports, speeches, political statements, reports, 
interview transcripts, video footage (of demonstrations and riots) radio and television 
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reports and broadcasts, talk radio discussions and taped conversations, recordings of 
song/performance and pictures. The interrogation of text is important in corroborating 
evidence derived from other sources and they tend to specify issues in greater detail than 
interviews can.  The data provided from these sources may also be different from or not 
available in spoken form. Texts also endure and thus give important historical insight 
(Burns, 2000; Hodder, 1998). Further, ‘as elements of social events, texts have causal 
effects – i.e. they bring about changes in our knowledge (we can learn things from them), 
our beliefs, our attitudes, values and so forth’ (Fairclough, 2003:8). The question in this 
regard becomes not how truthful the account is but how useful it maybe in understanding 
and perhaps in doing something about the subject under investigation – uncivil protest in 
Jamaica.  
 
As is often the case elsewhere in the world, the collection of secondary materials in 
Jamaica can be a tedious affair. The archival database or record-keeping systems in many 
government and non-governmental organizations are, more often than not, archaic or 
non-existent.  Indeed, there does not appear to be a strict policy in Jamaica concerning 
making documents and records available to members of the public. Access to information 
thus tends to be the sole domain of the officials heading particular organizations or 
departments and the persistence of the researcher. While in Jamaica, I collected data from 
the Police Statistics Department, the Ministries of National Security, Water, and Justice, 
the office of the Prime Minister (OPM),  the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), University of the West Indies library, Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and 
Economic Studies - SALISES, Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ) (human rights lobby group), 
Citizens’ Action for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), the People’s National Party 
headquarters (PNPHQ), The Jamaica Observer, Jamaica Gleaner, Radio Jamaica 
Communications Group (RJR), HOT 102 FM, Power 106 FM, Planning Institute of 
Jamaica (PIOJ), Caribbean Institute of Media and Communications (CARIMAC) library, 
the Broadcasting Commission, Creative Production and Training Centre (CPTC), Jamaica 
Information Service (JIS) – the government’s official news agency), the Rural 
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Electrification Programme (REP), Flames Productions, Penthouse Recording Studios and 
Gagamel Studios.  
 
The data I gathered dealt specifically with conventional and unconventional political 
participation and behaviour. For example, I was able to gather a printed and updated set 
of crime statistics and the police yearly incident reports of protests and demonstrations. 
Sadly, due to a glitch in its database, the usual highly detailed incident reports of citizen 
protest (mainly roadblocks) since 1999 are no longer available. This has proven 
problematic as the mere recording of the total number of protests per annum since 2000 
does not provide the sort of details on the character and nature of protest activity that are 
indispensable to this study. This, however, does not make the data any less valuable since 
I was able to supplement these statistics with detailed reportage from Jamaican media 
sources such as the Jamaica Gleaner and the Jamaica Observer as well as radio reportage. 
In addition, I got access to the incident reports for the years prior to 2000 from which I 
can draw reliable conclusions based on certain patterns of behaviour and their degrees of 
consistency and/or variability. I also gathered tape clips, video footage, news reports, 
discussions and interviews that dealt specifically with the subject under investigation - 
protest, crime, general citizen behaviour norms as well as opinion, attitude and 
commentary on said issues from news reporters, editors and media libraries.  
 
I also incorporate vital historical materials and texts (looking at Jamaica’s historical past) 
particularly the narratives, perspectives and rationale for violent protest over time to see 
the extent to which the contemporary dispensation represents continuity or change. 
David Scott (1999), in examining post-colonialism in Jamaica and the movement towards 
the present historical moment, which he labels ‘post-coloniality’, argues for a stronger 
and more definitive link between the historical present and the historical past in attempts 
to understand and explain social reality. The current nature of political protest and citizen 
politics more broadly is therefore not alienated from but conditioned by the historical 
slave rebellions for emancipation and the subsequent construction and socio-political 
development of the Jamaican society. These, as I discuss in chapter 4, in significant ways, 
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have helped determine the character of citizen politics and the emerging civil society. 
Although primary data (interviews, focus groups, observation) garnered from empirical 
investigations often assumes precedence over secondary data (documents) in most social 
science research, I do not privilege one over the other here. My interviews, focus groups 
and direct observations have had equal bearing on my findings and conclusions as 
documentary and audio-visual (media-driven output).  
 
Given the episodic nature of street demonstrations in Jamaica and the mediated avenue 
(radio, television) through which popular protest captures public attention, I relied 
heavily on coverage, reports, facts, narratives and information from the popular press. 
The dearth of contemporary analyses on this mode of political participation in Jamaica 
has served to effectively elevate media outputs as strategic and vital sources of knowledge. 
The increasing and widespread use of this data source by Jamaican academics confirms 
this fact.  The subjective nature of journalistic reportage is undeniable, so I did not try to 
escape it. However, for academic clarity and analytic accuracy, I have supplemented and 
cross-checked the visual and textual data with personal interviews and discussions as well 
as with some of the current analytic work exploring the issue of political behaviour 
(Gray, 2004; Charles, 2002; Meeks, 2000; Munroe, 1999) in Jamaica more broadly. The 
images that I have used as illustrations throughout this study depict various 
representations of protest activity. They are meant to convey both internal narrative – the 
story that the image communicates, as well as external narrative – the social context that 
produced the image and the social relations within which the image is embedded at the 
moment of viewing (Banks, 2001:1-12). While visual images are sometimes meant to be 
read at only the most superficial level (Banks, 2001), the Jamaican media, as media 
everywhere, employ arresting images of some aspect of popular protest, and social 
disorder more generally, to capture the public’s attention and to subliminally invoke 
particular messages. The popularity of television news broadcasts of demonstrations 
appears to derive from this strategic manipulation of information. Indeed, protests and 
demonstrations, at one time, seemed to have formed the main corpus of television news 
output engendering intense competition between two television stations.  
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In my attempt to make sense of the complexities of contemporary protest activity in 
Jamaica, I therefore foregrounded media output and sought the meanings that people 
attach to it. Through a critical interpretive look at the visual images (TV footage, press 
pictures) of protest activity and with an awareness of the theoretical attributes which 
constitute a civil and uncivil society (see Table 2.1, chapter 2), I asked the following 
questions of my participants: Do protestors behave differently when the media is present 
at the site of a demonstration?; who are these protestors?; how do they behave (what 
exactly do they do)?; why are they doing it?; are you satisfied with how media has 
covered protest?; (if not) how would you have preferred to have it covered? These types 
of questions were analytically significant as they placed media at the centre of political 
behaviour and showed effectively how this interaction between protest participants and 
the (television) news journalist influence the manner in which Jamaican citizens elect to 
conduct their politics. On a much wider scale, I took into account the general output by 
Jamaican media, especially radio because of its increasing popularity, ‘in your face-ness’ 
and widespread usage as an avenue of complaint and debate. The goal was to show the 
extent to which media itself has helped to shape the current values, attitudes and norms 
at work in the Jamaican society.  
 
3.7 DATA ANALYSIS 
The sources of data in field research – observations, texts and interviews – all share in 
common a focus on language and so, in keeping with the interpretative theme, I focused 
on language and employed one form of discourse analysis (text analysis) as my main 
method of interpreting and analyzing the data. Text may be written or visual material or 
spoken conversations which, once transcribed, can be deconstructed. This is what 
Fairclough (1992) refers to as formal discourse analysis. It is important to recognise that 
texts are open to multiple interpretations. Indeed, ‘as the text is reread in different 
contexts, it is given new meanings, often contradictory and always socially embedded’ 
(Hodder, 1998:111; see also Fairclough, 1992). ‘Text and context are in a continual state of 
tension, each defining and redefining the other, saying and doing things differently 
through time’ (Hodder, 1998:112). Newspaper reportage of protest may thus differ from 
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television coverage as well as from personal perspectives recorded in interview transcripts 
and from the statistical evidence and police reports on protest incidents. Indeed, as one 
interviewee told me (PN1- see appendix) ‘when you see a thing happen and you hear it 
pon de [on the] news, its two different things’. My aim is therefore to explore multiple 
and conflicting voices as well as differing and interacting perspectives and interpretations. 
I now outline the ways in which I attempted to make sense of the data, a process which 
Denzin (1998:314) calls the ‘art and politics of interpretation’. 
 
3.7.1  Analysing the Data 
My goal in this research was to achieve a contextual, situated understanding of popular 
protest in Jamaica, hence I attempted to uncover the meanings particular types of protest 
carry for those involved. I then described, based on my interpretation and that of my 
interviewees, what such knowledge may demonstrate about civilian politics in the 
Jamaican society. I then cross-referenced this knowledge to the data provided through 
documents and other texts. In other words, I constructed a system of analysis dependent 
on thick descriptions and thick interpretations. The importance of intertextuality is 
significant here. Intertextuality refers to: 
how texts draw upon, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts. 
It is also partly a matter of the assumptions and presuppositions people make 
when they speak and write. What is [therefore] ‘said’ in a text is always said 
against the background of what is ‘unsaid’ – what is made explicit is always 
grounded in what is left implicit’ (Fairclough, 2003:17).  
 
The newspaper articles, reports, commentary, speeches, recorded conversations, police 
reports, statistics, visual footage and observation all form an intertextual chain with the 
actual performance of protest on the street because elements of each are interpreted and 
incorporated and represented within the study and serve to either confirm perspectives 
and/or extend the interpretation of the protest phenomenon. Of course, the process of 
making sense of this enormous mountain of data did not just happen. Given the vast 
quantity of data - documents and interview transcripts (some 350 typed pages) that I had 
to confront, it was necessary to code the data according to themes. I read through the 
hundreds of pages of transcripts several times as well as other numerous documents – 
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speeches, newspaper reports and commentary, police incident reports on protest activities 
as well as other texts relating to the subject. I highlighted, using different colour markers, 
various themes, some overlapping, others contrasting. The following table outlines the 
initial narrative themes and sub-themes that emerged from the data: 
 
Table 3. 2 – Narrative Themes 
  Main Themes      Sub-themes 
– Protest Incentives and Rationale  – Justice, injustice, survival 
– Protest Descriptions  – Uncivil protest tactics 
– Attitudes to violent protest/peaceful 
protest  
– Values and norms 
– (Perspectives on) state response  – State performance and  
accountability 
– Politicians and protest – Partisan politics and its 
impact on protest 
– Media and protest  – Impact of media coverage 
and treatment 
– Talk show as protest 
–  The state/quality of civil society   – Performance of official civil 
society groups 
  
 
Continuous sifting, deliberation and reflection on the data allowed me to recognise 
significant trends and patterns in the data and isolate related themes. For example, in 
identifying the sub-themes above, I unearth the possible linkages between feelings of 
injustice and the need to survive (poverty) with the inclination to stage protest. How the 
Jamaican state responds to the sources of protest also possibly influences the frequency 
and brand of political rebellion undertaken. I also identified potential explanatory 
linkages between partisan politics and the character of protest as well as the impact of 
media coverage and treatment of protest on the kinds of protest performance assumed by 
Jamaican citizen-protestors. After several readings of the data which fall within the main 
clusters, I discovered the multiple uses and emphasis on certain words and expressions 
which facilitated greater understanding of the complexities of protest activity in this 
political context and thus thick descriptions in the writing-up phase. For example, the 
notions ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ were common themes ascribed as the rationale for protest 
by my interviewees.  
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I therefore placed these within the cluster labelled protest incentives and rationale and 
created a sub-theme which includes justice. This concept thus assumed centrality in my 
interpretation and analysis of the data. I also took account of the frequent usage of words 
such as disruptive, violent, excessive and uncivil during classifications of protest activity 
by interviewees within all clusters of the sample (refer to sample outline in section 3.5.2 
above). These discursive elements were highly significant to my analysis as they allowed 
me to compare them against my theoretical framework and the research objectives. 
Specifically, the discourses constantly spoke directly to the character of contemporary 
protest as my interviewees have seen, lived and experienced it. Because the incentives for 
protest is seen to be credible by so many of my interviewees, I also had to determine how 
clusters of beliefs, feelings and opinions were related to each other, to what extent they 
were in conflict and what this revealed about the larger phenomenon under 
investigation. This was important as it helped to confirm or disconfirm any 
preconceptions and pet theories that I may have had about the nature of popular protest 
in this context. This required that I be constantly aware of the social context (and at 
times, the political leanings) which underlay the perspectives on offer and to be able to 
navigate through contradictory opinions and positions.  
 
The discourses of concern to this study have to do with conceptions of civil politics, and 
specifically, civil protest. I have therefore found it useful to match interviewees’ 
concerns, perspectives and feelings about popular protest against the existing reality of 
protest as embodied in the text such as newspaper reports, audio-visual materials, police 
reports etc. The views of students, some unemployed and self-employed persons as well as 
those who work in creative industries (reggae entertainers, talk show hosts) can be seen 
as shaped by their own personal experience of protest but also by an often anti-
establishment discourse based on their views of and feelings towards authority, 
particularly political authority. This did not, as I discovered, mean that they did not form 
critical opinions of the current practice of protest operative in Jamaica. At the same time, 
the language of politicians, political activists and public sector representatives represent 
an insider knowledge and expertise of the workings of the system and the challenges that 
 105
impinge on the state’s capacity to act. This did not so much undermine the rationale of 
the ordinary citizen whose discourse is justice and survivalism (see chapter 6) but it 
helped to strike a balance.  
 
3.7.2 Discourse Analysis and Media 
Since the arrival of the electronic mass media, popular protest worldwide has made an 
almost paradigmatic shift from an activity of public participation to include an activity of 
visual spectacle. Media in Jamaica have come to assume such a centrality in protest 
politics in this context, in terms of coverage and treatment, that many of the meanings 
and interpretations that my interviewees attached to popular protest was constructed 
from their interaction with the media, particularly television. The mass media in this 
context also provides a mechanism through which citizens seek and project their 
identities and engage in actual or vicarious behaviours. In fact, ‘through media and their 
symbols, we make sense of our lives through the frame of a dramatic structure’ (Sayre & 
King, 2003:12). To this extent, the perspectives held by my interviewees cannot be 
divorced from what they see on television or read in the newspapers over time and 
which, no doubt, predisposed them to a particular understanding of, and relationship to 
protest.  
 
Interestingly also, the innate emotiveness and tendency to orality of the Jamaican people, 
embodied in how they choose to perform protest, particularly viz. a viz. media, renders 
media discourse fundamental to this analysis. For example, it is worth noting the 
tendency to drama in the Jamaican personality which emerged as discursive elements of 
the transcribed text. Indeed, many utterances which I encountered in my perusal of the 
interview transcripts did not simply describe a state of affairs but were so intense as to do 
what Silverman (1993) sees as ‘performing’ an action. Uttering such performances, he 
argues, ‘commits speakers to their consequences’ (Silverman, 1993:120 quoting Austin, 
1962). For instance, when my interviewee, in describing how Jamaicans protest, declares, 
‘we bun dung de place’ [we burn down the place], he is not necessarily describing the 
collective state of minds of the Jamaican citizenry or picturing a reality but rather 
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performing some action. Indeed, there seemed, sometimes, to be a thin line between 
describing an action and prescribing a course of action (see chapter 7).  
 
The gist of media discourse analysis usually involves comparing and evaluating media 
(television and radio) representations, in terms of what they exclude, what they 
foreground and what they background, where they come from and what factors and 
interests influence their formulation and projection and so forth (Fairclough, 1995). 
Television representation, for instance, is not just constructed portrayals, visual stories 
about what is happening in the world but also, to a great extent, talk. ‘This talk is public 
talk, usually talk taking place in a studio. It consists of people talking to themselves but its 
communicative intentionality is such that it is aimed at the television audience beyond 
the studio (Dahlgren, 1995). That media is often owned and controlled by dominant 
economic institutions impacts on the types of coverage it offers (Street, 2001; Herman & 
Chomsky, 1994). At the same time, it is worth noting that this type of political economy 
approach has been criticized for being reductionist in its approach to texts and for 
assuming ideological effects of texts upon audiences without investigating how audiences 
read texts (Fairclough, 1995:47). This of course does not mean that ideology is absent but 
it must also account for the private, individualized contexts in which people consume 
media products, in this instance, how Jamaican citizens respond to the mediated images of 
protest they receive and the effects it has on their definition of civil protest.  
 
Media discourse analysis also involves being conscious of more than just the immediate 
situation of the communicative event (in this case, coverage of a protest) but also the 
wider social and cultural context (in which such protest takes place). This is because the 
media are shaped by the wider society while, at the same time, playing an essential role in 
social and cultural changes. The analysis of media texts must reflect these changing 
constructions and meanings. For example, although journalists talk about stories, 
journalists, according to Fairclough (1995:91) ‘don’t only recount events, they also 
interpret and explain them, try to get people to see things and to act in certain ways, and 
aim to entertain’. Fairclough identifies two facets of media narrative that are relevant 
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here: (a) ‘the actual story, a basic chronologically ordered series of events including the 
participants involved in them; and (b) the presentation, the way in which the story is 
realized and organized as a particular text’ (1995:91). It is therefore this multiplicity of 
purpose that I am obliged to take into account in the Jamaican media’s treatment and 
coverage of protests as well as the treatment of issues of complaint by callers to radio talk 
shows. In my analysis of my conversations with news reporters, editors and radio talk 
show hosts about protest politics – how they view protest events, how protesters relate to 
them and how they re-present the events that they witness to the wider public, I 
examined whether the stories the journalists recount of protest are fictional or factual and 
/or the extent to which they aim to inform, educate or simply entertain their listening or 
viewing audience. In other words, I remained conscious of the fact that all media is a 
representation of reality and the dramatic and sensational representation of protest events 
maybe a response to commercial pressures to entertain (Street, 2001). How a protest event 
or issue is therefore negotiated, mediated, constructed, re-presented and/or interpreted by 
the journalist/talk show host not only reveal much about the quality of civil action and 
civil discourse in the Jamaican context but exposes the extent to which the media 
becomes a constituent element of the very character of popular citizen action (see chapter 
7 for an extension of this discussion). 
 
3.8  Summary of Data Analysis 
Overall, the analysis in this study gave space to a diversity of voices which represented 
multiple perspectives. The following chart demonstrates how the various voices in the 
study are categorised for analytical purposes.  
 
Table 3.3  Voices Represented in Analysis 
Elite Voices    Ordinary Voices  Ordinary Voices 
                                                                             
  
     
 
Academics, 
Political actors  
Govt. officials 
Reporters 
Public commentators 
Texts - documents 
audio-visual materials, 
statistics, newspaper 
Lawyers,  
Radio talk 
show hosts, 
Activists 
Entertainers 
Students 
Rural dwellers 
 
Unemployed 
Self-employed 
Hustlers 
Gangsters 
Garrison dwellers 
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I must emphasize that the elite voices, while indispensable, were not positioned as more 
credible or legitimate in the study. Rather, as the above table indicates, elite voices were 
given as much space as the ordinary voices. In fact, many times both sets of voices were 
essentially interactive (as indicated by arrows). Other times, they challenged and 
contradicted each other based on individual interpretation of certain themes and/or 
shared similar meanings. This is not to say that there are not hegemonic discourses of 
power based on race, class and social status that may have helped to shape some ideas 
interviewees’ hold of civil behaviour and therefore civil action and civil discourse. I tried 
to be open-minded about the frames of meaning that emerge mostly from the data. This 
meant attempting to understand themes, patterns, relationships and associations and then 
deriving firm analytical judgment and theories, which aim to account for the 
phenomenon under study. 
 
3.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the epistemological and ontological considerations underpinning 
the methodology employed in this study. It articulated a meta-theoretical framework 
based on qualitative interpretivism and social constructionism. I employed aspects of 
structuration theory and discourse analysis to make sense of popular protest and citizen 
politics in the Jamaican context. This analytic framework acknowledges the role of 
structure (political and social institutions) in shaping political behaviour but extends 
beyond structure to take stock of individual agency and citizen responsibility in shaping 
the character of civilian politics and the quality of civil society. The chapter also explored 
the quality and politics of the relationship between the researcher and researched as well 
as the more practical and procedural issues of gathering, organizing and analysing the 
data. Here, I outlined how the data was categorised into various themes in the search for 
discursive patterns. I also delineated the diversity of voices (including audio-visual text 
and performance) in my attempts to interpret the data and to draw theoretical 
judgements.  It is to the actual case study on Jamaica and the more substantive analysis of 
my research findings that I now turn in the remaining chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Collective Bargaining By Riot: Citizen Politics in 
Jamaica Since Slavery. 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Jamaica’s history is the history of protest. For close to four hundred years, popular protest, in 
all its forms and by every usage of the term (riots, uprisings, rebellions, disturbance, revolts 
and demonstrations) has been the official answer of the Afro-Jamaican people to enslavement, 
colonization, domination, tyranny, oppression and injustice. This long-continuing resistance 
has, as its historical and political starting point, the liberation movement involving African 
slaves, which stretches from the period of the English conquest of Jamaica (1655- 1665), the 
Maroon Wars of the mid-17th and 18th centuries to the massive slave uprisings from 1831 
onwards which eventually culminated in (full) emancipation in 1838. Riots and civil 
disturbances also persisted throughout post-emancipation Jamaican society, becoming as 
commonplace as slave revolts were during slavery. Simmonds (1983:1) captures this 
extraordinary attention to popular collective action when she argues that ‘to protest against 
negative developments and stagnation, Jamaicans assembled and participated in acts of open 
defiance and violence’. Indeed, the contemporary historical account exhumes over eighty 
separate instances of violent disturbances and spontaneous popular direct action in the 
(immediate) post-emancipation period alone.  
 
The political scholarship, for instance, gives particular theoretical weight to the landmark 
Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865, positioning it as a symbol of the failure of (colonial) governance 
in Jamaica and, although less explicitly, as a precursor to the persistence and indispensability 
of protest in this context (Manley, 1974; 1991; Sherlock & Bennett, 1998; Dick, 2002). This 
was manifested later in the violent Labour unrest of the 1930s and 1940s, the agitation for 
Universal Suffrage in 1940s, Jamaican Independence and Black Power movements of the 1960s 
 110
(including the Walter Rodney riots of 1968), the violent partisan political upheavals of the 
1970s as well as even the more contemporary popular action, embodied in the fuel protests of 
1979, 1985 and 1999 (Charles, 1977; Munroe, 1999; Meeks, 2000). An examination of the 
political meaning of these extraordinary events is thus imperative if one is to obtain theoretical 
insights into the profound ways in which popular struggle not only helped to shape the 
Jamaican society but also determine the character of its politics. It is therefore through the 
historical lens of this deep and abiding resistance movement that I attempt to fully understand 
and make sense of the distinctive personality and temperament of citizen politics and the 
character and quality of civil society in present-day Jamaica. In this chapter, I explore the 
nature of the struggles of the early Afro-Jamaicans against British plantation slavery — their 
modes of organization, leadership, tactics and resources – and significantly, the extraordinary 
politico-historical circumstances which rendered the movement indispensable and 
necessitated and institutionalized an apparatus of violence in the performance of political 
rebellion in this post-colonial society.  
 
It is not my aim to undertake a revisionist interpretation of slave emancipation or to 
regurgitate the history of the period. Rather, my attempt is to fill in significant gaps in the 
historical-political scholarship by taking into account the manner in which the Jamaican 
people organized themselves and mobilized politically to confront the issues and conditions of 
slavery. I argue that the social, economic and political oppression as well as the 
institutionalised racism which attended colonial and post-colonial society is to be seen as more 
than just a precursor to the emergence and formation of particular classes of Jamaican citizens 
with differing levels of power, wealth and status. It also has to do with the  divergent 
interpretations of and responses to their condition, which not only made way for a variegated 
civil society but also the emergence of different approaches, especially by poor, marginalized 
and powerless sectors to political protestation and negotiation. In other words, the violent 
political tactics resorted to during the slave emancipation period – rebellions, insurrections, 
riots – are, for all intents and purposes, predecessors to the unconventional character of 
contemporary popular protest which the re-negotiation of power and rights inevitably enacted 
in the Jamaican society.  
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Using general references and specific incidents, I will therefore argue for the emergence of a 
militant black population in Jamaica with its own unique forms of social organization and 
political behaviour – a development which not only defies the traditional European elite view 
of them as an acquiescent people but which challenges the prevailing definition of civilization 
and civility. At the same time, while certain continuities with regard to the rationale and 
seeming indispensability of this brand of popular protest are evident, I argue that given the 
radical socio-political transformations which have taken place in the Jamaican society since 
slavery and the political tolerance for protests and civic participation, the absence of 
comparable changes with regard to the contemporary approaches and tactics employed during 
citizen protestation is an anomaly which needs to be transformed and transcended.  
 
4.2  THE SYNDICATION OF SLAVERY & WHITE POWER IN JAMAICA: AN 
OVERVIEW. 
If one is to understand the politics of protest in Jamaica and the reasons this brand of 
citizen politics and participation has come to play such a central role in this society, it is 
important to go as far back as the evolution of the sugar plantation in West Indian society 
as a whole. This is because: 
the West Indian sugar and slave plantation brought into existence a special kind 
of society created for sugar; Jamaican customs and culture were fashioned by 
sugar; sugar for two hundred years, was the only reason behind Jamaica’s 
existence as a centre for human habitation (Sherlock and Bennett, 1998: 157 
quoting Hearne, 1965). 
Since the mid-1600s, sugar, as a commodity for export, carried tremendous economic 
potential for European planters and by the start of the 18th century, sugar had established 
itself as king, replacing tobacco, ginger, indigo, cotton and coffee as agricultural 
mainstays. The West Indian islands had by this time become the jewel in England’s 
crown as insatiable European demand for the product had made a West Indian plantation 
an enormously profitable investment. So sweet were the returns on sugar that European 
nations even went to war with each other to defend their possessions abroad (Augier et 
al., 1960). Within the British Empire, Jamaica inspired the greatest interest and hence the 
highest investor confidence. This island was not only the largest of the West Indian 
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possessions but was possessed with available undeveloped land, which offered investors a 
more favourable opportunity than the more fully developed smaller islands of the Eastern 
Caribbean (Augier et al., 1960). Sugar, in other words, enhanced the economic 
importance of the island.  
However, the nature of sugar production was such that considerable capital was needed 
to set up a factory. Machinery was expensive and for a plantation (or sugar estate) to run 
economically, it had to be big enough to keep the factory constantly supplied with cane 
throughout the crop season. Each estate then had to be both a farm and a factory. The 
pattern established was clearly not for small yeoman farmers but large estates which were 
heavily capitalized, in short, the plantation system (Parry & Sherlock, 1971:66-67; Hart, 
1965). Since running a sugar plantation was a highly expensive undertaking, sugar 
became a rich man’s crop, which made the British planters and merchants connected to 
the trade in sugar largely people of financial substance and power. The sugar estate thus 
became the bastion of white power (Sherlock and Bennett, 1998) and the ‘plantocracy’ 
they created assumed the only voice of West Indian society (Augier et. al, 1960). The 
white planter class went to desperate lengths to maintain this source of livelihood and 
power. But in order to meet the demands of an ever-expanding sugar production and 
trade, the sugar estate required a large and disciplined force of cheap, unskilled labour 
capable of withstanding tremendous physical exertion in a warm climate. Enter African 
slaves and the induction of slavery in the Caribbean.  
It is a historical truism that the basis of slavery was economic. However, ‘the attitude of 
the white planter towards the Negro slave was one of genuine contempt arising from an 
ingrained belief in his own racial superiority. In his eyes, the Negro was an inferior being, 
less than a man, towards whom one may be condescending if he “keeps his place” ’ (Hart, 
1965:15). Throughout the 18th century, African slaves thus became the most important 
part of an estate’s stock - having been classified with the estate animals. Hart quotes the 
words of a planter-historian who provides a rationale for this above classification: 
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In general, they are devoid of genius, and seem almost incapable of making any 
progress in civility or science. They have no plan or system of morality among 
them. Their barbarity to their children debases their nature even below that of 
brutes. They have no moral sensations, no taste but for women, gormandizing and 
drinking to excess, no wish but to be idle. They are represented by all authors as 
the vilest of the human kind… [They are] savages in every sense of the word, 
marked by bestial manners, stupidity and vices (p. 16). 
 In order to extract maximum profit from their labour in the shortest possible time, the 
planters therefore recklessly sacrificed the Negro life. The slaves were thus driven to 
extremes, kept hard at work by lashes of the whip, subjected to severe beatings, torture 
and bodily mutilation for the slightest offence or disobedience. They were given no relief. 
Some kind of work was found for every slave for as much of the working day as possible, 
and by night, work continued by the light of lamp and torches (Augier et al., 1960; Hart, 
1965; 2002). Parry & Sherlock, (1971:146) writes that: 
the planting process was extremely and unnecessarily labourious and could have 
been done far more quickly and efficiently by the use of ploughs; but a planter 
had little incentive to buy ploughs and to train ploughmen and plough cattle 
when he could dispose, out of crop, of the labour of a large gang of slaves.   
Indeed, it would appear that the large garrison of white slave owners had built up a 
deliberate tyrannical system to dehumanize and brutalize the slave.  The presumption 
was that the imposition of rigorous discipline would avert any notion of open rebellion, 
including personal attacks, or disobedience among the slave population. Thus, typical 
penalties included flogging for threatening a white person, the loss of a hand for striking a 
white person, the loss of an ear for theft and for repeated thefts, hanging. The 
punishment for mutiny was savage in the extreme and, in some places, included being 
burned alive (Augier et al. 1960; Parry & Sherlock, 1971). In the face of an absence of any 
intermediary or intervening force to provide effective restraints on the planter’s 
behaviour or institutional structures for redress for the slaves, brutal acts of violence upon 
the slave community were habitual and numerous. The introduction of sugar was much 
more than the spread of a profitable crop and a new industry. It also enacted a revolution 
which changed the whole racial composition and social structure of the West Indian 
islands. In other words, the workings of plantation society reflected the emerging 
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political stratification of West Indian society along racial lines, as the following 
characterization by Sherlock & Bennett (1998:151) illustrates: 
Black slave and white master; slave quarters and great house; provision ground 
and plantation; outlawed [African indigenous] religions, cults and established 
church; justice for whites and legally instituted injustice for blacks; civil rights for 
whites and restricted movement for blacks; freedom of movement for whites; 
pickney gangs for blacks and schools for whites; the ‘bongo image’ against the 
‘busha image’, yard-talk and English; slave and freeman. 
 
The landless, whether white or coloured, and the ever-increasing number of Negro slaves 
played no part in government except as recipients of laws. Property and capital were 
necessary for membership of the ruling classes and government was the privilege of a 
small influential group. Among the free and white, there were further sub-divisions based 
on wealth and social standing. There were also distinctions among the slave population – 
brown vs. black, Creole vs. African, skilled vs. unskilled, household vs. praedial or field 
(Sherlock & Bennett, 1998; Augier et al., 1960; Parry & Sherlock, 1971). Clearly, in the 
words of Parry & Sherlock (1971:156), ‘a favoured place in the slave hierarchy did not 
necessarily make a man contented with slavery’. Every aspect of this hierarchical, colour, 
class and status-coded plantation life represented conflict and became fertile incubators 
and ready catalysts for rebellion and resistance. Much of the historical literature up to the 
mid-1980s, however, assumes an almost imperialist perspective and emphasizes the 
economic aspects of slavery, particularly the decline of sugar even while it de-emphasizes 
the role played by slaves in lending the issue of their emancipation more urgency and in 
strengthening the hand of the abolitionists (see, Curtin, 1968; Augier et al, 1960; Parry & 
Sherlock, 1971; Hall, 1959). In other words, these accounts give only scant attention to 
the relentless struggles waged by slaves against their oppressors and instead focus on the 
brutal repression of slave rebellions by white slave masters and later a British colonial 
administration. Shattering the myth of a docile people, acquiescing in slavery, it was 
popular resistance involving thousands of Afro-Jamaican slaves in open rebellions as well 
as more concealed resistance, which forcefully signalled the birth of citizen politics in 
Jamaica.  
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Riots, as the chief collective bargaining tools, became the central means through which 
the oppressed peoples challenged slavery and the hegemony of colonial rule and 
demanded redress against repressive laws and deplorable living conditions. It was in the 
heart of the alliances formed by the slaves to achieve emancipation and later against 
oppressive post-emancipation conditions that some of the violent tools of political 
negotiation and participation that Jamaica witnesses today were honed and some 
semblance of civil society promulgated. I therefore examine as a point of departure the 
context within which some of these alliances were formed and suggest that these 
developments ought to be theoretically accounted for in historical discussions about the 
early development of civil society in modern Jamaica.  
 
4.3  ORGANIZING AND MOBILIZING FOR FREEDOM – EARLY GLIMPSES OF 
CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAMAICA. 
Students of politics who subscribe to the often rigid interpretation of civil society 
prescribed in scholarship as ‘organized public life and free associations beyond the 
tutelage of the state’ (Alexander, 1998:67; cf. my discussion in chapter 2) would arrive at 
the very illusory conclusion that a civil society was non-existent in Jamaica during 
plantation slavery and only emerged post-emancipation with the formation of official 
welfare organizations aimed at assisting the freed Afro-Jamaican peoples. Indeed, within 
the spatial environment of plantation society marked by social exclusion and division, 
where African slaves were classified as chattels and had no civil rights, civil society, in its 
most formal construct, was not allowed to develop. Where some semblance of 
associationalism existed, it would appear, in Marxian terms, to be fraudulent and 
redundant. This is because, hemmed physically and psychologically within the 
boundaries of the sugar estate with political representation and religious instruction 
sealed from him, the slave existed almost wholly at the mercy of his master. Tribal and 
linguistic differences largely barred communication while festivities, which lent 
themselves to camaraderie and could be distinguishable as an aspect of unionization, were 
minimized. Organization and mobilization was naturally difficult to foster under these 
circumstances.  
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This does not mean that horizontal relations were not fostered and sufficient amounts of 
social capital were not generated amongst the slave population and manifested in 
collective action. Indeed, despite his status as mere property, the slave remained very 
human in a social sense  with a rooted objection to being forced to work as an animal 
(Hart, 1965). Hence, civil society, more loosely defined as ‘the networks and relationships 
which may or may not crystallize into [official] groups but which connect individuals 
together in some non-coercive reciprocally purposive manner’ (Munroe, 1999:78), was 
inevitable. Despite being effectively detached from their cultural roots, indigenous 
religions and social norms, which emphasized brotherhood and family responsibility 
(Barnett, 2001), the African inhabitants of plantation society, in many ways, resurrected 
their lost social capital and begun to lay what I argue were the building blocks of  
(loosely) organized, if not official civil society.  I discuss in the following sections how the 
slaves organized themselves and engaged in powerful collective action in the face of 
overwhelming odds to secure their freedom and later to struggle for rights and justice as 
freed peoples.  I, however, wish to draw as an example of the early formation of 
associationalism and civil society (albeit loosely structured, informal and fluid) the 
situational and analytic paradigm of the street-based entrepreneurship and informalism 
within which Afro-Caribbean slaves were heavily involved during and after slavery.  
 
I emphasize the centrality of the street (surrounding market centres) as the amphitheatre 
of not only economic, cultural and political activity but also the theoretical context 
within which social capital materialized and allowed for the transformation of Jamaican 
slaves into central actors in the slavery resistance and post-emancipation popular 
movements. The market and the street acquired prominence during slavery but 
particularly during the transitional apprenticeship (period of half-freedom between 1834-
1838 aimed at preparing slaves for full freedom) and post-emancipation phases when the 
British planters and estate owners, aiming to escape the enormous costs and burden to 
feed a massive slave population, allotted both male and female slaves plots of land (later 
called provision grounds) on which to cultivate their own crops, on their own time, for 
their own consumption. Both male and female slaves exploited this opportunity by selling 
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the surplus from their provision grounds at weekend markets. The very exercise of 
planting, harvesting and selling their own crops transformed the provision grounds into 
an arena of economic independence and material betterment as well as a source of 
personhood and personal autonomy (Sherlock & Bennett, 1998; Momsen, 1996). The 
urban slave could, for example, hire himself out, decide on the length of his working day, 
and to a certain extent, determine his income. Given that the daily work routine and 
leisure activities of urban slaves were much less closely monitored than those of 
plantation slaves, this offered the former the kind of lifestyle which permitted indulgence 
in a range of activities (Simmonds, 1984).  
 
In fact, so important had the Sunday market become that the otherwise stringent laws 
restricting the mobility of the slaves were relaxed, at least where marketing activities 
were concerned. As higglers, peddlers and roving vendors took advantage of this 
weekend flexibility and freedom, the streets around market centres quickly 
transmogrified into vibrant shopping places, where urbanized slaves, particularly women, 
exchanged goods, made their living, fostered enduring friendships, built horizontal 
relationships, feasted, entertained each other, shared gossip, debated and quarrelled (cf. 
Sheller, 1997; Momsen, 1996; Sherlock & Bennett, 1998 – refer to chapter 15; French, 
1995). It is this arena of small-scale entrepreneurship, marketization and informalism, 
dominated by a ready and active network of urban slaves exhibiting elements of civic 
engagement and social cohesion, which ultimately created an enabling environment for 
organized slave resistance in Jamaica. The operation of Sunday and Saturday markets in 
major towns and the convergence of hundreds of slaves provided a fluidity of movement 
and allowed them to become periodically immersed in the mass of shoppers and sellers as 
well as assume some measure of anonymity.   
 
It is also worth noting that recent historical scholarship on slave resistance, particularly 
those seeking to engender Caribbean history, is awash with evidentiary transcripts of the 
impact of women in this domain during and after slavery (Shepherd, 1995; Beckles & 
Shepherd, 1996; Wilmot, 1995; Reddock, 1995; Mintz, 1996; Momsen, 1996; Sheller, 
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1997)27. Together, these analyses confirm that it was the near permanent presence and 
cohesiveness of slave women (and later freed women) in the public spaces of towns, and 
notably, their monopolization of the public spaces of the markets which played an 
important role in the development of a politically active Afro-Jamaican public. Indeed, it 
was the presence of vast and highly visible networks of women that facilitated crucial 
flows of information between town centres and the rural countryside and between urban 
markets and (plantation) fields which enabled the slaves to orchestrate and execute 
collective action, including various forms of resistance in the cause of freedom and social 
rights (after emancipation). Indeed, as I argue later, given their numerical dominance in 
urban public spaces, it was also women who filled the streets and squares during popular 
mobilizations or demonstrations and played impressive roles in some of the most violent 
public disturbances and riots (Sheller, 1997; cf. Wilmot, 1995).  
 
The flexibility enjoyed by urban slaves in the economic sphere also extended to social 
activities, which itself influenced the associationalism indispensable to the construction 
and definition of civil society. Slave leisure included seasonal or holiday activities such as 
Christmas and Easter. These were officially sanctioned by the authorities during and after 
slavery and closely supervised by masters and the police. It also comprised various social 
events which took place throughout the year, (sometimes illegally and without consent) 
during leisure time, on weekends and at nights (Simmonds, 1984), such as  ‘Janoe Canoe’ 
                                                 
27 I consider in greater detail elsewhere, the differential roles of women in Jamaican popular 
protest. See, for example, Johnson, H. (Forthcoming) ‘(Defiant) Rituals of Resistance: Situating 
Higgler Women in the Protest Performance of the Jamaican Poor’. See also chapters 6 and 7 of this 
work where I position the media as part and parcel of the constitution of feminine power and 
draw into focused, critical analysis the controversial protest performance of disadvantaged women 
as a credible and powerful aspect of citizen action. As my discussion in chapter 6 will illustrate, 
this development is also the most manifest precursor to the character of present-day street-side 
markets in urban Jamaican and importantly the aggressive popular struggles and resistance still 
being undertaken by the collectivities of private individuals - higglers, street vendors, hustlers – 
who operate here to defend their claim of ownership and/or customary rights to this public space. 
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(now referred to as ‘Jonkunnu’)28, other music and dance festivals, as well as carnivals, 
involving large processions of extravagantly costumed musicians and dancers. These 
social gatherings not only gave the slave community unique opportunities to come 
together to celebrate the joyous aspects of their African heritage and light-hearted 
entertainment, but offered them a cathartic escape from their appalling, routinized and 
tyrannized existence on the sugar plantations as well as momentary laxity of supervision 
and control (Simmonds, 1984).  Although held under some measure of control and 
toleration, these forms of social congregation were largely feared and disdained by the 
white planter class and thought to contain within them a subversive potential. Slave 
festivities were generally regarded by slave masters as grotesque habits which were 
morally unhealthy. Horns, shells and drums, for example, were considered to be uncouth 
or rude instruments and therefore forbidden.   
 
It was, however, their disruptive and potentially destabilizing effect on the white slave-
owning class which led to widespread concerns about the non-enforcement of laws 
regulating slave festivities. Simmonds (1984) outlines in great detail the arguments made 
in support of the political condemnation and prohibition of slave entertainment, many of 
which were designed, she argues, to ‘prevent the negroes from having sufficient time to 
bring their dangerous plots to maturity’ (1984:4). Repression and cultural denigration 
notwithstanding, it was this cultural sphere of urban slave entertainment, involving so-
called ‘barbarous music’ from the ‘negro drums’ (ibid, 1984), as well as the activities of the 
economic sphere, which encouraged sociability and camaraderie among the community 
of African slaves in the West Indies, fostered social cohesion, horizontal relationship 
building and networking (as opposed to the vertical, top-down, hierarchy installed on the 
plantation) and generated requisite levels of trust among these enslaved peoples. Perhaps 
                                                 
28 Jonkunnu (John Canoe) is a Jamaican traditional dance of African origin. A strong feature of the 
dance is its characters, all males, whose movements match their roles. Some of these characters are 
Devil, Cowhead, Horsehead, Actor Boy, Belly Woman, Warrior and Wild Indian. The rhythm of 
the Jonkunnu music is quite distinct from other ritual folk music with its fife and rattling drum, 
carried on the shoulders and played with sticks. See http://www.jcdc.org.jm/folk_forms.htm 
 
 
 120
more importantly, it was this sort of Putnamian social capital formation, civic 
engagement and associationalism – (bowling together) – that later translated into political 
activism and became indispensable to the slavery resistance movement. It is, hence, 
within this civic context that I seek to understand and come to terms with the nature of 
the collective struggles undertaken by Afro-Jamaican peoples.  
 
4.4 SLAVE RESISTANCE – ORGANIZATION, RESOURCES AND TACTICS. 
Although this chapter has, as a chronological starting point, the 1800s, slave resistance in 
Jamaica can be traced as far back as the 17th century. This struggle for freedom and justice 
assumed three significant forms (Patterson, 1969; Sherlock & Bennett, 1998; Hart, 1965):  
1) Flight from the Plantations – Here, slaves staged ‘runaways’ from the sugar 
plantations to form independent, garrisoned settlements in the mountainous 
regions of the island. (They later acquired the name maroons or runaway slaves).  
 
2) Passive Resistance – This took the form of individual action in which some slaves 
refused to work or eat. Other forms of hidden transcripts included sabotage on 
the estates, the use of poison, arson, go slows, destruction of property or damage 
to it and in some instances, a wilful misunderstanding of instructions. 
 
3) Revolt/Insurrection – Organized, open rebellions.  
 
Although these resistance forms generally overlapped in the sense that they operated 
simultaneously, I draw particular attention to the flight from the plantation here because 
it unquestionably represents the first period of active and successful attempts at resistance 
to oppression and injustice in Jamaica. Beginning in the 1670s, hundreds of slaves, later 
labelled ‘maroons’, signalled their early rejection of slavery by devising creative schemes 
of escape from the sugar plantations and establishing highly fortified settlements in the 
rough, mountainous terrains of the island. The series of uprisings, called the Maroon 
Wars, which they led against British forces to secure their freedom, carry enormous 
analytical significance as it not only compelled the British to sign a Treaty granting 
freedom and legitimizing Maroon settlements but it also created the political precedent 
for the struggles for emancipation by other slaves some two centuries later. But what kind 
of organization, resources and tactics were employed by the Maroons in these seminal 
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struggles? In other words, what was the character of this resistance and to what extent 
did this character underscore its success? To begin with, under the oppressive regime of 
British plantocracy, freedom was the closest thing to impossibility.  Although Jamaican 
slaves had a long tradition of passive slave resistance which continued for the almost four 
centuries of slavery, there was collective consensus that the restoration of freedom was 
remote if they continued to accord with this strategy. They also recognized that despite 
enormous tribal and linguistic differences among them, emancipation strongly depended 
on organized effort with each other. The Maroons were therefore the first to demonstrate 
that strategic planning, organization and leadership were not only possible but 
indispensable to the liberation movement.  
 
Historians have correctly observed that during the initial stages of Maroon resistance, 
there was an absence of a general leader or chief of the body (Hart, 1985) and so the 
Jamaican Maroons concentrated their forces under different bands under the direction of 
different leaders. Jamaican political history recalls names such as Cudjoe, Cofi, Tacky and 
the enterprising and mysterious female warrior called Nanny as one of the first examples 
of strong grassroots leadership emerging from within this informal sphere. The Maroons 
were compelled to effect negotiations between smaller bands of Maroons and take critical 
decisions to coordinate their operations into two main groups – the Leeward and 
Windward Maroons. This was necessitated by the common threat to their survival, 
embodied in the sustained and earnest organization of the planter-led islandwide attack 
on them, the brutal punishment landed upon those who were recaptured (execution, 
amputation of limbs) and the covert nature of their own resistance plans and 
organization. The Leeward Maroons were under the elected leadership of an able general 
called Cudjoe whereas the Windward Maroons were under the command of the guerrilla 
leader, Cuffee. There were also other subordinate captains such as Accompong, Johnny, 
and Cudjoe’s brothers Cuffee and Quao with clearly defined responsibilities. These 
included providing the community with food and organizing hunting parties to track 
wild hogs. They were also expected to direct and supervise the women in planting 
provisions and managing domestic affairs (Sherlock & Bennett, 1998; Hart, 1985).  
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Of crucial note here is the extent to which runaway slaves accepted the requirement of 
organized resistance and the elected leadership of Cudjoe and his sister, the revered 
female warrior, Nanny. Sherlock and Bennett (1998:136-137) note that: 
not even Cudjoe’s name carried with it a greater sense of power and of authority 
than did that of Nanny, rebel leader and tactician, who by sheer force of 
personality and her powerful oaths of loyalty breathed courage and confidence 
into her followers.  
 
As a counter-response challenge to their traditional cultural repression, the Maroons 
committed themselves to an autonomous way of life with their own customs and laws 
even while they had to endure the insecurities and privations of guerrilla warfare. It is 
obvious that a workable hierarchy of effective and respected leadership as well as a 
trusted partnership and a mutually beneficial relationship had been promulgated between 
these bands of slaves and a great deal was achieved as a result. The election of Cudjoe 
resulted in a more regular and connected system of warfare, and the maintenance of 
regular contact with the slaves who remained on the plantations also speak to the 
development of a sophisticated intelligence network and a highly developed capacity for 
negotiation and cohesiveness in times of great stress and against the power of those they 
deemed to be their oppressors (Sherlock & Bennett, 1998; Patterson, 1969; Hart, 1965; 
1985).  
 
Sherlock and Bennett (1998), in cataloguing the insurrections and uprisings which 
heralded and defined the Maroon wars in Jamaica, provide critical insights into the 
nature and temperament of this resistance. Beginning their documentation as early as 
1670, they note a widespread pattern of slaves setting alight sugarcane plantations. In 
explaining the potency and considerable impact of this protest action, they describe a 
cane-piece fire as ‘a most tremendous object; no flame is more alarming, none more rigid, 
none more rapid, and the fury and the velocity with which it burns and communicates 
cannot possibly be described’ Sherlock & Bennett, 1998:134). Within the nearly two 
decades (1673-1690), hundreds of slaves rebelled by plundering estates, killed their 
master and other whites and retreated to secure positions in the mountains on the borders 
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of the parishes of St. Ann, Clarendon and St. Elizabeth. From their fortified positions in 
new village settlements, they raided the plantations on which they had given years of toil 
and which remained the source of bondage for many of their fellow slaves. The 
widespread nature of desertions by slaves to the nearby mountainous regions of Jamaica 
continued throughout the 1730s and the success of their rebellions against the Assembly-
configured troops soon gave the impression of an island besieged by a series of disasters 
(Sherlock & Bennett, 1998). Within a twenty-year period, the Maroons had managed to 
assemble a formidable army with huge successes to show for it. They were increasing 
their settlements, bolstering their supply of arms and food by raiding and plundering 
neighbouring plantations and in periods of war, murdering the troops of whites sent to 
suppress, enslave or annihilate them and increasing in confidence and resourcefulness 
(Hart, 1965:29). Ineffectual efforts were made to subdue them and although they suffered 
greatly in surprise attacks and well projected assaults from government militias, many 
planters succumbed to the fear of their lives and abandoned their plantations (ibid, 1965; 
cf. Sherlock and Bennett, 1998:140).  
 
By 1737, after sixty years of fighting and in the face of successive losses in guerrilla 
warfare against Cudjoe’s forces, the political authorities relented, agreeing that the best 
way of resolving the Maroon war was to advocate peace talks. This resulted in a peace 
treaty signed between Leeward Maroons and the whites on March 1, 1739 and with the 
Windward Maroons on June 23 of the same year. The treaty guaranteed ‘the liberty and 
freedom of Cudjoe and his followers and their right of ownership of all lands in the 
vicinity of their towns’ (Sherlock & Bennett, 1998:140). Paradoxically, the peace treaties 
required that runaway slaves who had joined the Leeward and Windward Maroons 
within the last two-year period were to return to their masters with full pardon and that 
Cudjoe and his captains were to repress any other attempts by Negroes at Maroon 
settlement (Hart, 1985). This treaty accomplishment was an important victory,  
enormously valuable in boosting the confidence of the slaves even while it represented, at 
least for a period, a clear weakening of the white’s power and hold on Jamaican society. 
The controversial aspects of the treaties, however, meant that freedom was tenuous and 
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transient; social and political stability never assured, and an enduring and organized 
counter action involving plantation slaves impractical and unrealizable. It is worth noting 
that the peace treaties not only put an end to marronage as a viable option of resistance 
and a path to freedom, but it heralded the Maroon leaders’ abandonment of their 
exemplary revolutionary role which had brought hope to thousands of their fellow slaves 
trapped in plantation slavery. Indeed, that they effectively agreed to become allies of the 
government and betray other runaways symbolized, to my mind, early signs of the slave 
community succumbing to disunity and partiality as they seriously compromised their 
principles and the cause for which they had fought29. While the treaties ensured that 
flight to rugged terrains and mountainous interiors were closed routes to freedom, they 
also consolidated the lesson that rebellion was perhaps the slaves’ singular option and 
that, according to Sherlock & Bennett (1998:142), ‘the plantation was the final 
battlefield’.  
 
Slave uprising and rebellions thus continued unabated for another fifty years, even in the 
face of bloody repression. Of note are the Tacky War of 1760 and the second Maroon 
War, which began in 1795. I however wish to forward to the 19th century in order to 
account for the politics and character of the continuing resistance movement, embodied 
in the emancipation rebellions from 1831-32. These rebellions are analytically crucial 
because they marked the climax of the Afro-Jamaican struggle against slavery and the 
ultimate granting of Apprenticeship in 1834 and ‘full free’ in 1838. My goal here is not to 
retell the story but to show the extent to which the political circumstances of the time 
underscored the emergence of a brand of citizen politics in Jamaica, marked by 
adversarialism and hostility, which has persisted through to contemporary times. 
                                                 
29 Hart (1965) provides a contrary explanation for this development. He argues that the Maroons 
under Cudjoe had little choice but accept this clause as a partial victory for freedom and that the 
treaty was a compromise accepted by a wise rebel leader as to fight under such difficult conditions 
might have jeopardized the victory already secured. He further notes that there is no evidence that 
the Maroons took any steps to implement this clause during Cudjoe’s lifetime. However, although 
often ignored in the historical scholarship, it is acknowledged that the government later offered 
substantial rewards to the Maroons for their services in the capture of runaways. It is also a true 
that on occasions Maroons hired themselves out as mercenaries and fought alongside government 
forces against their fellow slaves during revolts on the plantations (see pp. 40-41).  
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 4.5  THE CHARACTER AND QUALITY OF POPULAR STRUGGLE AND 
COLLECTIVE ACTION PRE & POST 1838 
With all previous rebellions crushed, the beginning of 1831 saw slavery firmly 
entrenched in Jamaica, an oppressive machinery which had not only manifested itself 
institutionally and politically but had become stronger and more vicious (Hart, 1965:69). 
This, of course, was set against a Negro community still refusing to submit to white 
captivity and domination and egged on by an emerging conviction, invested in them by 
Baptist missionaries, that there was no moral justification for slavery. An atmosphere of 
expectancy had also been promulgated amongst the slave community as news filtered in 
the islands of the mounting of the intense anti-slavery campaign in Britain (Hart, 1985) 
and the passing of legislation to ameliorate the conditions under which slaves were forced 
to work. It is therefore within this context of anticipation and hope of emancipation that 
I seek to understand these rebellions.  As a point of departure, it is important to note that 
unlike previous rebellions, the leadership of the emancipation rebellions contrasted 
sharply to that of former revolts. These  leaders ‘formed the elite of the labour force, men 
who had exercised as much authority as a slave could exercise, some of them deacons of 
the Baptist Church, literate, aware of events in Britain [protests/parliamentary 
submissions against slavery], and especially the work of the abolitionists’ (Sherlock & 
Bennett, 1998:213).  
 
The leadership of Sam Sharpe (now National hero of Jamaica) was particularly recognized 
during the period leading up to 1831. A deacon in the Baptist Church with a massive 
following, ‘Daddy Sharpe was an outstanding leader who impressed all whom he met 
with his sincerity, intellectual grasp, oratorical power and personal magnetism’ (ibid, 
1998:213).  Sam Sharpe not only signalled the emerging power of the church as an 
organizational force and a recognizable leader in the later formation of official civil 
society but the nature of his leadership and following was such that it rendered the 
Christmas rebellion (or what is sometimes referred to as the Western Liberation Uprising) 
which he led, one of the landmark events of Jamaican history. I call attention first and 
foremost to the character of the citizen-led political protestation and negotiation that Sam 
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Sharpe, at least in theory, attempted to fashion. Rather than a call to arms, Sharpe’s 
petition to the slaves, who had gathered under the guise of a prayer meeting, was to 
deliberately withdraw their labour after the customary three-day Christmas Holidays in 
December 1831. All slaves were required to return to the plantations but to refuse to do 
work unless their owners were prepared to recognize their freedom and pay wages to 
them. Significant to this analysis is that they were bound by oath not to engage in the 
destruction of property or open hostilities with planters unless pre-emptive attempts 
were made by their masters to force them to work as slaves (Sherlock & Bennett, 1998). 
Violence was, in short, to be the last resort and was to be used only in self-defence.  
 
Sharpe’s intent was clearly to organize and execute a general strike and invite 
negotiations. It is worthwhile to note that the strike as a political weapon (of non-violent 
resistance) was not uncommon in those times but it was certainly not open for use by 
slaves. Nevertheless, the proposal attracted enormous support among a slave population 
convinced of their right to freedom. Slaves inhabiting estates on the entire Western belt 
of Jamaica comprising the parishes of Trelawney, St. James, Hanover, St. Elizabeth and 
Westmoreland heeded the call for strike action. For example, in Trelawney, some nine-
tenths of the slave population refused to turn out for work. Their calculation was that a 
refusal of the majority of slaves in the Western parishes to work as slaves after Christmas 
would be sufficient to bring the system to an end. The plantocracy, however, failed to 
yield to the tenets of the work stoppage organized by slaves. The defensive build 
up/response of the government militia and the disturbing news that emancipation would 
not be granted prompted the slaves to immediately abandon peaceful protest and resort to 
open rebellion. Armed with cutlasses, sharpened sticks and wooden clubs, the slaves 
actively challenged the militia and soldiers in aggressive warfare (Sherlock & Bennett, 
1998:219). Although Sharpe’s army was untrained, inexperienced and inadequately 
equipped for guerrilla warfare, they compensated for this with the use of fire power, by 
burning down many sugar factories and estate buildings.  
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It is crucial to reiterate here that a legitimate work- to-rule was the original intent but set 
against an oppressive slave administration bent on keeping them in a brutal system of 
enforced labour, genuine and reasonable political negotiation was virtually impossible. 
The torch thus became the only tool through which the slaves could expose the 
vulnerability of the sugar plantation. Indeed, burnt-out sugar works, estate buildings and 
ravaged cane-pieces through the five Western parishes and as far away as in East 
Portland, where discontent also erupted, were a testament that the slaves, though 
defeated, had destroyed an appreciable part of the material basis of their enslavement. 
They had, in other words, succeeded in rendering slavery an expensive system to 
maintain (Sherlock & Bennett, 1998:220-221; Hart, 1965; 1985). The response of the 
plantocracy is of theoretical purchase as an embodiment of the popular distaste for (slave) 
resistance and protest. The plantocracy and the military instituted tyrannical punishment 
to the perpetrators of the insurrection. These included summary trials, savage floggings 
and hangings.  The historical record reveals that about 750 slaves were convicted and 
some 580 publicly executed, including leader, Samuel Sharpe. However, the timetable for 
emancipation had already been reset. Like the rebellions and uprisings of Windward and 
Leeward Maroon nearly two centuries before, the Christmas rebellion had served a 
significant purpose. Thanks to the work of religious missionaries and British abolitionists, 
who rode on the momentum it provided to capture public opinion and sympathy in 
Britain, it proved to be incredibly useful in moving the emancipation agenda forward and 
hastening the passing of the Emancipation Act in 1834, paving the way for full freedom 
in 1838 (Dick, 2002).  
 
4.5.1 Post Emancipation: The Struggle for Rights and Justice 
 
‘A race had been freed but a society had not been formed’   
(Lord Harris, 1838, quoted in Dick, 2002: xiii) 
 
This statement by Lord Harris, Governor of Trinidad & Tobago in 1838, is perhaps the 
most instructive commentary on the catalyst for protests during the post-emancipation 
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period in Jamaica. To understand the socio-political dilemma which confronted post-
emancipation Jamaican society demands reckoning with the conditionalities imposed on 
the grant of freedom. Put bluntly, although offered in theoretical terms in 1834 (with the 
passing of the Emancipation Act), freedom remained an elusive goal for another four 
years. This unfortunate development is tied directly to the institution of a period of 
nominal (or semi) freedom called apprenticeship (1834-1838) in which all slaves over the 
age of six years old were to be prepared for freedom by becoming apprenticed labourers 
on the sugar plantations of their former owners. This was no doubt a vexing period for 
Afro-Jamaican slaves. Apprenticeship was in actuality a camouflaged form of enslavement 
and a clever attempt to perpetuate the established order. In other words, although 
officially free, the ex-slaves lived in circumstances akin to slavery. Poor wages, appalling 
working conditions and high rents for provision grounds were only some of the bullying 
tactics employed by former slave owners to extract continuing labour from the freed 
peoples. So, from 1834 onwards, the Afro-Jamaican ex-slaves not only struggled against 
persistent poverty but even worse, stood in contention with a colonial administration 
which largely catered for the elite classes (Augier, 1996; Bolland, 1996; Craton, 1996; 
Sherlock & Bennett, 1998).  
 
Upon emancipation, legislative power was vested in a colonial governor and House of 
Assembly. The membership here was confined to landowners, a constitutional system 
which only served to consolidate the inequities in the society. Local government and the 
judiciary were also controlled by the white propertied class. Official civil society was thus 
part and parcel of the establishment (Barnett, 2001). It soon became clear that in the 
words of Dick, (2002: xiii): 
no thought was given to where the largest population of ex-slaves in the British 
West Indies would live. No community was prepared for them, no government 
was established that was inclusive of their racial group or responsive to their 
needs and no social amenities were provided for healthcare, recreation or 
education (except for a small education grant). The primary concern of the British 
government was how the planters would survive, having lost the commodity of 
free labour.  
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The years 1838-1865 not only exacerbated the inequities of the system but immobilized 
the social, economic and political standing of blacks. The absence of available socio-
economic and political opportunity structures to the black majority was increasingly 
reflected in unfair taxation, restricted franchise, extreme disparities in wealth 
distribution, lack of arable land, inadequate and irregularly paid wages (on account of the 
terms of employment for black workers controlled by white employers) and, not 
insignificantly, a repression of indigenous cultural practices aided and abetted by a biased 
judicial system (Craton, 1996; Bolland, 1996; Simmonds, 1983; Sherlock & Bennett, 1998; 
Wilmot, 1996; Dick, 2002). It was against these institutionalized patterns of social 
exclusion and lack of rights that Afro-Jamaican men and women struggled. In other 
words, in many respects, freedom had done little to alter the socio-economic and political 
circumstances of the black community, a state of affairs which provided a ready basis and 
rationale for protest. Popular struggle was already a tried and tested (and perhaps 
singular) political weapon and thus Jamaica’s creolized freed peoples turned their 
attention to not only emancipation but also to questions of governance [or lack thereof] 
and rights.  
 
Resistance initially took the form of withdrawal from the regular field labour on the 
sugar plantations but conflicts over rent and wages in the immediate post-emancipation 
period and the tensions created by the disadvantaged position of the former slaves 
eventually led to violent confrontations. As it was females who comprised the majority of 
the labour force, slave women became crucial players in the success of the strategies 
employed in the resistance movement. Market women or higglers, for example, often 
went undetected as bearers of information to rural districts. In largely non-literate 
societies, women’s concentration in the towns and markets gave them an advantage in 
gathering oral information, while their economic and familial ties in the countryside 
enabled them to disseminate important information more quickly than official channels 
(Sheller, 1997). Many examples of violent language recorded in the British records were 
spoken by women, whether during slavery and apprenticeship, or in later court-house 
scuffles and riots; when violence occurred, working-class women were often at the 
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forefront, brandishing not only insults and provocation but quite often weapons as well 
(Sheller, 1997). For the most part, however, both male and female labourers joined hands 
in mounting determined and protracted resistance to unfair treatment not only against 
overseers and plantations personnel but against representatives of the colonial state: 
policemen, court-houses, militias and particularly against a judicial system which 
persistently failed to effect appropriate compromises or fair judgment (Wilmot, 1995; 
Simmonds, 1983).  
 
In a fascinating discussion, Simmonds (1983) addresses the extent to which the Afro-
Jamaican freed peoples, in agitating against the injustices of the planter-class dominated 
colonial administration, weaved threads of collection action post-1838. She focuses on the 
series of riots which took place throughout the 1840s and 1850s around the struggle of 
blacks to practice their indigenous religions and the attendant divisions which appeared 
in the Baptist Church between persons giving attention to Africanisms as opposed to the 
more European-centred Afro-Christianity. The tension between Europeanism and 
Africanism persisted because the ruling classes were strenuously opposed to the latter. 
Clashes and public disturbances therefore constantly erupted over attempts to ban public 
festivities engaged in by blacks and to outlaw celebrations such as Christmas.  The white 
ruling class saw Christmas and August celebrations as not merely a disruption of 
economic activity but continuing Negro threat. Simmonds (1983) argues that this threat 
included more than violence, encompassing Afro-Christian practices termed Obeah and 
Myalism, which the planter class understood only as heathenism and associated with 
black exuberance in the streets. White and coloured leaders drew clear distinctions 
between European cultural patterns which they considered uplifting, and the practices 
derived from Africa or from slavery which they deemed debasing. In the West Indies, 
civilization was seen to be in conflict with primitivism, and the victory of the former 
could only be achieved, it was thought, by controlling or eradicating ‘corrupt and 
debasing influences’ (Simmonds, 1983:10).  
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Although much of these riotous conflicts were brought before the courts for adjudication, 
justice remained elusive. More often than not, the Jamaican authorities were prone to 
give support to the groups committed to preserving and strengthening European cultural 
influences in the island. Of significant analytic purchase however is that the justice that 
the blacks sought collided with the laws passed to prevent black assembly. One such was 
the ‘Act for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies, and for the more speedily and 
effectually punishing the rioters’. This act essentially defined the extent to which an 
assemblage would be regarded as a riot30, outlined the mode of dealing with rioters and 
provided protection for the police forces should the rioters be maimed or killed. These 
laws were the all-encompassing political weapons held in the hands of the Jamaican 
Assembly composed of the white, male property-owning ruling classes to ensure the legal 
and legitimate suppression of black cultural expression, religious organization and 
commercial activities (Simmonds, 1983:15). Political redress or political power clearly 
could not be sought or found through political means. By 1865, rising discontent over 
social conditions and impoverishment, continuing discrimination and outright racism as 
well as institutionalized violence against the former plantation slaves had sparked a new 
kind of militancy among them which spilled onto the streets of almost every corner of 
the island. It must be noted here that although the Church, as manifested by non-
conformist missionaries, had emerged as a recognizable civic organization dedicated to 
education, welfare and other charitable efforts and had created the basis for communal 
cooperation and Christian principles in this colonial society (Dick, 2002), it was the 
violent street- level protests, which began at Morant Bay in the parish of St. Thomas, (an 
area traditionally backed by the Maroon bases of the Blue Mountains), involving 
thousands of ex-slaves, later called The Morant Bay Rebellion, which represented a 
landmark configuration of  popular protest. It underscored the rationale for later political 
                                                 
30 It is important to note the usage of the word ‘riot’ as opposed to ‘protest’ or ‘civil disturbance’ 
here. Although many of the protests carried out during this period were highly violent, this was a 
clearly deliberate effort on the part of the Jamaican Assembly to collectively bracket all forms of 
collective struggle by the black lower orders as ‘riots’ and thus legislatively cast them in breach of 
the law. This had the effect of illegitimating popular protest as one form of collective action and 
political participation while legitimizing the grounds for their prohibition and repression. 
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struggles from the 1930s onwards, including the contemporary citizen action that Jamaica 
is witnessing today. I review these political protests in the final sections. 
 
4.6  THE MORANT BAY REBELLION 
The Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865 is a historical watershed for the maturing and 
consolidation of the loose networks and relationships (which may or may not crystallize 
into official/formal groups) which have come to best define civil society in Jamaica. 
Enjoying the eventual relaxations on the policies on assembly, movement and expression, 
a mighty civil society emerged, from above and below led by George William Gordon and 
Paul Bogle. It is important to highlight the differences in standing and technique of these 
two leaders. George William Gordon was an upwardly mobile coloured planter, business 
man and independent Church leader, who championed for the rights of the poor in the 
Jamaican Assembly. This is while Paul Bogle, who became the rebel leader in 1865, was a 
peasant small holder and one of Gordon’s black deacons (Craton, 1996). These men thus 
clearly occupied different spaces in the social and ideological structure of colonial-dom, a 
significant factor in the contrasting approaches and strategies of political participation, 
protestation and negotiation. As two emerging civic leaders, they had a central mission - 
to protest against the intolerable economic circumstances, the paucity of social services 
for the poor and the injustices of the legal system.  
 
Given his role and voice in the Jamaican Assembly, Gordon recognized and used political 
(parliamentary) power as a lever to raise the socio-economic conditions of the poor while 
Bogle, without the benefit of institutionalised political voice, resorted to a more militant 
type of organization (Barnett, 2001). It is to be acknowledged that the events that 
precipitated the Morant Bay Rebellion were not unlike previous revolts, except in this 
instance, violent protest by the masses assumed precedence in the face of the persistent 
inflexibility of the colonial state to the demands of civil society, expressed via 
conventional means such as petitions and lobbying. Bogle operated a strong 
organizational network in the Blue Mountain Valley, involving both men and women 
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and, by all accounts, not only held meetings but also opted for the use of petitions and 
letters as first option. Craton (1996:197) writes that the events accelerated when:  
[George William] Gordon was sacked as a St. Thomas Vestryman and JP for 
criticizing the operation of justice and a lack of social services in the parish… 
Shortly afterwards, Governor Eyre refused to even see petitioners, including Paul 
Bogle [and his large followership], who had walked the 45 miles from St. Thomas 
into Spanish Town.  
 
The failure of the colonial administration to address their grievances, particularly low 
wages on the estates and the oppressive and partial administration of the law, as expressed 
in the protracted Court-imposed eviction of persons over non-payment of rent in 
addition to attempts to arrest Paul Bogle only served to intensify the fury of the people 
against the judicial system, embodied in the Morant Bay Courthouse. It should therefore 
come as no surprise that the Morant Bay Courthouse became the political and 
institutional centre of the ensuing rebellion. The historical record reveals that hundreds 
of Afro-Jamaican men and women, on Paul Bogle’s orders, marched to the sounds of 
drums, cow horns and conch shells upon the authorities in Morant Bay, where the hated 
Vestry was in session. This march is perhaps the most described and researched aspect of 
citizen politics in Jamaica and includes a fascinating examination of the impressive roles 
played by women in the confrontation which sparked the Morant Bay Rebellion. Scholars 
foreground women such as Rosanna Finlayson, Caroline Grant and Sarah Johnson, who 
raided the police station for ‘guns, bayonets and swords’, and directed the attack against 
the men who had taken refuge in the courthouse (Wilmot, 1995; Sheller (1997). Wilmot 
(1995:292) suggests that some women may have had their own agenda for participation, 
as the following excerpt illustrates: 
Elizabeth Faulkner, who lived at Church corner, a mile from Morant Bay, wanted 
to kill John Bonner Barrett, a black shopkeeper in Morant Bay because of his 
dishonest business practices. Mary Ward and other women, who urged the killing 
of Charles Price, a black contractor and former Assemblyman, were labourers 
who had worked for Price and had not been remunerated. 
 
These women (supported by men) did not so much hijack the rebellion or depart from its 
central mission but clearly undertook vigilante justice in an arena where justice through 
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legitimate means would have been virtually impossible to obtain. The confrontation at 
Morant Bay resulted in the burning down of the Morant Bay Courthouse, the release of 
prisoners, looting of the town and estate provision grounds and the killing of 20 whites, 
including the Custos. The retribution was however swift and extreme, with more than 
430 men and women shot down or put to death after trial, 600 publicly flogged, 1000 
houses burned and George William Gordon and Paul Bogle publicly hanged (Craton, 
1996).  Nonetheless, it is fair to argue that the institution of more aggressive tactics such 
as riots and marches on the part of the former slaves served its intended purpose – the 
abolition of the colonial House of Assembly and substantial social, economic and political 
reforms under a new Crown Colony Government. Civil society organizations – charities, 
community groups, citizen initiatives and economic cooperatives flourished in this new 
public sphere. The Morant Bay Rebellion symbolized an important part of the struggle of 
freed peoples in Jamaica to construct a society that reflected their new status as free 
citizens. This struggle has almost always assumed a confrontational character. Fighting 
with governors, complaining to the Crown and Parliament about social conditions and 
the repression of lower orders, while not high politics, gave the Jamaican political 
community a particular political style which would survive more than half a century later 
(Augier, 1996). In other words, the constant neglect of the welfare of the society as a 
whole meant that riots would remain the predominant means of collective bargaining for 
the Jamaican poor and the essential character of the emerging civil society.  
 
4.7 THE LABOUR RIOTS OF THE 1930s 
The emergence of popular protest as a predominant tool of political negotiation in 
Jamaica expressed itself most clearly in the years up to the 1930s. Indeed, while public 
opinion, economic cooperative societies and welfare organizations burgeoned to empower 
the masses and press demand for social change, high unemployment, low wages and poor 
social services were contributing to widespread discontent. Frustration again gave way to 
aggression, resulting in the riotous Labour movement of the 1930s and 1940s. It was 
against the backdrop of these violent labour uprisings from 1938 onwards that the 
Jamaican proletariat called attention to their economic circumstances. This historical 
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moment is significant as it was these riots which created the context within which local 
political organization and indigenous political leadership had its embryonic beginnings in 
this post-colonial society.  As is clear from the preceding discussion, Jamaica, prior to 
1938, was a deeply racially divided society run by a Crown Colony government. While 
the white merchant and plantation owning classes hoarded wealth, and a carefully 
delineated middle and professional class was the beneficiary of economic security, 
generalized unemployment, poverty and hopelessness characterized the life of the black 
masses. Agricultural wages were extremely low in an island economy still dominated by 
the sugar industry. Rural peasant farming was condemned to poor hillside lands, 
rendering it unproductive while poor working conditions or joblessness were typical 
features of the urban proletariat.  
 
Suffering colonial control and exploitation, underpaid and despised, the Jamaican labour 
force naturally saw in episodic eruptions of violence, a potential source of bargaining 
power. Bereft of effective trade union representation and political organization but 
spurred by widespread sugar strikes and agitation for higher wages which were occurring 
throughout the wider Caribbean – Puerto Rico, St. Kitts, British Guiana, Grenada, St. 
Vincent, St. Lucia, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago – since 1935 (Sherlock & Bennett, 
1998:366-364), Jamaican workers, from the sugar plantations in rural townships to dock 
workers on the Kingston waterfront, erupted in civil unrest in May, 1938. They soon 
attracted the leadership and representation of two stalwarts of the emerging labour 
movement, Alexander Bustamante and Norman Washington Manley. Through these 
men, strikes, mass meetings and marches became the initial platforms upon which the 
urban and rural proletariat staged their protests against low wages and working class 
poverty and pressed home their demand for work. Constantly broken up by the police 
and aggravated by the intractable response of the colonial government, including the 
arrest of trade union activist/leader, Alexander Bustamante, the labour unrest was to 
enter an explosive phase characterized by a conflux of workers’ riots, throughout the 
country.  
 
 136
During weeks of civil disorder, thousand of sugar workers on Jamaica’s major sugar 
producing complexes set fires to cane-fields, destroyed plantation buildings while their 
urban counterparts clashed violently with the police during continuous labour strikes. 
When the dust of civil unrest had settled, eight workers lay dead, having been shot and 
killed by the police, thirty-two were wounded, 139 sustained other injuries and some 400 
were imprisoned (Manley, 1975; Sherlock & Bennett, 1998). Although it was economic 
hardship more so than a lack of political rights which brought the urban and rural masses 
into open protest (Schmeider, 1993), these labour riots brought about widespread 
structural and social changes - improved living standards, the emergence of an active 
trade union movement, the development of the country’s major political parties, the 
attainment of Universal Adult Suffrage and eventually, self-government and 
independence in 1962.  
 
Two developments are of theoretical significance here. First, the labour unrests exposed 
the inadequacies of Crown Colony rule and increased the desire of the Jamaican 
citizenship for home-grown political leadership. Secondly, it gave birth to a trade union 
movement inhabited by a politically-engaged citizenry drawn from both the middle and 
lower classes. It was by virtue of this organized political action and strong citizen 
negotiation that the violent protests were converted into political progress. The fracture 
of this labour movement into two independent and ideologically opposed political camps 
produced Jamaica’s first formal political institutions, a structure of local state power and 
two important nationalist leaders. For example, from a collection of labour unions called 
the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) sprung the conservative Jamaica Labour 
Party (JLP) led by Alexander Bustamante. Meanwhile, with roots firmly tied to the Trade 
Union Congress (TUC), (today known as the National Workers Union - NWU) arrived 
the radical progressive People’s National Party (PNP) headed by Norman Manley. It was 
continued political pressure, mainly by the latter, which resulted in the official granting 
of self-government and universal adult suffrage in 1944 and Jamaica’s migration from its 
‘colonial condition to full and sovereign nationhood’ (Sherlock & Bennett, 1998: 372). 
With the full acceptance of a two-party political system and an elected majority in the 
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legislature, the cornerstones of democratic government had been laid in Jamaica. 
However, despite unyielding commitment to democracy and to improving the lot of the 
working poor, the ideological polarity between Bustamente’s capitalist-oriented JLP and 
Manley’s Socialist PNP resulted in the polarization of the Jamaican society around these 
political blocs. This polarization became the frame for the bitter political clashes and 
intense antagonism which characterized the 1970s as each competed for the greater share 
of the people’s vote. The political transition from colonial rule in Jamaica therefore 
became characterized by the casting aside of what Gray (2004:34) describes as ‘the earlier 
genteel politics of native elite leadership in favour of a tough, unforgiving, bare-knuckled 
approach to political contestation’ and state governance. The introduction of the 
discriminatory practice of earmarking work, political favours and other benefits on the 
basis of political party and trade union affiliation ushered in a political culture defined by 
patronage, partisanship and violence (Gray, 2004; Charles, 2002; Rapley, 2003; Stone, 
1980; National Committee on political Tribalism, 1997). I will look at the impact on 
citizen politics of these unfortunate developments in Jamaican political governance in 
greater detail in later chapters.  
 
4.8 SUMMARY   
Critical to this research is that positive developments were taking place, but, seemingly, 
inevitably, in an atmosphere of antagonism. By Munroe’s thesis (1999:81) ‘violent 
behavioural norms under-girded the society’s advance with adversarialism, with its 
armoury of weapons, most notably the strike, central to working class progress and to the 
strengthening of civil society as a force for expanding democracy’. At the same time, the 
changing global and national economic and political circumstances of the post-
independence era, most notably the introduction of the Structural Adjustment 
mechanism, globalization and economic liberalization during the early 1980s and 1990s, 
would combine to impact on Jamaica’s democratic life in multiple ways. The trade 
unions, for example, which had been perhaps the chief weapon of organized, modern 
civil society, contributed to reducing autocratic rule at the workplace, helped to enhance 
upward social mobility for the black working class, improved levels of real income for 
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unionized sectors and their dependents and brought the interests of labour to bear on 
national decision-making, lost its strength and role as a vital cohesive element of civil 
society (Munroe, 1999- refer to chapter 5; Manley, 1991). This meant that the strike, 
although still employed by working class groups, had lost much of its power as a tool of 
political protestation and negotiation.  
 
Other developments such as ‘stagnant or declining per capita income, a significant 
proportion of citizens living below the poverty line, widening income inequality, rising 
levels of violent crime, high unemployment and low wage employment, deteriorating 
roads, inadequate water supply and sewerage systems’ (Munroe, 1999:43),  meant that the 
withdrawal of labour could only be used by specific sectors. Therefore, the unemployed, 
on account of being unable to strike, or ‘to withdraw some crucial contribution on which 
others depend’ (Piven & Cloward, 1977:24) but who are still entitled to the commodities 
defined as public goods, resorted to the more intense street-level protests and 
demonstrations. Open political struggles, including roadblocks, burning of public 
property and other forms of vandalism, placard-bearing and violent confrontations and 
clashes with the police remain the popular means of expressing discontent in Jamaican 
civilian politics. Indeed, as my discussion in subsequent chapters will reveal, the resort to 
more militant styles of political protestation and negotiation, including open violence, is 
invariably seen by Jamaican citizens as the most viable option to raise the visibility of 
their demands and to force redress from the state bureaucracy. In order to come to terms 
with the rationale behind these approaches and their impact on the transformation 
and/or building up of a truly civil society, it is imperative that I take into account the 
nature of the structure of governance under which Jamaican citizens now operate and the 
quality of governance provided to them. This discussion must, inevitably, include the 
existing performance of political representatives and the state system as well as the 
various (economic) constraints impinging on the capacity of the state to offer ‘good 
governance’ to its citizenry. It is to this discussion that I turn in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER  5 
____________________________________________________________________ 
The ‘Seige-ure’ of the State and The Changing 
Nature of Citizen Politics 
5.1   INTRODUCTION 
 Youths a wipe car glass fe get a meal …fe de hungry whe dem a feel 
 Government, we need a betta [deal] 
 Dem say promise is a comfort to a fool …So right ya now, yuh betta cool 
 Yuh nuh want see nuh rise in a de tool… 
 Yuh likkle curry meat a nuh much… just gi we whe we vote fah. 
 
 (Youths are wiping car windows because they are hungry 
 Government, we need an improved situation 
 They say a promise is a comfort to a fool 
 You do not want to see a rise of the tool [increase in gun crimes] 
 Your small efforts are nothing, just give us what we voted for. 
 
     (Queen Ifrika, Zinc Fence Community, 2004) 
 
I had come to see that everything was radically connected with politics and that 
however one proceeded, no people would be other than the nature of its 
government [my emphasis]. 
    (Jean Jacques Rousseau) 
 
The lyrical protestation of Jamaican entertainer, Queen Ifrika, embodies and reproduces 
the existing mood – dissatisfaction, anger and frustration – of the citizenry regarding the 
performance of the Jamaican State. As my discussion of the slave revolts against the 
British plantocracy and subsequent riots against an inflexible colonial (Crown Colony) 
government in chapter 4 reveals (and as affirmed by the latter quotation from Rousseau), 
it is the performance and character of the state which appear to bear heavily on the 
nature and tone of civilian politics within a particular society. This is because in every 
national context, it is the structural power of the state that ultimately shapes and 
determines socio-economic interaction and effectively conditions the everyday life of 
citizens.  
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Orr (2004) argues that it is the state which is ultimately charged with the responsibility to 
deliver the security and the economic, social, political and judicial goods that its 
population demands – a political approach which reflects the top-down view of 
governance. The state’s capacity to deliver these goods therefore has enormous 
implications for its legitimacy and the quality of governance it provides in the eyes of the 
citizenry and, hence, the nature of civilian politics. As governance requires an interactive 
two-way process between the government (of states) and the governed (citizens) (Orr, 
2004; Packer, 2003), any notion of good governance must encompass citizen participation 
– the processes and institutions through which citizens articulate their interests and 
resolve their differences (Mbogori & Chigudu, 1999; UNDP, 1997). This study is about the 
street-level protests by which Jamaican citizens to make claims upon the state and the 
impact of this brand of citizen politics on the quality of civil society. Of course, how the 
state itself relates and responds to citizens’ demands also has a great deal to do with the 
nature of citizen politics and the quality of civil society. It is this latter phenomenon that 
I focus on in this chapter.  
 
For all intents and purposes, the dichotomy between the state and civil society is an 
imposed, if not artificial one31. It is clear that politicians and bureaucrats do not hold the 
monopoly on politics nor is politics strictly within their precincts. Indeed, from the 
populous grassroots of ordinary citizens to the apex of the state, politics is as common as 
salt. The nature and role of civil society is in critical ways moulded to the shape of the 
state, and as the reach of the state becomes more complex, its roots grow deeper into civil 
society. The state and civil society are therefore inextricably intertwined in a symbiotic 
relationship. Non-state actors thus find the scope and range of their rational choices 
bounded and channelled by the rules and resources which constitute the state (Cerny, 
1990). This framework either protects or suppresses citizens’ freedom of expression, 
association, and peaceful assembly (Mbogori & Chigudu, 1999) and determines the type of 
                                                 
31 See Keane, J. (1988) for a detailed account of the origins and historical development of the 
distinction between civil society and the state. 
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relationship between these two entities – collaborative or adversarial. Both civil and 
uncivil actions on the part of both entities are framed within this symbiotic relationship.  
 
I post a caveat here. When the language of civil society takes centre stage in modern 
analyses of the state, the tendency has been to focus on the sources of its discontent with 
regards to a predatory monolithic state, thereby feeding an adversarial portrayal of the 
state/civil society nexus (Keane, 1988). It is worth noting that it is the essential character 
and pre-eminence of citizen politics viz. a viz. the structure of state power, which 
underscores the persistent antagonism between these entities both in scholarship and 
political reality. For example, it is the historical force of people power (see for e.g. Dalton, 
1996) which tore down the blocks of the Berlin Wall; brought democracy to Eastern and 
Central Europe, the Philippines and Latin America; civil rights and political liberties to 
African-Americans; de-legitimized the Vietnam War; undermined South Africa’s 
apartheid system; disrupted world trade talks of global economic corporations; and, in a 
less publicized example, resulted in the roll-back of government-imposed fuel taxes in 
Jamaica in 1999. All this is citizen politics in its most positive manifestation but in hostile 
opposition to the state.  
 
While these events emphasize the changing nature of contemporary politics, their most 
apparent offshoot, popular protest, also signals the rupturing of the stability on which 
state power stood and the ushering in of a new, more aggressive approach to politicking 
by citizens in some contexts. These processes of structuration,32 which both states and 
citizen politics are undergoing, are also in themselves radical developments (Cerny, 
1990). This is because it is from citizen politics that state power derives its legitimacy and 
on which democracy calibrates its quality and survivability (Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 
                                                 
32 Structuration implies a process of continuing interaction between agent and structure, in which 
structures which are generally constraining can also change and be changed in certain conditions. 
For a more detailed account of this process, see the discussion in chapter 3.  
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1990) 33. By the same token, the quality of public life and the performance of social 
institutions are powerfully influenced by longstanding traditions and networks of civic 
engagement or its absence (Putnam, 1993; 1995; Barber, 1998; Hall, 1995). The 
importance of an autonomous, vigorously organized civil society for stable democracy is 
thus well taken. A rich associational life, according to Diamond, Linz & Lipset (1990:21), 
can ‘supplement the role of political parties in stimulating political participation, increase 
citizens’ efficacy, recruit and train political leaders and enhance commitment to the 
democratic system’. In addition, much of the vast literature of international development 
agencies stresses the centrality of civil society to development and democratic governance 
(Rojas, 1999; United Nations Development Programme, 1997; cf. Girvan, 1997). Yet, it is 
the state rather than civil society that is accorded the greatest responsibility for 
maintaining social order and advancing development. Not unlike its counterpart in social 
sites, apparent decline in the performance of political institutions and political actors can 
and will necessarily impinge on the quality of public life, standards of living and upon the 
social and political values that collectivities of citizens uphold.  
 
My own perspective is therefore biased towards a liberal democratic order in which there 
is a reasonable degree of equilibrium amongst the following entities: an effective 
government, a properly functioning market economy and an active civil society (that 
sufficiently balances the others). This means that civil society ought to ‘complement 
rather than (seek to) replace the state’ (UNDP Policy Document, 1997:5). Civil society is 
strategically positioned within the rubric of social governance to fill in where there is a 
vacuum in state governance under the rationale that ‘governments cannot do everything, 
do not know best how to do everything and do not necessarily see priorities as citizens 
                                                 
33 Whereas most governments rest on a conjunction of coercion and consent, Diamond, Linz & 
Lipset (1990) argue that the stability of democracies, to a large degree, depends on the consent of a 
majority of those governed. Democratic legitimacy hinges on an ‘intrinsic value commitment 
rooted in the political culture at all levels of the society’ (Diamond et al 1990:9). Bear in mind that 
it is also shaped by the performance of the democratic regime, both economically and politically 
via promoting civil liberties, maintaining civil order, personal security, adjudicating and 
arbitrating conflicts. In other words, the more successful a regime is at providing what people 
want, the greater (and more deeply rooted) its legitimacy tends to be. For a more expansive 
discussion on this issue, see Diamond, Linz, & Lipset (1990).  
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do’ (Buddan, Jamaica Gleaner, 2003). Indeed, in this new dispensation of power-sharing 
or co-governance, civil society is expected to play increasing roles in delivering services, 
helping to shape and implement programmes and mobilizing communities to gain access 
to basic human needs (Mbogori & Chigudu, 1999). Clearly, civil society and the state 
differ in the ends they seek. Civic networks in democratic societies are also entrusted 
with mitigating ‘the dilemmas of collective action by institutionalizing social interaction; 
reducing opportunism, fostering trust and making economic and social collaboration and 
the public participation of civil society members easier’ (Putnam, 1995:667).  Civil society 
is thus obliged to mobilize groups to participate in economic, social and political 
activities, while attempting to regulate the state.  
 
As my discussion in chapter 2 illustrates, developing and/or rebuilding these horizontal 
relationships and social norms are invaluable because they constitute a nation’s social 
capital. Fforde & Porter (1995) argue that strong social capital is responsible for the 
extraordinary ability of the civil, economic and political institutions of some Asian 
countries (China, Japan and South Korea) to respond to economic opportunities.  No 
doubt, in many instances, much of this social capital has been directed and driven 
institutionally by the state. It has, however, in other contexts, been responsible for the 
spontaneous reactions by citizens in the face of either incapable and/or overbearing state 
bureaucracies (ibid, 1995). This serves to reinforce the now prevailing view that the 
empowerment of citizens for strong, organized, effective and politically viable action can 
only take place if civil society is not weak, marginalized or uncivil (Held, 1996). The state, 
on the other hand, though kept in check, cannot become bereft of the power to provide 
the enabling circumstances of a well-ordered society – the rule of law, justice and security 
(Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1990). It is unquestionable that in many societies, the 
achievement of goals in areas of health and education has depended on the existence of a 
strong and competent state (Fforfe and Porter, 1995).  
 
It is therefore not an inflated postulation that a strong civil society can only flourish 
within the ambit of a strong state outfitted with legitimate and effective political 
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institutions. The reverse perspective is also poignant as a weak and contested state can be 
a major impediment to the development of a structured social project, unable to deliver 
the social and economic goods that citizens expect or to maintain order in the face of 
contradictory group demands (Diamond, Linz & Lipset, 1990; Held, 1996). As the 
experience of the Philippines since 1986 demonstrates, very often in the absence of a 
strong state, the organizations and individuals of civil society are unable to exert lasting 
influence on important issues (Forde & Porter, 1995)34. An enfeebled, vulnerable state 
may also hinder the formation or stunt the growth of an active, politically efficacious 
citizenry and, in some circumstances, may foster, as we will see in the Jamaican case, 
open spaces for uncivil social currents and actors. It therefore seems clear that the state 
and civil society condition each other’s development (Held, 1996). The current challenges 
facing the state in the 21st century, in many ways, rupture this normative principle. In 
fact, the state’s structural capacity to deal with social, political and economic 
development and fulfil its obligations to civil society, particularly in Third World 
contexts such as Jamaica, is no longer self-evident but problematic. It is to this subject 
that I turn in the next section. 
 
5.2  THE STATE – AT THE CROSSROADS? 
The centrality of the state is unlikely to be undermined unless an alternative 
structure can not only challenge it but also replace it. And in a world where other 
structures have their own weaknesses, to replace the state would require not only 
the emergence of a potential ‘challenger’ but also the decay of state structures and 
their inability to cope with critical conjunctures. The list of alternative structures 
from markets to civil society seems unlikely to include one with a sufficient 
potential scope of structural power… to be successful (Cerny, 1990: 200-201). 
                                                 
34 Fforde & Porter (1995) argues that despite maintaining a vibrant and active civil society, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), professional and workers’ associations and rural people’s 
organizations, which presented the incoming 1986 government of then Philippines President, 
Corazon Aquino, with a broadly supported mandate for structural change, little was achieved in 
important areas such as land reform. They attribute the then situation to the absence of strong, 
administratively disciplined government apparatus capable of implementing nationally mandated 
policy.  
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The foreboding image of an unravelling of the state apparent in current political economy 
approaches renders views such as Cerny’s above as either romantic or out of touch with 
political reality. There is now general agreement among international relations scholars 
that although the state and the apparatus of government remain of central importance, it 
is no longer the sole actor in determining the direction of society (see Bull, 1977). 
Contemporary analyses of the state thus tend to focus on this apparent implosion of 
traditional notions of state authority, including the limits of politics and sovereignty, the 
failings of representative governments and political actors and, at times, question outright 
the future of the state (Mason, 2005; Ferguson, 2003; Dalton, 2000; Rotberg, 2002; Pharr 
and Putnam, 2000; Strange, 1996).   Egged on by a wide range of global and local events 
and trends over the last decade such as the increasing power and noticeable ascendancy of 
a multiplicity of non-state actors – multinational and transnational corporations, criminal 
and terrorist organizations as well as social movements – it would appear that ‘the state is 
at a crossroads’ (Cerny, 1990:113).  
 
This capitulation in the authority of contemporary states is reflected in a growing 
diffusion of authority to a varied mix of global and local institutions, bodies and 
associations35. That citizens identify even less with the state is represented by Strange as a 
severe limit on its power. The state, or at least the great majority of states, she argues, 
cannot ‘claim a degree of loyalty from the citizen substantially greater than the loyalty 
given to family, to the firm, to the political party or even in some cases to the local 
                                                 
35 Of course, the argument here does not presuppose that a fading away of the state is underway or 
that there is a deliberate, sustained theoretical and political attempt to oust the modern state 
system and replace it with some other hegemon. In fact, to use the extreme examples of Somalia 
and Rwanda in the mid-1990s or the Solomon Islands or Iraq in 2003 as actual manifestations of 
the absence of a centralized state organization, it is clear that an overarching form of political 
authority within societies such as that provided by states is indispensable. This is regardless of 
whether that authority is legitimated coercively (as in Haiti in 2004) or by popular consent. 
Further, that there are nations/regions (Taiwan and Chechnya) struggling to acquire independent 
statehood coupled with the satisfaction of others (such as Georgia of the former Russian 
Federation) in acquiring this entitlement, underscores the increasing desire for the structural 
system of the state and for all that is invoked herein – the seductive promises of modernity 
embodied in notions of sovereignty, self-government, legitimacy and nationalism.  
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football team’ (1996:72)36. The fact that citizens now exhibit and maintain multiple 
identities and overlapping loyalties is, however, not unusual. What is remarkable here is 
that retreat from the state is being occasioned by increasing public disaffection globally 
with the performance of representative democracy. Some of the more notable scholarly 
accounts (Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Norris, 1999; McAllister, 
1999; Putnam, 1995, Diamond & Gunther, 2001 and Diamond et al 1990 for example) 
highlight widespread ‘democratic malaise’ manifested in anaemic levels of voter 
participation in elections, the widespread absence of accountability of elected officials, 
the exclusion or peripheralization of significant sectors of the population, economic 
underperformance, reflected in massive unemployment, impoverishment, high crime 
levels, poor living standards and restricted social and political rights. Norris (1999), for 
example, writes that at the end of the twentieth century, citizens in many established 
democracies give poor marks to how their political system functions, and in particular 
how core institutions of representative government such as political parties, parliaments, 
the legal system and the civil service work in practice. Whereas citizens adhere to 
democratic values and largely accept democracy as an ideal regime37, Norris observes that 
in large part, citizens have become highly critical of the performance of political actors 
and the performance of political institutions.  
 
 
                                                 
36 An important question here is whether this retreat from the state by citizens in turn props up 
civil society. This division of loyalties that Strange (1996) writes about may instead represent what 
Banfield (1959) refers to as ‘amoral familism’ whereby citizens abandon their basic feelings of 
mutual trust and defensively retreat into the limits of their intimate circles. It must however be 
borne in mind that loyalties can be bought. Indeed, the whole notion of political patronage is 
grounded on the buying of loyalties. The compunction of materially deprived citizens, as we shall 
see in the case of Jamaica, to freely divide their loyalties between the state and local rogue leaders 
(called dons) immediately prejudices the state while doing nothing to improve civil society. 
 
37 Numerous recent examples of popular citizen uprising, including the pro-democracy and anti-
corruption protests in Nepal and the Solomon Islands respectively in 2006, the Orange Revolution 
which forced fresh elections in Ukraine in 2004 and the Rose Revolution which culminated in the 
independence of the former Russian Federation state of Georgia in 2003, all confirm increasing 
public desire for the promise of democracy, including democratic freedoms and values. 
 147
Recent scholarship (Norris 1999; Inglehart, 1999) also draws attention to the emergence 
of ‘critical citizens’ who are more informed, educated and urban and, hence, more 
demanding of government to provide meaningful standards of living for its citizens. It is 
the capacity of the state to deliver this quality governance which most impinges on its 
contemporary power and authority.  As citizen politics has as its starting point the 
performance (or lack thereof) of the state, it is compelled to account for and act in 
response to this new development. Despite retaining considerable utility, it is the 
phenomenon of a besieged state which holds strain in many political contexts around the 
world. The state’s incapacity to perform its specific functional tasks adequately is clearly 
worrisome, a situation of particular relevance to the less-economically robust societies of 
the Third World. But what is it that determines state strength and state weakness (or 
failure) and what kinds of implications does the strength and character of a state hold for 
the nature of citizen politics and the quality of civil society?  
 
Several contemporary scholars focus a great deal of attention on the subject of state 
strength and failure. The work of Skocpol (1985) and Sorenson (2004), for example, insist 
on ‘bringing the state back in’ while that of Rotberg (2002), Gray (2004) and Meeks 
(1996) using Third World case studies, elucidate the causes, nature and consequences of 
state weakness and failure. Meeks (1996), using the Caribbean as his frame of reference, 
gauges ‘strength of state’ on the basis of its resilience to threats to its continued authority 
and dominance. Dominance is interpreted to mean the state’s ability to exercise effective 
intellectual, moral and political leadership. A resilient state, Meeks (1996:90) argues, 
should therefore be able to ‘absorb, incorporate, head off in advance, or if necessary, 
crush effectively, significant threats to its survival, integrity and coherence’ (cf. Gray 
2004, chapter 1). By this token, a fragile state is one sufficiently divested of its dominance 
and thus unable to respond adequately to challenges to its survival. Yet, a level of fragility 
cannot be conceptually construed as failure as one is not necessarily tantamount to the 
other, although they most definitely rest on the same continuum.  
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State failure, on the other hand, is not a phenomenon which occurs overnight. In his 
operationalization of state failure, Rotberg (2002) maintains that a state can be driven into 
failure by exhibiting over a period of time, chronic endemic weaknesses in its 
(representative) government – ineffectual institutions, corruption and poor political 
leadership. Although failure and weakness can also flow from a nation’s geographical, 
physical, historical and political circumstances38, Rotberg’s contention is that state failure 
is not accidental but rather man-made. In other words, as Rotberg (2002:85) states, 
‘nation states fail when they can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people. 
Their governments lose legitimacy and in the eyes and hearts of a growing plurality of its 
citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate’. Using this very general definition as 
a singular interpretation of nation-state failure is however problematic. This is because all 
governments, at one point or another, experience varying periods of illegitimacy 
depending on the vicissitudes of their political and economic circumstances. For example, 
after the 1999 April riots in Jamaica, a poll conducted by the popular Stone Poll 
organization revealed that 54 percent of Jamaican citizens agreed with the view that the 
P.J. Patterson-led government had lost its moral authority to lead. However, within the 
space of four years, the same P.J. Patterson-led government was returned to power for a 
third consecutive term, the fourth in succession for the People’s National Party (PNP). 
Prior to this, no administration or head of state had survived national riots to win a 
general election (Jamaica Observer, 1999, July 15). I will discuss the circumstances and 
implications of this protest event in greater detail in subsequent chapters.  
 
Rotberg’s (2002) analysis, however, reveals a credible theoretical continuum, which has 
as its starting point states classified as weak, failing, declining progressively to those 
experiencing total collapse. The illustration below outlines this continuum:  
 
                                                 
38 In the Caribbean, such socio-political, historical and economic circumstances include slavery, 
colonialism and, more recently, the imposition of neo-liberal economic reforms under the 
IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment policy. I will explore the latter in more detail later in this 
chapter.  
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Weak    Failing                Failed                   Collapsed 
 
By Rotberg’s categorisation, Zimbabwe and Haiti, for instance, are two clear examples of 
states displaying systemic weaknesses. Failed states would include Congo, Liberia, 
Afghanistan and Iraq (after 2003). This is while historical examples of collapsed states 
include Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Tajikistan. State failure (in its most 
comprehensive form) therefore originates towards the furthest point of this continuum. 
Rotberg admits that although the list of weak states is long, only a few of those weak and 
badly governed states necessarily edge to full failure. The categorization of a state as 
failing thus need not doom it unquestionably into full failure. A state would have to 
present evidence of the deteriorating conditions outlined by Rotberg (2002) and 
demonstrate that it meets most of these explicit criteria in order to exemplify failure. It is 
to be noted that although Jamaica may, at times, exhibit some of the causative and 
descriptive features of failed or collapsed states (such as seemingly endemic violence), the 
country does not sit comfortably within any of these strict theoretical categories. My 
preoccupation here, however, is not so much with the theoretical assessments of whether 
states are failing or have in fact failed. My purpose here is to consider the extent to which 
it is the weaknesses and/or failings of the Jamaican State that predominantly underpin the 
proliferation of ‘critical citizens’ (Norris, 1999), who are demanding more of their 
government and elected representatives and who demonstrate a preference for 
unconventional styles of citizen politics. In order to do this, I am obliged to look at the 
existing characterizations of the Jamaican State. After all, as chapter 4 illustrates, it is first 
and foremost, the character of state power which determines the tone of citizen politics.  
 
5.2.1  The Jamaican State – A Political Sketch 
Of the state forms that have evolved in the contemporary Caribbean, Jamaica has been 
described as representing the ‘strong state’ (resilient) model (Meeks, 1996). This flattering 
characterization is based on the generally accepted view of Jamaica’s post-colonial 
political order as a highly consolidated democracy and that this democratic framework 
rests on relative political stability. This is derived from having institutionalized a virtually 
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impermeable two-party political system since attaining Universal Suffrage in 1944, 
conducted relatively free and fair elections and installed and removed governments 
without resort to popular uprising, military coups or extra-constitutional means. Indeed, 
despite highly publicized incidents of electoral violence, party patronage and partisanship 
which may have blotted this lofty record somewhat, there is consensus that the political 
system is complemented by high levels of freedom, civil liberties and an extraordinary 
retention of elite consensus (Meeks, 1996; Munroe, 2002; 1999). At the same time, 
however, these scholars signal deep deficits in the processes of representative democracy 
in Jamaica. Popular discontent with democracy is not remarkable but common to both 
transitional and established or consolidated democracies (see Pharr & Putnam, 2000; 
Norris, 1999; Inglehart, 1999). Nevertheless, Munroe (1999:42) observes that popular 
dissatisfaction with Jamaican democracy has been at an all time high since the mid-1990s. 
He notes that remarkably for a consolidated democracy, no more than 35 percent of the 
Jamaican population was very or fairly satisfied with the system in 1996 while only 2 
percent in 1995 designated their constitution and government as aspects of Jamaica of 
which they are most proud.  
 
Munroe (1999) chalked this sense of inadequacy among the citizenry with the Jamaican 
democratic system then to special factors. One relates to the range of negative features 
with which the system is associated – political violence, party patronage and clientelism 
and elite dominated party organizations (cf. Gray, 2004; Stone, 1980; National Committee 
on Political Tribalism, 1997). It may be fair to say that there have been some changes in 
this regard since then. Certainly, in terms of the minimalist criteria of democracy – 
electoralism - the 1997 and 2002 general elections in Jamaica saw marked improvements 
in the freeness and fairness of the voting exercise and far less violence compared to 
previous polls (see Neuman, 2003; Munroe, 1999- refer to chapter 2).  Another factor 
which would have heightened dissatisfaction with the political system, particularly 
amongst disadvantaged sectors, is the relative non-performance of governmental systems, 
reflected in economic indicators and the quality of life of the majority of the population.  
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This refers to ‘stagnant or declining per capita income, a significant proportion of the 
citizens living below the poverty line, widening income inequality, rising levels of violent 
crime, high unemployment and low wage employment, deteriorating roads, inadequate 
water supply and sewerage systems’ (Munroe, 1999:43; cf. Economic and Social Survey of 
Jamaica, 2003). It is, in part, the persistence of these negative features which leads to very 
few optimistic characterizations of state authority in Jamaica. Indeed, using the ongoing 
economic crisis of the mid-1990s, the collapse of the political project and the growing 
empowerment and psychological independence of subordinate classes as frames of 
reference, Meeks (2000; 1996) predicts as emerging in Jamaica what he calls ‘hegemonic 
dissolution’. He uses hegemony here in the Gramscian sense to refer to effective 
leadership and control of the society by the state. On this basis, he maintains that ‘the 
social bloc [embodied in the political elite] in charge of Jamaican society are no longer 
ruling over a people convinced of its social superiority and its inherent right to “run 
things” ’ (1996:131).  
 
Gray (2004:5), on the other hand, emphasises the state’s parasitic, predatory, violent and 
extra-legal qualities and perceives political rule as a fluid transposition between 
democratic liberal-constitutionalism and violent parasitism depending on the exigencies 
of the political situation39. Its most outstanding feature is identified as a ‘mutating, 
                                                 
39 Gray’s thesis appears to reproduce a prevailing view, echoed by the lyrics of Jamaican reggae 
icon, Bob Marley in 1978. Here, Marley not only refers to the whole power structure as Babylon 
but insists that it is the embodiment of the mythical Dracula: 
Babylon system is the vampire 
Sucking the children day by day 
Babylon system is the vampire 
Sucking the blood of the sufferahs [sufferers] 
 
The term Babylon is an ancient (Christian) biblical term which has developed a fascinating 
connotation in Jamaica. Ever since the rise of Rastafari in the 1930s, a religious movement 
indigenous to Jamaica, Rastafarians have held the belief that they, along with all Africans across 
the Diaspora, are exiles in Babylon, destined to be delivered out of captivity by a return to Zion, 
that is Africa, the land of their ancestors. In Jamaican parlance, Babylon symbolizes the ‘oppressive 
order’, meaning all the bureaucratic structures and official institutions of the state, particularly the 
police as well as the political ideology of the ruling elite. For a further elucidation of the Babylon 
philosophy and interpretation, see Chevannes (1995) and Cooper (1993). 
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opportunistic system that willy-nilly incorporates antagonistic norms and practices, 
several of which are hostile to the ones it publicly defends and selectively enforces’ (ibid). 
Gray’s thesis recognizes political leaders as demonstrating remarkable resourcefulness and 
flexibility in adapting to the changing moods and trends of the political community. For 
instance, Gray (2004:5) claims that rather than being purely prohibitive, repressive and 
fostering dependency, ‘political rule in Jamaica cedes significant social space, limited 
political influence and a palpable cultural agency to clients and supplicants from the 
lower class’.  It is this adaptive strategy which he assigns the designation ‘parasitic rule’. It 
is worth noting however, that it is this very capacity to absorb, integrate, incorporate, 
pre-emptively eliminate or soften threats to its power that Meeks (1996) recognizes as 
part and parcel of a strong, resilient model of statecraft. Indeed, rather than suggesting 
failure or weakness on the part of the Jamaican political system, Gray (2004) admits that 
these ‘extra-legal political border crossings’ characterize the successful straddling of 
conflicting political values, which is an essential feature of Jamaican statecraft and a 
crucial strategy of political (crisis) management in peripheral states across the developing 
world(2004: 1-12).  
 
That Jamaica maintains a highly consolidated democratic political system and is able to 
stave off crisis by adapting to new power-sharing arrangements with a variety of actors is 
not a guarantor of good governance. Indeed, as I argue, part of the definition of good 
governance is the ability of states to implement effective social policies, to efficiently 
manage public resources and to use them to achieve societal goals such as access to public 
goods – water, housing, employment (Mbogori & Chigudu, 1999). In this regard, much of 
old authority systems of Jamaican democratic governance are being undermined not only 
because there is ‘hegemonic dissolution’ but because of the declining capacity of the state 
bureaucracy to meet the expectations of citizens for a meaningful life. In fact, the term 
‘state failure’ appears to have acquired a sort of notoriety in Third World contexts such as 
Jamaica, particularly among commentators who often subscribe to and/or become 
imprisoned in a fatalistic dialogue when gauging the performance of the Jamaican state. 
In the following sections, I suggest that this process of state decline is powerfully 
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exacerbated by the impact of economic globalization and the subsequent marginalization 
of small states, a phenomenon which is exposing the weaknesses of the Jamaican state or, 
at the very least, rendering it less dominant than it used to be. The claims that citizens 
make upon the state must therefore be gauged both within the context of the 
responsibilities of the state and the extent to which it is able to fulfil its functional tasks 
and honour its obligations to its citizens. 
 
5.3  UNVEILING THE STATE’S JOB DESCRIPTION 
The responsibilities attributed to the (democratic) state by social theorists are enormous 
and demanding. The modern state, organized into a coherent set of bureaucratic 
institutions, whether democratic or authoritarian, must perform if it is to remain stable 
and retain the legitimacy and confidence of its population. It is compelled, as a rule, to 
maintain the overall conditions of capitalist economic development and social order. Its 
functions hence run the gamut of monopolizing legitimate sources of coercion, giving it 
control over national security, taxation, currency stability, infrastructural development, 
environmental protection, education and health care (Ferguson 2003; Rotberg, 2002; 
Przeworski et al 1999; Strange, 1996; Cerny, 1990; Skocpol et al 1985). For the purposes of 
this study, I adopt here Rotberg’s (2002:87) view of the ideal role of the state where, at 
minimum: 
Nation states exist to deliver political goods – security, education, health services, 
economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order 
and a judicial system to administer it and fundamental infrastructural 
requirements such as roads and communication facilities – to their citizens.  
 
By Rotberg’s thesis, to operate in breach of these basic obligations renders a state weak, 
incompetent or, in extreme cases, a failure, perhaps leading to a state of collapse. I now 
look more closely at some of the responsibilities of the modern state and, within this 
discussion, attempt to gauge the performance of the Jamaican state in this regard. As it is 
the performance of the state in this area of service provision and (social) justice, as we 
shall see later, which has the most obvious impact on the tone of civilian politics and civil 
society in this context, it is these state responsibilities that I mainly focus on. 
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5.3.1  Economic Development 
Of the extensive inventory of responsibilities assigned to the state, maintaining the 
economy is imperative. This is because a country’s economic fortunes and its efficient use 
of public resources tend to have a defining impact on its capacity to secure the well-being 
of its citizens and consequently on political and social stability. Strange (1996) identifies 
as the state’s essential economic functions the following: (1) maintaining the value of the 
currency, (2) choosing the appropriate form of economic development, (3) controlling 
market volatility, (4) imposing taxation 5) establishing authority over foreign trade, 
particularly imports, and (6) ensuring competitiveness within national markets. My 
summation of them here is not to undermine their individual purchase in larger state 
theory. Rather, given that these assumptions are all tied to the overall economic 
development strategy of capitalist-oriented states, they must be viewed as a whole if a fair 
assessment of state performance is to be achieved. To begin with, successful economic 
development depends on the close relationship between states and markets. States 
establish and administer rules and sustain the enabling environment for the market to 
function properly whereas ‘market dynamics affect the state because the economic 
resources available to states and the concrete scope for state intervention [in the 
economy] are influenced by the way markets function’ (Sorenson, 2004: 51). 
Contemporary political scholarship places economic activity as the locus of state power, a 
principal requisite for its survival. The integration of states into the global economy 
means both developed and developing countries are undertaking the gruelling task of 
properly positioning their economies to deal with the realities of international 
development. The reality of competition renders the success of states crucially dependent 
on commitment to the principles of the market.  
 
It is however misleading to adopt a zero sum view of the relationship between states and 
markets. The prevailing hypothesis among many (Cerny, 1990; Evans, 1985; Ferguson, 
2003; Strange, 1996; Willetts, 2001) is that the growth and significance of transnational 
actors, especially banks and other speculators, has managed to weaken the apparatuses of 
the state thereby according the market significant power over the society and economy, a 
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role previously reserved for, and which ultimately rested with, the state. Although some 
scholars attempt to dispel the ‘myths’ of a retreating state and have attempted to ‘bring 
the state back in’ (Sorenson, 2004; Skocpol et al. 1985), it is increasingly obvious that 
‘where states were once masters of markets, now it is the markets which on many crucial 
issues, are the masters over the governments of states’ (Strange, 1996:4). The tremendous 
resources and extraordinary financial capital being claimed by non-state actors is the 
glaring contemporary political reality. In most open economies, this private sector has 
had far more total wealth at its disposal than governments (Ferguson, 2003:90), making 
them far more in control of the fortunes of states, the public policies it undertakes and 
thereby the well-being of citizens, and of critical purchase in this research, the values 
that they observe and perpetuate. Citizens engaging in aggressive demand politics with 
the state must become aware of this contending power of the market.   
 
The fact that developing states are scarcely accruing significant benefits from their 
insertion into the international economy is also problematic. Capitalist economic 
development is an uneven process and the radical transformations to the state that attend 
this exercise have proven to be an uncomfortable option for many economies, particularly 
the weaker economies of the Third World. Here, economic globalization has perpetuated 
marginalization and dependency and placed limits on the functional power of developing 
states in managing their economic affairs (Sorensen, 2004), a situation which helps 
explain issues of social order, wider state governance and the nature of citizen politics. 
Caribbean countries such as Jamaica are textbook examples of this dilemma.  The failure 
of the Jamaican state to deal with economic stagnation, including its inability to control 
inflation and grow its economy, cannot therefore be objectively examined without 
reference to the global context of Structural Adjustment (SA) and economic liberalization 
since the 1980s. Presaged by the world oil shock of 1973, manifested in the rapid surge in 
OPEC oil prices from 1974 onwards, a process of so-called ‘stagflation’ was promulgated 
in all market-oriented economies globally, forcing many countries to undertake a 
fundamental restructuring of their economy (Sorenson, 2004).  
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The experiment of Structural Adjustment, advanced by first world countries, particularly  
the United States through agencies such as the IMF/World Bank, was imposed on lesser 
developed countries, including Jamaica and required a deregulation of the economy 
including installing a competitive exchange rate, encouraging foreign direct investment 
flows, privatizing state–owned enterprises, massively reducing government expenditure 
and liberalizing trade by removing barriers and relying on market forces in line with 
global trends (Le Franc, 1994; Grant-Wisdom, 1994). The Structural Adjustment 
conditionalities imposed on the Jamaican economy, though aimed at reducing fiscal 
deficits and achieving greater competitiveness, proved to be the harsh experience of the 
1980s. Structural Adjustment dealt a severe blow to an already enfeebled Jamaican 
economy, leaving social and economic sectors in a state of crisis. With regard to housing, 
the implementation of Structural Adjustment policies was associated with high mortgage 
interest rates, increasing rents, over-crowding and urban sprawl.  Where the supply of 
basic commodities such as food was concerned, the pursuit of SA meant the removal of 
price controls and subsidies, while in health it meant fee-for-service and escalating drug 
prices. In education, it meant over-crowding, deterioration of physical facilities, and 
declining performance (Gordon et al., 1997; Le Franc, 1994; Grant-Wisdom, 1994).  
 
As the state contracted and reduced its role in the economy, production and employment 
levels and opportunities also dwindled while balance of payments deficits, 
impoverishment and inequality grew exponentially (Gordon et al., 1997; Dominguez et 
al., 1993; Le Franc, 1994; Grant-Wisdom, 1994). The existing (unstable) economic 
environment has manifested in exchange rate depreciation, increases in international 
commodity prices, massive jumps in inflation (despite modest growth) and the legacy of 
social and economic sectors in a state of crisis (Economic and Social Survey, Jamaica, 
2003; Davies, 2000; Franklyn, 2001). This profound social and economic crisis is 
exacerbated as the government’s priority over successive fiscal budgets has made a 
paradigmatic shift from service provision or employment generation to debt servicing 
(Munroe, 2000). The continued reliance on protected overseas markets have also placed 
the highly trade dependent economies of the Caribbean in an economically precarious 
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position. No longer shielded from the forces of world economic change, Caribbean 
nations such as Jamaica face unsecured markets and a further fracturing of their 
economies, thus increasing the powerlessness of the state to guarantee social, economic or 
political stability (Mandle, 2003; Girvan, 1996; Klak, 1999; Klak & Das, 1999; Thomas, 
2000).   
 
It would appear that the more drawn these states are into the global economy, the more 
difficult it often is for state managers to devise policies to promote economic growth. Like 
Jamaica, many Third World governments thus find it virtually impossible to boost their 
economies, create jobs, stem unemployment, improve standards of living and offer their 
poor any kind of meaningful life. Disease, poor housing, lack of water supply, electricity 
and poor sanitation thus characterize living conditions in many parts of the Third World 
– India, Nigeria, Mexico, Brazil and Jamaica. Indeed, the poor ultimately became the 
major casualties of global recession and austerity policies. For many, the situation is dire. 
With the majority unskilled/under-skilled and educationally disadvantaged, there are 
limited opportunities for paid, stable employment (Johnson, 2005; Johnson, forthcoming).  
At the same time, the overall ability of developing states to realize their individual 
economic goals, including proper control and distribution of economic resources, also 
redound to state manager’s judicious execution of their functions and how well they are 
able to respond to the unpredictable changes and shifts in the international economy. The 
inability of political leaders to generate the kind of policies that are conducive to growth, 
low inflation and job creation is reflected in the penchant of Caribbean political science 
scholarship to allude to ‘crises of leadership’ and expressions of concern over the 
managerial skills of Caribbean politicians (see Mandle, 2003; Munroe, 1999; 2000; Klak, 
1999).  
 
It is however clear from the preceding discussion that the Jamaican State is presently 
confronting economic situations that impinge on its capacity to fulfil its functions in a 
market economy. Extraordinarily, all this is occurring at a time when there are pent-up 
popular expectations and increasing demands upon the state by an increasingly frustrated 
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populace ready to resort to violent means to have their needs addressed. Popular 
dissatisfaction among marginalized sectors has grown tremendously in recent years, 
which is increasingly expressed in aggressive street protests and demonstrations and an 
acute escalation in levels of crime. Indeed, there is general scholarly agreement that the 
emergence of popular uprising is a reflection of profound (structural) changes in the 
larger society. Piven & Cloward (1977), drawing on the work of Gurr (1968; 1970), and 
Parsons (1965) emphasise that economic change is a precondition for civil disorder. The 
rationale is that sharp economic change (on top of serious deprivation) disturbs the 
relationship between what men and women have been led to expect and what they 
actually experience. This experience of sudden hardship and disappointed expectations 
leads to anger and therefore precedes eruptions of mass turmoil. Walton (1997:12) 
confirms this explicit link between a state’s economic performance and the levels of 
conflict within the civilian sphere. He argues that: 
During periods of economic growth and social mobility, conflict tends to be low, 
aimed at income maximization, and expressed in collective action focused chiefly 
on institutional channels of labour unions and political parties. Conversely, in 
periods of economic crisis and arrested mobility, conflict is high, aimed at 
collective goods and expressed in collective action by popular mobilization.  
 
To the extent that Third World nations suffer economic dependency and chronic 
underdevelopment, Walton maintains that the latter pattern of conflict is more common. 
It is reasonable to argue that periods of rapid change, such as occurred under the 
Structural Adjustment programme, at the same time as they build frustration, tend also to 
weaken the structures of daily life and the regulatory capacities of those structures. Long 
standing unemployment therefore goes hand in glove with rising indices of crime, family-
breakdown, vagrancy and vandalism – in short the disintegration of communities as 
people struggle to live within and without the rules. By Piven & Cloward’s (1977:12) 
thesis, protest movements arise out of these traumas of daily life when people perceive 
the deprivation and disorganization they experience as both wrong and subject to redress. 
Indeed, they argue that the sheer scale of the economic dislocation brought on by the 
depression in the 1930s as well as in the post-war years (1950s and 1960s) in ghettoes in 
the United States, ‘helped to mute the sense of self-blame, predisposing men and women 
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to view their plight as a collective one, and to blame their rulers for the destitution and 
disorganization they experienced’ (1977: 12).  
 
How the Jamaican state therefore navigates itself economically is thus crucial to political 
and social stability. This is because the responsibility of the state for economic 
development, although driven by and highly dependent on the external forces of the 
global market, means that civil society relies almost exclusively on the state for its 
economic well-being. Indeed, for most citizens, the ability of the state to shield the 
population from economic insecurity remains one of the hallmarks of good governance 
and they therefore expect their governments to be ultimately seized with this charge 
(Baker, 2003). Of course, the answer to bad governance is not simply good or better 
economic performance, albeit highly important. However, that the unemployment rate of 
countries like Jamaica is persistently over 15 percent means that the state is 
underperforming in this regard (see Social and Economic Survey, Jamaica, 2003). This 
development places severe pressure on the ‘welfare’40 function of states, and, even greater 
strain on weak economies whose national budgets permit only the most minimal welfare 
spending. Paradoxically, it is within the ambit of social services and economic security 
that states such as Jamaica are most open to scrutiny.  As I shall illustrate in the 
subsequent chapters, it is the inadequate provisions of collective goods such as water and 
proper roads, which often represent the deciding factor in national elections and the 
political sparkplug igniting aggressive street protests and demonstrations.  
                                                 
40 This reference to the ‘welfare’ obligations of states is not to suggest that Jamaica is a welfare 
state.  The best examples of welfare states are the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark) and indeed much of Western Europe. Here, significant proportions of national resources 
are spent on social security, including pension and unemployment benefits and a national health 
service. In the welfare state, the government, rather than retreating, plays an active role in the 
economy and society, both regulating and providing the framework for the market to operate. The 
Jamaican State, by contrast, can be referred to as a minimalist or free market state as the market is 
allowed space to develop the economy while the state primarily acts as facilitator of private 
enterprise and market activities.  In other words, the minimalist state limits its responsibilities to a 
bare minimum - maintaining law and order and providing such essential services as education and 
water supply. (These notes are taken from Munroe (2002). However, for a more extensive 
discussion of the ‘welfare state’, see Atkinson (1999), Keane (1984), Barrow (1993) and Esping-
Andersen (2002). 
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It is clear from the preceding discussion that Structural Adjustment essentially 
encroached on the role and responsibility of the Third World state in development, 
handicapping its ability to choose the form of economic development that is most 
appropriate to its socio-economic needs. This development has enormous implications for 
developing countries such as Jamaica, where the dependence and demands on the state 
for the provision of public goods has reached peak levels. I take a closer look at this issue 
as I continue to look at the obligations of the contemporary state in the following 
discussion. 
 
5.3.2 Social and Infrastructural Development.  
The provision of effective education and health systems as well as investments in 
infrastructural development remains an important functional responsibility of the 
modern state and underscores the theoretical and political distance between strong and 
weak states. Indeed, for Rotberg (2002), deteriorating or destroyed infrastructure typify 
failed states. Metaphorically, therefore, for many Third World countries, ‘the more 
potholes (or roads turned to rutted tracks or littered with holes), the more likely a state 
will [appear to] exemplify failure’ (Rotberg, 2002: 88). It is worth noting however that the 
corporatization and/or privatization of a majority of government operations under the 
Structural Adjustment programme impacted negatively on the provision of services such 
as transportation, telephone and electricity (power) in Jamaica. Although prior to 
Structural Adjustment, the government had a dismal record of maintaining public 
infrastructure, the shift towards market-led ownership and management of public 
commodities had negative implications for the quality and efficiency of those operations 
(see Gordon et al, 1997) . For example, overcrowding, speeding, poorly maintained buses, 
unreliable service, perpetual increases in fares and bad road conditions are only some of 
the issues that Jamaican citizens faced within a ‘vandalized’ transport sector. Not 
surprisingly, this area accounted for the bulk of citizen mobilizations and demonstrations 
throughout the mid-1990s.  
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Likewise, a thirty-year monopoly by the multinational telecommunications firm, Cable & 
Wireless (C&W), had resulted in limited access to fixed line telephone service by 
significant segments of the Jamaican population and soaring calling rates. The divestment 
by the Jamaican government of the major shares in the country’s electricity provider, 
Jamaica Public Service (JPS), to the United States, Mirant Corporation, has also generated 
similar problems of soaring power rates, which are seen by many citizens to be 
inconsistent with the quality of service provided. As I will illustrate in greater detail in 
subsequent chapters, the brunt of popular protests is, in part, a reaction to the absence or 
poor delivery of some of these public goods. This was continuing proof that the 
imposition and promise of corporatization, viz. a. viz. Structural Adjustment, had not, in 
the main, translated to improvements in the quality of public utilities provided to citizens 
in this context. In fact, rather than retreat, the Government of Jamaica recently 
successfully broke the monopoly of Cable & Wireless and completed a full liberalization 
of the telecommunication system since 2003. There has since been a gradual opening up 
of the industry and a resulting increase in telephone (landline) access to citizens as well as 
a competitive mobile telephone market (see Economic and Social Survey, Jamaica, 
2003:14.3). It has also extended and improved the island’s road network and 
revolutionized the country’s transportation service, providing much needed and obvious 
improvements (ibid). This is while it increased access to electricity for most rural 
residents under a successful Rural Electrification Programme (ibid, 2003)41. However, that 
the debt servicing portfolio is given priority attention in successive national budgets of 
the Jamaican government (with some 70 percent of the expenditure dedicated to debt 
repayment in 2004/2005 alone)42 suggests that all has not been well with regard to the 
performance of the state in this context.  
                                                 
41 See also ‘Solid Achievements’ www.pnpjamaica.com/solid_frame.htm and Franklyn, D (2004) 
(Ed). The Challenges of Change: P.J. Patterson Budget Presentations 1992-2002 for a detailed 
outline of the programmes and policy agenda which the government has undertaken over a ten-
year period in areas such as education, health, infrastructural development and national security. 
 
42 See www.mof.gov.jm/jabudget.shtml  
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Frustration over persistent lack of collective goods and a feeling of historical neglect 
based on poor management of public resources and public policy decisions provide 
sufficient basis for some citizens to harbour feelings of antipathy against the government.  
It is this kind of umbrage which drives some residents to undertake aggressive 
contestations with the state to force the provision of these public goods. It is worth noting 
also that aside from improper policy planning and inefficient use of public resources, 
natural disasters sometimes impinge on the government’s capacity to adequately maintain 
the country’s overall infrastructure or retard the gains already made.  The deadly category 
five Hurricane Ivan, for instance, which bore heavily into Jamaica on September 11, 
2004, not only caused massive structural damage but also strained an already weak 
Jamaican economy.43  
 
5.3.3  National Security and the Rule of Law  
National security remains the most central of all political goods expected of the modern 
state. Defending the national territory against foreign invasion and the protection of 
citizens has been one of the pillars justifying the existence of the state, even though the 
risk of foreign invasion is minimal or declining in many societies (Strange, 1996)44. 
Concern in recent years with a wide assemblage of rogue actors – Mafias, terrorists, drug 
cartels, guerrillas and rebel groups as well as criminal gangs -- have generated global 
anxiety among states about their internal as well as external (border) security and put 
public safety atop citizens’ concerns. Citizens everywhere therefore charge their 
                                                 
43 The damage and loss caused by Hurricane Ivan is estimated at J$36 billion or 8 percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2003. A total of 369,685 persons or 14 percent of the population 
were directly affected by the Hurricane. The Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) break down the 
overall economic cost of the Hurricane as: Social Sectors – $12.7; Productive Sectors – $13.3b; 
Infrastructure – $6.9b; Environment - $2.5b and Emergency Expenditure - $277 m. See Jamaica 
Gleaner, 2004. November 4. www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner20041104/lead/lead4.html 
 
44 The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991 and the occupation of Iraq by the United States in 2003 
represent two of the most highlighted cases where the protection of territorial sovereignty was 
compromised by external intervention. The United States on several occasions has also intervened 
in the domestic affairs of other states (Grenada- 1983, Panama – 1989) under the guise of 
humanitarianism and so-called ‘threats to the safety of US citizens’ (Hartlyn, Schoultz & Varas, 
1992: 1). 
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governments to protect their person, safeguard their property and create and sustain a 
nationwide atmosphere free of fear. Keeping crime and violence levels in check is 
increasingly indispensable in successfully fulfilling this obligation. Rogue actors in civil 
society, however, evolve and become entrenched where and when the state is too weak 
to control the monopoly of violence and ensure good governance, safety and public order 
in everyday life (Rapley, 2006; Strange, 1996; Johnson, 2005; Soeters, 2005; Mason, 2005). 
Mushrooming homicide rates are a fundamental and immediate preoccupation for many 
governments across the developing world, not the least of which is Jamaica. The 
following table, which shows annual rates of homicides since the millennium, illustrates 
the dramatic nature of Jamaica’s crime problem:  
 
Table 5.1 Annual Homicide Levels in Jamaica, 2001-2004 
Year Homicides 
 
2001 1138 
2002 1045 
2003 975 
2004 1471 
2005 1674 
 
Source: Jamaica Constabulary Force Statistics Unit 
 
In 2001, the number of homicides in this small island-nation of 2.6 million people stood 
at a record 1,138, a figure which represents 44 per 100,000 (population), the third highest 
in the world (Acosta, 2005). Merely five years into the new millennium, Jamaica’s 
homicide rate stands at 1674 at the end of 200545. These extraordinary homicide figures 
                                                 
45 It is to be noted that almost half of these cases were resolved by the police through arrests and 
prosecution. For example, of the 1045 reported homicides in 2002, 496 were cleared up. Of the 945 
recorded for 2003, 564 were cleared and, of the 1471 reported homicides for 2004, 659 were 
cleared up. Source: Police Crime Statistics, Jamaica Constabulary Force. 
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must be understood within the context described by leading Jamaican criminologist, 
Anthony Harriot (2000), as the historical rootedness and multi-dimensionality of 
criminality in Jamaica, which features a perverse linkage between gangs, drugs and 
politics. Harriot (2000) links the emergence of criminal violence in Jamaica to  the 
dramatic transformation in the structure of crime and the unique social organization of 
the criminal, to different periods: (1) the introduction of Structural Adjustment in the 
1980s (2) the accelerated growth of the export trade in cannabis as drug traffickers sought 
to exploit the economic crisis facing the island, also in the 1980s and (3) the resort in the 
1970s to highly intense political violence as the country closed ranks behind two 
ideologically distinct political parties. The crime situation post-1987 (to today), he argues, 
is occasioned by a shift in the position of Jamaican gangs in the international drug trade, 
their highly structured organization at home featuring empowering political connections 
and the extraordinary influence they wield within the informal economy and the wider 
urban communities (Harriot, 2000; cf. Rapley, 2006, 2003; Gray, 2004, 2003; Figueroa, 
2003; Charles, 2002; Griffith, 2002; Munroe, 1999; Report of the National Committee on 
Political Tribalism, 1997; Gunst, 1995).  
 
Whereas the growth of criminal violence in a country, as I will argue later,  may contain 
liberatory elements and represent the collective resistance of the poor to impoverishment, 
political exclusion and marginalization (Gray, 2004; Bayat, 1997; Scott, 1985; 1990), it is 
also often powerfully identified with a beleaguered state and, in extreme cases, 
exemplifies state failure. I draw attention here to the extraordinary rate and enduring 
character of violent crime in Jamaica because it has severely weakened the state’s 
monopoly on the use of violence, thereby rendering it particularly difficult for the state 
to advance one of its central duties of maintaining internal stability. Recent scholarship 
links the state’s ineffectiveness in containing violent crime to a demoralized police force, 
which has been subject to widespread and credible allegations of excessive use of lethal 
force, corruption and politicization (Harriot, 2000; 2003). Indeed, the historical record on 
Jamaica illustrates a systematic practice of violence by members of the country’s security 
forces. According to a United States-based Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), 
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Jamaican constables do not appear to be trained ‘to employ a continuum of force that 
begins with an escalating range of non-lethal tactics before relying on firearms’ (PERF 
Report, 2001). Although the reality is that armed criminals are more likely to shoot at the 
police than surrender, a sort of trigger-happiness in which constables fail to exercise 
muzzle control is prevalent.  Police crime statistics reveal that an average of 140 people 
are shot and killed annually by the Jamaican police, one of the highest rates of lethal 
police killings in the world. Amnesty International in a damning report on Jamaica’s 
human rights condition also argues that ‘the manner in which deadly force is frequently 
employed and the absence of prompt, thorough and effective investigations are consistent 
in many instances with a pattern of extra-judicial killings’ (Amnesty Report, Jamaica, 
2001). 
 
Although these developments may also suggest that the state is attempting to be strong 
and proactive in its management of the crime problem, it can also position the authority 
of the Jamaican State as weakening in the face of the continual upward movement of 
crime rates. In this sense, the state itself becomes criminal in its attempt to suppress 
incidents of crime and violence, in which case, criminality and lawlessness are 
normalized and civilized governance is at risk of retreat. Within the context of this study, 
the growth of criminal violence is manifestly problematic. This is because illegality and 
violence, as I suggest in Table 2.1 (chapter 2), is perhaps the most glaring indicator of the 
presence of incivility within civil society and the persistence of uncivil politics (cf. Keane, 
1996; 1998). Routine, flagrant violations of the law by Jamaican citizens, at times, carried 
out in full view of the police and relevant policing authorities is also strongly indicative of 
severe weaknesses in the institutions of civil society geared to social control and civil 
politics. In fact, this seemingly laissez-faire attitude toward the rule of law and an 
increasing accommodation to and/or tolerance of criminality may also be tied to what 
some analysts see as popular withdrawal of citizen participation in policing (refusal to act 
as witnesses, give information to police etc) (Patterson, 2000; Harriot, 2003; Gray, 2004). 
These developments exacerbate the challenges for the Jamaican state, not least because it 
is within the context of the drive to uphold the rule of law that some of the most 
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contentious issues arise between civil society and the state. Indeed, one of the most 
controversial areas of civilian conflict with the Jamaican state, expressed in hostile citizen 
protests, is alleged police brutality and the perception that justice, especially through the 
court system, is elusive. This leads me to the state’s obligation to provide a credible and 
transparent judicial process.   
 
5.3.4 Justice (through the Courts). 
Freedom from injustice, and developing and maintaining strong and transparent 
legislative and judicial institutions are among the most defining professional 
responsibilities of the modern state and ultimately tied to its security obligation (Rotberg, 
2002; United Nations, 2000). In its most desirable context, the enactment of laws is 
designed to serve the needs of all actors comprising the public sphere. Its independence 
from the executive and its integrity must therefore be obvious. If it contravenes this 
desired principle to reflect instead, in rubber stamp fashion, the desires of the executive, 
then the needs of civil society are poorly served and the state is deemed to have failed in 
the execution of its responsibility.  Indeed, it is Rotberg’s (2002:87) view that a state has 
failed if ‘citizens know that they cannot rely on the court system for significant redress or 
remedy especially against the state’. In contexts such as Jamaica where criminal violence 
is pervasive and state-directed ‘wars on crime’ are seemingly at risk of becoming assaults 
on the poor, a reliable judicial system is mandatory. Munroe (2000:14) further writes that: 
The inadequacy of the available means of citizen redress and ineffective oversight 
of the police force undermine community confidence in the criminal justice 
system. On the other hand,  ‘vigilantism’ and informal community justice is 
fuelled by slowness on the part of the system to identify, apprehend, prosecute, 
convict and adequately punish wrong doers. Complementing this generally 
negative aspect of the rule of law is deplorable prison conditions, inordinate 
delays in the court system and inconsistent, class-influenced sentencing practice. 
 
It therefore seems clear that if the organs of the state created to dispense justice are to 
retain citizen confidence, they cannot be seen to exhibit chronic weaknesses such as 
those outlined here. Recent political scholarship suggests that there is a widespread 
perception of failure by the state to adequately address these fundamental problems in the 
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justice system (Gray, 2004; Harriot, 2000; 2003; Munroe, 1996; 1999; 2002). As I shall 
argue in subsequent chapters, citizen mobilizations for justice are in response to this 
prevailing perception of a flawed system by the mass of the population. In the same 
breath, the inclination to mount street-level protest as a first resort to seeking redress to 
injustice signals a widespread and continuous erosion of confidence in the conventional 
(available) means of citizen redress. It is also worth noting that in most societies access to 
justice is shaped by one’s economic power (see United Nations, 2000).  
 
Munroe (2002:16) highlights the implications of this situation for Jamaica. He argues that 
there is the perception among the public (and confirmed by international agencies such as 
Transparency International) of pervasive corruption at all levels of the Jamaican society 
in the award of public contracts, disposal of public assets and the allocation of ‘scarce 
benefits’. He maintains that pervasive corruption and the allegations made against varying 
suspects – government and political party officials, members of the security forces, private 
sector functionaries – who are not followed up with prosecution, conviction or 
punishment not only alienates civil society but also increases its apathy and 
disenchantment with politics and political processes. This is a worrying development for 
many developing states. If those responsible for administering justice are violators of the 
law, this weakens the state’s capacity for productive citizen engagement and, instead, 
engenders mistrust of state managers, encourages radicalized political negotiation tactics 
by citizens and sanctions extra-legal forms of community power. The Jamaican case, as 
we shall see, exemplifies this situation – a radical assault by extra-legal actors upon the 
legitimate authority of the state, the subversion of its monopoly on the use of violence 
and, as a result of uncompromising protestation models, a negation of civility and civil 
politics. As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, the state is no longer the exclusive 
authority it once was and is just one among several other power brokers. As empowered 
extra-legal actors currently expose the declining omnipotence of the state and are 
negatively influencing civilian politics globally, I look more closely at the power of these 
actors and the implications they hold for the way in which citizens in contexts such as 
Jamaica choose to make claims upon the state, and thus on the quality of civil society. 
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5.4   ROGUE ACTORS AMBUSH THE STATE 
Criminal activity is nothing novel. Neither is the transnationalization of criminal actors 
particularly phenomenal. Then, why study them? The phenomenon of the outlaw is 
significant to this study for two reasons. (1) It impinges on the power and authority of the 
Jamaican state, rendering weak its capacity to stem crime and violence and maintain 
social order and stability. (2) It severely affects the tone and quality of civil society given 
their power and extraordinary influence over significant numbers of citizens and upon 
the values and norms at play in the wider society. Indeed, as I will argue in subsequent 
chapters, protests and demonstrations are sometimes strategically coordinated by these 
individuals to serve their own selfish ends. In such cases, residents of communities are 
forced to engage in causes they have little knowledge of and demonstrate on behalf of 
criminal elements which have hitherto terrorized them and against the state whether or 
not the issue in contention is a legitimate one.  It bears repeating here that the 
globalization of the world economy and the entrenchment of the processes of 
transnationalization have only exacerbated this problem. The criminal coalition of the 
Mafia has long extended its wings across continents, making contacts and business deals 
with like organizations such as the Chinese triads and the Colombian drug cartels 
(Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Soeters, forthcoming; Strange, 1996; UNDP, 1994).  Likewise, 
Jamaican ‘yardie’ gangs have internationalized their operations, establishing bases 
throughout the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States (Harriot, 2001; 2003; 
Rapley, 2003; Gunst, 1995).  
 
Their increasing wealth, the expanding extent of their transnational operations and the 
degree to which their authority in world society and in world economy rivals and 
encroaches upon that of governments is a source of anxiety for many countries. This is 
especially true for the governments of states such as Jamaica where the challenges they 
pose are becoming much more obvious (Rapley, 2006, 2003; Harriot, 2003, 2000; Charles, 
2002; Munroe, 1999). Criminal gangs traffic in illegal and prohibited activities – crime, 
violence and narcotics trafficking – and, based on my discussion in chapter 2, are not your 
most civil citizens. Yet criminal actors have, until recently, occupied almost negligible 
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attention in the academic theorizing on the state and on civil society. As I argued in 
chapter 2, as residents in communities, voters in electoral constituencies and holders of 
national passports, criminal actors are, in conceptual terms, legitimate members of the 
public sphere, an ingrained part of the local community and benefit from all the trappings 
of universal citizenship. As they are formed voluntarily (albeit non-institutionalized or 
informal) and maintain their autonomy from the state and market, criminal actors are, in 
theory, accorded membership in civil society (see Whitehead, 1997; Barber, 1984). This is 
notwithstanding that they reject being subjected to or constrained by the rules of either 
civil sociability and /or interaction which itself also defines civil society (see Table 2.1, 
chapter 2).   
 
In this regard, criminal networks do not meet the normative obligations that constitute a 
strong civil society. This is because, as I discuss in chapter 2, they do not demonstrate 
civic values and democratic practices which include tolerance, inclusion, non-violence 
and a commitment to promoting the public good. In short, the fact they engage in extra-
legal practices does not by itself exclude them from the theoretical boundaries of civil 
society but it renders them uncivil actors within the civil sphere. It is precisely this 
dichotomous yet colliding role played by criminal networks which makes them an 
aggravating, unavoidable menace to the authority of the state and in some cases, a direct 
threat to the stability of society. Criminality and illegality are today so pervasive and 
criminals operate with such wide latitudes of autonomy and high levels of impunity that 
citizens in some contexts seem to have developed a sort of familiarity with and 
accommodation to it and, in some instances, even empathize with the perpetrators of 
illegal activity (Harriot, 2000, 2003; cf. Collins, 2004; Price 2004). Indeed, a great deal of 
political theory seeks to understand and explain the structural conditions which drive 
people to commit unlawful acts. Often commiserating with the illegal actor, some of these 
theories sanction these actions as part of a (neo-Marxian) project of resistance to poverty 
and domination (see Scott, 1985, 1990; Gray, 2004).  
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It is certainly true that social structures and particular legislations can perpetuate unjust, 
inequitable systems. Resisting such systemic, structural oppression is therefore an 
important aspect of citizen action. Yet, this cannot be used to condone criminality. In 
other words, current hypotheses on citizen action cannot ignore the significance of 
human agency nor can it view uncritically the larger systemic forces which sometimes 
guide the behaviour of individuals (Giddens, 1979). There is, for example, a tendency 
towards economic reductionism in analyses of the causes of crime in Jamaica.  While no 
direct causal link can be made between crime and poverty, this research recognizes that 
part of the problem faced by states such as Jamaica is the resort to anti-social activity by 
an increasing number of citizens in circumstances where there is an acute absence of a 
structure of social and economic opportunities (see Seaga, 2005; Franklyn, 2001).  
 
Given that most theorists have focused on notions of resistance, it is important that we 
draw a distinction between legitimate resistance to oppression as a consequence of the 
absence of economic opportunities and criminal behaviour in the search for explanations 
of the presence and growth of illegality or uncivil behaviour. My concern in this research 
is therefore with the large criminal organizations and the smaller bands of ‘urban 
terrorists’ in the Jamaican context, the kind of politics that they engage in, the counter-
society they construct, its impact on the values and politics of the civil community and 
the extent to which this impinges on the capacity of the state to maintain good 
governance and construct a truly civil society. It is worth restating that their presence 
and influence on civilian politics powerfully confirms the weakness of the state apparatus 
(Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Soeters, forthcoming). As I will show (see chapter 8), the 
failings of law enforcement agencies and the contradictory linkages of political actors 
with the criminal underworld in contexts such as Jamaica undermines the authority of 
the state and creates an immediate space for criminal actors to augment their power and 
control over the civil community. The conceptual invention of the term ‘shadow 
government’ or ‘counter-government’ (Strange, 1996; Charles, 2002) is an ominous 
recognition of the emergence and political significance of such groups in the civil 
community.   
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In fact, the political phenomenon of community dons in Jamaica, with their expanding 
contingent of urban terrorists and mercenaries, represents an emerging counter-
government in Jamaica.  Since community dons, unlike other non-state actors, are not 
bounded by the rules governing civil or legal behaviour, they, perhaps, have the greatest 
influence on the quality of civil society.  As I shall argue later, at different historical 
junctures, the Jamaican State has succumbed to criminal power sharing, finds itself a 
contested, weakened authority, lacking legitimacy and is forced to become jealous of its 
power. Reasserting its authority over the spatial environment and its civil and uncivil 
publics is often marked by violent confrontations with its citizens. Strange (1996:117) 
argues that ‘when national governments are weak and criminals are rich and the state 
zealously defends its power, something close to a civil war results’ (cf. Rapley, 2006; 
Mason, 2005; Soeters, 2005).  
 
In other words, criminal gangs, mini-Mafias and drug syndicates are not going to roll over 
and play dead while the state threatens their profits. At the same time, when the 
Jamaican State feels compelled to reply sternly to the viciousness of criminal networks, it 
faces a backlash from civil society which aggressively defends itself against the possibility 
of abuse of human rights. This research therefore attempts to balance its focus on this 
development with a parallel examination of the increasing demands of law-abiding 
citizens for economic, social and human rights. It is here that the potential for the 
opening of new democratic spaces for real civil society to act viz. a. viz. the state is most 
evident. At the same time, this theoretical insight gives space to further questions which 
holds relevance not only for Jamaica but for other political contexts. Firstly, to what 
extent do the colliding values and approaches to political engagement and negotiation of 
different groups within civil society impact on the nature of the state-civil society 
relationship and the quality of civil society? Secondly, how might we view the demands 
of oppressed groups for justice within a context of mushrooming criminality and 
generalized hostility against the police? Thirdly, is a state’s failure to adequately respond 
to and/or negotiate these demands a sign of its declining power or has it become a victim 
of ‘the people’s will trying to substitute itself for the rule of law’ (Barber, 1984:114)?  
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It is because of the theoretical purchase of these questions that rising levels of crime and 
violence as well as the empowerment of deviant actors, though extraordinarily 
worrisome, are not the only problematic in this study of civilian politics in Jamaica. As I 
will illustrate in the following section and more substantively in subsequent chapters, a 
theoretical focus on the very tenor of citizen protest, particularly where it intersects with 
criminality and/or extra-legality is essential, as it not only impacts on the quality of 
governance and the stability and legitimacy of the state but, powerfully on the building of 
a strong civil society – truly participatory, functional and democratic.  
 
5.5  CONTENTIOUS CITIZEN POLITICS AND THE STATE 
As a point of departure, the health of democracy does not depend on the passivity of 
citizens. In fact, by Barber’s (1984:261) thesis, ‘strong democracy [embodied in a strong 
state] requires unmediated self-government by an engaged citizenry. It requires 
institutions that will involve individuals at both the neighbourhood and the national level 
in common talk, common decision-making and political judgement, and common action’.  
Where this collective engagement and action becomes overly aggressive and violent, 
however, it may not serve the ends for which it was enacted. Certainly, in terms of the 
construction of a truly civil society and a civil politics, it would have lost sight of its 
purpose. At the same time, the extent to which citizens utilize their rights – to protest, 
assemble, march and of free speech – to influence or get involved in public activity 
amounts to acting or participating politically (Munroe, 2002). It is important to recall 
here that this political participation may exhibit both conventional and unconventional 
forms. The most established of the conventional forms is the act of voting in elections, 
with membership in political parties/ organizations, attending political meetings and 
signing petitions coming close behind. Although these conventional models are also the 
most passive forms of citizen political involvement and participation, they are a 
significant part of the democratic machinery and political culture of many countries. 
Occasionally, however, citizen participation bursts beyond the bounds of conventional 
politics to include demonstrations, protests and other forms of unconventional activity 
(Dalton 1996).  
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Although some protests and demonstrations assume passive forms (such as peaceful 
marches), the unconventional mode of political participation is usually aggressive, 
coercive, confrontational, and in extreme cases, falls outside the confines of lawful and 
civil behaviour. Where citizens pursue more direct and radical modes on a consistent, 
normalized basis, it may effectively render these unconventional modes of political action 
as conventional! Contemporary political scholarship has failed to make this significant 
distinction. Some scholars attached labels such as ‘exuberant’ and ‘excessive’ to the 
turbulent protests of the 1960s and rendered the agitation over civil rights during this 
period as incompatible with effective governability (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki, 
1975 quoted in Norris, 1999). In contrast, the widespread protests over environmental 
protection, unfair trade rules, gender discrimination and other infringements on human 
rights throughout the 1990s in advanced industrialized countries are now presented in 
the scholarship as mere smatterings of violence and unpleasant protest incidents by 
citizens of a global civil society who are struggling for social reform, political goods and 
the consolidation of democracy (Tarrow, 2000)46.  
 
A more sanguine approach to social activism is thus the current theoretical tendency 
(Jasper, 2003; Tarrow, 2000; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Norris 1999; Foweraker, 1995; Tilly, 
1978, Piven & Cloward, 1977). This approach renders flawed and exaggerated Crozier, 
Huntington and Watanuki’s (1975) idea that widespread citizen mobilizations and direct 
citizen action represents a form of ‘anomic democracy’ and sees instead contentious 
politics as a normal part of the democratic system. Yet, it is important that contemporary 
political science scholarship is cautious about the romanticisation of protest. In other 
words, although this research recognises the validity of the mobilisations of particularly 
the marginalised as a useful, autonomous aspect of civil society, it maintains that such a 
collectivity, operating vicariously and with little attention to legality and tolerance, 
                                                 
46 It is worth noting that these latter protest campaigns carry significant theoretical purchase in 
helping to expose, as the earlier discussion reveals, the power of multinational and transnational 
corporations over the state and the consequent limits on the ability of the state to meet the 
demands placed upon it. 
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departs from the notion of civil  activism. In this regard, the relationship between uncivil 
politics and good governance require serious intellectual contemplation rather than 
scholarly dismissal. Uncivil citizen politics, as I will argue in the following chapters, may 
rather prove to be less a boon and more an encumbrance to democratic dialogue and 
action and seriously impede the chances for mutually beneficial interaction between the 
state and civil society.  
 
My intention in this research is not to cast protest politics as an enemy of the structural 
power of the state. I, however, seek to explore the politics of uncivil civilian engagement 
where protest interaction and discourse remains within the realm of belligerence and 
incivility.  By Barber’s (1984:222) thesis, ‘such forms of politics are rightly feared by those 
who cherish liberty no less than community and who seek a form of public being that can 
preserve and enhance the autonomy of the participants [and the quality of civil society]. 
Depending on the historical and socio-political evolution of these vigorous collectivities 
of citizens, their personality, mandate and politics, civil society can be invested with 
significant, useful power. By the same token, however, depending on how they choose to 
express this power, they can distract from civil society’s strength and usefulness and test 
the capacity and willingness of state authority to respond adequately to the (very often) 
legitimate demands from this body. It is this theoretical dilemma which confronts civilian 
politics in Jamaica. I discussed, for example, in chapter 4, the unique historical and socio-
political contexts in which civil society, including citizen mobilization and popular 
protest, emerged in Jamaica. The implications these hold for radical and violent forms of 
protestation retaining sources of power in this context, especially within the arena of 
grievance politics, are evident. Even a cursory perusal of the literature on citizen politics 
(Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Barber, 1984; Dalton, 1996; Norris 1999) will 
reveal that democracy and dissent are two sides of the same coin and hence popular 
protest and/or demonstrations have naturally emerged as unavoidable (and instrumental) 
forms of political action for citizen-watchdogs of government.  
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Although state theories almost always de-emphasize this functional element of civil 
society (and sometimes civil society theory itself!), popular protest remains a compelling 
political resource especially for minorities, repressed groups, the economically and 
socially disadvantaged and other groups structurally alienated from the established 
political order. The poor and oppressed retain an affinity for this form of political action 
because, as Dalton (1996:68) suggests, ‘when citizens are blocked from exercising political 
influence through legitimate participation channels, protest politics stands as a (practical) 
option’. By this logic, the absence of adequate mechanisms of state representation or the 
failure of the institutional state channels for citizen redress compels citizens both inside 
and outside official civil society to install more insistent tactics, ushering in what Dalton 
(1996) sees as a new style of citizen politics.  
 
It also stands to reason that the weaknesses of civil groups to adequately lobby and 
negotiate claims on behalf of their constituents also encourage support for the use of more 
direct forms of popular protestation. Historically, unconventional protest and collective 
action was an absolute last resort, a desperate public act, arising from feelings of acute 
frustration and deprivation (Tilly, 1978). It now appears to be the standard response not 
only for groups that lack access to politics and politicians through conventional channels 
but has broadened to include a wider spectrum of political groups. An important 
theoretical distinction is that in many advanced industrial societies, unconventional 
political action such as protests are employed by social activists as effective additional 
strategies to more institutional lobbying methods. It advances their cause by driving the 
emotional momentum of particular issues, keeping it fresh in the public’s mind and on 
the agenda of the mass media (Jasper, 2003; Dalton, 1996). On the other hand, as I will 
argue in subsequent chapters, in countries such as Jamaica with many numbed, 
disengaged citizen groups, protest action, with very few exceptions, appears to arrive as 
an almost instinctive, solitary response where there are perceptions of injustice. Here, 
protest campaigns are more or less spontaneous, episodic, aggressive, dramatic and at 
times quite violent.  
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The high level of unconventional political activity in Jamaica, especially the current 
frequency with which the protest tool is employed, suggests its entrenchment as an 
instrumental part of the strategies of the poor. Of course, it may no longer be an extremist 
political tactic, signalling revolutionary ferment and directed at overthrowing the 
established political order as it did during the era of slavery and British colonial rule. Yet, 
it may be exemplifying an intense anti-state mentality based on widespread perceptions 
of government neglect and under-performance. Jamaican citizens, like citizens elsewhere, 
have become increasingly critical of the major institutions of representative government 
and the performance of elected politicians. This disaffection causes many to become 
deeply disengaged not only from state-level politics but also from community-level 
citizen initiatives and public activities. This is while others, angered and frustrated by 
persistent deprivation and the government’s inability or unwillingness to come to their 
aid, are frighteningly ready to revolt.  
 
Much of contemporary political science scholarship on citizen participation grapples with 
this kind of political cynicism, and the subsequent withdrawal of citizens from politics 
(see Norris, 1999; Inglehart, 1999l; Dalton, 1996; Munroe, 1999; Putnam, 1995) evidenced 
in declining voter turn but only few assess its impact on unconventional political 
participation. Confidence and trust in government and political leaders are, of course, not 
stable phenomena but fluctuate according to the performance of politicians, particularly 
in their handling of the economy. It is worth pointing to the examples of Japan and Italy, 
however, which experienced widespread cynicism and voter disenchantment in the post-
war period in the face of rapid economic growth, to indicate that economic performance 
(and even economic non-performance) is a poor indicator of the pervasive levels of 
political cynicism (McCallister, 1999 in Norris, 1999; Munroe, 2002). I will not tackle 
those contextual issues here. It is worth noting, however, that while the proliferation of 
protest movements prove that we are not witnessing a flight from politics, the ubiquitous 
confrontational direct-action style of protest politics which abides in contexts like 
Jamaica may instead only result in very limited short-term gain for the participants, 
stunts civic dialogue and engagement, threatens the stability of the political system and 
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negates civil politics and civil society. It is for this reason that most theorists discussing 
citizen politics, including this researcher, accept the view that citizens want to 
demonstrate against the actions of the democratic political process and the actors driving 
that process, not destroy it (Dalton, 1996; Norris, 1999).  
 
At the same time, as contemporary publics lose respect for authority and simultaneously 
display more political efficacy by utilizing their increasing influence to maximize their 
demands on the state, participation patterns are bound to change and impact directly on 
the functional capacity of the state. The attention-getting, direct action methods of 
contemporary citizen protests may not trouble the established state institutions or robust 
economies of many advanced industrialized countries but they are sure to place severe 
strain on overloaded political systems most likely to be found among the often more 
fragile states of the Third World. In other words, ‘excessive’ citizen politics may not 
overburden democracy per se but may invest civilian politics with a particular tone 
which may prove inimical rather than helpful to building civil society. It is a cyclical 
struggle as the inability of the state to honour its obligation to its citizens not only 
potentially alienates civil society but remains the very source of citizen mobilizations and 
popular protest.  
 
5.6  SUMMARY 
This chapter emphasized the changing architecture and mood of contemporary citizen 
politics within the context of the hollowing out of the state’s authority and the 
empowerment of alternate powers. The discussion established that these contesting forces 
are rendering the state highly contingent, variable and subject to prevailing conditions. 
For example, as a result of the rise in power of the market (banks, multi-national 
corporations), the governments in developing countries today retain less control over 
their economic destinies and hence are unable to fulfil adequately their obligations to 
their citizenry. At the same time, it is now recognised that the adaptive capacity of a state 
to its existing circumstance is a strong determinant of its survivability, longevity and 
legitimacy. I, therefore, explored the performance of the state, particularly the extent to 
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which it is able to deliver political goods – security, education, health services, economic 
opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework, a reliable judicial system as 
well as infrastructural requirements such as roads and communication facilities – to its 
citizens.  
 
The performance of the Jamaican state carries critical theoretical purchase in this study 
since political distrust and disaffection in this context is increasingly linked to the use of 
more direct and aggressive forms of citizen politicking such as street protest, blockades 
and demonstrations as well as other forms of unconventional political action. Indeed, a 
sceptical global public comprised of ‘critical citizens’ is now more likely to question 
government policies and action (or inaction) as well as mount challenges to force 
alternate responses from states (Tarrow, 2000; Warren, 1999; Dalton, 1996; Norris, 1999). 
It therefore follows that as the nature of state authority shifts, so does the character of its 
relationship with and behaviour towards civil society and vice versa. As I highlighted in 
this chapter, it is this kind of dramatic contestation and dynamic process of ‘structuration’ 
between citizens and the state, embodied in popular civilian politics, which manifestly 
demonstrate the need for political science scholarship to begin to examine citizen politics 
as much through the conceptual lens of civil society as uncivil society.  
 
Why this concern with uncivil politics? Firstly, as the preceding discussion suggests, it is 
from civil society, and the public sphere more broadly, that the state derives its 
legitimacy and calibrates its quality. Secondly, the declining power of the state and the 
calls for participatory governance exposes civil society to theoretical scrutiny, challenging 
its mandate and normative basis and significant to this study, the nature of its politics. 
Susan Strange (1996:14) outlines the rationale for the latter concern when she argues that 
‘the diffusion of authority away from national governments has left a yawning hole of 
non-authority, ungovernance it might be called within society’. It is, in part, this spatial 
environment of ‘non-authority’ or ‘ungovernance’ which breeds incivility and appears to 
be the nesting place for uncivil citizen politics. I now tackle more substantively the 
manifestations of uncivil civilian politics in Jamaica in the subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Roadblocks to Justice: Protest Politics in 
Practice 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
The Jamaican experience of citizen politics presents a case of both peaceful and violent 
protests. I will argue that the latter predominates while, at times, the distinction between 
the two is not very clear-cut or easily observable. This is because even genuinely peaceful 
demonstrations can and do, sometimes, deteriorate into violence and aggression, making 
resort to boisterous displays, disruptive actions and intimidatory tactics the conventional 
routine. This resort to direct action approaches, such as those illustrated in Box 1.1, means 
that popular protest, is more often than not inconsistent with the law. Breaches of the 
Road Traffic, Anti-Litter, Public Order and Town and Communities Acts come readily to 
mind. But given the manner in which protest has evolved historically in this post-
colonial society (see chapter 4), it is unsurprising that Jamaicans have always expressed 
themselves angrily in numbers. The intent, by and large, to use the Jamaican vernacular, 
has been to ‘lick out’ or ‘bun a fire’ (to lash out; show disapproval) against the established 
codes of order, whether manifested in the plantocracy, Crown Colony Government or 
self-rule.  
 
Yet, the ubiquitousness of violent protests in Jamaica has taken a toll, and has 
consequences for the promise of establishing a truly civil society.  In chapter 2, I 
attempted to underscore the theoretical and political relevance of the problem of 
incivility within the domains of citizen politics and civil society. One of the underlying 
issues to emerge from this discussion is that this problem of incivility, although present in 
all known forms of society, is seemingly more acute, and hence problematic, in some than 
in others. Jamaica is one such context where the powerful proclivity for popular protest 
naturally leads to questions not only about its tenor but also the conduct of civilian 
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politics and the quality of civil society more broadly. Actively engaging these issues is 
now almost inescapable in the Jamaican experience because, as one political activist 
remarked during my field interviews, ‘social protest is our way of doing things’ (PN27). 
This chapter explores the manifestations of popular protest in Jamaica within the contexts 
of survivalism, the ethic of justice, resistance to oppressive treatment by the state as well 
as anomic disorder. Much of this discussion is framed within a continuum of protests 
featuring the struggles of citizens for collective goods (water, power and proper roads), 
the resistance of street vendors and petty traders to government removal policy, on behalf 
of area leaders such as Donald ‘Zeeks’ Phipps, and against assumed police brutality.   
 
6.2  THE VOCABULARY OF PROTEST IN JAMAICA 
The following police report of protest events gives basis to concerns over the form and 
tone of contemporary social protests as well as provides useful glimpses into the dynamics 
and repertoire of popular protest in Jamaica: 
 
Box 6.1 Police Incident Report - Protest Events 
Between 4:45am and 1:15pm on October 12, 1998, citizens numbering about 200 from the 
communities of Mavis Bank, Content, Content Gap, Guava Ridge, Flamstead, Mount 
Charles, Violet Bank and other adjoining districts, staged roadblocks and demonstrations 
at several points along the Mavis Bank Main Road, protesting the lack of telephone, water 
and proper roads in the area. The demonstrators used freshly cut trees along with stones 
to block the road. They were addressed by Member of Parliament, Oliver Clue and 
Councillor, Edna Spaulding. The crowd was hostile toward Mr. Clue and stated that he 
was doing nothing to alleviate the situation. The road was cleared by 22 police officers 
with the help of a front end loader. (Event # 98000294280) 
 
Between 7 am and 12:30 pm on September 21, 1998, about 200 persons consisting of taxi 
and mini-bus operators and bus conductors demonstrated along the Big Bridge, Bay Road, 
Little London and Retreat Main Roads in Westmoreland. They used logs, stones, broken 
bottles and other debris to block the road. Several fires were lit along the roadway, 
causing delay to vehicular traffic. They were protesting over bad road conditions from 
Savanna-la-mar to Negril. Ten persons were arrested and charged for breaches of the 
Anti-Litter Act. The blockage was cleared by the police who maintained a presence in the 
area. (Event # 98000270984) 
 
Between the hours of 9:30am and 3:00 pm, on September 14, 1999, citizens of breadnut 
Valley blocked the main road leading to the JAMALCO (Bauxite) Mines using stones, old 
trees and other debris. They also blocked the railway line using similar methods. They 
were demanding that JAMALCO give them contract jobs in the area. Also, on June 22, 
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1999, about forty men from the Old Harbour Bay area of St. Catherine, seeking work at 
the Jamaica Public Service Company, Power Station, Old Harbour Bay. Stones were 
thrown and two vehicles damaged, one of which is owned by the company. On the arrival 
of the police, the blockage was cleared and seven men were taken into custody for 
breaches of the Anti-Litter Act and malicious destruction of property. 
Source: Incidents Report for 1998, 1999, National Police Control Centre, Jamaica 
Constabulary Force. (Last box represent events # 99000237103 and # 99000161795). 
 
The following portrayals of protest campaigns by the Jamaica Gleaner  (2005a; 2005b) are 
also not uncommon:  
Fiery roadblocks, sporadic gunfire, closed business places and empty schools were 
all part of the mayhem which erupted across the island yesterday, as placard-
bearing residents took over the streets to voice their frustration with recent price 
increases.  
 
Mayhem gripped Spanish Town, St. Catherine, in its deadly embrace yesterday as 
angry protests and running gun battles between armed thugs and the police 
forced the lockdown of most schools, shuttered businesses in the area and led to 
the shooting death of one woman 
 
The appetite for hostile, radicalized forms of popular protest as the predominant means of 
conducting citizen politics illustrated in these examples is substantiated by these 
perspectives from a Jamaican anthropologist (PN12) and a journalist (PN24) with 
extensive experience covering demonstrations: 
PN12: Who cares when you picket peacefully? No protest like that is legitimate 
in the sense that if it were legitimate, it would not be much of a protest in 
the Jamaican experience. You have to [s]mash up the place. We have 
developed a culture, almost a way of protesting which is to bring 
everything to a halt – the lock down of the University campus by 
students, nobody can go to work and students should not be allowed to go 
to classes. Everybody must stay out so you either lock down or block the 
roads. You hold innocent people hostage in order to get attention, to get 
your demands – not literally, we have not reached that stage yet – thank 
God. But you inconvenience everybody in order to make your point – the 
good must suffer for the bad and the innocent for the guilty. No matter 
what as long as you are protesting. 
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PN24: We are fond of bearing placards. We are one for extremes. We are 
colourful and we are an emotional people and it doesn’t take much for us 
to get overly emotional. We can become violent, we lose it quite easily 
and we tend to become even more violent if we perceive that there is 
opposition to our protest action. For example, if I am protesting and you 
come there and you object. You don’t explicitly say anything and I 
perceive that you are opposed to the issue, you might be physically 
attacked. 
 
The following perspectives from a former student activist (PN18b) and a senior police 
officer (PN16) not only corroborate the observations made above but appear to infer that 
peaceful or conventional forms of protest face diminishing impact and popularity in the 
Jamaican political setting:  
PN18b: Peaceful protest is not as effective as a protest which involves overt 
action. 
 
PN16: Even if it is peaceful protest, you have to accompany it with some form of 
intimidation. So if you are a lady who used to talk calmly, when it is 
peaceful protest, you have to talk loudly and strong and resort to the 
vernacular [expletives] in order to get listenership. 
 
In order to come to terms, however, with the phenomenon of popular protest in Jamaica, 
as embodied in the roadblock or street demonstration, it is important to provide a brief 
sketch of its recent history. The roadblock, as a political weapon, had its beginning in 
Jamaica during the 1970s at the height of the bloody warfare which was being fought in 
the urban slums of the capital, Kingston between supporters of the main political parties – 
The People’s National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). Citizens in war-
ravaged communities would block a road or a lane to ensure that no one was allowed 
entry without legitimate cause or the expressed permission of those on the inside. The 
roadblock permitted residents to safeguard their property and person as well as retain 
control of their community. Mounting roadblocks consequently became a useful form of 
protest against such incidents as ‘drive-by’ shootings but quickly escalated into an 
instrument, not just to keep out partisan enemies but at times, used against the state itself. 
The following are images of typical roadblock-demonstrations: 
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This image is of one of the multiplicity of roadblocks mounted during three days of national 
protests in Jamaica in April, 1999 over a government-imposed increase in the tax on fuel. Jamaica 
Gleaner staff reporter, Glenroy Sinclair, writes that “law-abiding citizens woke up to debris in 
streets surrounding their neighbourhoods, with looters and gunmen involved …. Residents in 
Central Kingston attempted to set the Gold Street police station on fire…. ‘Someone threw a 
Molotov cocktail inside the station but luckily for us, it did not explode, a lawman said” (see The 
Jamaica Gleaner (1999) “Police Stations Become Targets: Rioter turn ire on cops, businesses” April 
21.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image is one of the large numbers of roadblocks mounted by Jamaican citizens on September 
6, 2005 during nationwide protests over inflation. Here, residents of Central Village in the parish 
of St. Catherine man roadblocks during the demonstrations. See The Jamaica Gleaner (2005) 
“LETTER OF THE DAY – Disappointed at old-style JLP demonstration”. September 7. 
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Indeed, since 1986, when Jamaican citizens mounted nation-wide riots and strikes over 
the government-imposed increase in fuel prices, the country has witnessed an explosion 
of hostile citizen mobilizations and demonstrations. Table 6.1 below illustrates this 
dramatic rise in direct citizen action within the last twenty years:   
 
Table 6.1 – Roadblocks-Demonstrations in Jamaica  
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Source: Police Statistics Department, Jamaica Constabulary Force.  
 
Based on the above statistical grid, the ten- year period stretching from 1986 to 1995, for 
example, saw the number of roadblocks mounted by Jamaican citizens per annum 
progress dramatically from a low of 23 in 1986 to a high of 202 in 1995. Within the last 
decade (1996-2005), the number of street protests and demonstrations staged has 
fluctuated between 150 and 339 annually. Today, the street demonstration, although 
predominantly taking a roadblock approach, in actuality, assumes several forms and 
operates at different levels of intensity. I delineate them here (see overleaf): 
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Box 6.2 Models of Popular Protest in Jamaica 
Peaceful marches, ‘placarding’, industrial action (strikes, go-slow). 
Lighting fires and burning debris on the streets (vehicle tyres, garbage, tree 
trunks/branches, unwanted furniture).  
Blocking minor roadways or major thoroughfares using assorted objects (huge 
boulders/stones, tree branches, abandoned cars and other debris as well as the 
protestors’ physical bodies. 
Erecting barricades and fortifications and/or denying access (right of entry/right 
of use) to facilities, buildings or communities. 
Vandalism (destruction of public and private property – setting alight shops and 
stores, desecrating public monuments and attractions, destroying police vehicles 
etc). 
Looting, robbing, extorting from businesses, entrepreneurs and other individuals. 
Boisterous, aggressive displays of behaviours (shouting, screaming, bawling, 
issuing threats and insults, stripping/disrobing and clashing with security forces).  
 
Interestingly, the above table showing the levels and types of protest in Jamaica closely 
resembles Smith’s (1996) table (below) in which he delineates a typology of coercion in a 
political system.  Based on this continuum of force, it is evident that Jamaican protests 
run the gamut from non-violent coercion, embodied in strikes, boycotts and the mediated 
propaganda promulgated through talk radio, ‘minimal-injury coercion’ such as aggressive 
picketing, mounting obstructive roadblocks and boisterous displays – disrobing, shouting 
and issuing threats and insults, to  sub-lethal force personified in rioting, clashing with 
the police, burning buildings and generalised vandalism and lethal force such as killing of 
police officers and general assault (See Smith, 1996). 
 
Table 6.2 – A Typology of Coercion in a Political System 
Non-Violent Coercion Minimal-Injury 
Coercion 
Sub-lethal Force Lethal Force 
Non-compliance, 
strikes/boycotts, 
bribes, propaganda. 
Obstructive picketing, 
occupation, breaches 
of the peace 
Rioting, attacks on 
buildings & persons. 
Assassinations. 
 
Source: Smith, R.C. (1996) Violence, Politics and Morality: Ethical and Political Issues in War and 
Peace. Hamilton: Hillcrest Books. 
 
Many of these demonstrations have, of course, been directly related to the dramatic 
impact on people’s lives of inflationary economic conditions, made unbearable by 
persistently low wages and inadequate social services and public goods – water, 
electricity, proper roads, sewerage and telephone. This is while others relate to human 
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rights, particularly police (mis)conduct and other perceived injustices meted out by the 
state such as the removal of squatters or vendors. Whereas these explosive protests and 
demonstrations often capture significant media headlines and grassroots interest, there 
has, unfortunately, been little corresponding scholarly curiosity.  Save for the selective 
scholarly work on the emerging social power of Jamaica’s poorer classes, embodied in the 
recent analyses of popular culture, the underground economy and informal commerce, 
criminal violence, garrisonization and donmanship (Gray, 2004; Rapley, 2003; Charles, 
2002; Hope, 2001; Harriot, 2000; 2003; Figueroa & Sives, 2003; Figueroa, 1996), a 
comprehensive analytical look at the manifestations of and the ethos driving 
contemporary grassroots protest politics, is largely missing. I address these gaps in this 
chapter (and with greater specificity in subsequent chapters). I do so through an analysis 
of interviews with a wide cross-section of Jamaican citizens, including students, media 
practitioners, entertainers, politicians, police, academics, activists as well as the self-
employed and unemployed.  Before, I wish to look more closely at the protest population. 
 
6.3  DECONSTRUCTING THE PROTEST POPULATION: WHO ARE THE  
PROTESTORS? 
The protest population in Jamaica runs the gamut of the professional middle and upper 
(elite) classes, the working class, students, the self-employed and unemployed. These 
groups engage in a range of protest forms such as strikes, marches, religious crusades, 
public meetings, petitions, demonstrations, roadblocks, obstructive picketing, placarding, 
violent attacks (community on community/person on person), random violence, attack on 
property, theft, violent clashes with police, symbolic protest (boycott, protest music, 
political theatre), legal action as well as media action (letters to the Editor, political 
commentary and radio talkback). The choice of a protest strategy is not random but 
largely determined by level of education and literacy, social, communicative, experiential 
and perceptual worldview, position on the social pecking order and (perceived) level of 
influence on the political system. Piven & Cloward’s (1977:14) thesis on poor people’s 
movements confirm this view. In attempts to explain why political actors sometimes 
strike and at other times, boycott, loot or burn, they argue that forms of political protest 
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are governed by the institutional context in which people live and work. In other words, 
it is their view that political actors, whoever they may be, are constrained by their 
location in the social structure in deciding upon one political strategy or another. The 
Jamaican professional classes (e.g. civil servants and factory workers) who feel that they 
are treated unfairly will thus demonstrate discontent by way of sit-ins, go-slow, outright 
strikes as well as peaceful picketing or marches. This group may also instigate petitions, 
channel their dissatisfaction through the popular press, take legal action or operate as the 
‘unseen hand’ which can mean a withdrawal of financial or other support from particular 
initiatives. That members of this middle and professional class perform protest in these 
ways has a great deal to do with their institutional context and advantageous location in 
the highly stratified Jamaican social structure. Significant here is the historical capacity of 
the educated and ‘monied’ classes to influence the political system through their contacts 
with or access to state power (such as with Members of Parliament), articulate their 
concerns effectively through media and, at times, procure the kinds of intellectual, 
financial and organizational resources needed to sustain and advance their protest action.  
 
Human rights lobby group, Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), for example, is symbolic of the 
power of resources as well as personal and political influence. JFJ is comprised mainly of 
professionals, a number of whom are members of Jamaica’s white or brown-skinned 
middle class and is widely perceived to maintain strong allegiance to the country’s 
political opposition, Jamaica Labour Party. The organization is recognized for its 
successful efforts at calling attention to human rights abuses by the Jamaican State, as 
manifested in the actions of the police force. This it does by maintaining a powerful 
presence and influence in the local press, utilising judicial procedures through the courts 
and making frequent submissions to parliament and international human rights bodies on 
conventions of which Jamaica is a signatory. On the other hand, the persons who form 
the focal point of this analysis – Jamaica’s poor and economically-dispossessed – actively 
participate, in the main, in street–centred demonstrations (roadblocks, marches, picketing 
and riots) based on their peripheral location in the social strata.  
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Contemporary political science scholarship (Bayat, 1997; 2000; Portes, Castells & Benton, 
1989; Castells, 1983; Scott, 1985) refers to members of the socially excluded and 
economically-dispossessed sectors variously as informals, urban poor, peasants or 
marginals. The informal sector anywhere is a complex, dynamic space and encompasses a 
wide range of inhabitants. Generally, it is a geo-political space of the urban poor – the 
self-employed, unemployed, partially employed, permanently or chronically unemployed 
or unemployable (Gray, 2004). In the case of Jamaica, the diverse cluster of informals 
includes the following: 
(1) an expanding, self-employed and unregulated group of medium-scale 
entrepreneurs (‘higglers’,  shopkeepers, retailers). 
 
(2) casual labourers and petty traders such as handcart men, taxi-drivers as well 
as small-scale vendors selling miscellaneous items (cigarettes, pencils, box 
juice and bottled water, rags, lighters and other miscellaneous items).  
 
(3) a low wage sector of the mostly unskilled – street subsistence workers,  
household helpers, street cleaners, garbage collectors, office cleaners and 
assistants. 
 
(4) the so-called sufferahs (read as sufferers) - hustlers, panhandlers, squatters, 
street children, prostitutes, homeless. This subaltern sector also includes 
members of the criminal underworld - thugs, thieves, gangs and drug lords 
called dons47.  
 
Of course, this is by no means a precise or even exhaustive categorization as the urban 
marginals tend to assume overlapping roles according to need, thereby making definitive 
scholarly classification problematic. Characterizing this grouping is further complicated 
by Karl Marx’s pejorative reference to its constituents as the lumpenproletariat. Roughly 
                                                 
47 As my discussion in chapter 8 will reveal, dons, although they reside and operate within the 
same informal domain as the marginalized cannot accurately be described as impoverished, non-
productive and property-less, in short, marginalized. In other words, although theoretically 
categorized as sufferahs here, dons possess extraordinary wealth by engaging in large-scale illegal 
activities (drug trafficking, money–laundering, burglary and gun-smuggling) and by siphoning 
resources from the state and the petty commodity sector of the larger national economy. Indeed, 
some dons even operate legitimate businesses. At the same time, it is to be acknowledged that their 
engagement in all manner of extra-legal practices renders them outside civil society and among 
Marx’s outcasts and degenerates.  
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translated, this term is synonymous with extreme impoverishment and hardship and 
identifies the class of outcast and degenerate elements of the population - beggars, 
gangsters, prostitutes, racketeers, petty thieves and tramps who exist mainly in and 
around commercial centres. In other words, whereas the proletariat were seen to be the 
class of wage earners in industrial society, the lumpens were, by and large, marginal and 
unemployable (Communist Manifesto, 1848). Given the nature of their circumstances, the 
people on the margins were deemed to be, in Marxian terms, ‘social scum’ or ‘dangerous 
classes’. This is because the lumpenproletariat is a sort of ‘catch-all [phrase or category] 
for those who fall out or drop out of the existing social structure so that they are no 
longer functionally an integral part of [mainstream] society [and where] the tendency 
towards illegality simply arises from the scarcity of choices’ (Draper, 1972: 2309).  
 
Although many among this group live solely by illegal activity, informals are obviously 
not a homogenous group and, hence, it is not surprising that a significant number within 
this rank are law-abiding citizens who seek creative ways to earn a living and uphold 
traditional values of civility, tolerance and non-violence. Scholarly re-assessments of this 
sector (Fanon, 1965; Scott, 1986; 1990; Bayat, 1997; 2000) tend, however, to cast these 
marginal groups in more constructive ways. Fanon (1965:104), for instance, recognises 
the latent miltancy of this lumpen sect and acknowledges their revolutionary potential, 
once they are organized by committed leadership:  
[They are] like a horde of rats; you may kick them and throw stones at them but 
despite your efforts, they will go on gnawing at the roots of the tree…The 
lumpenproletariat, once it is constituted, brings all its forces to endanger the 
‘security’ of the town, and is the sign of irrevocable decay, the gangrene ever 
present at the heart of colonial domination. So the pimps, the hooligans, the 
unemployed and petty criminals, urged on from behind, throw themselves in the 
struggle for liberation like stout working men. These classless idlers will by 
militant and decisive action discover the path that leads to nationhood. They 
won’t become reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the 
morality of its rulers… they take for granted the impossibility of their entering 
the city save by hand grenades and revolvers. 
 
It may be difficult to locate this revolutionary potential in a postcolonial context but, 
suffice it to say, as their levels mushroom and socio-economic circumstances remain 
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unchanged, the politics of the so-called lumpens have become consolidated, intense and 
obvious. It is this development and their presumed threat to political and social stability 
within particular contexts, which have catapulted them to the centre of contemporary 
academic analyses. The scholarship on the Jamaican lumpenproletariat (Gray, 2004; Price 
2004; Harriot, 2003; Charles, 2002; cf. Hope, 2006) is an attempt to come to grips with the 
kind of politics the people on the margins espouse. Missing from these theoretical 
analyses, however, are responses to questions such as: how do the marginalised organize 
themselves to call attention to their concerns and wrest concessions from the state? What 
kinds of tactics do they employ? What is the character of these activities? How does the 
state respond and how does this response influence the way such citizen politics is 
managed and/or performed in this context?  
 
6.4  WHY JAMAICANS PROTEST: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE GROUND 
The perspectives arising from my interviews with a cross-section of Jamaica’s civil society 
reveal several dominant themes which provide insight into the dynamics and quality of 
citizen politics in this context. These themes cover their notions of justice and injustice, 
the communion of feelings that feeds their struggle, and importantly, the impact and 
outcomes of the methods of protest employed in Jamaica and the political values, norms 
and attitudes being reinforced in this process. ‘Why and how do Jamaicans protest’? This 
is one of the central questions I posed to each of my interviewees during fieldwork. 
Inherent in the responses was a presumption that coercive and provocative tactics are 
indispensable to citizen political negotiation in the Jamaican context. The interviewees 
responded in a way which confirms that aggression is, more often than not, the sole 
intended combat strategy of the Jamaican protestor. The following responses represent 
the views of a young Jamaican Rastafarian entertainer (PN4), a cabdriver (PN1), a self-
styled cultural commentator (PN29) and a young professional (PN11) :  
PN4: That is the only language which those in power understan’. This nation 
[Jamaica] is being ruled by people wid hardened hands and hearts man 
and de only means of compassion dem will show is when dem see flames 
and destruction. 
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PN1: We can do it [protest] in a subtle way, normal and nice but fe (for) certain 
people fe (to) listen, you have to protest rough. We block street because 
we feel say we naah get (not getting) justice and if we feel we naah get 
justice, we will bun dung (burn down) the place. 
  
PN29: We protest because we never usually heard unless we do someting rash. 
Memba [remember] we emerge from a people who were once tings, 
people who were owned. But who has made the effort to show us that 
times change, that the state more conciliatory and accept participation. 
We siddung (sit down) and mek the anger build up and after it build up, 
then it spill over. 
 
PN11: This is only way we can be heard because you are forced to see us and 
forced to hear us because we are in your face. If we go through the formal 
channels that are available, they are not fast enough and so when we 
protest and walk with the placards, you have to view us and usually the 
reality is that we get quicker action.  
 
Protest, in this context, is viewed in purely functional, utilitarian terms. The protestors 
goals are deliberate – to create maximum disruption of the normal conduct of life in order 
to bring attention forcefully to their grievances. The consensus here is that unless the 
actions taken by citizens are emphatic and/or extremist, an immediate and positive 
response to whatever concern will not be forthcoming. As a consequence, protestors 
often feel that they are largely justified in mounting militant and, sometimes, openly 
violent forms of protestations. As these interviewees (female talk radio host – PN5; 
political activist – PN27) put it: 
PN5: If I have a road that is not being fixed and I go to citizen association 
meetings, I speak to my political representatives and I call the talk shows 
and absolutely nothing happens and we go out there and we stage a 
demonstration and it is fixed, it must say to me well, this is the reaction 
you get, this is the kind of rewards that you get and this is the only way in 
which you get a response. 
 
PN27: They [citizens] want something immediate. They want to bring a problem 
to attention and to them even if it is a 48-hour issue [does not last more 
than 2 days], they have protested and the powers that be know that they 
are angry. 
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Based on Piven & Cloward’s (1977) thesis that institutional context and social status 
determine strategic opportunities for defiance, it follows that unemployed, lower-class 
political actors are more likely to employ more militant strategies of popular protestation 
(e.g. violence and vandalism) in seeking concessions and/or resolutions to their concerns. 
This is because the networks of unemployed poor or those who work in economically-
marginal sectors represent groups in flux and largely operate outside institutional or 
structural settings and mechanisms such as factories, schools, associations and unions, 
through which they can express their grievance and enforce demands (Bayat, 2000:548; 
1997). Organised workers therefore protest by striking because they are drawn together 
in a factory setting and their protests consist mainly in defying the rules and authorities 
associated with the workplace. Likewise, students protest by signing petitions or 
mounting blockades because they have the benefit of the institutional setting of 
Universities and their protest is often geared towards challenging decisions taken by 
campus administrations. Unlike organised workers and students, however, the 
unemployed do not and cannot strike. They are unable, in this sense, to apply what Piven 
& Cloward (1977:24-25) describe as: 
a negative sanction, the withdrawal of a crucial contribution on which others 
depend, and it is therefore a natural resource for exerting power over others… 
Indeed, some of the poor are sometimes so isolated from significant institutional 
participation that the only contribution that they can withhold is that of 
quiescence in civil life: they can riot. 
 
It follows that the unemployed poor in the Jamaican context, as elsewhere, are therefore 
more likely to protest by bearing placards, mounting roadblocks and engaging in acts of 
vandalism or violence. Indeed, the poor seem to resort to hostile demonstrations as a 
means of compensating for their lack of real bargaining power. (see images below).  
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This image shows a lone protestor mounting a blockade in a rural Jamaican community during 
nationwide protests over rising consumer prices on September 6, 2005. See The Jamaica Gleaner: 
(2005) September 7. 
 
 
 
 
This image shows the burning of tyres on the roadway in Spanish Town in protest over rising 
consumer prices on September 6, 2005. see The Jamaica Gleaner (2005) September 7. 
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The spontaneity and disruption which attends these kinds of protest tactics is designed to 
force immediate attention and a swift resolution. Radicalized protest events attract heavy 
media publicity empowering protestors as they are left with the firm impression that they 
have taken some action – they have vented their anger on some of the issues of concern 
to them. Belligerent protestation has therefore emerged as an essential condition in the 
process of making one’s voice heard or to act against a situation that the protestor deems 
to be either inappropriate, unjust or contrary to an individual or general interest. 
Conversely, within this same context, peaceful protestation (writing letters, signing 
petitions and contacting MPs), on account of being less demonstrative and emotionally-
charged, is seen as meaningless and futile. I now wish to draw attention to the substantive 
issues over which Jamaicans protest in the contemporary period. Table 6.3 below outlines 
the concentration of roadblocks in Jamaica over a seven-year period (1998-2005) 
according to the issues about which citizens protest. It is taken from the more expansive 
Police Incident Report (Statistics Unit, Jamaica Constabulary Force) which shows the 
number and type of protests per year, per parish for all 14 parishes in Jamaica. 
 
Table 6.3 - Summary of Roadblocks per Grievance48 
 
Year 
 
Lack of 
Water 
Bad Road 
Conditions 
Criminal 
Activities 
Telephone Industrial Transportation Others 
1998 21 20 10 7 15 10 31 
1999 22 58 21 8 30 12 88 
2000 27 71 11 5 26 9 125 
2001 21 76 8 3 11 15 150 
2002 16 54 20 1 6 6 85 
2003 14 43 6 0 54 4 35 
2004 27 25 7 0 21 0 66 
2005 17 44 15 0 24 0 81 
                                                 
48 Despite a parish by parish delineation, the police data does not exhaust the types of protests that 
are staged throughout the country in any given year. For example, whereas the ‘others’ column 
clearly shows the largest volume of protests, these are not classified under specific headings. This 
creates analytic problems as it inevitably gives importance to some protests while collapsing others 
in a vague category, thereby rendering them irrelevant. At the same time, the ‘criminal activities’ 
column is misleading as it can either be read as the number of roadblocks staged to prevent 
criminal activity in particular communities or to protest against the increase in criminal activity in 
some communities or as I shall discuss later, the problematic issue of protests staged to protect 
criminals from police action (arrest/prosecution) and to defend their extra-legal activity.  
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The above chart suggests it is essentially people’s experience of declining social conditions 
and quality of life which provide the main rationale for protest in Jamaica. These figures 
provide insight into the performance of the Jamaican State. For example, that the country 
records as many as 76 demonstrations (see column 2 above) in a single year over bad road 
conditions alone suggests not only the demand of Jamaican citizens for access to public 
goods but the persistent failure on the part of the Jamaican State to provide or maintain 
the quality of these public goods. It is frustration with this state of affairs that signals the 
poor’s petition for justice, resonating in the strong sentiments issued by PN1 above – ‘if 
we feel say we nah get (not getting) ‘justice’, we will bun dung (burn down) the place’.  I 
call attention to the term justice because Jamaican popular protest has not only been 
conditioned by a widespread perception of injustice but has led to the institutionalization 
of what may be called a pathology of justice. To grasp fully the underpinnings of popular 
protest in Jamaica, I therefore look to citizen perception of justice and injustice. 
 
6.5     TOWARDS AN ETHIC OF JUSTICE IN JAMAICA. 
 ‘There is a deep and persistent cry by the Jamaican people for what they call 
‘justice’ ‘.  
(Former Jamaican Prime Minister, P.J. Patterson, 1999, quoted in 
Franklyn, 2004: 285).   
 
This desperate cry for justice is, at once, literal and figurative. It is instinctively manifest 
at the site of almost all demonstrations through the shouts and screams of protestors 
and/or their insistent waving of dilapidated, hurriedly-constructed cardboard box 
placards bearing the refrain ‘we want justice’.  That the Jamaican people want justice 
raises questions about the quality of the bureaucratic channels established to dispense 
justice and reflects a perception among the citizenry of prevailing injustice. When 
questioned as to what justice might entail for the Jamaican protestor, however, the 
complexity of the value in this political context became obvious. The following responses 
from a lawyer (PN21) and journalist (PN24)49 are instructive:  
                                                 
49 I wish to note that the perspective of PN24 here reflects both a standpoint of the journalist and 
that of an individual with personal knowledge and lived experience of inner city life in Jamaica. 
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PN21: We have a way in Jamaica to use words the way we want to use them and 
everybody understand what it means. Justice now means what I want’. I 
want justice. That means whatever I tell you is my problem, deal with it. 
If you don’t give it to me, it is unjust. (My emphases). 
 
PN24: Justice is, in the case of police shooting, whether the police is in his right 
[to use lethal force] or not, to be taken off duty, to be fired, to be 
dismissed, to be locked up. It is a generic term that they [protestors from 
the lower classes] hear people use and they use it too. For them, justice 
means that they want what they want’(my emphasis).  
 
Consensus appears to exist around these perspectives. Whereas some interviewees stuck 
to the usual safe, textbook characterization of justice as equality, fairness, impartiality and 
even-handedness of treatment, the common inclination was concern with the 
‘unsophisticated’ manner in which the concept is currently interpreted and applied by 
protestors. Indeed, some interviewees intimated that there may be a gratuitous 
deployment of the term justice and admit to becoming exhausted with its loose 
interpretation. This is the view of a Jamaican graduate student: 
PN30: I think it is the frequency with which dem [them; they] say dem want 
justice that I have become cynical about the legitimacy of protest. It is at 
times just a matter of spectacle and there is nothing of substance behind 
some of these things. If ants bite somebody, dem a protest, dem want 
justice, as against something serious. 
 
Admittedly, justice is a contested term, rarely lending itself to precise definitions. The 
concept varies in terms of meaning at particular historical moments and places, and 
depends on the persons involved. The kind of justice that is enjoyed in any society 
reproduces the political circumstances at work in that society and the power relations 
existing between different social actors. It also reflects how the society sees itself, 
individually and collectively, the values that it cultivates and the attitudes that form part 
of its way of life (Patterson, 2002; Harvey, 1996). Justice, then, to adopt Harvey’s 
(1996:330) definition, is ‘a socially constituted set of beliefs, discourses and 
institutionalizations expressive of social relations and contested configurations of power’. 
It would appear from the above discussion that Jamaican citizens have managed to adopt 
a workable understanding of justice that holds permanence in and is particular to this 
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society. This conception of justice, while acknowledging notions of rightness, fairness and 
evenhandedness of treatment, also subscribes to the view echoed by PN 21 above – 
‘justice means what I want. That means whatever I tell you is my problem, deal with it’.  
These notions of justice are so firmly entrenched within the Jamaican vocabulary and 
psyche that citizens often feel powerless to make political claims without an appeal to 
them. It is the latter conception of justice as what I want, however, as I will illustrate 
later, which supplies a potent mobilizing discourse for political action. In realistic terms, 
no society can operate by the tenets of such an arbitrary translation of justice, however 
varied and particular the concept. This is because it contains a strong potential for 
exploitation. At the same time, however defined, the access to justice, its timely, 
transparent and impartial dispensation and the protection of human rights are mandatory 
in any properly functioning democracy and crucial to an enlightened civil society 
(Munroe, 2002; Patterson, 2002; Rotberg, 2002).  
 
It is evident that rather than being bounded by a restrictive definition of justice, Jamaican 
citizens subscribe to an undoubtedly expansive, broad-based and all-encompassing view 
of the notion. In this political context, social justice locates itself solidly in the foreground 
and it is this notion which comes readily to mind for the Jamaican citizen when he or she 
makes appeals to the state. Hence, the protestors’ plea for justice is not purely about the 
administration of criminal or civil justice through the courts but it also crucially embraces 
the realization of very concrete and desirable goals to which they are entitled – drinking 
water, housing, proper roads, telephone service and electricity as well as civil treatment 
by the police. These travails that the Jamaican people experience are nothing new. In 
times of economic rupture and stress, however, such as in April 1999, they swell into 
vociferous demands for justice and collide with the state’s inability to provide this public 
good. I wish to revisit this protest campaign, which became known as the ‘Gas riots’ 
because it represents a defining political moment in contemporary popular struggle and 
resistance in Jamaica. It warrants attention because its swift and unexpected outburst as 
well as the vision of injustice by which it was informed suggest that the continued 
divergence between the struggle of the Jamaican people to overcome material deprivation 
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and the performance of the Jamaican State had reached crisis point. The Gas riots also 
provide insights into the disjuncture between the democratic right to engage in civil 
protest and the desire for civil society in the Jamaican context.  
 
6.5.1 Portrait of a Protest – The 1999 Gas Riots in Perspective 
Gripped by a budget deficit of some J$160 billion, the Jamaican government in April 1999 
announced a hike of over 30 percent in the tax on gasoline. Already burdened by 
inflationary costs of living, Jamaican citizens reacted with rage, forcing the Jamaican State 
to near ‘collapse’50.  The protests were led by motorists, particularly large transport 
operators and smaller taxi -drivers who, in the main, would bear the immediate brunt of 
increased taxes on fuel.  The protests, however, intensified as many of the country’s 
unemployed as well as various citizen groups, the Church and students joined the ranks of 
this core protesting group to demand a roll back of the tax. It was, however, the 
government’s firm stance on its new tax measures, particularly what some interviewees 
felt was the Finance Minister’s callous disregard of initial public outcry that ‘fuelled’ the 
severest backlash - three days of riots. The country was shut down. Commerce, public 
transport and the education system were crippled as people across the island staged 
protests, joined marches and mounted roadblocks51.   
                                                 
50 As my extensive discussion of the Jamaican State in chapter 5 reveals, in general terms, a 
collapsed state is an extreme version of a failed state. It has a total vacuum of authority where sub-
state actors take over, controlling particular regions of the society. They then build their own local 
security apparatus, sanction markets or other trading arrangements and in some cases establish 
attenuated forms of international relations. By definition, they are illegitimate and unrecognized 
but some like Somaliland in Northern Somalia will acquire the trappings of a quasi state. Within 
the collapsed state, disorder, an anarchic mentality, anomic behaviour and entrepreneurial pursuits 
such as gun and drug running prevail. Recent examples are the Solomon Islands, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Lebanon, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Liberia. The phrase ‘near collapse’ is not here being used 
in such strict terms but describes the state of anomic disorder and instability which confronted the 
Jamaican State over three days in April, 1999 (see Rotberg, 2002). 
 
 
51 Interestingly, this was the third time within a time span of 20 years (1979, 1985, 1999) that 
social protests, public riots and civil disobedience attended increases in fuel prices in Jamaica. See 
Gray (2004: 257-261) for a report on the 1979 riots.  
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In the words of one interviewee, ‘we were locking down the country to see if we could 
get the government to listen to us’ (PN25). In the urban centres of Montego Bay, Spanish 
Town and Kingston, these protests degenerated as the action became infiltrated either by 
criminal elements or political interests with a seemingly contradictory agenda. 
Widespread newspaper reportage of this event, my own lived experience of it and my 
interrogation of several hours of television footage appear to confirm pervasive criminal 
behaviour – the exchange of gunfire with the security forces and a rampage of arson, 
looting and vandalism. The destruction to private and public property was extensive. This 
included the setting ablaze of police stations, police and military vehicles, courthouses, 
banks, businesses, sugarcane plantations, tourist attractions and forest reserves (Jamaica 
Gleaner, 1999, April 19; 20). Overall, nine persons were shot and killed by the security 
forces and some 152 persons arrested. The cost was enormous. Domestic and international 
flights to and from Jamaica as well as tourism bookings were cancelled. Loss of 
production, revenue (measured in General Consumption, travel, profit and income taxes 
and user fees), employment, damage to state infrastructure – roads, bridges, public 
buildings – and private property (measured in compensation costs) as well as clean up 
(removal of debris, police and military overtime funds and fuel) and post-riot tourism 
promotion totalled over 14 billion Jamaican dollars, a figure which represented 5.25 
percent of projected Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 1998 (Jamaica Gleaner, 1999, 
April 30). See images of the 1999 Gas riots overleaf: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 200
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image shows the burning of debris on Olympic Way in Kingston during day 1 of the Gas Riots 
in Jamaica. See The Jamaica Gleaner (1999), “COOL IT!” April 20.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This image shows participants in the Jamaica Labour Party’s ‘March of the Women’ along 
Waterloo Road in Kingston during day 3 of the Gas Riot. The Jamaica Gleaner (1999) “Seven shot 
dead” April 22. 
 
It is important to note that despite the violent manifestations and obvious criminality 
which characterized these April riots, 69 percent or more than two-thirds of the voting 
population supported the protests (Stone Poll findings, quoted in The Jamaica Observer, 
1999). Whereas 54 percent agreed with the view that the P.J. Patterson-led government 
had lost its moral authority to lead, six percent of the respondents said they actively 
assisted in blocking roads while another four percent said they marched or took part in 
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rallies (ibid)52. In their analysis of these findings, the Stone Poll organization argues that 
‘given an estimated voting age population of approximately 1.5 million, about 90,000 
people would have helped with the roadblocks and 60,000 would have marched. This is 
while twelve percent or 180,000 people (Jamaicans of voting age), stood-by in support’. A 
significant twenty-five percent of those polled were, however, against the demonstrations 
(Stone Poll findings, quoted in The Jamaica Observer, 1999, August 15). That a 
considerable portion of the Jamaican population gave material and/or symbolic support to 
the demonstrations exposes two interconnected themes, which are indicative of what 
many perceive to be the poor quality of governance in this political context:  
 
Firstly, the government-imposed hike in gasoline prices triggered a ‘panic button’ for the 
Jamaican people. This was not novel but historically linked to the customary impact of an 
increase in fuel taxes on the cost of a range of basic commodities such as food and 
clothing as well as critical services such as transportation and power supply, and 
consequently on inflation. Secondly, there was (and continues to be) a perception of 
failure on the part of the Jamaican State to: 
• sufficiently empower the local government system as a first point of 
expression, through which the system can be alerted to problems at the 
grassroots level, 
  
• keep an effective monitor on public opinion and remain sensitive to the 
economic pressures that the poor, low wage sectors confront, and  
 
• provide adequate shock absorbers to cushion the effects on the most 
vulnerable (see Dunn, 1999; Miller, 1999) 
 
 
In short, from the point of view of the many interviewees, the people were ‘simmering 
and simmering’ (PN7) and the government sensors failed to pick this up. The state’s 
imposition of sudden hardship, in this case, through added taxes, on top of already serious 
                                                 
52 These figures are based on a survey conducted by the Jamaican Stone Polling organization and 
published in the Jamaica Observer newspaper of July 15, 1999. A total of 1200 people aged 18 years 
and over, in 40 communities across Jamaica were polled. The poll had a margin of error of plus or 
minus three percent. 
 202
deprivations (inadequate water and power supply, proper roads, low wages, 
unemployment) can therefore be regarded as not only a failure to meet social needs but a 
radical departure from a genuine commitment to social justice. On this basis, the 
implication for a deeper understanding of the symbolic meaning of what drives protest in 
this context is virtually self-evident. ‘To protest’ in the Jamaican context goes beyond a 
mere demonstration of dissatisfaction with social conditions (though it most certainly 
remains that). The overwhelming goal of the Jamaican protestor is to call attention – ‘look 
at me’, ‘hear me’, ‘feel my plight’, ‘help me’. The primary reason generating increasing 
community-level social protest in Jamaica is, in other words, a widespread feeling of 
injustice among the population, based on the neglect of the community and the 
unresponsiveness of social and political leaders to community plight. Whether this appeal 
for justice is therefore measured in terms of the need for collective commodities (water, 
roads and power supply) or as an expression against unfair taxation, joblessness, unfair 
wages and police misconduct, popular protest in Jamaica appears to be a fundamental 
expression of people asking to be seen, heard and affirmed. As Jamaican Minister of 
Justice, Hon. A.J. Nicholson acknowledges: 
[Citizens] want a better way of life. The situation has gone beyond the 
immediate subject that they are protesting about. ‘We want justice’ has 
become a sort of calling card for look – I need you, Mr. Big Man, to pay 
attention to what is happening to our lives (PN8).  
 
The Jamaican citizenry also retain a deep and abiding feeling of neglect in terms of 
conversations with their political representatives – an abandonment of contact and 
dealings with a political class no longer alive to their problems. It is important to note 
here that although the Gas demonstrations had reached their peak by day four, it was the 
formation by Jamaican Prime Minister P.J. Patterson of a committee of private citizens 
(called the Moses Committee), to re-examine the increased taxes and to derive 
alternatives to close the gap in the national budget, leading to the eventual 
announcement of a 45 percent reduction in the new gasolene tax, that ultimately resulted 
in the containment of the riots. The Moses Committee, in its report (1999), also gave 
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emphasis to an estrangement of Jamaican citizens from the corridors of power as part of 
the inadequacies of state governance in this context: 
Citizens are cut off from or subordinate to the authorities which make critical 
decisions affecting their daily lives; the available means of redress are distant and 
often ineffective. Taken together, this means that the government is a power over 
the people rather than a means through which people exercise their sovereign 
authority (Report of the Special Committee, 1999: 11). 
 
Jamaican citizens therefore see aggressive direct-action demonstrations as the chief and 
most viable option to raise the visibility of their demands. Indeed, to the extent that 
citizens believe that they are confronting issues that are unjust and in resistance to a 
distant and arrogant state bureaucracy, forceful protest tactics and actions are seen to be 
justified, if not permissible. It would appear that the more fervent the protest, the more 
comprehensive the response from the state bureaucracy, political representatives and the 
media. The Jamaican State in fact, finds itself in a sort of catch-22 situation where, on the 
one hand, some sectors of the community do not believe their voices can be heard any 
other way except through violence thereby forcing the government to responding 
affirmatively to violent demands. On the other hand, it is now a reality that some of its 
constituents do not even attempt to access or to use the appropriate procedures or 
avenues open to facilitate redress because they assume, at the outset, that it is easier to get 
attention by protesting.  
 
6.6  SURVIVALISM AND ANOMIC DISORDER: A RESPONSE TO MARGINALITY 
IN JAMAICA.  
The goal of this section is to explore issues concerning the moral economy of the poor to 
provide insights into the judgements they develop about their (socio-economic) 
circumstances and where to apportion blame. To begin, since the quietening of the 
protests and demonstrations that dominated the world in the 1960s and 1970s, political 
science scholarship has been preoccupied with the more unobtrusive realm of political 
struggle inhabited by subaltern groups (Bayat, 2000; 1997; Castells, 1983; Scott 1990; 
1985; 1976). The focus of this scholarly work has largely been to situate the subsistence 
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ethic at the centre of analyses on so-called peasant politics and outline the moral 
economy and the politics by which the poor organize and govern their lives. Indeed, 
theories of subsistence, including the ‘culture of poverty’, ‘everyday peasant resistance’53 
and/or ‘hidden transcripts’ are useful because they provide a rational basis for both the 
low-profile or off-stage modes of struggle and the more aggressive, dangerous and open 
forms of resistance that the socially excluded often employ to confront exploitation and 
poverty.  
 
As in many parts of the Third World, a culture of informality, networking and hustling is 
acknowledged and supported in Jamaica as an important element in the individual and 
collective strategies employed by people on the margins to survive poverty and better 
their lives. Under conditions of arrested economic development (see chapter 5), and 
historically hampered by class, racial and residential discrimination, the urban poor resort 
to different forms of ‘self-help’ in their quest for livelihood, within or  without the rules 
(Johnson, 2005; Gray 2004; Le Franc, 1994; Portes et al 1997; Piven & Cloward, 1977). 
Further, with the majority educationally-disadvantaged and unskilled, there are limited 
opportunities for paid, stable employment. For most, making a good, honest living is 
therefore a tough proposition. Informalization has, consequently, been an almost organic 
response to chronic joblessness, growing destitution and, possibly, a way out of misery for 
those in the urban slums who are driven to rely on their own devices to eke out an 
existence. It is in the informal economic sphere in Jamaica, as elsewhere in the Third 
                                                 
53 ‘Everyday forms of peasant resistance’ is used by Scott (1985;1990) to refer to the ordinary 
weapons of relatively powerless groups who participate in a prosaic and constant struggle with 
dominant groups who seek to extract labour, food, taxes, rents and interests from them. These 
weapons include foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, 
slander, arson, sabotage etc. Scott (1985:35) refers to this development as ‘a social movement with 
no formal organization, no formal leaders, no manifestos, no dues, no names and no banner’. 
Recent scholarship such as Bayat’s (1997; 2000) ‘quiet encroachment’ theory extends this analysis 
to take account of other deinstitutionalized modes of struggle and resistance (squatting, illegal 
vending, stealing) that the urban poor in particular engage in, to survive and improve their lives. 
See Scott, (1985), Bayat, (2000; 1997).  
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World, where the poor deploy creative strategies54 (both legal and extra-legal) to struggle 
against political and economic peripheralisation that the extraordinary tension between 
the quest to survivalism, resistance and anomic disorder becomes exposed.  For close to 
fifteen years, armies of small-scale vendors, hustlers  and higglers along with the 
unemployed, have acted in defiance of efforts of the Jamaican State to remove them from 
the streets, sidewalks, intersections and storefronts to what many believe to be unsafe, 
decrepit, un-lucrative selling arcades. Using everyday, low-profile, silent and concealed 
protestation narratives and practices, as well as open collective disturbances, a powerful 
network of informal traders have united in popular resistance to defend their way of life 
against the encroachments of super-ordinate groups, including the Jamaican State.  
 
By employing inventive and effective tools of ‘anancyism’55, and/or cat and mouse games, 
street vendors have managed to outwit and outmanoeuvre the state authorities – the 
police and Metropolitan Parks and Markets (MPM) – marshalled to drive them off the 
streets. For example, determined to cash in on the lucrative market of the street but 
wanting to feign compliance by appearing to act upon removal orders, vendors obediently 
clear off the streets and abandon trading on piazzas and store fronts, in accordance with 
instructions from the local political body, Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation (KSAC) 
but return the next day to peddle their goods and continue with business as usual. Rather 
than compete with each other, sellers also network with each other to devise even more 
clever ways of deceiving the authorities. Many itinerant traders, for instance, artfully 
store their goods in the passageways that run between large retail stores and buildings and 
peddle them in small portions on the streets.  
                                                 
54I undertake elsewhere an extensive exploration of the various techniques employed by the 
Jamaican poor to confront material deprivation, maintain a livelihood and improve their lives. See 
Johnson, H. ‘(Defiant) Rituals of Resistance: Situating Higgler Women in the Protest Performance 
of the Jamaican Poor’. Forthcoming, Bhavnani, K.K, Foran, J. Munshi, D., and Kurian, P. (Eds.) On 
the Edges of Development: Cultural Interventions. New York: Routledge. 
 
55 Anancy is a colourful and imposing character in Jamaican mythology and folklore. Caricatured 
as an insect identical to the spider, Anancy symbolizes trickery and is celebrated for his gimmicks, 
cunning and ingenuity in finding loopholes in or ‘beating’ (dodge, skirt, elude) the system. 
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It is worth noting that consumers, particularly keen shoppers and bargain hunters, also 
understand the language and politics of illegal vending and are themselves unwittingly 
absorbed as active participants and facilitators in these counter-hegemonic practices of 
resistance. A news report published in the Jamaica Gleaner in 2001 reveals that: 
Customers of shoe and belt vendors who are willing, lounge beside the more 
expensive stores, while their correct sizes are quickly sought by eager sellers in an 
alley a few metres away. [In order to avoid being caught], watchmen are 
employed to shout when the authorities, usually clad in blue approach. Cries of 
‘MPM, MPM’ [Metropolitan Parks and Markets] elicit swift movement and the 
crowded streets are cleared in minutes (Jamaica Gleaner, 2001, December 6).  
 
These resistance strategies of false compliance and/or passive non-compliance (Scott, 
1985) means that Jamaican male and female vendors have developed the empowering 
capacity to ‘call the bluff’ of the authorities and escape penalty. Through this collective 
resistance-response tactic, they thereby reinforce their dominance of the street and 
underline their customary rights and usage of this public space while weakening the 
ability of the state to enforce its removal policy and invoke civil order and the rule of law 
(see Johnson, forthcoming). Indeed, despite government efforts to refurbish vending 
arcades in the market district, including the installation of improved sanitary facilities 
and ready-made stalls, many street and pavement vendors are reluctant to reposition their 
businesses due, in part, to declining security in the commercial district and a genuine fear 
of predatory criminality in the trading areas to which they are being relocated. Despite 
their majority status, women traders are especially susceptible to crime – physical 
violence, extortion, robbery and the upheavals of gang warfare which tend play out in the 
Downtown Kingston market district (see Jamaica Gleaner, 2000, September 1). The 
following quotations by female vendors expose the gravity of their vulnerability and 
explain, in part, their resistance to relocation: 
‘we nah go ‘shooting valley’ [referring to the Oxford Mall]’ (Jamaica Gleaner, 
2001, November 20). 
 
‘If police are running from Oxford Mall, why should we go there?’ (Ibid, 2001) 
 
 ‘When we sell round there, dem [thieves] take up wi [our] goods and we can’t do 
nothing bout it. When we sell here so [referring to the street], we more safer. We 
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can’t go round so go sell, dem will kill we off’ (Jamaica Gleaner, 2002, November 
5).  
 
The predominant factor conditioning their defiance, however, is that most of the nearly 
15,000 vendors, who ply their wares in Downtown Kingston, simply prefer to sell on the 
sidewalks and streets on account of these being lucrative economic trading spaces. 
Higglers especially rely heavily on maximising profits at specific times such as weekends 
(Fridays, Saturdays), ‘Back to School’ (July, August) and at peak shopping periods such as 
Christmas and (although less so) New Year’s, Valentine’s Day and Easter (Jamaica 
Gleaner, 2001, December 6). While shoppers do patronize the arcades to which they are 
to be resettled, many small-scale vendors and hustlers fear the intense competition from 
big businesses and, in instances, even from their arcade-based counterparts – the more 
established Informal Commercial Importers (ICIs). Given that, at present, the streets and 
sidewalks prove to be the most lucrative spaces to earn their livelihood and ‘move up in a 
life’ (better their lives; become socially mobile), vendors are more willing to become 
involved in more militant resistance campaigns, explicitly combative and violent.  
 
These include mounting hostile street demonstrations and administering a succession of 
‘shut downs’ of the Downtown Kingston commercial district. For example, in 1999, 
vendors (both male and female) collectively defied the police and officers from 
Metropolitan Parks and Markets (MPM) who were enforcing the government’s ‘Vendor 
Removal Action Plan’ by physically hauling down the shutters of some competitor stores 
in the business district. ‘If we cyaan [cannot] sell, then no body will sell’ was their 
rallying cry (Jamaica Gleaner, 1999, December 22). Again in 2001, following the refusal of 
authorities to allow vendors to off-load their goods for sale in prohibited areas, hundreds 
of angry street vendors, led by mostly female traders, prompted the closure of several 
businesses through aggressive demonstrations, which effectively ground to a halt all 
commercial activity in the city. Spurred on by a powerful network of higglers, these 
empowered informals bore placards and chanted ‘no seller, no store’.  In symbolic and 
physical assertion of their right to justice and, in recognition of their moral economy viz. 
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a. viz. these very streets on which they earn their food, they marched in procession on 
Beckford Street, strutting past members of the security forces in a ritualized challenge to 
their authority (see Jamaica Gleaner, 2001, November 20; cf. Johnson, forthcoming).  
 
This capitulation of traditional norms expresses itself not only in the pervasive 
criminality but, significantly, in the use of the tool of popular protest to serve extra-legal 
ends. Indeed, dons and assorted criminal gangs, as I will argue in chapter 8 when I 
examine more closely the politics of rogue leadership and outlaw governance in civil 
society, trespass on the informal sphere in a way which secures for them socio-cultural, 
political and economic power while becoming an anathema to civil society. The 
dominance of these rogue actors inside Jamaica’s urban communities, the fear they 
engender across the entire civil sphere and the manner in which they use their 
overarching power to manipulate and buy the alliance of many of the marginalized makes 
the poor’s quest to survive poverty and acquire justice a much more complex 
phenomenon in Jamaica than it is in other contexts espousing a culture of informality. It 
is to this extraordinary development, as was blatantly illustrated during the now infamous 
‘Zeek’s’ protest in September, 1998, among others, that I now turn.  
 
6.6.1  ‘We Want Justice’ - Justice for Whom? Zeeks Uprising and Other Incidents 
In order to locate the Zeeks uprising within the larger theoretical frame of survivalism, 
resistance and the quest for civil politics and civil society in Jamaica, it is important to 
revisit the incident here. In September 1998, hundreds of irate inner city residents 
citizens mounted roadblocks, formed human barricades and slashed and punctured the 
tyres of passing motorists to protest against the arrest of Donald ‘Zeeks’ Phipps, a 
prominent area leader (also known as don) of the People’s National Party garrison 
community of Mathew’s Lane in Western Kingston. Phipps had been detained for 
questioning and later charged with attempted murder, illegal possession of a firearm and 
unlawful wounding. Bearing placards ‘No Zeeks, No Peace; No Zeeks, No Business 
Downtown, the protestors, mostly vendors and hustlers, in strategic alliance with ‘shottas’ 
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(criminals) armed with AK-47 and M-16 rifles, barricaded the Central Police Station and 
demanded his release.  
When this demand was not met (and reportedly fearing his potential ill-treatment in 
detention), a rampaging mob took to the streets in droves, mounting numerous 
roadblocks, burning market stalls and debris in the streets and openly exchanging gunfire 
with the Security Forces. In the ensuing melee, four people, including one soldier, were 
shot and killed and several military vehicles set ablaze56. Despite numerous appeals by the 
police and political representatives to contain the situation, normalcy was only restored 
to the business district and the incensed mob quieted and disbursed when the prisoner 
was allowed onto the station balcony to appeal to his riotous supporters for calm. Zeek’s 
plea for calm from an overhead lookout tower remains, according to one media 
commentary, ‘a memorable tableau of law and order gone awry in Jamaica’ (The Jamaica 
Gleaner, 1998, December 22) (see image below): 
   
                                                 
56 For a more exhaustive account, including news reports and commentary of this incident, see The 
Jamaica Gleaner, September 24-27. See also the following scholarly analyses: Charles (2002) and 
Price (2004). Here, Price (2004:76) offers a personal account, part of which I quote here: ‘Prior to 
leaving Lawrence Tavern, we heard a radio announcement warning motorists not to go into 
Downtown Kingston because of a disturbance in the Mathew’s Lane section. Upon reaching 
Kingston, we found ourselves in the midst of a war zone… we pushed forward and by the time we 
reached the area of Central Kingston known as Parade, I heard gunfire exchanges involving large 
calibre weapons; soon heavily armed soldiers and police were swarming in and around the area. 
The entire square surrounding the park was littered with rubble, burning trash bins and debris 
piles, while small but growing groups of angry onlookers were busy erecting roadblocks (to hinder 
army and police vehicles), setting fires, and throwing bottles and rocks at the police and soldiers. I 
shortly found that much of Downtown had been blockaded by the citizenry’. 
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Several observations are instructive here. Firstly, these dramatic moments in Jamaican 
(democratic) ‘governmentality’ appear to represent triumph for protestors and for a 
significant section of the subaltern in Kingston’s ghettoes who have officially declared 
their ascending autonomy. Indeed, they appear to give basis to Meek’s (2000; 1996) 
notion of ‘hegemonic dissolution’ (see chapter 5) as a critical fissure in the (legitimate) 
authority of the Jamaican State embodied in the police force was exposed. By Meek’s 
(2000:2) words, its ‘constitutional right to rule and the (presumed) overwhelming control 
of force’ had been capitulated in the presence of remarkably violent citizen mobilizations 
and the emerging power of a mafia-style subaltern leadership. Meeks also captures the 
paradox inherent in this political phenomenon when he writes that ‘the cardinal rule of 
post-war Jamaica had been shattered in that the supporters of the ruling party – the 
clients of the overarching patron had risen in revolt, biting as it were the hand that had 
fed them’ (ibid, 2000: 2). I discuss this curious intersection between rogue actors and the 
Jamaican state within the context of patron politics more closely in chapter 8.  
 
Secondly, the mobilization of citizens in support of extra-legal actors reveals a 
fundamental aspect of the working of the moral economy of the urban poor which is 
sometimes overlooked. For example, in examining the Zeek’s uprising within the context 
of development issues, moral economy and the urban lumpenproletariat in Jamaica, Price 
(2004) writes that: 
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the people who took to the streets in support of Zeeks were fed up with police 
brutality, feckless politicians and a dearth of basic resources. They framed their 
grievances in terms of injustice, acting as if a widely understood norm has been 
violated through threatening a mainspring of community resources, security and 
favours [as embedded in this area leader].  
 
This observation is, however, only partly true. Without doubt, as I will argue in chapter 
8, the people on the margins, particularly in the urban slums, are caught up in a web of 
economic dependency viz. a. viz. the patronage and client politics of drug dons and/or 
area leaders. The arrest and subsequent prosecution of Zeeks would significantly cut off 
this means of livelihood and threaten the subsistence of a large number of marginals. 
Price, however, says nothing of the values and implications inherent in the 
commandeering of the streets by criminal gangs (in both voluntary and forced alliance 
with other members of the informal sphere) and their engagement in direct, 
confrontation with the legitimate authority of the state. By Scott’s (1976) argument, the 
values that the poor hold are also crucial aspects of their moral economy. Therefore, if we 
are to objectively assess the character and quality of citizen politicking in this context, 
then we must also give due consideration to the values guiding political behaviour and 
implications of such political norms and practices. In other words, whereas, there may be 
a genuine concern over the potential maltreatment of Zeeks in detention, such protest 
tactics do not help in the construction of a functioning, participatory civil society and a 
civil form of citizen politics. Subsequent incidents bolster my observations here, 
suggesting that scenarios such as that described above require complex explanatory 
theories rather than uni-dimensional analyses.  
 
6.6.2  “I Shot the Sheriff”: Anti-Police or Anti-Policing? 
In July 2001, extra-legal actors made manifest their rejection of the legitimate authority 
of the Jamaican state by responding to a search and cordon operation in a way which 
suggests that any act of standard policing is hostile encroachment on their lives. I provide 
a summary of the incident here based on newspaper reports, a personal interview with 
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the senior officer in charge of the operation and a report of a state-commissioned inquiry 
into the incident57: 
Between 7-10 July 2001, the Jamaican State mounted a challenge to the authority 
of dons and criminal gangs when it sanctioned a joint police-military search and 
cordon operation in the politically-charged enclaves of Western Kingston, 
including the often volatile Jamaica Labour Party stronghold of Tivoli Gardens. 
Gunmen clashed with the Security forces. In the mutual gun battle that ensued, 
twenty-five persons (civilians) were shot and killed. State vehicles, including 
police cars and Jamaica Defence Force armoured carriers, some of which were 
engaged in extracting personnel from danger zones and those conveying the 
injured to hospitals, were destroyed. Criminal gangs were able to attack and elude 
the security forces because of a bizarre accord with contingents of the 
marginalized which saw women and children allowing their bodies to be used as 
shields, thereby protecting criminals from the law or aiding their escape. Citizen-
supporters later mounted numerous roadblocks in strategic locations across the 
country to protest against the police search operation, arguing that the Tivoli 
Gardens community was specifically targeted by the police because of its 
historical political allegiance to the opposition, Jamaica Labour Party. 
 
The proliferation of this kind of paramilitary situation in both these cases confirms that 
there is an ‘extremely high level of rage against the security forces and a clear attack on 
the hegemony of the Jamaican State’ (West Kingston Commission of Enquiry, 2001:12) by 
lesser illegitimate authorities. Furthermore, the orchestration of roadblocks and other 
forms of protestation, against not so much human rights violations but, seemingly, the 
very idea of a police operation suggests defiance against the rule of law by some citizens 
and a calculated manipulation of the protest tool to serve problematic ends. This 
combination of criminal war and aggressive protestation, in the words of one political 
activist, served ‘to draw the police out’ of the community: 
PN27: It was a logical, tactical move by the JLP supporters. It was to take the 
pressure off Tivoli since the police had to attend to protests elsewhere 
such as in the Mountain View, Olympic Gardens and Stony Hill areas.   
                                                 
57 For a full report of this incident, see West Kingston Commission of Enquiry; 2001; See also The 
Jamaica Gleaner. (2001). July, 8, 9 & 10.  Available at http://www.jamaica-
gleaner.com/gleaner/20010708/lead/lead2.html ; http://www.jamaica-
gleaner.com/gleaner/20010709/lead/lead1.html ; http://www.jamaica-
gleaner.com/gleaner/20010710/lead/lead5.html 
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The senior officer in charge of the police operation on July 7 confirmed this state of 
affairs: 
We were offered safe passage out [of Tivoli] by the Leader of the Opposition 
[Edward Seaga]. Safe passage in the sense that we should not be operating there, 
in other words, what he [Edward Seaga] was saying is ‘leave here, you shouldn’t 
be here, go away – you shouldn’t be here whether criminals were here, yes or no’. 
It is a way of getting you [the police] out of the area58 (PN16). 
 
The clear ‘anti-police’ mentality evident among significant clusters of the urban poor has 
to be pitted analytically against the historical view among the marginalized, of the police 
as being ‘anti-them’. The consistently poor human rights record of the Jamaican security 
forces has, in other words, helped to promulgate a deep and abiding distrust of the law 
(and law enforcers) among the Jamaican citizenry (Headley, 2001; cf. Gray, 2004). This 
mistrust of the law resounds loudest, particularly within the heartlands of ghetto 
communities, where, due to its often rash dealings with residents, the police (and police 
action) is held in extreme disfavour. Indeed, protests against police misconduct in these 
urban slums seem also to be a resistance against policing itself (see Box 6.3 below). 
 
Box 6.3 Protests Against Policing 
On March 9, 2004, a police constable who attempted to apprehend a gunman in Olympic 
Gardens, St. Andrew, was set upon by members of an angry mob who not only beat him 
but also reclaimed a gun he confiscated and turned the suspect loose… Allegations are 
that the suspect grabbed the officer and both got involved in a fight. Scores of residents 
intervened; some attacked the officer with stones, while others hit him with pieces of 
stick… The law man and his partner had to beat hasty retreat59  
 
Between 6:00 pm and 7:00 pm, July 13, 1998, about forty residents of Aenon Town, 
Clarendon, blocked a section of the Aenon Town main road, protesting against the arrest 
of three men by the Cave Valley Police. A group of men were playing football on the 
road, when the ball smashed the glass window of [a resident’s] (name withheld) house and 
he seized the ball. As a result, the men stoned the house and beat [the resident] severely. 
Three of the men involved were arrested and charged with wounding with intent and 
                                                 
58See also The Jamaica Gleaner. (2001) ‘Seaga wants Adams out of West Kingston’. July 9. Available 
at http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20010709/lead/lead4.html 
 
59 The Jamaica Gleaner. (2004). ‘Lawman Mobbed by Angry Crowd’. March 10. 
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20040310/lead/lead3.html 
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malicious destruction of property. The residents subsequently blocked a section of the 
road, which was later cleared by the police. The men were granted bail and normality was 
restored. (Police Incident Report, event # 98000203617) 
 
About 10 am on April 20, 1998, citizens of Grant’s Pen Road blocked the Grant’s Pen, 
Waterloo and Shortwood roads, in protest against the arrest of man charged with 
possession of ganja. While escorting the accused man, the police party was attacked by a 
group of about 50 persons, including relatives of the accused, who attempted to take the 
prisoner from the police…Two females held unto one of the constables and relieved him 
of service M16 rifle loaded with thirty rounds. One of the two used a blunt instrument to 
strike an officer in the back, tearing his shirt… Following the transportation of the two 
females, citizens blocked the roads, threw debris on the roads and stones at the police. (PI 
report, event # 98000117274) 
 
Sources: Incident Report, Police Control Centre, 01/01/1998 – 31/12/98; The Jamaica Gleaner, 
2004, March 10 
 
Also, on Friday, 13 February 2004, sections of one of Jamaica’s most volatile and feared 
urban slums, Western Kingston, erupted in rage when a 14 year-old student of the 
Denham Town High School had been shot by the police. Throngs of residents from the 
Denham Town community poured into the streets, clashing violently with members of 
the Jamaica Constabulary and Defence Forces. Word had spread across West Kingston 
that the student had died. The now programmed, almost automated gut reaction of inner 
city residents to questionable police action was set in motion. Led by students (still clad in 
their school uniforms), an incensed mob hurled missiles at the Denham Town Police 
Station, mounted roadblocks with burning tyres and other debris. With the help of 
home-made firebombs and in full view of television cameras and media personnel, they 
torched vehicles belonging to the security forces to the cheerful approval of the crowd 
(see image below). A two-hour gun battle later ensued between the security forces and 
armed criminals in which a protestor was killed and a soldier injured. Although the police 
used tear gas in attempts to disperse the crowd, calm was only fully restored after a 
prominent area leader and  former Member of Parliament and Leader of the Opposition, 
Edward Seaga made a plea to residents to ‘cool it’ (see The Jamaica Observer, 2004, 
February 14).  
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Source: The Jamaica Observer, February 14, 2005 (Photograph by Bryan Cummings) 
 
In order to grasp the multi-faceted nature of this dilemma, it is important that I locate 
this discussion in its proper context. Jamaica is, at present, wedged in the midst of a 
profound crisis of public safety. This deteriorating security situation is definitively tied to 
a consolidated drug trade, including weapons smuggling, historically entrenched gang 
warfare between politically-divided communities and the fall-outs of unemployment and 
intense material deprivation and poverty among significant segments of the population 
(Harriot, 2003; Harriot, 2000; Figueroa & Sives, 2003; Gunst, 1995; cf. Gray, 2004). The 
extraordinary rate of violent crime (refer to table 5.1, chapter 5) severely undermines the 
rule of law, its seemingly wanton nature elevates citizen vulnerability and leaves the 
impression of a country on the brink of anarchic disorder. Such a state of affairs does not 
bode well for Jamaican society, an almost exclusively tourism-dependent Jamaican 
economy and it severely impacts the investment climate. It also, significantly, speaks 
volumes about the ability of the Jamaican State to maintain monopoly control of violence 
and ultimately its legitimacy. As a consequence of this tarnished image, the Jamaican 
State, by tradition, feels compelled to reply sternly to criminal activity, which often 
results in what Gray (2003:12) describes as ‘a mutual war of terror between ‘most wanted’ 
criminals and the security forces’. The 7-10 July police operation in which twenty-five 
civilians were shot and killed is a case in point. The situation is also exacerbated by highly 
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publicized cases of police killings such as the Braeton, Crawle and Michael Gayle 
incidents, where citizens were killed by the police in suspicious circumstances.60 
Allegations of police brutality and excessive use of force therefore plague the security 
forces. The remarkable levels of grievance are embodied in the aggressive protests which 
trail many police actions. Jamaican citizens, for example, mount up to sixty roadblock-
demonstrations per annum in response-resistance to police (mis)conduct (see table 6.4 
overleaf for a glimpse of the levels and tenor of such protests): 
 
Table 6.4 Citizen Demonstrations Against Police Misconduct 
       Year  Number of Protests 
1998 26 
1999 60 
2000 66 
2001 40 
2002 31 
2003 62 
2004 42 
2005 45 
Source: Police National Computer Centre, Jamaica Constabulary Force, 2005 
 
It is clear that citizen protests over human rights are inextricably tied to the repertoires of 
repression used by the state in policing. They are also linked to perceived absence of 
justice through the judicial system or appropriate political action that will hold the 
offending police officer or public official accountable.  That there is not even the ‘self-
critical assumption of that responsibility’ (Henke, 2004:118) by the Jamaican state lead 
scholars such as Henke to insist that: 
it is not enough in such instances [of police brutality] for the ‘responsible’ 
minister to simply call for an enquiry, investigation, and/or the removal of 
subordinates. If qualitative progress is to be achieved, then those who claim 
responsibility have to set the example and remove themselves from office, as well 
as those immediately involved with it (2004:118).  
                                                 
60 For a detailed account of some of incidents referred to here, see ‘Jamaica: Killings and Violence 
by the Police: How Many More Victims’. Amnesty Country Report, Jamaica. http://www.amnesty-
caribbean.org/Jamaica/AMR3800101/bericht.htm. See also Commission of Enquiry Into and Report 
on Recent Incidents at the St. Catherine Adult Correctional Centre on May 21 through to May 25, 
2000 
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As I indicated earlier in this chapter when I discussed the conception of justice held by 
many Jamaican citizens, the achievement of justice for the poor in the case of police 
shootings tends to translate into ‘whether the police is in his right or not [to deploy force] 
to be taken off duty, to be fired, to be locked up’ (PN24). The truth however is that police 
investigations and commissions of enquiry into human rights violations do not often 
result in convictions or actions that illustrate political accountability. These developments 
therefore exacerbate already existing hostility against the police. At the same time, within 
the context of this study, if the pleas for justice and against police brutality are to be 
reconciled with the political and theoretical desire for civil society and civil politics in 
Jamaica, then we are compelled, of necessity, to take account of the following theoretical 
suggestions.  
 
Despite the obvious capacity of urban marginals to act collectively – a recognizable 
characteristic of a functioning civil society - the brand of citizen activism being espoused 
in this context represents everything that civility and civil politics’ is not. It is not likely 
to generate the type of social capital (positive networks, norms and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit) into which Jamaican citizens 
may tap to constructively confront and redress the apparently vexed issues of human 
rights abuses in this political setting. Indeed, these forms of unconventional citizen 
mobilizations, albeit powerful weapons of the weak, run the risk of making a mockery of 
calls for justice and potentially undermine the conceptual and political force of the 
subsistence ethic. This is because while the practices of the economically-dispossessed 
represent rational ways to survive poverty and improve their lives, the simultaneous 
staging of various modes of struggle and resistance to preserve their livelihood and also to 
seek freedom for persons detained by the state for criminal action can hardly be defined 
as ‘peasant resistance’ in the strictest usage of the term.  This phenomenon is further 
complicated by the powerful role of rogue authorities—community dons or area leaders – 
and the extraordinary influence they wield over significant collectivities of marginals in 
the civil sphere. As I will discuss in chapter 8, dons have evolved into almost ‘a law unto 
themselves’ and, in instances, the sole source of justice for the communities over which 
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they preside. Their bizarre influence thus cannot be discounted in any serious analysis of 
citizen mobilization in Jamaica. I refer here to their role as chief determinants of the 
types of action/inaction taken by citizens to express their discontent and resolve their 
dilemmas. In other words, the tension between the genuine desire for human rights 
among clusters of the urban poor in Jamaica, the illicit (patron-client) ties that bind 
whole communities to the rule of dons and the state’s obligation to ensure public safety 
calls into question the legitimacy of some citizen-fomented resistance against the police 
and the demands for justice. At the same time, in realistic terms, within a context of 
mushrooming criminality and a Jamaican state desperate to contain it, human rights 
abuses are real possibilities. Therefore, in the absence of established and effective judicial 
and social recourse, citizens will, inescapably, continue to view social protests as the most 
viable counter-hegemonic response to their circumstances.    
 
6.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter reveals the paroxysms, dynamics, complexities and contradictions of civilian 
politics, as embodied in the practice and sheer mundanity of popular protest in the 
Jamaican context. My fundamental goal was to expose the contemporary manifestation of 
protest in Jamaica, the socio-economic and political factors which engender it, the ethos 
(moral economy) and values which together energise and steer it as well as the 
vocabulary of emotions, arguments and attitudes that sustain it. I was, in other words, 
obliged, as Tarrow (1994:3) advises, ‘to relate collective action to people’s social networks, 
to their ideological discourses and to their political struggles’. The following statements 
summarize the overarching problematic which was central to the foregoing analysis: 
(1) The Jamaican proletariat is frustrated and angry over the condition of their lives. 
This dissatisfaction is powerfully linked to (a) the declining quality of the 
(bureaucratic) mechanisms of political representation and redress, particularly the 
disappointment by certain groups in the performance of political actors and (b) 
the inadequacies of the institutional structures of civil society. 
 
(2) The Jamaican underclass sees resort to disruptive, and at times, violent 
demonstrations, among other forms of popular protest, as the most viable and 
constructive response to their political condition.  
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(3) While intended to elicit attention for the protestor and secure short-range and 
even longer term goals such as a more equitable society, these aggressive direct-
action do not seem to offer long-term gains in terms of the building of a truly civil 
society, outfitted with organized social movements, civil values and civil politics.   
 
Based on the preceding discussion, it is clear that Jamaicans are fully cognizant of the 
power of the protest tool and use it to maximum effect. Usually, it is to expose a condition 
that does not serve their interest, to lodge a complaint, criticism or grievance or simply 
demonstrate that a situation does not meet with their satisfaction. In specific terms, 
Jamaican citizens are usually responding to the many faces of poverty – unemployment, 
low-income, poor education, crime, police brutality, dilapidated social amenities and the 
absence or substandard quality of public goods and services such as transportation, roads, 
power supply, water and sewerage. Admittedly, compared to lofty issues of human rights 
etc, these issues may not seem particularly extraordinary.  However, together they are 
fundamental to basic survival and quality of life, hence their significance as the main 
driving forces behind contentious citizen politics in settings such as Jamaica. The 
consensus among a wide cross-section of the Jamaican citizenry, as reflected in the 
perspectives of the interviewees, is that the Jamaican State is doing a botched job in this 
regard, thanks, in part to bureaucratic negligence and the indifference of political 
representatives in responding to people’s needs.  
 
Indeed, it would appear that Jamaican citizens have come to demand and expect more 
from a ‘fourth term’ (People’s National Party) government. The natural result of 
widespread perception of failure to adequately meet those expectations is popular 
disenchantment and high doses of rancour among the citizenry, expressed in hostile 
mobilizations and protest. The de-institutionalised context, marginal social status, poor 
education, in other words, lack of bargaining power exacerbates the situation of the poor, 
many of whom engage in openly violent social protest and confrontations as well as 
blatant criminality as an inevitable counteraction to their dilemma and as a means of 
raising the visibility of their demands. The ubiquitous nature of protests chronicled in 
this chapter suggests that the Jamaican citizen has found a voice and an outlet for public 
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expression. But, the hijacking of genuine citizen mobilizations by persons with 
contradictory or outright criminal intentions presents a grave problematic for citizen 
politics in Jamaica. This unsettling (albeit seemingly effective) socio-political weapon, 
expressed variously through open police-citizen confrontations and mob activity (looting 
and vandalism), has the potential to arm legitimate forces of activism (community groups, 
student groups; youth movements) with destructive mobilization and political negotiation 
tactics. This is because these groups may also come to feel that their voices may not be 
heard unless it arrives through disruptive and/or violent protests.  
 
Of course, the consequence of assuming this brand of citizen politics is that it may compel 
and legitimate repressive tactics by the state intent on maintaining social stability and the 
rule of law. Indeed, this type of direct action may instead perpetuate the further 
marginalization of the urban marginals and undermine the cause and purpose for which 
they protest. It is on this basis that I argue that the Jamaican case appears to present with 
a peculiar form of grassroots activism containing multiple elements, both legal and extra-
legal.  This kind of protest politics and the causes its constituents defend are hence not 
always guided by the rules that generally inform civil discourse and civil action. These, as 
I outlined in Table 2.1 (chapter 2) include the active participation of citizens in public 
affairs, respect and tolerance for the rights of others, regard for the authority of the state 
and adherence to the rule of law. The forms of activism displayed in the Jamaican context 
is, nevertheless, linked to the same moral economy – survival, subsistence, a desire for 
justice and, in some instances, autonomy. As such, in a context of social instability, 
intense material deprivation and donmanship, popular citizen politics will unsurprisingly 
exhibit elements of extra-legality and violence, ranging from vandalism and banditry to 
intimidation and murder (see Table 6.2 showing the continuum of coercion in a political 
system). These elements are given high priority in the Jamaican context. Indeed, 
aggressive negotiation seems to represent a workable and proven model in the process of 
wresting from the state ‘what they want’ - justice, collective consumption, the right to 
subsist and, in instances, freedom from official (police) surveillance and modern social 
control.  
 221
 
To fully account for the implications of this approach to political negotiation and problem 
solving requires a more explicit look at the character and performative aspects of protest 
in Jamaica, particularly the ways in which its tenor is both driven by and dependent upon 
powerful institutional organs such as the media.  My overarching objective here is to 
determine whether or not a new paradigm of citizen protestation and politicking would 
be more beneficial to the protestor and, significantly, more amenable to the building of a 
truly civil politics and civil society. It is therefore to the uses to which media is put and 
conversely, the media’s treatment and coverage of protest and protestors that I now turn 
in chapter 7.   
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CHAPTER 7 
Performing Protest:  The Mass Media61 as Stage. 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
‘…a poor people press conference’.  This is how a former media colleague 
described street demonstrations in Jamaica. The remark was a reference to the frequency 
of protest action (see table 6.1, chapter 6) and the regularity with which the news media 
lend it coverage. The description is an intriguing one because, as my colleague continued, 
‘the media is where a forum is established which allows poor people to speak and be 
heard’. Given the powerlessness of the disadvantaged classes and their historical exclusion 
from the (bourgeois) public sphere, there are few opportunities for announcing 
grievances or making demands on the system. Direct popular citizen action, including 
roadblocks and placard-bearing street protests, often come into contact with the power of 
the media. And popular protest, as broadcast by the news media, is often the only means 
through which political representatives and other bureaucrats are alerted to the concerns 
of their constituents. The quest to influence the authorities has resulted in the mass media 
gaining prominence within the context of newer and more dynamic modes of action and 
self-expression (Munroe, 2002).  
 
Downing (2001:26) maintains though, that, although the media play a huge role in social 
movement trajectories, the scholarship on collective action or civil society rarely 
preoccupies itself with the protestor-media nexus. It is, however, becoming decidedly 
impossible to analyze and make sense of the dynamics of popular protest without 
systematic attention to its utilization of and relationship with media. Whereas citizens 
                                                 
61 I use the terms mass media and news media interchangeably to encompass the various media – 
newspaper, radio and television – that by their coverage of protest events, become participants in 
protest politics in Jamaica. I however privilege the television medium due to the accent and 
popularization given to television coverage in protest politics in Jamaica. I also recognize the 
importance of radio in my analysis within the context of the proliferation and increasing 
significance of the radio talk show as an avenue of ‘protest’ – debate, criticism and complaint.  
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often build on existing networks and traditional communities to mount their protests, it is 
also upon the external resources of the media, above all else, on which they depend to 
mobilize a following and encourage support (Tarrow, 1994). Furthermore, the attendance 
of media at protest sites also exerts a powerful influence on the overall functioning and 
management of protest action and, significantly, on the performance of protestors. In 
order to come to terms with Jamaican protest and the problematic collision between 
uncivil protest and civil society, the analysis of the politics of protest has to take account 
of this acute interdependence between popular protest and the popular press. 
 
Protest in Jamaica cannot be uncoupled from the presence, operation and political 
economy of the media. It is within this mutually constituted arena that I analyse the 
varied and multiple uses to which media, particularly television, are put during protest. I 
examine how protestors perform and manoeuvre themselves to secure their interests and, 
crucially, the media’s treatment of protest and protestors. Treatment here suggests both 
coverage and impact. In light of the increasing popularity of talk radio as an avenue of 
public complaint, I also focus on the role and dynamic functioning of the radio talk show 
in Jamaica as an additional dimension of citizen engagement. I draw attention first to the 
politics of performance by arguing that popular citizen protestat is, first and foremost, a 
kind of political performance, which is later reproduced, re-presented and amplified by 
the media with enormous implications for the tone and quality of citizen politics. I look 
in depth at the performance of protest in Jamaica within the framework of popular media. 
This includes the politics of media attention in social protest, the increasing tension 
between spectacle and genuine grievance, as well as issues of gender and identity politics. 
I examine how the media chronicles protest and the extent to which talk radio fosters 
avenues of civic engagement and civil discourse. I begin by introducing my rationale for 
the emphasis on ‘performance’ and its relationship with media treatment and coverage. 
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7.1.1  The Politics of Performance. 
‘All the world’s a stage,  
And all the men and women merely players’. 
- William Shakespeare. 
By Shakespeare’s maxim, the world is constituted by performance. Theatre studies scholar, 
Ben Kershaw (1996:6), has argued that the increasing ‘mediatisation of societies disperses 
the theatrical by inserting performance into everyday life’.  He maintains that performance 
extends beyond the institutionalized arena of the theatre to find place within socio-political 
domains and that the performative quality of power is becoming more evident. Kershaw 
extends this theory to account for what he calls the sources of radicalism in performance in 
crucial features of contemporary social processes. Here he identifies protest events as not 
only expressions of civil society but also spaces where oppression is most acute and thus 
where performance exposes its radical potential (ibid, 1995:19). In a broader vein that offers 
a particular rethinking of political action, Hannah Arendt declares that politics itself is an 
art. The political art to which she refers is not just any kind of art but ‘a performing art’ 
(1965:153). In this theatrical rendering of politics, the accomplishment lies in the 
performance itself, as it is in drama, dance or music. In other words, the value of 
performance is prized for its own sake, as something intrinsic to political action itself, not as 
something extrinsic and thus dependent on outcomes (Torgerson, 2005:510). Arendt’s view 
of politics as performance is an attractive and persuasive one. Theatre is, after all, 
fundamentally about entertainment. Its purpose (and power) is to get a strong reaction from 
the audience (Cole, 1983). Is political performance the same? In other words, to what 
extent is the political performance embedded in a protest event purely concerned 
intrinsically with entertainment and not concerned with political outcomes?  
 
The question over the intrinsic or extrinsic nature of performance is not peripheral to this 
study because, as I shall show, there is a view among some members of Jamaican civil 
society that Jamaican citizens perform protest purely for dramatic, symbolic or cathartic 
effect (PN18b; PN3). Of course, whether it is for the latter or to genuinely make claims 
upon the state, the protest performance has enormous implications for the tone of civilian 
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politics in this context. This is because, in this sense, theatre is the strongest of weapons but 
like all weapons, it works both ways – it can produce great benefits as well as become the 
nesting place for malevolence (Cole, 1983). If the end result of theatre then may be either 
good or bad, then performance (of any kind) in reality has consequences and outcomes and 
therefore cannot, as Arendt suggests, be merely intrinsic. Arendt’s argument, however, has 
value. She argues that ‘performing artistes need an audience to show their virtuosity and 
acting men need the presence of others before whom they can appear; both need a publicly 
organized space for their work and both depend upon others for the performance itself’ 
(1965:154). Following this logic, just as performance depends on a cultural space of 
institutions and identities, politics (of any kind) also requires a public space of institutions 
and identities that allows for political action.  
 
If popular protest is a performing art, then it is the street which represents a public stage 
upon which it is performed. The street is, however, not the only platform when there is 
access to an even more powerful political stage – the mass media. It is from this powerful 
communications arena that protest performers reach and address their mass audience, 
which, more often than not, comprises state actors and various anonymous publics. Indeed, 
it is the media which often confronts us with this performative world and gives weight to 
the assumptions informing radical citizen politics. In studying this performance, we can 
explore the relationship between the real and representations of the real viz. a. viz. the 
mass media and the implications it holds for social change. Here, I focus on uses, potential 
and limitations of media within the theoretical context that the media industry represents a 
key dimension of the public sphere. Further, scholars such as Dahlgren (1995) write about 
the inescapable integratedness of journalism and political culture where media is, in many 
ways, shaped by the political traditions of our societies, while the day-to-day processes of 
politics are adapted to the logic of media. The capacity of the media to reproduce and ‘re-
present’ protest performances raises the potential for citizen protest to collide with the 
normative agenda of civil society and expose its uncivil characteristics.  
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Indeed, it is at the political site of protest performance and media representations that the 
existing tensions between the Jamaican citizenry and the source of its discontent, the 
Jamaican state, often play out and become intensified. In fact, successful protest events must 
confront the voracious gaze of media whose power oftentimes imprisons protest 
performance within its own need for exposure. Within the context of the declining quality 
of representations of mediatised political performance, that is, the inherent power of the 
media to (positively or negatively) shape perceptions, I focus on how protestors, especially 
those from the disadvantaged classes, exploit this media opportunity to air their concerns. 
Are protestors, in other words, obliged to concern themselves with how they are portrayed 
and similarly with how they represent themselves within media? How do they direct and 
manage their protest performance to attract maximum media coverage? What kinds of 
discursive resources and political techniques are used to disseminate their political message 
and to what extent do they live up to the notion of civil discourse and/or civil protest? How 
do media practitioners produce and reproduce these discourses and performances and to 
what extent might the media’s role as the ‘fourth estate’ be compromised in this process? In 
short, within the protestor–media nexus, whose ends are being served and how? These are 
vital questions, the responses to which depend, firstly, on looking more closely at the 
actions of protestors as they engage in the performance of protest and, secondly, on the 
extent to which the mass media plays into and becomes subsumed and assimilated in this 
process. In the first section, I examine how protestors navigate themselves within the media 
spotlight and manipulate them to serve their own ends.  The second section confronts the 
flip side of this scenario – how do the media cover and treat protest and to what extent do 
journalistic values, editorial policy and the political economy of media impact on the way 
protests are represented in Jamaica?  
 
7.2  Performing Protest in Jamaica 
In order to gain insights into the ways in which Jamaican citizens perform protest based 
on their own lived experiences, I asked the interviewees, ‘how would you describe 
protests in Jamaica?’ and ‘do protestors behave differently when the media is present at 
the site of a demonstration’? Note that the following responses from former student 
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activists advance only the theatrical, performative and melodramatic aspects of 
protestation in their own representation and interpretation of citizen politics in Jamaica:  
PN25: It’s like a stage show. I buck up [encountered] a woman one day 
Downtown, [Kingston] and she say ‘roadblock a keep [is being staged], 
roadblock a keep, she a go dung deh’ [she is going to the ‘venue’]. Me say 
‘roadblock a keep’? And she say, ‘you don’t know roadblock is something 
like you a go party and me a go come pon TV too’? [I will be on TV as 
well]. So, it’s like a stage show and they [protestors] know that. I mean, 
turn on the TV 7 o clock or 8 o clock news on whichever channel, they 
more than likely will see themselves represented on television. And most 
poor people in Jamaica don’t see themselves on TV.  
 
PN18a: It is a spectacle and the people themselves are actors in the pieces so every 
protest is then an opportunity to act. We are a very status-oriented society 
and so we are very much into the hype. We love the excitement – so it is 
an opportunity for you to conduct yourself with a certain amount of 
drama. The media only serves to magnify the whole process. We have 
become superstars overnight. I don’t know that some of these people are 
necessarily protesting for any other reason but to get on TV. [The 
emphases are the speaker’s] 
 
PN3: Oh Lord, it’s like Kapo Reynolds, Pocomania and Revival.62 You know 
that ecstasy, that moment of ecstasy and convulsion is when they [the 
Revivalists] taste the blood from the chicken. Seeing the media is like you 
get a rush, it’s like you tasting the blood. It is that moment – that 
crescendo, it is orgasmic for the people because that is the motive. That is 
the objective because tonight you watch Prime Time News or News 
                                                 
62 Revivalism is an Afro-Christian religious movement which developed in Jamaica throughout the 
18th and 19th centuries and is divided into Zion and Pocomania branches. Revivalist churches, of 
which Pocomania carried a more African leaning, exuberantly fused African and Protestant 
performance styles, images and traditions. Its Pentecostal style services is said to owe an obvious 
debt to African possession ceremonies. Here, worshippers would dance counter-clockwise to 
powerful drums while breathing very heavily. This repetitive pulsation and dancing would 
ultimately invite possession by the spirit world. Some commentators credit the term ‘pocomania’ 
to Spanish origins, hence the popular translation ‘little madness’. Others attribute the term to an 
alternative genesis, more akin to the African tribal language of Twi, in which ‘po’ is taken to mean 
‘small’ whereas ‘comania’ is seen as a corruption of the term ‘Kumina’, which itself means ‘dance of 
ancestral possession’. Kumina is today a popular traditional dance form in Jamaica and represents 
one of the entrenched aspects of the African retention in Jamaican culture. Indeed, its followers 
engage in and perform very intense religious dance rituals. Part of this ritual involves chopping the 
head off chickens and sprinkling the blood, a precursor to becoming possessed with the spirit 
world.   The interviewee’s reference to Kapo Reynolds is in recognition of one of the late Jamaican 
icons of the revivalist tradition. 
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Watch and you are seeing yourself on television or you are seeing the 
community on television and you feel proud. It is that moment. The 
media coming, that is the crowning moment. Matters not what happens 
after that.  
 
Nothing advances a more theatrical, performative and melodramatic image of politics 
than the representation of protest activity portrayed above. It powerfully falls in line with 
Hannah Arendt’s (1965) view of politics as a performing art, where the value is not in the 
lasting result but in the performance itself. That protests in this context seemingly 
metamorphose into a ‘spectacle’ (PN18a) or ‘stage show’ (PN25) and are even likened to a 
spirit-possession ritual (PN3), especially in anticipation of the presence of media, is a 
powerful and overt illustration of its intrinsic drama and excitement. Emotional and 
spectacular forms of action strategies are a significant part of the conventional repertoire 
of protest in the Jamaican setting, as elsewhere.  
 
Jasper (2003), however, maintains that emotions are disappearing from models of protest. 
He argues that when crowds and collective behaviour, as opposed to social movements 
and collective action, were the lens for studying protest, emotions were central. To that 
extent, the motivations and explanations for protest were posited under the ambit of 
theories of frustration, anger, alienation and anomie. Over the last thirty years, however, 
emotions have taken a back seat to rational calculations and purposive formal 
organizations as the analytic model by which to study protest. Jasper (2003) contends that 
concepts such as identity and injustice (see discussion of injustice in chapter 6) by which 
rational protests are now framed are not entirely cognitive but possess highly charged 
emotional dimensions. Emotion, he contends, is the glue which generates feelings of 
solidarity among protestors and serves to activate and mobilize conflict. In Jasper’s  
words, ‘not only are emotions part of our responses to events, but they also – in the form 
of deep affective attachments – shape the goals of our actions and without them, there 
might be no social action at all’ (2003:153). Evidence of this dramatic emotionalism even 
within rational motivations for action is not hard to locate in the following description of 
Jamaican protest by a former student activist: 
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PN25: When we are protesting, we are jumping up and screaming. We are 
lighting fires, cutting down and burning trees and old cars. When the 
policemen clear the roadblocks, as soon as they are cleared, you see ten or 
twenty strong black men who should be at work running across the street 
dragging an old car from some car cemetery to block the roads again, 
lying in the streets, shouting, daring the police to shoot them. Women 
exposing their naked bodies as happened in Tivoli, women and children 
lifting up their clothes and exposing their rear ends and daring the police 
to hit them. Inciting the police to violence and hurling abuse – police 
bwoy, dutty police bwoy, yuh tink yuh gwine shoot me like how yuh 
shoot Mack Ten.  [Police boy, dirty police boy, do you think you can 
shoot me in the same way that you shot ‘Mack Ten’ (fictional person)].  
 
The action described here is undeniably dramatic and pregnant with sentiment – anger, 
violence, anxiety, excitement, amusement and vulgarity. This mix of ludicrous, festive 
and unpredictable behaviour is an important component of collective action. It 
symbolizes a significant aspect of what Hannah Arendt (1965:176-177) sees as the actual 
content of political life, that is, ‘the joy and gratification that arise out of being in 
company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public’. For protestors, 
there is, then, an intrinsic pleasure and gratification which derives from marching and 
bearing placards together, desacralizing power, embarrassing political representatives or 
the police and watching their panic and perplexity, as well as the sensation of triumph 
when they force concessions from the state.  
 
Two observations are however essential here: (1) This brand of protest performance may 
be intrinsically theatrical but it is also fundamentally concerned with directing attention 
to social conditions (as discussed in chapter 6) and thus, highly dependent on achieving 
(positive) outcomes. (2) Given that protest performance in this political context is 
concerned with (quality) outcomes, its existing representation must not expose signals 
which are inconsistent with a desire for social change. In other words, while the 
enjoyment and gratification that comes from ‘acting together’ at protest are components 
of this exercise in some political contexts, the production of spectacle, for its own sake, 
may not be a sufficient element of political action to induce the change in circumstances 
that protestors seek.  
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The crucial point here is that if popular protest is to live up to its nomenclature as civil 
action, we are obliged, as political science scholars, to pay more than passing attention to 
the type and quality of the political action undertaken and its potential impact, whether 
positive or negative, on the character of civil society and the tone of citizen politics. 
Indeed, by Arendt’s (1965:179) thesis, ‘acting is conduct that is meaningful and inventive 
[and] through it human beings come to reveal themselves and acknowledge each other’.  
While ‘actions’ will have different meanings in different contexts, it is important to 
underscore the point that, however justified, violence cannot be construed as part of the 
theoretical construction of civil protest or welcomed within a normative agenda of civil 
society which demands attention to civility, legality and tolerance. It is for this very 
reason that Arendt’s argument, which prizes political performance for its own sake (as 
opposed to extrinsic outcomes) is unsustainable when applied to the phenomenon of 
violent protests in Jamaica. A study of the character of citizen politics therefore demands 
a theoretical framework which concerns itself not only with the intrinsic performance of 
protest but significantly, with its impact and outcomes. It is here, in this search for civil 
action and civil discourse, that the media becomes implicated within protest 
performance. How protestors perform on account of media presence and how the media 
themselves perform when covering protest and in debating the issues and concerns about 
which citizen’s protest, have a great deal to do with the character of citizen politics and 
the quality of the civil society of which they are a part. I now look closer at this symbiotic 
relationship between protestors and the media and the extent to which it hinders or 
advances the agenda of civil protest and ultimately of civil society. 
 
7.3 ‘MEDIA’ TING PLACARDS & PERFORMANCE: PROTESTORS & THE PRESS    
As a point of departure, I wish to use the following quotations to illustrate the complexity 
of the relationship between popular protest and popular media in Jamaica. The first 
(PN13) is a recollection of an incident, which took place at the Palace Theatre in 
Downtown Kingston in the mid 1990s, as revealed during my discussion with a former 
Member of Parliament. The second set of quotations (PN23, PN24, PN29) from media 
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practitioners, confirm the pervasiveness of the situation and the extent to which the 
Jamaican media becomes incorporated in protest performances: 
PN13: There was an overflowing sewerage main and the people of the area were 
rightfully distressed and so they blocked the road [in protest] and we 
came out there and got the Water Commission on spot and pumped out 
the thing and when we were nearly finished pumping out now, feeling 
quite satisfied that we had done something, a couple of the large ladies 
who were leading the protest came forward and said ‘no, no, stop, don’t 
do that anymore, can’t done it ‘til CVM [Television] come’. Despite the 
fact that very fine relationships had been restored, everything was 
understood, when CVM came, there was massive ‘we want justice’, ‘we 
can’t deal with de nastiness’. We had various ‘gynigogues’ (sp.) from the 
Water Commission and various Ministries calling right after the newscast 
to ask what is happening there. They could hardly believe it – pure 
pretence – because the thing had already been fixed.  
 
PN23: People will call you out and tell lies and they will roll on the ground and 
it is drama. A man will come to you, ready to speak on the mike 
(microphone) or on tape to give you his eyewitness report [of an incident] 
and eight times out of ten, he is not the witness. He does not know what 
is going on or he is protesting exuberantly and he does not know what the 
people are protesting about. 
 
PN24: A politician told me that he was watching a news item about a police 
killing and he saw a woman wailing [presumably the victim’s wife], 
weeping so hard she had to be supported. He said he was so moved by it, 
he felt he had to pursue the matter and when he saw the woman a couple 
days later, she said ‘no no, a [it’s a] bad man, but you know a TV camera’. 
This is an opposition politician and he says he was most taken aback and 
now he is most hesitant, reluctant to assist, to respond to these matters. 
There is an issue of believability here. 
 
PN29: The [protest] performance is for the media. I see a case where a man get 
shot, is lying on the ground and the demonstrators from the community is 
telling the undertaker or the coroner people don’t move it til CVM come 
– that happen live on ya [here] while de people dem de a grung a bleed to 
death [the person is on the ground dying]. We are an upfront people, I 
call it the ‘African Peacock Syndrome’, where everybody is a star and if 
we ago ‘keep’ [stage; put on] demonstrations today, then you must haffe 
[have to] star∗. So is like some a dem are music videos despite they are 
                                                 
∗ The word ‘star’ here suggests that this person intends to become the leading personality or 
performer in the protest, as in the lead role in a film. 
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genuine causes deep down, so there is a level of manipulation too and the 
individuals a come out, come star.  
 
These accounts of the dramatic nature of popular protest episodes reveal several 
important and interconnected themes: 
(1) The repertoire of actions taken by Jamaican protestors includes a sharp attention 
to the effect of their struggle on the mass media. 
 
(2) There is a unique blend of genuine concern and pure exhibitionism within 
protest politics in Jamaica.  
 
(3) It is at this intersection (of legitimate disquiet and sheer spectacle) that Jamaica’s 
media are located and within which they operate.  
 
(4) There is a direct correlation between uncivil protestation and media 
coverage/treatment of protest in Jamaica.   
 
I will explore each of these themes in greater detail in the following discussion.  
 
7.3.1 The Politics of Media Attention in Social Protest 
It is clear from the above quotations that the very language of protest assumed by 
Jamaican citizens reveals an explicit resolve to attract maximum attention from the 
popular press, particularly television (and on a lesser, though not unimportant scale, to 
generate a stir of public opinion through the radio talk shows). It is evident from the 
quotations that the presence of the media incites a sense of sustaining the protest 
performance until ‘the press’ departs. In fact, as a consequence of the protest tool’s 
deployment, the Jamaican media, particularly television and radio, is fast emerging as 
identifiable and active arbitrators in conflict between protestors and the state. The 
increasing importance of the media is based on the idea that the issue in protest will 
naturally claim prominence on the public’s agenda, and thus, more likely provoke a swift 
political response from the state. For many of my interviewees, the presence of the media 
is transliterated as a call to action. Note, for example, the change in the attitude of the 
protestor in the following perspectives from a former student/political activist (PN3) and 
news journalist (PN5):  
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PN3: When the [television] camera comes, everybody is an expert at 
everything. Nobody is loitering or sitting idly by anymore, everybody is 
in a concentrated area following the camera, pointing out all the ills – if it 
is a road, they say ‘look at the craters’, everybody is active. 
 
PN5: I don’t do TV reporting but when I reach a scene, almost immediately, 
they [protestors] decide say ‘where is the camera?’ and I say ‘this is radio’ 
and you can see the disappointment but they will still get excited because 
they want to hear the issue on radio. Police personnel have told me that 
they have gone to demonstrations and have asked people to clear the 
roads and they say ‘hold on, we waiting on TV fe come’. 
 
It is apparent that protestors clearly want to make a good showing. Accordingly, 
dramatizing their case is of the highest priority. For example, an agitator, who may or 
may not be the instigator or leader of the protest, usually secures full control of the 
(reporter’s) microphone and continuously shouts out the cause or nature of the problem 
and/or makes demands. These demands often include calls for the intervention of the 
Member of Parliament or simply to announce that ‘we want justice’. As a rule, throngs of 
fellow demonstrators are also typically located firmly in place behind the speaker. As if 
this was a predetermined task, they customarily nod in angry agreement to what is being 
said or scream demands themselves. As they struggle to outdo each other, it is the speaker 
who shouts the loudest whose voice the listener (in this case, viewing/listening audience) 
automatically hears. Media coverage is thus the high point in Jamaican popular protest. 
The presence of media at the site of a demonstration allows the protestor the opportunity 
to let off steam and offers a vent to their issues beyond the narrow confines of their 
immediate communities. The view among some interviewees is that this is the role of 
media in these scenarios – to give attention to the concerns of the members of the 
political community and solicit a response from the political or bureaucratic power base 
on behalf of the community. How the media undertakes this process of mediation 
(between protestors and the state), even while they strive to fulfil their own editorial 
agenda and commercial imperatives, is of critical concern in this study. This is because 
media everywhere, without doubt, crucially affects the tone of politics and the quality of 
the prevailing social order (Dahlgren, 1995). Indeed, it is clear from the above quotations 
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that civilian politics in Jamaica, particularly with regard to popular protest, are 
powerfully adapted to the logic of media (cf. Dahlgren, 1995). It is within this framework 
that I look at the increasing tension between mediated representations of protest and 
demand politics in Jamaica. 
 
7.3.2 Between Spectacle and Genuine Grievance 
While the media provide clear advantages for the protestors, it may also place them at 
some disadvantage. This is because the conflict and uncertainty of popular protest are 
points of high drama and make for fascinating television. But increasingly, the credibility 
of the emotions portrayed by protestors is being challenged by both the public and policy 
makers.  As indicative from the perspectives outlined above (see section 7.3), the absence 
of believability frustrates attempts at ameliorating the conditions about which citizens 
protest. It diminishes the integrity of the protest, makes a mockery of the protestor (albeit 
self-inflicted), dilutes the potency and authority of the political message being 
communicated and renders the democratic exercise seemingly trivial and unconstructive. 
However, in order to make sense of the politics of theatricality and deception that has 
come to permeate the domain of popular citizen protest in Jamaica, I attempt to give 
analytic purchase here to the motivations driving protestors to act in dramatic ways. At 
the outset, it is important to ask the following questions: Is the protestor’s overall goal 
merely to attract media attention or is it to seek to ameliorate the circumstances that 
initially made protest compulsory? There is a strongly held view that there may be an 
almost myopic emphasis by Jamaican protestors on attracting media attention. (See for 
example the perspectives of PN 25 & PN18a in section 7.2 above).  
 
The coverage of street demonstrations is very important to the Jamaican protestor. 
However, aside from the natural curiosity of onlookers, I advance several reasons for this 
extreme fidelity to media presence. In the first place, the politics of protest in Jamaica 
appears to cultivate, over time, what appears to be a rather restricted idea and/or 
inadequate definition of what it is to protest. For example, in response to the question, 
‘what is it to protest’?, my interviewees largely view ‘attracting attention’ as crucial to the 
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characterization of protest. Here are some of the responses from members of a young 
professional group (PN11a, PN11b), former student activist (PN18b), a communications 
consultant (PN7) and human rights lobbyist (PN22):  
PN11a: A protest in the Jamaican context is persons trying to express  
  themselves. 
 
PN11b: A protest is where persons who have strong objections to certain things 
decide that they are going to take very decisive action which draws 
attention to them. In the Jamaican context, this is by blocking roads, 
screaming ‘we want justice’ or some other objectionable behaviour to civil 
society. It is always something, to my mind, a little extreme, it sometimes 
veers to the extreme to get the necessary attention. 
 
PN18b: A protest is ‘to call attention to an ill’  
 
PN7:  To protest is ‘to express disagreement or dissatisfaction in a visible or 
noticeable manner’.  
 
PN22:  ‘Jamaican protests are fundamental expressions of people asking to be seen 
and heard on an issue’ (emphases are mine).  
 
It is important to lodge a caveat here. There are many instances when Jamaican citizens 
‘call attention to an ill’ (PN18b) by attempting to making petitions to their local member 
of parliament through person to person contact, letters of complaint or telephone calls. 
Some prefer mediated forums such as calling talk back radio programme and/or penning 
‘Letters to the Editor’ of national newspapers. At the same time, there is a very apparent 
absence of a focus on the ameliorative aspects of protesting in the above comments. 
Instead, there is a seeming partiality to securing attention and pacification in the rational 
calculations about protest in this context. As one interviewee (PN21) sarcastically puts it: 
‘I am upset and my objective is to let you know that I am upset and to the extent that 
everyone knows that I am upset, we [protestors] have achieved something’. If to draw 
attention to their plight, by whatever means necessary, in order to achieve maximum 
media coverage is the principal goal of the protestor, then it follows that dramatic, violent 
and extremist tactics are instrumental components of what Jamaican citizens view as 
effective, attention-getting protest. It is therefore my argument that it is, in part, the 
restrictive definition, which significant segments of the Jamaican citizenry harbour about 
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what it is to protest, and their awareness of the significant ability of media to emphasise 
and expand their concerns beyond the limited spatial and political limits of the protest 
site, which forcefully explain the affinity for animation and hyperbole as well as the 
inclination to violent protestation in this context. This, of course, is not to say that the 
politics of theatricality (and deception) operative in this domain of political protestation is 
purely for its own sake and bereft of acumen. Instead, they are powerful weapons 
reflecting rational explanations. I offer some theoretical suggestions in the following 
section, which may further explain the inclination for theatre in the performance of 
Jamaican protest. 
 
7.3.3 Mediated Theatricality as Identity? 
The attention to drama and spectacle in Jamaican popular protest is not divorced from the 
politics of identity and gender and the way these are played out in the media. For one 
thing, the presence and attention the media affords street demonstrations and invest 
protestors with tremendous political voice, the power of collective self-expression and 
identity. This latter politics of identity, embodied in the seeming craving of protestors to 
hear or see themselves (and their communities) on the evening news or to see their issues 
and concerns represented in the newspapers, is significant in the search for explanations 
for the foregrounding of spectacular forms of action at protests. But it represents more. 
Within the context of this highly stratified post-colonial society where the poorer classes 
are often socio-politically and economically marginalized and thereby rendered invisible 
(Stone, 1980), citizens often feel compelled to announce and/or validate their presence in 
varying ways.  
 
Recent scholarship (Hope, 2006; 2003; Gray, 2004) on this subject examines the inventive 
ways in which the Jamaican underclasses navigate, negotiate and project their identities 
within the context of a powerful and entrenched colour, class, race, status and gender-
coded society. Hope (2006; 2003), for example, uses the context of Jamaican dancehall 
music culture viz. a. viz. the media to show how the poorer classes are reclaiming cultural 
dominance in an otherwise restricted socio-economic environment. This is while Gray 
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(2004) illustrates how economically-deprived contingents of the urban poor use banditry 
and what he calls ‘badness-honour’ to secure political influence and authority in domains 
otherwise under the exclusive control of the state. These phenomena may not be 
exclusive to Jamaica but there is, first and foremost, a very strong desire in the Jamaican 
context to be ‘smadditized’ – to become somebody (from the Jamaican word ‘smaddy’, 
meaning ‘somebody’). This desire is itself theoretically accepted as having its basis in the 
country’s long history of slavery, racialism, and oppression, and as I allude to above, the 
unequal advantage (consciously or unconsciously) accorded to particular groups on the 
basis of colour, race and social class (cf. Manley, 1974). This craving by some citizens to 
be ‘smadditized’ within the context of popular protest, oftentimes results in a struggle to 
be documented by media and therefore for camera and microphone space – for the ‘video 
light’ – to use the Jamaican vernacular63.  
 
This perspective is also framed within the context of Jamaica’s male-oriented, patriarchal 
society, where there is a psychological, egoistic desire of men to ‘prove’ and to ‘show’ – to 
effectively demonstrate that they can do ‘something about it’, that is, in this case, to take 
a stand against whatever is the perceived injustice. While my overall study does not offer 
an analysis of the gender discourses of protest, I acknowledge, albeit briefly here, the 
significance of the differentiated roles (theoretical and ‘choreographic’) between men and 
women in social protest and their distinctive impact. Given the negative impact of 
inferior road conditions on transportation generally, as well as on the economic 
livelihood of significant groupings of men (taxi-drivers and other transport operators), 
men tend to have a greater input in protests over this issue. In fact, it is worth noting that 
most of the physical erection of roadblocks – felling trees, hauling logs and abandoned 
                                                 
63 Underlying the histrionics of protestors in this scenario is therefore a genuine need to be 
acknowledged, to be noticed, not necessarily in a sterilized sense, but, as I discussed in chapter 6, 
in a way which suggests the need to be affirmed as a citizen who is important and who possesses 
rights that deserve to be recognized. As such, there is an eagerness of protestors to tell their story, 
dramatize it, to get various anonymous publics, particularly state officials, to see, hear and feel 
their emotions and to understand their plight. The argument can also be made that demanding and 
claiming attention from the mass media supplies protestors, especially those from poor urban 
communities, with a keen sense of individual and community empowerment. 
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vehicles into the streets, piling tyres and setting them alight on the asphalt – are done by 
the men. The physical clashes with the police, including exchanging gunfire, forcibly 
shutting businesses, students locking gates to Universities and the barricading of 
communities also fall under the purview of males (see PN25, section 7.2 for a comment 
on the genderized role differentiation evident in the description of Jamaican protest by a 
former student activist.64 However, the differentiation of roles is only one part of the 
politics of gender taking place at the site of popular protest in Jamaica.  
 
That protestors are able, through radical direct actions, to compel politicians to come (to 
the protest site) and negotiate with them, translates into ‘stripes’65 (recognition, fame) for 
some men in particular communities. It elevates them in the eyes of community members 
and enhances their own feelings of esteem and importance. Some of the ‘ring leaders’ 
later become referred to as the ‘don’. As a former student activist and political party 
youth leader puts it: 
PN3:  You are the big man, politician haffe [have to] come and talk to you – and 
sometimes this establishes or concretizes their donmanship over that 
community because when the politician comes, he is going to look for the 
leader of the demonstration and therefore he is going to come to you and 
therefore next time, when [United States] farm and hotel worker 
application forms ready, they come to you because you are the don in the 
community, you are the leader or maybe the don will have you as his 
second [in command]. So this type of protest benefits them in the sense 
that people feel this importance, it is this whole feeling of self, that they 
are worth something. 
 
                                                 
64 I examine the politics of gender in protest in greater detail, including a focus on the differential 
roles performed by men and women in Jamaican protest. See ‘(Defiant) Rituals of Resistance: 
Situating Higgler Women in the Protest Performance of the Jamaican Poor’. Forthcoming. 
Bhavnani, et al. On the Edges of Development: Cultural Interventions. London: Routledge. 
 
65 This achievement of ‘stripes’, embodied in recognition and celebrity status is not always or 
necessarily interpreted as a positive acclaim. Instead, it may be more accurately viewed as the 
realization of notoriety. This is as a result of the otherwise unsavoury reputation and illicit 
activities sometimes already tied to the men acquiring approbation in instances of protest. For a 
more explicit examination of this unique combination of ‘civic-ness’ and criminal conduct, see my 
later discussion on rogue leadership and outlaw community governance in chapter 8. 
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This perspective essentially reinforces the strong masculinist ideals and values rooted in 
this political culture. The political economy of women in Jamaican popular protest is also 
especially significant here because it is in the performance of women, more so than that 
of men, that the nexus between protestors and the media is fully realized. It is also here 
that the problematic boundaries between civil and uncivil citizen politics sometimes 
become exposed. As a context, many of the issues about which Jamaican citizens protest 
and demand action – inadequate provision of public goods (water, ‘light’ [electricity], 
roads, telephone service) as well as police brutality – are typically categorized as domestic 
concerns. When there is a deficiency in the supply of domestic goods, it is women who 
are usually most affected in their ability to carry out their domestic responsibilities. It 
should be no wonder then that it is women who feel especially obliged to place these 
issues onto the agenda of the media. In fact, so constant and imposing has been the 
historical presence of women in the public actions taken by Jamaican citizens that the 
prevailing view is that while men may instigate and lead protest in its initial stages, 
without the committed, sustaining work of women, who keep the issues alive and carry 
them forward, protest would be an exercise in redundancy66. From the singing of the 
chants at demonstrations and rallies, walking and praying at church-led marches and 
crusades, to bearing placards written in the most colourful language, it is women who 
invest protest action with emotion and meaning.  
                                                 
66 There is a growing body of scholarship which focuses on historical role of women in popular 
citizen action in Jamaica. See, for example, Sheller, M. (1997) ‘Quasheba, Mother, Queen: Black 
Women’s Public Leadership and Political Protest in Postemancipation Jamaica’. Lancaster 
University: Department of Sociology. Available at: 
http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc049ms.html; See also Shepherd, V., Brereton, B. & 
Bailey, B. (Eds.) (1995) Engendering History: Caribbean Women in Historical Perspectives. 
London: James Curry; French, J. (1995) ‘Women and Colonial Policy in Jamaica’. In Wieringa, S. 
(Ed.) Subversive Women: Women’s Movements in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. 
London and New Jersey: Zed Books. 
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They are often the most vocal and spirited at protest. It has therefore become politically 
strategic to position women at the forefront of the protest action, especially when it 
involves issues of victimization such as police abuse. This is because it is here that 
females, particularly mothers, exert extraordinary power. Through their seemingly 
natural ability to express deep emotional anguish, Jamaican women are historically 
effortless champions at soliciting public empathy (see Wilmot, 1995; cf. Sheller, 1997). 
The media are incorporated, wittingly or unwittingly, into this kind of protest 
performance, and can hence be viewed as part and parcel of the constitution of feminine 
power in this political domain. The following perspectives of two senior journalists – the 
first, male and the second, female forcefully captures the power plays which some female 
protestors deploy in their quest to attract maximum media visibility and public attention 
and secure their goals, illustrating how the media becomes subsumed in this performance:  
PN24: I have been on several of these protest assignments and trust me, women 
know how to tug at the heart strings of the public. You will see a woman, 
a mother wailing over the killing of her son or spouse by the police or an 
old woman, perhaps a grandmother bawling over the lack of water or 
over some other type of neglect and this instinctively attracts a reporter’s 
attention. Women also strip themselves and gwaan bad [behave badly], 
tek off dem blouse (remove their clothing) and that kind of lewd 
behaviour.  
 
PN5: People, especially women, get more loud and boisterous when media is 
there. You see a lot more screaming and the hysteria and they work 
themselves up into a state because they have this impression- rightly or 
wrongly- that media like this emotion and this screaming. 
 
It is, however, within the dynamics of this remarkable media- citizen encounter that 
protestors may exercise some monopoly over the rules of the political game. They are able 
to use media to purvey their message but also to embarrass their political representatives, 
portray opponents in an unfavourable light and influence state decisions (Goodwin & 
Jasper, 2003). The foregrounding of the media in the latter quote by PN5, as an 
explanation for the ‘loud and boisterous’ performance of women at protest, led me to ask 
the interviewee this follow- up question, ‘Do media like these dramatic and emotive 
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displays’? Note the powerful role of subjective media representation in the response of 
this news reporter:  
PN5: Well, you certainly want a human element to your story so [interviewee 
laughs loudly], you want to hear some kind of emotion coming out and 
you do see people working up themselves and they talking to you and 
they start getting hyper and screaming and this over the top displays of 
emotion and they carry you to show you this 
or that – they want to tell a story.  
 
The theoretical complexity embedded in the protest cycle described here lies not only in 
the evident capacity of women to raise the visibility of their concerns in the media but in 
their apparent persuasion that ‘inappropriate’ and ‘uncivil’ displays are fundamental to 
what the media is searching for in their own quest for news. Certainly, the reporter’s 
response tells us that an element of emotionalism and drama is a necessary driving force 
in what is considered to be newsworthy here. At the same time, it is evident that the way 
a story is recorded and ‘re-presented’ to the public in the Jamaican context appears to be 
linked to the way protestors are driven to perform them. In other words, citizens who 
take to the streets in protest largely model the protest behaviours they see in the mass 
media. For example, one of the dangers of media coverage, as evidenced in the 
perspectives outlined above, is the manufacture of ‘personalities’ or ‘stars’ from among 
protest campaigners. These are not always the only organizational or intellectual leaders 
of the protest but usually people who are flamboyant, loud or disruptive, in other words, 
with the talent for attracting media attention. The coverage of such performances serve to 
establish and expose the more negative aspects of protest action, has the capacity to 
distort a protest event’s message and will greatly affect a protest campaign’s ability to 
meet its goals and change its society (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003). The following quotation 
by a former student activist (now young professional – attorney at law) articulates this: 
PN18b: It is essentially offensive because you see people carrying on. It is, as my 
colleague says, the spectacle that it has become. Any kind of protest now, 
whether it is for light [power] or roads or water, a mother for a son, a 
community for water, has become subsumed under the umbrella of a 
spectacle and so when I watch it, I am utterly turned off and I know that 
people may have a valid reason for coming out [to protest] and really and 
truly, there should be in 2004 no place where there is no water or light 
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but the spectacle that it has become offends. You feel as if ‘oh my God, 
what kind of person is that?’  
 
I wish to reiterate here that the recourse to more subversive strategies of popular 
protestation is a significant element of the political armoury of the less educated, less- 
politically connected and less-influential groups of citizens, who have not yet acquired 
the skills to manipulate the media more effectively. This view powerfully echoes Piven & 
Cloward’s (1977) theory that disruptive, ‘inappropriate’, attention-generating techniques 
often represent the poor’s only resource in the quest for attention and redress. The 
persistence of the overly negative protest forms is, nonetheless, becoming increasingly 
problematic. Indeed, it would appear that despite their seeming effectiveness as a way to 
attract attention, overly-dramatic displays of protest are losing favour with some citizens 
and reducing their effectiveness as a means of winning sympathy for particular issues. 
 
It is perhaps fair to ask, then, whether this perspective is indicative of an emerging 
resistance to uncivil forms of protest performance in Jamaica. If so, how widespread is it? 
Does it represent the attitude of elites or generalised public opinion? These questions are 
important; the answers lie in examining the official political responses to protestation and 
ascertaining what types of protest action, over time, elicit what types of responses from 
the Jamaican state and the extent to which these official responses impact on the way 
protestors elect to perform protest. Indeed, official response may be one part of the 
answer. This is the subject of my discussion in chapter 9.  For the purposes of this 
discussion, however, I wish to emphasize that the interviewee’s (PN18b above) 
disinclination to extract the nature of the protest performance from the media’s 
representation of it implicates the Jamaican media in the perpetuation of uncivil political 
conduct and renders this civil institution potentially inimical to the functioning of a real 
civil society. The interviewee’s perspective therefore necessitated clarification as to the 
extent to which people watching protest in their capacity as members of the mass media 
audience focus on the individual temperament and/or behavioural norms of the persons 
protesting as opposed to the issues over which they are protesting. This is the response: 
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PN18b: You are forced to [watch] because the media has fed you this diet of 
spectacle upon spectacle, of fanfare, of jumping up and tearing off your 
brassiere. 
 
Theoretically, this takes us into media representation and effects theory (the extent to 
which the media influences behaviour) versus audience needs and perceptions of mass 
media content. It also exposes the theoretical and political collision between what 
Halloran, Elliot & Murdock (1970) see as restricted access (to the media by some sectors) 
and unrestricted coverage (injudicious treatment of the disadvantaged classes by the 
media). In other words, the less-educated, less-affluent and less-influential citizens, who 
have limited access to the media, are forced to compensate (or perhaps, overcompensate) 
for this restricted access through uncivil forms of political behaviour. Meanwhile, 
unrestricted coverage assures protestors of attention and guarantees that the full breadth 
of their protest performance will be aired on the mass media. In short, the concerns and 
grievances of citizens are wide open to superficial handling and for representation in a 
way that is designed to extract maximum entertainment value. The role of media, 
themselves organized components of civil society and forceful players in popular protest, 
thus bears tremendously upon the character of citizen politics and the quality of civil 
society. The nature of demonstrations and the tone of civilian politics more broadly in 
contexts such as Jamaica is, in part, as one journalist admits (PN5), ‘a matter of treatment 
and how we tell the story’. It is to this subject that I now turn.  
 
7.4 How the Media Chronicles Protest: Narrative & Treatment 
We read the newspaper and watch your TV 
You want us believe that it is pure sufferation [suffering] we would see 
Now our eyes behold, the story is told  
Sufferation, starvation, Part of your manipulation. 
Now we rise …       
Mutabaruka & Tony Rebel, Mama Land, 1994 
 
Jamaican entertainers, Mutabaraka and Tony Rebel, in this powerful piece of dub poetry, 
cast an indictment on global media practice. Their poetry reproduces the current public 
disaffection in Jamaica, as elsewhere, about the performance of the mass media and the 
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practice of journalism. In specific terms, we are directed to the problematic nature of 
media representation and output, that is, what is selected for portrayal and how it is 
presented (Dahlgren, 1995). Television, for instance, has been the subject of ongoing and 
widespread criticism for contributing to deterioration in aesthetic tastes and general 
cultural standards. Indeed, there is growing concern in some quarters that the emotional 
and entertainment predisposition in television is so acute that even the most serious 
issues of public concern are inevitably trivialized (Street, 2001:90 quoting Entman, 
1997:78; Putnam, 1995; Postman, 1992; 1987; cf. Halloran, Elliot & Murdock, 1970).  
 
Robert Putnam, for example, while extolling the virtues of newspaper reading and 
elevating the medium as an agent of civic responsibility, indicts television for being an 
agent of social disengagement, responsible for a catastrophic decline in social capital, 
gauged in terms of the networks, norms and trust that allow people to act collectively. He 
blames television for privatizing people’s leisure time and therefore their civic activity. In 
short, his contention is that television deadens people’s capacity to operate as citizens, 
thereby causing civic disengagement (Putnam, 1995:678; 2000:229). This is while other 
scholars (Curran, 2002; McGregor & Comrie, 2002) argue that public confidence in the 
news as a source of information and education, and faith in its integrity is plummeting. 
Such criticisms essentially reproduce Habermas’ (1989) concern over the demise of the 
media as an effective political public sphere and a space for rational debate and discussion 
of political issues. Although seen to be largely justified, this type of commentary is 
troubling. This is because the institution of media is positioned as one of the important 
pillars enabling the development of a functioning, participatory civil society. Indeed, the 
media is generally thought of as supplying information in a context where information is 
a key political resource which determines people’s capacity to act. In other words, 
without this information, citizens are powerless (Street, 2001).  
 
Putnam’s formulation, however, largely rejects the idea that atomized individuals 
consuming media in their homes comprise a public or are contributors to the discursive 
and social interactional processes indispensable to civil society. While Putnam’s argument 
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is well-taken, his thesis is predominantly grounded in the United States context and thus 
may not have the same relevance elsewhere. For example, rather than an impediment to 
civil society and deadening people’s capacity to act together, television (and radio) in 
Jamaica are fast transforming into active outlets and spaces for civic interaction and 
participation. As my preceding discussion firmly establishes, the mass media, particularly 
television (and as I will show later, the ubiquitous radio talk show) have become crucial 
players in protest activity in Jamaica, in terms of providing a public vent for issues beyond 
the narrow confines of communities and mediating between these communities and the 
Jamaican state to which citizens direct their protest. My theoretical concern in the 
remainder of this chapter is therefore with how the media itself have dealt with this 
‘civic’ role even while it inescapably operates as an economic (cultural) industry.  
 
The scholarship on the political economy of media suggests that we concern ourselves 
with the institutional logics of media ownership, financing and control, organizational 
imperatives and dynamics as well as the professional frameworks operative among people 
who work within the industry, all of which impact on the way journalism (and 
journalists) functions (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004; Curran, 2002; 1991; Dahlgren, 1995; 
Fairclough, 1995). I draw heavily on the perspectives of Jamaican citizens and, 
importantly, media practitioners in order to make sense of media treatment of protest 
action in this context. My objective here is not to necessarily critique or condemn their 
positions or the values implicit in them but to throw light on some of the implications of 
the existing approach to media coverage for the tone of citizen politics and the quality of 
civil society. To begin with, there is a view among some members of the Jamaican 
citizenry that the media has played a negative role in civilian politics as far as their 
coverage and treatment of popular protests are concerned. For example, the following 
perspectives from an attorney at law (PN18b), two University undergraduate students 
(PN20a & PN20b) and a local commentator (PN29) convey a view of media coverage of 
protest events as largely emphasizing triviality, sensationalism and superficiality: 
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PN18b:The way they [the media] cover it is like fanfare – citizens in Riverton 
come out and they zoom in and they show this woman in her bra and her 
underwear saying ‘me want justice’, ‘yuh kill me pickney’ [you killed my 
child]. I have no experience in media but I am sure the thing can be 
edited in such a way that the real issues come out – not so much the 
fanfare but of what people are protesting about. They [the media] want to 
sensitize you to the problems but the way in which it [protest] is covered 
is exaggerated sometimes and it is as if it is deliberately portrayed in a 
negative manner. I think media houses can do better in terms of how they 
put across the message.  
 
PN20a: A video coverage of protest will focus far more on the people who are 
holding their heads and crying than the people who are solidly saying this 
is the issue. Instead, they [the media] bring to the home audience the 
agony but without the words to explain what the agony is about.  
 
PN20b: I think sometimes a lot of messages of protest get lost in trying to get a 
catchy cover story so that your paper will sell. Instead of saying that the 
people are genuinely hurt by fire or whatever, it is ‘man chopped in the 
head at protest’ or ‘women strip naked, breasts flying’ because they want 
to sell paper so they sensationalize it and the people come across like they 
are not protesting for any reason because the focus is more ‘on their 
actions’ than ‘why’ they are protesting. 
 
PN29: I think media exploit people’s grief. Our people, when dem in a grief, dem 
hold up dem belly bottom, dem roll pon de grung and a carry on and the 
camera boy a gwaan [going on] like say him want to show de woman 
drawers and me phone de [television] station and dress dem down 
[quarrel with them] because we have to start objecting to this kind of 
media coverage. 
 
These perspectives are a candid articulation of dissatisfaction from a cross-section of the 
Jamaican citizenry with the way the news media has covered and treated popular citizen 
protest. The quotations suggest that the news reportage of demonstrations is an area 
where the distinction between hard news and entertainment is blurred. The interviewees 
all indicate that there is less of a focus on the motivations, purpose and rationale for 
citizen action and more concentrated attention to the dramatic aspects of the protest 
performance. My own observation of actual protest and my interrogation of television 
footage of recent demonstrations confirm this impression of media coverage. A news 
broadcast of popular citizen action does not always or inevitably leave the audience with 
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a very clear understanding of what citizens are protesting about. The consequence is that 
it becomes virtually impossible to locate the concerns or grievances of protestors within a 
wider political context and/or identify the expressed objectives of the citizen action. As a 
broadcasting regulator puts it: 
PN21: you are put in a state of anxiety. Something is going on and a lot of people 
are there and they [are] blocking up the place. What are the issues, who 
are the potential spokespersons, who you choose to put in your news clip 
may have little to do with trying to have people have a full grasp of what 
is going on but probably who is the most animated so it has the greatest 
impact audio-visually. 
 
These perspectives on news coverage of protest all appear to derive from a collective 
notion of how the news ought to be covered and presented, that is, what elements of a 
story should be given salience and prioritization and what ought to be ignored or 
considered peripheral. The emphasis on the dramatic and spectacular in news reports of 
political events, whether at the citizen or state level, is not unusual. Instead, it represents 
an established global approach to news production and presentation. John Street (2001) in 
a very persuasive discussion in Mass Media, Politics and Democracy describes the 
reporting of politics as the metaphorical equivalent of ‘telling tales’. The mass media, he 
argues, do not simply cover observable events and report facts but animate them by 
turning them into narratives with plots and actors. He writes: ‘Movies use the artifice of 
cinema to tell a story, to create characters in a believable world; news does a similar job 
for the events that are its concern’ (2001:36). It is Street’s contention, then, that news is 
in this sense an art.  It follows that just as politics can be seen as a performing art (Arendt, 
1965), the coverage of politics by the news media is also an art.  
 
The nature of the television medium, for instance, favours dynamic and attention-
grabbing visual images. A typical newscast, essentially communicating in a language of 
pictures, is therefore a symbolic event, a form of theatre in which the day’s events are 
dramatized (Postman, 1992). This leads to questions of the role of a journalist at the site of 
a demonstration. Aren’t journalists, in this sense, implicated in the production of political 
art?  To the extent that the media, particularly television, have become so mired within 
 248
the political dynamic of Jamaican protest, they are no longer seen as mere spectators at 
the site of demonstrations but incredibly influential in setting the tone of the protest 
campaign, informing the political behaviour of protestors, and, at times, determining the 
outcome.  Iyengar (1994), in effect, confirms this view when he argues that the way 
television frames an issue influences the allocation of responsibility: who is to be blamed 
or praised. In the Jamaican context, the issues at play, such as inadequate water supply, 
poor road conditions or police brutality, are framed in terms of the (declining) 
performance of the state and political representatives. The television medium often 
positions the protestors in an adversarial relationship to the state and locates itself as an 
intermediary.  In this sense, ‘television influences attributions of responsibility both for 
the creation of problems or situations (causal responsibility) and for the resolution of 
these problems or situations (treatment responsibility) (Iyengar, 1994:3). In turn, both 
protestors and the media audience are influenced by how the media frame issues and 
allocate responsibility.  
 
The argument can thus be made that there is indeed a social and professional obligation 
upon the journalist to go beyond superficial coverage. The function of news is thus not 
only to signal an event but to bring light to hidden facts, to set them in relation with each 
other, and make a picture of reality on which people may act (Lipmann,1922). News 
should thus provide people with the sort of information that can assist them to participate 
in comprehensive discussions about their society and take informed decisions about their 
lives. Given that the politics of media treatment of news and its potential negative impact 
on citizen behaviour is already a point of debate within media and political circles, I 
posed this question to media managers and senior news reporters: ‘are you satisfied with 
how the media has covered protests in Jamaica’? The responses dramatically coincide 
with the concerns of members of the mass media audience (attorney at law and university 
students- PN18b, PN20a; 20b) outlined before: 
PN4: I have a problem with how we have covered it. I think there is too much 
emphasis on the superficiality, on the immediate screaming and the 
immediate emotion and not enough digging of the underlying issues. So, 
you get a story on a demonstration without the fact that it has been an 
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issue for 10 or 15 years and the type of impact the problem may have had 
on people. It is ‘fast food’ journalism. You go in, you grab some quick 
sound bites, you do a story and then you go home. So, in terms of the 
underlying issues and the underlying frustrations, I think maybe we pay 
too little attention to it. 
 
PN9: I am never satisfied. I think we have added fuel to the fire to some degree. 
If these are people [protestors] who have been trying to get their voices 
heard, we have a responsibility to bring their issues but we also have a 
responsibility to bring them reasonably and sensibly. It is how we do it. 
We have too often gone for the person who is jumping up and carrying on 
rather than the person who is standing on the side who wants their voice 
heard but may not necessarily be the one to jump up, to get on bad and 
maybe those are the ones with the reasoned response and the reasoned 
arguments that we would want to put forward. 
 
These perspectives represent a powerful admission by some sections of media 
management that there is a detriment (to civil politics and civil society) in the way that 
protest performances are currently reported and represented in Jamaica. One of the 
dangers with this myopic approach to media coverage of protest is that citizens have 
clearly begun to hold a particular view as to how popular protests ought to be carried out. 
In other words, there is an emerging cyclical relationship between media coverage and 
the tone of protests where protestors are led to believe that if they desire to draw 
attention to a plight, then they have to conduct their protest performance in a particular 
way. The consequence is that an acute attention to animation and hyperbole, including 
violence, has become part of a combination of direct action strategies that the Jamaican 
underclass views as effective protest67.   
 
Any analysis of the craft of journalism and nature of news production and coverage 
cannot, however, discount the enormous impact of media ownership and the imperative 
of the market, which often demands compliance to ratings, profits and entertainment as 
well as the management and editorial imperatives which impact on the operations of the 
news and the work of journalists. Using the Netherlands as a case study, Bardoel and 
                                                 
67 Refer to my earlier claim that there is a shift in protest behaviour when the media is present at 
the site of a protest event as well as my extensive discussion on the performance of violent protest 
in Jamaica in chapter 6. 
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d’Haenens (2004) maintain, for example, that modern entrepreneurship and shareholder 
interests ushered into that country a new style of broadcasting which was no longer 
oriented towards citizens but instead towards consumers of television and radio 
programmes. Programmes and programming, they argue, were therefore increasingly 
tailored to preferences discovered through market research. Every editor or editorial 
office works within a philosophical frame set by the commercial owners and interprets 
that philosophy in their everyday production of news. The news we receive is thus the 
product of organizational processes, shaped by public relations management, the methods 
and sources used by the journalists in gathering the news, and the organizational 
requirements, resources and institutions they work for (Curran, 2002). It therefore 
follows that a newspaper will present its broad philosophical frame and although 
individual perspectives impinge on what journalists write, the philosophical frame, 
including its commercial imperatives inescapably come through. This, however, does not 
mean that editors do not hold a view of what they consider ‘news’ or ‘newsworthy’. 
Visualness, emotion and conflict are usually some of the more important news 
imperatives. The news must not only capture the audience imagination through visual 
story-telling but arouse the feelings or emotions of the audience as well as satisfy the 
criterion of conflict – competing views, competing actors (Street, 2002; Postman, 1992).  
 
In their research into how the British media (two television services and most of the 
national newspapers) selected and presented the news of the anti-Vietnam War 
demonstrations in 1968, Halloran, Elliot & Murdoch (1970:91) argue that in order to 
retain the interest of readers, press coverage will be directed towards atypical aspects, 
which then becomes the main news angles around which the coverage crystallizes. These 
atypical aspects are generally the negative and personality aspects of the event. In such a 
scenario, they argue, ethics and professionalism are likely casualties in the production of 
news – important subjects are skimped and critical discussions telescoped while conflicts 
are artificially sharpened. It is clear from the preceding discussion that the more 
spectacular the citizen action, the more likely it is to get coverage in the media. Of 
course, it is undeniable that the public responds avidly to such coverage, hence the 
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popularity of tabloid journalism. It was therefore without doubt that violent, disruptive 
protest action carries tremendous news value in the Jamaican context. I therefore found it 
prudent to ascertain what factors are used by Jamaican news editors in determining what 
gets covered. Here are two responses from senior editors: 
PN23: Before its gets to the violent stages, press coverage will be determined by 
the national significance of what the issue is. If it is a very localized issue, 
it is not likely to receive as quick a response from the media. There is that 
bias in the media to say well, is this going to play well nationally and if it 
is not a main road that is being blocked, it is less likely to receive the sort 
of attention that the people may think it deserves. 
 
PN9: Several factors, not the least of which is the resources that we have on the 
day. We are seeking to become a little more discriminating as it relates to 
what we go to because we have a responsibility not just to cover what 
happens but also to shape the nation that we want. We look at things like, 
is the protest peaceful, is it impeding traffic. In other words, is it getting 
in the way of other people going about their business, is their cry for 
justice ‘unjust’ in the sense that it is impeding others from doing what it is 
that they need to do. You are less likely to see us running –especially 
because resources are an issue – if it is a different kind of cry, not just 
about water, road, light, those are not always the things that would have 
us running in that direction. 
 
 
Based on the above perspectives, the constraints of time, resources and professional ethics 
clearly impact on the nature and quality of media coverage of protest events. The first 
quotation tells us that the Jamaican media is largely urban-centric and thus revolves 
around the events which occur around urban centres. It therefore follows, as the 
interviewee claims that protest events surrounding localized issues (such as lack of 
electricity in rural communities) are less likely to attract media coverage than those of 
national significance (such as industrial action by transport workers). The implication 
inherent in this admission is that if localized protests are to attract media attention, they 
ought to embody other news values such as conflict, emotionalism and unusualness, that 
is, be as disruptive and violent as possible. The editor in the latter quotation (PN9) takes a 
more discriminating approach to the coverage of demonstrations, where a number of 
criteria have to be met. Not all media organizations follow this editorial policy.  
 252
In fact, such is the pre-eminence of violence and open confrontation (between protestors 
and the police) as elements of newsworthiness that some media outlets, particularly 
television, actively compete with each other to broadcast these events. For example, 
Jamaican television network CVM TV, launched in 1994, immediately established itself as 
a station keen on providing coverage for, among other things, sundry citizen 
demonstrations. The station even went as far as to launch a ‘protest hotline’ whereby 
citizens were able to call the station to notify the news journalists of their demonstration. 
CVM’s radical news- gathering policy was motivated by its desire to gain competitive 
edge in terms of audience share and advertising revenue over its main rival, Jamaica 
Broadcasting Corporation - JBC (now called Television Jamaica). This practice however 
became problematic as it, in a sense, pre-notified people in social problems of the arrival 
of the camera. It also had the effect of not only fomenting protests but encouraging staged 
protest performances and expressions in the media. Instances of conflict are played up for 
dramatic effect. Drama is, of course, the stuff of which stories are told, within a context 
where telling stories is not just an art but a business. Television news globally has 
therefore tended to focus on concrete acts, breaking events and on-the-scene coverage of 
hard news. These are usually episodic reports which are visually compelling but do not 
offer a sense of coherence or meaning (Iyengar, 1994; Postman, 1992)68. It is this absence 
of coherence, background detail and meaning which my interviewees identify as missing 
in the way protests are covered and hence responsible for the mushrooming of uncivil 
brands of protestation and the negative tone to civilian politics.  
                                                 
68 The dominance of episodic frames in television news is grounded in a number of documented 
cases. Iyengar (1994) draws reference to the television news coverage of mass protest movements 
such as the Vietnam War and the developments over nuclear energy. Here, the focus was on the 
specific acts of protest than on the issues that gave rise to protest. This type of episodic framing is 
also replicated in television news coverage of labour management disputes, where scenes of 
picketing workers received more airtime than discussions of the economic and political grievances 
at stake. Event-oriented stories also account for most news coverage of international terrorism 
where, she says, information about specific terrorist acts is not accompanied by information about 
their underlying historical, economic and social antecedents. For a more detailed discussion of this 
kind of television framing, see Iyengar, S. (1994) Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames 
Political Issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Refer to chapter 2. 
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At the same time, it is worth reiterating that because the pressures of a commercial 
structure increasingly require that the news media (whether television, radio or print) 
hold its audience and maintain its ratings, thematic coverage presenting the related 
and/or background material is virtually impossible. It would take a longer time to prepare 
and there simply is not airtime available in (commercial) television to present background 
information or lengthy coherent explanations of events on all issues deemed newsworthy 
(Iyengar, 1994; Postman, 1992). The crucial question to be answered, then, is how far the 
media’s role as an economic cultural industry impinges on the normative obligations cast 
upon it to operate as an important civic actor in the public sphere. Clearly, the role of the 
media is to offer a judicious, balanced, non-partisan approach to news gathering and 
presentation. In line with the tenets of fair and objective journalism, the media are 
therefore obligated to carry all sides of the story – the antecedents, the outcomes as well 
as multiple and varied perspectives. In other words, even if the protestors represent the 
overwhelming majority of the actors in the drama, the view of the persons/agencies 
charged with neglect must also be accommodated and represented.  
 
Although there is some evidence of a shift away from the heavy coverage and 
foregrounding of ‘disruptive’ protests by particular media houses, it is apparent from the 
interviewees’ perspectives that Jamaican citizens demand that the media see themselves 
more in line with quality service. While some media outlets such as the newspapers allow 
people greater access through their publications to rigorous intellectual discussions from 
the academic community, there is, in the main, an absence of ‘good’ stories, carefully 
written with attention to analytical or investigative as opposed to sensational journalism. 
In other words, while the state is the object of protests, whether civil or uncivil, the 
media’s role, as an actor in the public sphere and an institution of civil society, is to assist 
protestors in rousing the state from its complacency and alerting it to their concerns. In 
the view of a former Member of Parliament (PN13), the media should not be seen to 
demoralize the citizenry by representing them and their concerns in ways that are 
negative or merely spectacular. The media, he maintains, are therefore obliged to provide 
information that can cause citizens to act more responsibly rather than become catalysts 
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for disorder and incivility. On the basis of the characteristics which render a society 
uncivil (see Table 2.1, chapter 2), PN13’s view is well taken. The overarching goal of the 
protestor-media encounter is to reduce the level of misunderstanding between 
government and citizens, empower the disadvantaged classes and draft them into a 
politics of participation. Given the limitations of television in this regard, it may therefore 
be in the role of the radio talk show that this can potentially be accomplished. It is to that 
discussion I now turn. 
 
7.5  TALK RADIO AS CIVIC ENGAGEMENT? 
In the following sections, I explore the role and functioning of talk radio in Jamaica as an 
additional dimension of citizen engagement and the extent to which it can bridge the 
communicative gap between the citizenry and the state. In a fascinating discussion in The 
Argument for Citizenship, Benjamin Barber (1984:173) argues that ‘at the heart of strong 
democracy is talk’ (Barber, 1984:174). Of course, ‘strong democratic talk entails listening 
no less than speaking; it’s affective as well as cognitive and its intentionalism draws it out 
of the domain of pure reflection into the world of action’ (ibid, 1984). Talk, in this 
instance, therefore reflects its potential within notions of citizenship and participation. Of 
course, not all social interaction involving talk can be treated as manifestations of a well-
functioning public sphere. In Dahlgren’s (1995:20) view, ‘there must be a focus on politics 
and current affairs – a quality of publicness attained by people interacting in their roles as 
citizens’. In this sense, talk is constructive, aiding in social construction and meaning 
making through conversation. In terms of the public sphere, Dahlgren argues for the 
centrality of social interaction through talk in order to permit and foster the processes of 
political sense-making.   
 
It is for this reason that I am interested in the nature of the talk which circulates between 
citizens (the discursive element), the sites and settings (the spatial element) where this 
social interaction takes place and what meanings these hold for the tone and quality of 
civilian politics and civil society. To begin with, this notion of talk as communication 
involving the interactive process of receiving information and expressing (opinions, 
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beliefs) as well as participating in (civic) action is vigorously reproduced within the 
spatial setting of talk radio in Jamaica.  To say that an enormous amount of media airtime 
is devoted to talk is to understate the embeddedness of orality in the Jamaican culture and 
the consequent popularity of talk radio in Jamaica. Up to June 2002, there were twenty-
two talk shows on the Jamaican airwaves. This means that Jamaican citizens are being 
treated to ‘a daily diet of a minimum of thirty-nine and a maximum of forty-four hours of 
talk radio!’ (Clarke, 2002). This proliferation of radio talk shows69 is itself linked to the 
explosion of radio in Jamaica in the mid 1980s. Thanks to globalization and the ensuing 
liberalization of the country’s telecommunications industry, Jamaica’s media landscape 
expanded exponentially from a mere two radio stations, which had been the standard for 
over twenty years, to fourteen which exist today.  
 
Next to popular music, talk shows are the main focus of the daily prime time 
programming for six of these stations, accounting for approximately forty hours of talk 
per day.  Forty-five years after the birth of radio in Jamaica, the radio talk show remains 
incredibly popular with audiences upwards of 100,000 listeners daily (Jamaica All Media 
Survey, 2002 in Clarke, 2002). This popularity is linked to the marketing and positioning 
of the radio talk show as an open forum for discussion of both public and personal issues 
                                                 
69 Since the mid-1960s, radio talk shows have been one of the most imposing aspects of Jamaica’s 
predominantly oral and aural culture. Through a series of in-depth interviews with media 
historians and some prominent hosts, who worked during the early years of the inception of the 
genre, Simone Clarke (2002) traces the genealogy of the talk show to the five-minute commentary 
pieces – political reviews of topical issues on the national agenda – done by veteran journalists, 
Peter Abrahams and Morris Cargill in the 1960s.  Clarke notes that this format evolved over time 
into one hour forums dedicated to listener feedback and political commentary. This format 
produced programmes such as ‘What’s Your Grouse?’, ‘Palava’, ‘Can We Help You?’, ‘In the Public 
Interest’, ‘An Open Mind’ which aired between 1968 and the mid-1970s. The genre later 
developed into multiple-hour shows where a significant portion is devoted to interactive talk, 
facilitated by call ins through the telephone.  This new, interactive format produced the extremely 
popular ‘Public Eye’ and ‘Hotline’, which both dominated talk radio throughout the 1980s. Hotline 
still airs on Jamaican radio after more than 20 years, even retaining much of its popularity, peaking 
at 180,000 listeners per day in 2000. See Clarke, S. (2002) Uncensored: Tearing Away at Traditional 
Talk Show taboos? A Case Study of Radio Talk Show ‘Uncensored’. Master of Arts Thesis. 
Kingston: University of the West Indies. 
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and a ready pressure point on government. A discussion of its role as a mode of civic 
action and expression is salient. Although recent scholarly work has recognized the 
importance of talk radio to democratic participation (Barber, 1984, 1998), limited critical 
research into the genre’s popularity, dynamics and political economy has been carried out 
in the Jamaican setting. Hence, I rely heavily on Clarke (2002) for the data used in this 
section. Of all the mass media, radio has been credited as the most utilitarian. This is 
because it is inexpensive, technologically-uncomplicated and portable, a fact which 
invests it with reach. It is utilitarian in function, which underscores radio’s pervasiveness 
throughout developing countries as a tool to enable development, empower citizens, 
foster education among less literate populations and promote social change.  
 
The radio talk show in Jamaica is the corollary to this development. The argument can 
therefore be made that talk radio is the product of superimposing a simple piece of 
technology – the radio – between people and their governments. The recognition of 
radio’s physical and political reach and citizens’ ongoing quest for the protection of their 
rights effectively imposes a compact between talk radio/mass media and Jamaican 
citizens. In other words, citizens allow the media unrestricted access to their lives in 
exchange for their capacity to act as ‘political watchdog’ and reach the corridors of power 
to protect and secure their interests. Citizens enter into this contract with the media in 
order to ‘speak to power in a voice rich with affect and commonality, a voice coloured by 
its origins in autonomous wills, seeking imaginative self-expression and by the public 
medium [mass media] through which it is conveyed’ (Barber, 1984:166-167). Talk radio 
and its listening audience clearly need each other. However, the evolution of the genre 
and the existing dynamics by which it operates means that this co-dependent relationship 
is fraught with problems, which are impacting on the genre’s potential to fulfil its role as 
a civic actor. The following discussion illustrates my point.  
 
Prior to the explosion of Jamaican media in the mid-1990s, radio talk shows were, for the 
most part, sedate.  They fulfilled a role of debating issues in the public domain, and, in 
instances, the radio talk show hosts served as a sort of ‘social ombudsman’ and advocates 
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of action from the bureaucracy. The genre was also an outlet for the public to ‘let off 
steam’ but overall the predominant aim of the talk show was to ‘inform’ and ‘educate’ 
(Clarke, 2002:12). Over time, as people became disenchanted with an inadequate local 
government infrastructure, talk radio has witnessed an increasing and manifest expansion 
of its role. In other words, talk radio has managed to embed within its traditional 
functions of information, opinion and entertainment the additional roles of interest-
articulation, representation, advocacy and the facilitation of participation for significant 
segments of the population (Munroe, 2002:18). In fact, Munroe contends that ‘the 
Jamaican talk show has, in substantial measure, become the means through which the 
voice and concerns of the disadvantaged are brought to public attention and to the 
authorities, which might otherwise remain distant and unreachable’ (ibid 2002:18).  
 
That the talk show, as a medium of public discourse, is undertaking such an expanded 
role as buffer between the poor and the powerful is not lost on the talk show hosts 
themselves. During in-depth interviews with Simone Clarke (2002), Ronald Thwaites, a 
thirty-year veteran talk show host, credits the talk show for giving people ‘a chance to 
express their own views and gives ordinary people access to those whom they would 
otherwise not have access’. This is while Barbara Gloudon, perhaps the most dominant 
woman on Jamaican talk radio, particularly, Hotline for over twenty years, underscores 
the significance of the radio talk show in Jamaica: 
A man or woman with a small transistor radio and a telephone can talk to the 
highest man in the land. He can be somebody – no degree or qualifications 
necessary. That man or woman, by virtue of owning the transistor radio, has a 
window to the world. He or she has the opportunity to talk back. 
 
The extraordinary impact of ‘call-in’ radio is confirmed by Surlin & Sonderland’s 
(1995:40) media survey, which reveals that its attractiveness lies with the ability of people 
to ‘set the agenda for themselves, the media and decision-makers in their society’, and in 
so doing ‘enhance the democratic process’ (quoted in Clarke, 2002). In other words, 
unlike the case in many developed societies (United States, New Zealand, Australia) 
where the topics covered on talk-back radio are set by the producers and presenters, the 
 258
Jamaican citizen determines the discussion topic by simply calling in and introducing a 
subject matter. In a predominantly oral and gregarious society such as Jamaica, this kind 
of citizen-led interaction is crucial to the fulfilment of the normative project of civil 
society. This is because, where there are apparent weaknesses in governance, citizens 
tend to use all the avenues at their disposal to get redress. Like the demonstration, the 
radio talk show has emerged as one such tool. In terms of civic engagement, it allows the 
social world to be linguistically constructed by ordinary citizens rather than those in 
positions of power where the imposition of power discourses are more likely. In this 
sense, talk embodies and manifests a shared sense of commonality in the (mediated) 
political community by fostering social bonds between citizens and promotes democratic 
discussion and political negotiation (Dahlgren, 1995; Barber, 1984).  
 
For example, a significant segment of the disadvantaged classes in Jamaica  have come to 
rely on the talk show as a reliable medium to announce their grievances, seek advice, give 
their opinions, debate the topical issues of the day, as well as serve as an outlet for their 
frustrations. From my own extended listening of talkback in Jamaica, particularly over 
the course of fieldwork and as a former producer of a talk programme, the issues most 
raised by callers range from government neglect of particular communities, reflected in 
complaints about bad road conditions, inadequate water or unreliable power supply, 
individual concerns over joblessness, education (high school fees, uniform, book and 
transportation costs) to domestic or relationship problems (cf. Clarke, 2002). Although, it 
is difficult to establish the instances where people’s circumstances have changed and 
things have been done for both individual citizens and communities as a result of the 
exposure, intervention and advocacy of talk radio, there is a strong view among  ordinary 
citizens as well as talk show hosts and producers with whom I spoke that a (more rapid) 
response from the authorities is more likely to be forthcoming when the complaints or 
criticisms of citizens are channelled through the medium of the talk show. My own 
experience in talk radio production and my empirical observation of the daily operations 
of talk shows bears this out.   
 259
As far as possible, talk show hosts will attempt to make telephone contact with the 
bureaucratic agencies or Members of Parliament and solicit official responses to the 
grievance of a particular community or network of citizens. The production staff 
(producers, researchers) have emerged as important brokers in this process as they largely 
assume the responsibility to alert the political representatives of the specific concerns of 
citizens, ascertain what progress is being made on resolving the problem, solicit a 
timetable for possible redress or, at the very least, elicit an explanation or apology to take 
back to the citizenry. This strategy of arbitration and intervention is established as a 
reliable and accepted technique to access the state. It is seen to work because the political 
leadership has tended, over time, to pay increased attention to radio call in programmes, 
especially at periods (such as elections) when citizens tend to channel their complaints 
more aggressively through this medium.  This view is confirmed by a former political 
party youth leader: 
PN3: I know from a political perspective that political parties monitor the 
media, so when people call the media and they complain about 
something, especially if it is close to an election or leading up to an 
election period which I know that is the pet peeve. They are monitored, 
parties have ‘war rooms’ where people write down these complaints that 
come over the air and try to respond to them quickly. The word gets out 
to the MP if it is in his area or region or if it is a Parish Council (local 
body) election, he/she addresses the concern of the people so the media in 
that sense works. 
 
In this sense, the radio talk show assumes a civic role – interest-articulation, 
representation and advocacy. Effectively eclipsing signing petitions or writing a letter to 
the MP or Parish councillor, it has really become a form of ‘people government’ for the 
Jamaican citizenry, appropriating unto itself the avenue of citizen oversight and redress, a 
means of popular participation and as a ready check on government (Munroe, 2002). That 
up to 100,000 people tune in everyday to listen to or to participate in a multiplicity of 
discussions, the majority of which are not ideological or ‘big’ subjects but specific issues 
and problems in their community, with the aim of building pressure on the state 
bureaucracy for action, suggests that radio is used very creatively and imaginatively in 
Jamaica. In fact, the very emotive and controversial nature of many of these discussions, 
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including the sheer venom which emanates from some callers, leads some persons to view 
talk radio as a necessary, allied element in protest. For example, the following 
perspectives from a political activist (PN27) and social commentator (PN29) indicate that 
the radio talk show serves as a sort of safety valve in that it counteracts the more 
vociferous, outward and direct forms of protest action: 
PN27: I am happy about the talk show phenomenon. Sometimes, I hear some 
people talk some nonsense on radio but I think it is a good safety valve. I 
think a number of people will go on the radio and cuss [curse] the 
government without any recrimination and the government is very 
tolerant in this area so they don’t feel like they have to go to any extreme. 
So, a number of people, if that channel was not open to them, would be 
using that energy perhaps in a more negative way. 
 
PN29: One of the roles that I think the talk shows play is a vent, a steam vent for 
the society and in some ways their role is soporific [act as a tranquilizer] 
because they vent all this steam. At least a boy can call and cuss out 
[curse] the Prime Minister and cuss out the Minister and cuss out the 
police – if dem doan get a chance fe do that, dem we block road or lick 
dung dem pickney [if they don’t get that chance to vent, they will stage 
roadblocks or abuse their children]. 
 
Henke (2004:121), although critical of Caribbean media’s ability to challenge what he 
calls ‘the hegemony of the ruling elites’ legitimacy claims’, confirms that: 
acrid radio call-in programmes highly critical of the government actually serve as 
pressure valves that allow the venting and releasing of psychological stress 
resulting from oppressive political and economic policies. In other words, at least 
in the medium term, the apparent criticism ultimately stabilises the very 
structures and societal forces it purports to undermine.  
 
Based on talk radio’s apparent cathartic role, it would appear that talk radio in Jamaica is 
emerging, at the very least, as a potential alternative to the roadblock.  I say potential 
because talk radio remains, for all intents and purposes, a complaining option rather than 
an enforcement mechanism, although the two action strategies often tend to interact. 
Indeed, it is true that the political leadership pays close attention to the talk shows and is 
alerted to the grievances of their constituents but not with the same level of immediacy 
and its response is not with the same level of urgency. It therefore follows that if 
members of a community call the talk shows to discuss the problems they are facing and 
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no effort is made to resolve their issues, that call can and often does galvanize sufficient 
opinion within that community for the residents to take a more direct and drastic action. 
This is often mounting a roadblock or staging a street demonstration. The news media 
may then be alerted to this additional action. In this sense, the street protest provides 
fodder for the media while the media feed the protestors’ concerns into the public 
domain and to the eyes/ears of the state bureaucracy. In other words, there is a symbiotic 
interaction between the different forms of accessing political attention. At the same time, 
while the radio talk show is being used inventively by Jamaican citizens to serve their 
needs and is proving to be a workable check on government within a context of declining 
political performance, its own inherent weakness as a civic conduit is becoming 
increasingly apparent. It is to the limitations of this medium within civilian politics that I 
now turn my attention. 
 
7.5.1  The Limits of Talk Radio (as Civic Conduit). 
The previous section revealed that Jamaican talk radio has emerged as a reliable conduit 
which bridges the gap between citizens and the state, allowed them ready space to engage 
with local and national issues and to vent their feelings about issues of concern to them. 
In this section, I argue for the limitations of this medium.  To begin with, it is no longer 
true, as implied by the arguments of Jamaican talk show veterans, Barbara Gloudon and 
Ronald Thwaites (quoted in Clarke 2002) that ‘the man or woman with a small transistor 
radio and a telephone’ can boast of ready access to the political authority. This is because 
a large majority of the people who are affected by the issues being discussed on talk radio 
and who are avid listeners to this medium cannot afford to call in to participate in the on-
air discussions. Whereas a liberalized telecommunications sector has ensured that more 
Jamaicans have access to telephone service, the fact is that there are still many 
communities that do not have telephones as an accessible tool to call radio talk 
programmes to voice their opinions about the matters that are of concern to them. Of 
course, the cellular phone is available in a more widespread way and many Jamaicans 
now own a ‘cellie’ (some several).  
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Mobile phones are, however, largely confined to low-cost, (pre-paid) limited personal use 
and are not, in the main, a mass media tool for heavy interaction. In other words, the pre-
paid user-caller to a talk show would have to ensure that he/she has adequate funding to 
talk at length about a problem and listen for appropriate responses. Without doubt, the 
cost of waiting in the ‘on-air queue’ to communicate with a radio talk host is prohibitive 
for many people, particularly those from disadvantaged inner city and ‘deep-rural’ 
communities. Given the extraordinary expense to the poor to participate in this public 
dialogue, it is therefore the members of the upper and lower middle classes who possess 
the economic means to call these programmes and who in reality possess monopoly 
control over political talk in this context. In fact, in the view of communications 
consultant and scholar, Dr. Hopeton Dunn: 
We have a lot of talk but a lot of people participate in that talk as listeners and the 
people who do the calling are sometimes people with either the means or the 
access to do so and they are sometimes participating in multiple inputs. So the 
same person may be calling two or three of the shows or the same person from a 
community with a phone may be doing all the calling for the community (PN7). 
 
My research as a participant observer of conversations between citizens and the popular 
press reveals that the poor classes of citizens, particularly the less-literate from both rural 
and urban areas, disclose either an unwillingness or trepidation at communicating one-
on-one with the media. This is because there is a widespread perception, real or 
imagined, among this sector that they do not possess the requisite eloquence, 
articulateness and intelligence to convey the nature of their concerns or to sustain the 
discussion with the talk show host70. The comment of this interviewee confirms this 
emerging problematic: 
                                                 
70 Given this otherwise oral and gregarious culture, this may seem paradoxical but the inclination 
for self-expression by significant segments of the Jamaican citizenry is (consciously) limited to 
unrecorded group story-telling. In other words, whereas citizens will boldly and self-assuredly 
express their opinions as a collective in a crowd, speaking individually, especially ‘on the air’ is still 
taboo for many Jamaicans. In short, the superimposition of a piece of (modern) technology (a 
recorder or television camera) upon an historical cultural retention (story-telling) not only creates 
a stilted conversation but, in a sense, robs ordinary citizens of the opportunity to speak candidly 
and unencumbered by perceived hegemonic linguistic and discursive rules. 
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PN5: I do a talk show and we are always looking for guests, always, but I don’t 
necessarily want somebody on for more than two minutes who is 
screaming at me and not able to articulate the concerns very well. Now if 
you find a group, I don’t care what it is called – Citizens for Justice, 
Citizens for Better Roads – and you have representatives who can 
articulate your concerns very well, I can tell you, as a talk show host, one 
who hosts and produces, almost certainly, I will be jumping with you. 
And if you have any kind of demonstrations, a peaceful protest but to 
highlight the issues further, that makes it more topical and therefore 
makes it more news. 
 
There is a clear privileging here of and/or a preference for a certain kind of caller-citizen 
– those who are well-organized, intelligent, educated and clearly able to articulate the 
issues which concern them. It is also worth noting that some talk shows such as The 
Breakfast Club, hosted by former Jamaican first lady, Beverley Anderson-Manley, and 
former (Jamaica Labour Party) Government Minister, Anthony Abrahams, cater almost 
exclusively to a middle class audience. This is although they do make solid attempts to 
give voice to the concerns of inner city residents and sometimes actively assume the 
function of mediation in conflict situations71. Together, these developments suggest that 
any ‘man with a transistor and a telephone’ is not, in fact, a real participant in the 
political talk or civic engagement being facilitated in this instance by talk radio. This is 
because his participation, as Dunn suggests above, is principally by listening. Talk radio, 
in this sense, is limited and under-utilized as a means of giving alternative voice to those 
who most require it. It is therefore my argument that although many citizens perceive 
and select talk radio as a viable channel for their protestations (if only by argument, 
debate and discussion), its monopolization by the more educated and affluent citizens, 
                                                 
71 A live discussion on the radio talk show, The Breakfast Club, on 16, April 2004, was interrupted 
by a female resident of the inner city who walked onto the set to complain about the personal 
threat to her life from ongoing war between criminal gangs from Arnett Gardens and Tivoli 
Gardens. The hosts immediately allowed the woman to detail her story, accepted telephone calls 
from other residents from the community who gave their versions of the events or refute the 
claims of the resident. Interestingly, the Member of Parliament for the South St. Andrew 
constituency in which the conflict was taking place, Dr. Omar Davies, who was in the studio on a 
separate matter, was also drafted into the discussion as a means of easing tensions and the emotions 
of the residents and, importantly, to allow the community an immediate response from their 
political representative. See Breakfast Club Archives, HOT 102 FM, April 16, 2004.  
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individually or through organized civic groups, renders the medium ineffectual as an 
avenue to serve the needs of the disadvantaged classes who most depend on its mediated 
facilities of interest-articulation, advocacy and participation. This development calls for 
critical theoretical stock-taking as to the real role and obligation of talk radio. If it cannot 
fully act as social advocate, can it then within its limited role to ‘inform’ and ‘educate’ 
(Clarke, 2002) serve to truly empower citizens, promote a civil discourse and improve the 
tone of civilian politics and the quality of civil society in contexts such as Jamaica?  I seek 
to answer this question in the following section. 
 
7.6  HATE RADIO? – TALK RADIO AS CIVILIZING DISCOURSE. 
Whereas the roles of interest articulation, mediation, debate and advocacy assumed by 
talk radio in Jamaica have been incredibly helpful in bridging the gap between citizens 
and their government, my research reveals that there is a clear dissatisfaction among 
citizens about what they view as a preponderance of negativism, political partisanship 
and superficiality within the domain of political talk, as embodied in talk radio. The 
following perspectives sum up the prevailing view. The first is from an anthropologist 
(PN12), the second, a media manager (PN9): 
PN12: To be honest, I have stopped listening to talk shows because I want to 
maintain my sense of balance. I feel that talk shows de-spiritualize you. 
The talk shows respond to moments and by responding to moments, they 
trivialize life and issues and things. Very few of them seek to get deep 
down into the issues and they become self-serving. There is a way that 
many of them try to outdo the other and to promote their image, so they 
are not in it for truth or for service. I am turned off. I stopped listening, 
even to the good ones. 
 
PN9: I don’t know if we could kid ourselves into thinking that they [talk 
shows] are advocates. Many times their role is to make money for 
whatever the station is. I think what some stations and some broadcasters 
go for – they don’t want balance because balance is too ordinary, too 
basic, what they want is who will take a stick and pierce and pierce, you 
must be an agitator, go to the edge and irritate people and annoy the life 
out of people. And at the end of the day, people are listening because they 
are saying ‘what is he gonna say today’. It [the talk show] is not for any 
other value other than the entertainment value. It is not really to inform. 
It is to entertain.  
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It is the perceived normalization and/or accommodation of an unconstructive brand of 
political engagement that renders talk radio, as a medium of popular participation and a 
platform for the reproduction and promotion of a civilizing discourse in Jamaica 
contentious. This expressed uncertainty and disaffection with Jamaican talk shows is 
linked to the imperative of global market capitalism and the consequent structural 
changes within the media industry, including commercialization, which has effected 
fierce competition among radio stations, thereby heightening the need to derive 
programming in line with the profit motive. The working of the profit motive in the hunt 
for audiences and/or advertising evidently holds huge consequences for media practice 
and media content, throwing into sharp focus the nature of mediatised talk and the 
quality of that talk in many political contexts (Bardoel & Haenens, 2004; Curran, 2002; 
Street, 2001; McGregor, 1996; Barber, 1984). In the case of Jamaica, Simone Clarke 
reproduces this political dilemma when she argues that: 
Money must be made to keep a radio station alive. The more stations that are 
born, the smaller the audience share becomes and the more drastic a [radio] 
station’s means of trying to keep the audience that it already has. Programming 
figures highly in the bid to gain and keep audiences. Therefore, a station will air 
programmes, which it believes will ultimately translate to profit. Talk shows have 
the potential to gain revenue for [radio] stations, hence the bid for ratings, and 
the apparent emphasis on personalities that can out do each other in whatever 
way (2002:7). 
 
Competition is indeed rife among Jamaica’s 14 radio stations and the bottom line (profit) 
is what carries critical purchase for the elite owners and managers of the broadcast 
stations. Talk shows have been seized for their entertainment value, that is, profit 
potential, and as a result tend to occupy prime time programming on Jamaican radio. 
Although it is clear from the preceding discussion that talk radio remains a fundamental 
aspect of the broadcasting needs of Jamaicans, the dependence on profit quickly 
transforms talk radio into media events where the focal point is less about the quality of 
the political talk and the civic service on offer (advocacy, representation, participation) 
and more about the talk radio host. In other words, the success (commercial value) of a 
talk show, embodied in ratings and listenership, is largely pinned to the host’s personality 
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and his/her capacity to hook an audience and sustain their interest. This increasing 
emphasis on the personality behind the microphone itself created a range of ‘celebrity’ 
hosts in Jamaica – Wilmot Perkins, Barbara Gloudon, Ronnie Thwaites, Winston 
‘Babatunde’ Witter, Cliff Hughes, Antoinette Haughton-Cardenas, Christine Hewitt and 
Tony Laing – and the construction of a contemporary talk show genre predominantly 
characterized by the identifiable behavioural or character traits of its hosts - cheekiness, 
hilarity, cantankerousness, ill-temper, grouchiness, boisterousness or somberness.  
 
Clarke (2002:13) uses the classic example of former talk radio host, Winston ‘Babatunde’ 
Witter to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the emphasis on the entertainment value of 
talk radio and the appeal of the host in Jamaica. She writes:  
He made the programme extremely popular with his almost dramatic 
presentation, and controversial nature, his seeming disregard for the government 
and his unpredictable behaviour. He was almost guaranteed to offend someone 
(whether a man in the street or a government official) with his outspoken style. 
However, his show was a huge success, perhaps in part because it was 
entertaining. 
 
This appeal to the entertainment value of the talk show host makes it difficult to assess 
the genre as a collective but instead compels citizens to absorb and rate talk radio 
depending on the host and not according to the extent to which the medium opens the 
avenue for people to participate actively and fully in public discussions on the issues 
affecting their lives. This is not to say that it is the host which sets the agenda for 
discussion but he/she, by sheer personality, determines and controls the tenor of the 
discussion and quality of the political dialogue. It is therefore my argument that a 
civilizing discourse is hard to promulgate in a context of celebrity hosts, profit 
dependency and entertainment. That there has been a wholesale retreat from ‘civic talk’ 
is, however, difficult to argue. Not all talk show hosts are comics. Some have brought 
intellectual astuteness, depth and high levels of professionalism to their craft. Other 
programmes play it safe and stick to what they argue is media’s overarching obligation – 
‘to inform and educate’ (Clarke, 2002).  
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Whereas this is an obligation more akin to public service broadcasting rather than 
commercial operators, Radio Jamaica’s twenty-year old talk back programme, Hotline, in 
keeping with their theme ‘we are not just talk, we are substance’, essentially retains their 
original role as social watch dog and advocate for the disadvantaged (Clarke, 2002). Yet, 
admittedly, this is not the global norm for talkback. Talkback radio is not known for its 
civil discourse. For example, Barber (1998:115) argues that: 
Talk radio is loudly public without being in the least civil, though it is seductively 
entertaining. Unfortunately, its divisive rant is a perfect model of everything that 
civility is not: people talking without listening, confirming dogmas, not 
questioning them, convicting rather than convincing adversaries, passing along 
responsibility to others for everything that has gone wrong. 
 
The overwhelming departure from healthy political debate and responsible civic dialogue 
on a significant number of talk shows is thus an emergent concern among significant 
pockets of the Jamaican citizenry and interestingly within the media community itself. 
Observe these perspectives from some radio talk show hosts: 
PN13: The people who host talk shows are dangerous people. They have too 
much power. You talk to more people than a Prime Minister ever does. 
By your tone, content, you sway lots of people. I am not saying people 
govern their lives by what they hear on the radio. I regret the 
intemperance but although I don’t think any purpose is served by 
suffering fools gladly, the freedom and personal liberation that a person 
gets from being listened to is important and I am told of others [talk show 
hosts] who delight in scorning people and making them feel small. I really 
don’t think that is the right way to approach it.  
 
PN23: First of all, they [talk show hosts] need to be informed, properly informed 
because too many people become talk show hosts without having the kind 
of background to take on the issues or to do the kind of continued reading 
and research to be current on the issues. I think that one of the biggest 
privileges you can have is an open microphone to an audience of so many 
thousands of your fellow citizens. It is an awesome responsibility which 
must be taken seriously and right now, I can’t say that is being treated 
seriously. 
 
These perspectives reveal an increasing discontent with the quality of the discussions 
engaged in by talk show practitioners. For instance, that some hosts are not seen to be 
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sufficiently informed about the issues suggest the working of imbalanced and distorted 
journalism in this domain. If inadequate or prejudiced information is what is available to 
citizens, then talk radio is unable to fulfil its utilitarian function of satisfying the needs of 
less-literate populations by supplying the kinds of informational resources which fosters 
civic participation and engagement and strengthens citizens’ capacity to act collectively 
in constructive ways (Bardoel & Haenens, 2004; Street, 2001; McGregor, 1996; Dahlgren, 
1995). That there is also an acute discursive (power) imbalance between the talk show 
host and callers, as evidenced by the following perspectives from a media manager, also 
impacts qualitatively on the political conversation.  
PN9:  A call-in show is supposed to be about people raising their issues and the 
talk show host helping them to reason them through and helping them to 
seek solutions and providing the ears. But I think talk shows are too much 
about providing the ‘mouth’ and not the ‘ears’. So you get more of the 
host’s opinion. Sometimes it is not even a debate because if you listen to 
how some of the talk show hosts conduct themselves, they are not really 
open to others’ opinions than their own and when they bring people in, it 
is either to ridicule them or to make them see things in their own way.  
 
Indeed, one of the main points of appeal about the talk show genre has been its capacity 
to allow ordinary people to set the agenda, express their own views and gain access to the 
corridors of state power – a facility manifestly absent and confirmed as one of the causes 
for disruptive, violent protests in this context (see chapter 6). In other words, given that 
policy agenda-setting is generally the province of elites, this (Harbermasian) public space 
furnished here by talk radio is solidly important to the construction of real, participatory 
civil society in Jamaica. This is because it potentially permits the empowerment of 
ordinary and otherwise disenfranchised and powerless citizens, welcomes their public 
participation in governance and encourages them to collectively engage with others in 
the political community via this form of communication technology rather than hostile 
street protests and confrontations with the police. Indeed, talk radio, in this instance, 
demonstrates the potential to act as a sort of counter-hegemonic force capable of fostering 
Benjamin Barber’s (1984) ideal conception of ‘strong democratic talk’. In this ideal, talk is 
the principal institutional mechanism in which citizens can retest and repossess their 
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convictions; it ‘immunizes values from ossification and protects the political process from 
rigidity, orthodoxy and the yoke of a dead past’ (Barber, 1984:190).  
 
This is not to say that there are not numerous examples of where this has been 
accomplished in Jamaica. Some talk shows do allow callers who are eloquent, well-
prepared and attention-grabbing to dominate the airwaves, albeit briefly. Their point is 
carefully listened to and the host may even engage in a healthy debate or light political 
banter. Others even ‘suffer fools gladly’. Predominantly, however, it is the opposite 
which is true. It is the host who largely determines the agenda and thereby control the 
act of political communication and civic dialogue. Consciously or unconsciously, by the 
sheer control of the public microphone, it is the talk show host who ultimately 
determines what is to be discussed, steers the tone and spirit of the conversation and 
retains the power to terminate the conversation at any time. My research reveals that 
some talk show hosts may, sometimes, elect not to engage in a conversation with a caller, 
choosing instead to merely acknowledge that there is a voice of a speaker on the other 
end of the line and then forfeits the call. Others may terminate a discussion as soon as the 
caller departs from sharing the perspective of the host. According to Barber’s (1984:175) 
thesis: 
listening is a mutualistic art that by its very practice enhances equality. The 
empathetic listener then becomes more like his interlocutor as the two bridge the 
[power] differences between them by conversation and mutual understanding. 
Indeed, one measure of healthy political talk is the amount of silence it permits 
and encourages, for silence is the precious medium in which reflection is 
nurtured and empathy can grow. 
 
By virtue of this reasoning, although it is the caller who raises the issues in the Jamaican 
context simply by calling in, it is the talk radio holds who wields power and exercises 
his/her judgment on what is said and how much. It is therefore how this power is 
exercised – autocratically or in a more consensual way – that is cause for concern. 
Whereas talk radio in the Jamaican context offers citizens some space for democratic 
participation, the scope and potential for reasoned discussion and meaningful exploration 
of social issues is sacrificed. This dilemma leads me to an equally problematic situation. 
 270
The historical political alignment of the Jamaican society into opposing political camps 
(Jamaica Labour Party and the People’s National Party) appears to replicate itself within 
the talk show medium and reproduces dissonance rather than cohesion among civil 
society. Wittingly or unwittingly, talk radio has come to somewhat diminish the capacity 
of political talk to foster trust and horizontal civic engagement (see Table, 2.1, chapter 2) 
by engaging in political partisanship 72. Note the powerful admission of this development 
by a social commentator:  
PN29: We live total politicized. We don’t wait on elections to campaign. We 
campaign every striking day of every year, in or out of election. So we are 
a politically-charged people and we operate in that charge with all the 
passion you can attribute to a people. So dem [talk shows] also have a 
slant. [Wilmot]Perkins is tear dung [iconoclastic] and you don’t expect 
him to ease up because him making millions annually tearing dung. How 
we gwine be passionate if we nah tek sides? That is why de people dem 
who call up pon issues so passionate because we are polarized. I have to 
race up [quarrel with] some a dem because the people align themselves 
behind them. Me no have no manners – me say ‘buy air time, nuh 
campaign ya so’ [don’t campaign here]. Me even refer to them as talk 
show hacker and talk show virus. 
 
That talk show hosts are seen to be partisan is problematic, especially in a context where 
there exists strong elements of political factionalism and violent political conflicts. My 
                                                 
72 An argument can be made that there is an apparent predominance of ‘political personalities’ 
(former Ministers of Government, Members of Parliament and/or political party leaders) as 
opposed to trained journalists on the Jamaican talk show circuit. For example, the reverend Ronald 
Thwaites, the host of ‘Independent Talk’, was a Government Senator and Member of Parliament 
for Central Kingston. In fact, he carried on as a talk show host even while he was a member of the 
government. Jamaican Opposition Leader, Bruce Golding, was, up until mid-2004, the host of the 
radio talk show ‘Disclosure’. Antoinette Haughton-Cardenas, the former head of the United 
Progressive Party (UPP), is a former host of ‘Hotline’ and ‘Disclosure’. This is while former 
Jamaican first lady, Beverley Anderson-Manley and former Jamaica Labour Party Minister, 
Anthony Abrahams, are the current hosts of the radio talk show, ‘The Breakfast Club’.  It is this 
privileging of political personalities over and above journalists as talk show hosts, which 
underscores my description of the genre as ‘media events’ (events staged by and played out on the 
platform of media). This is although some talk show hosts are trained journalists. I make clear 
however that the analytic link I make here between the presence of former politicians within the 
domain of talk radio is merely a scientific observation and not meant as an indictment on the 
integrity of these politicians-turned-talk radio hosts, many of whom carry out their duties with 
unquestioned professionalism. However, the theoretical impact of their presence on the nature 
and quality of political talk is an interesting subject which perhaps warrants further research.  
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argument is that talk radio is unable to reproduce a civilizing discourse, aid in the 
resolution of social problems, foster horizontal networking among citizens and become a 
viable alternative to violent street demonstrations if it is seen to exploit the social and 
political divisions that exist within the wider society. Some interviewees, such as the 
following human rights lobbyist (PN22), put down the tendency to subjectivity and 
political bias within the talk radio domain to an intellectual lacuna and a tendency to 
bipolar thinking which translates very easily into the political sphere: 
PN22:  There is a feeling that is developed in Jamaica where if you criticize the 
government, then you must be a JLP activist and if you criticize the 
police, then you must be anti-police. If you are defending people that the 
police kill, then you must be criminals. I think that that’s a failure of 
intellect. That’s the failure of logic and reasoning and that is a way we 
have fallen into thinking.  
 
That this particular situation of political prejudice and subjective reasoning begins and 
ends as a failure of intellect is moot. Overt bias in public political talk is not novel. Nor is 
it a phenomenon exclusive to Jamaica (see Barber, 1998). In a world where everything is 
political, political bias is an almost inescapable reality. Even a cursory reading of Barber’s 
(1984) thesis on political talk, including television and radio talk back programmes, will 
reveal that both television and talk radio hosts in many political contexts, including the 
United States, hold a very myopic view of the political issues and frame incidents 
principally in ‘black and white’ terms. It however becomes problematic in political 
contexts such as Jamaica, where there is a strong feeling that: 
PN9: we don’t read, we don’t listen, we don’t fully log on to what is going on in 
the country and depend far too much on second-hand information such as 
that provided by talk shows to form our opinions and perspectives on 
political issues.  
 
Given, as I argue before, the historically strong element of political factionalism and 
political party conflicts, the partisanization of (democratic) talk thus holds consequences 
which may progress well beyond the boundaries of mere discussion. For example, it has 
the potential to confuse political talk and set citizens against each other. In short, rather 
than bridge the sharp political and social divisions among the citizenry, talk radio, in this 
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context, may instead consolidate them. In this scenario, prejudiced political talk, whether 
premised on a failure of intellect or not, may thus incite open hostility towards the 
institutions of the state, as this example suggests: 
P23:  I know of one instance where a talk show host actively encouraged the 
people to protest violently against the police. A particular characterization 
of the police was made. When a particular protest was taking place, the 
people were going after the police in exactly the same way the talk show 
host suggested and were using the same references that the talk show host 
had used to the police. I don’t know if there can be any justification for 
the media encouraging a culture of violence or promoting deviant 
behaviour. 
 
The artificial fomentation of civil actions against the state is clearly in radical opposition 
to the definition of a civilizing discourse (see Table 2.1, chapter 2) and, significantly, it is 
against the law. It is this kind of uncivil dialogue which reproduces a sort of Hobbesian 
disharmony within civil society. Indeed, Barber (1984:175) contends that ‘speech in 
adversary systems is a form of aggression, simply one more variety of power. It is the war 
of all against all carried out by other means’. In a highly-charged political culture such as 
Jamaica, however, words can have what Barber calls a ‘limited but potent magic to divide 
or to unite; and silence too has a magic, if only to soothe too-often iterated passions’ 
(1998:186). Although some talk show hosts, by refusing to give air to hysteria and 
boisterous behaviours, are privileging a more structured, ‘civilized’ manner of channelling 
discontent, in the main, the genre has not yet itself developed a framework for the 
nurturing of a less provocative language than the one illustrated in the above example.  
What Barber (1998; 1984) is talking about when he discusses the power of the ‘word’ is 
the art of conversation, of finding a language that is broad, meaning in my view, not 
overtly partisan and inclusive enough to bridge conflicting perceptions of the world. 
These are the conversational skills which are needed in this context, not only by citizens 
who wish to be self-governing and participate actively in public discussions about the 
issues which affect their lives but by talk show hosts and media practitioners who 
subscribe to the view that the media is a commercial product as much as it is a public 
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trustee and thus support a role for the media in the construction and/or transformation of 
civil politics and a civil society.  
 
7.7  SUMMARY 
With the theoretical notion that politics is, for all intents and purposes, a performing art 
(Arendt, 1965), this chapter looked more closely at the performative aspects of popular 
protest, particularly through the lens of the Jamaican mass media. Based on the empirical 
evidence presented in this chapter, I draw the following summary conclusions. Popular 
protest and the popular media in Jamaica are mutually constitutive – each impacting on 
the power and functioning of the other in dramatic ways. For example, there is a mix of 
genuine grievance and pure histrionics within the domain of popular protest in Jamaica, 
and the news media (television, radio and to a lesser extent, newspapers) represents the 
platform upon which all of these performances (both civil and uncivil) are played out. It 
is evident that the strategies employed by the news media in furnishing coverage for 
popular protest and treating citizen’ grievances have a direct causative impact on the 
nature of protest and the tone of civilian politics in this setting. Although the less 
educated and affluent protestors rely on and need the reach and clout of the television 
and radio media more to access their political representatives and to hold them to 
account, it is this disadvantaged group which suffers from restricted access to and 
unconstructive utilization of this domain. It is this inescapable interaction between 
citizen politics and media practice in this context which implicates the media in the 
collision between civil protests and the normative demands of civil society.  
 
As I illustrated in Table 1.2 (see chapter 2), these are demands for legality as opposed 
extra-legality, ‘strong democratic talk’, embodied in democratic negotiation and political 
bargaining rather than malicious political banter and political partisanship. The attributes 
of a civil society also encompasses a certain degree of cohesion and trust among citizens, 
active interest and participation in public affairs as well as citizens who are kind, 
respectful, trustful and tolerant. Given the media’s unique position in relation to citizens, 
its institutions cannot be merely detached bystanders but central actors in the 
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constitution of civil society. For example, both television and talk radio are undeniably 
potentially powerful mouthpieces of disadvantaged groups in Jamaica. Yet, it is clear from 
the preceding discussion that rather than oriented towards citizens and citizenship, the 
structural changes in the media world, such as commercialization and competition, have 
ensured that the style of broadcasting in which they engage is, at present, oriented 
towards consumers of television and radio programmes (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004).  
 
This development, along with the absence of public service broadcasting in Jamaica, has 
made relevant the increasing demands for the social responsibility of the press. Using the 
Netherlands as their case study, Bardoel & d’Haenens (2004:170) use concepts of ‘social 
responsibility’ and ‘media accountability’ to refer to media’s responsibility with regard to 
society, and ‘responsiveness’ to indicate the manner in which the media listen to and 
consider the public. Whereas media accountability also refers to the obligations and 
expectations that society has regarding the media, it is theoretically important to accept 
that a civil society cannot live by ‘the press’ alone. In other words, the many challenges to 
the building up of a truly participatory and functioning civil society cannot lie at the feet 
of the mass media alone. Walter Lippmann is correct when he declares that: 
The press is no substitute for institutions… Men cannot do the work of the world 
by this light alone. They cannot govern society by episodes, incidents and 
eruptions…The trouble lies deeper than the press and so does the remedy 
(1922:229).  
 
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, as the preceding discussion tells us, the mass 
media are products of the societies and the cultures in which they operate. The media 
express the values and beliefs that most people hold in common, give voice to those 
differences of opinion and behaviour that characterize the particular society and draw 
upon the ideas, images and assumptions that are embedded in this cultural tradition 
(Curran, 2002). In this sense, the media are thus, inevitably, limited by the particularities 
of the political context and culture.  Secondly, the economic imperative operative in the 
global media industry means that the public interests of the target audience are often 
sidelined while popular content takes precedence over quality programming. As my 
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preceding discussion illustrates, the Jamaican news media largely represent popular 
protest action in a way which makes it mostly dramatic for the viewer and while the 
drama intensifies, the issues of genuine concern to the actors become, in a sense, de-
legitimized because greater room is given to the spectacle and less to channelling a 
community’s discontent. Thirdly, journalists, though acting as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the 
citizens, do not necessarily boast a more pronounced sense of values than the average 
citizen (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004).  
 
While this does not absolve media of their public responsibility or releases them from 
liability where the quality of coverage and treatment (of political events) is concerned, 
we are obliged to look elsewhere for explanations for the character of citizen politics in 
Jamaica. These alternate avenues of inquiry include the presence and influence of 
‘alternate sovereignties’ (Mason, 2005) which are giving social basis to political order (and 
disorder) in some local Jamaican communities. Since it is within the context of the local 
community that the habits of civic engagement and civil society must begin, I wish to 
look at the existing nature and complexities of citizen governance here and the extent to 
which it proves to be a hindrance to the production of civil norms, and instead render the 
building and transformation of civil society potentially problematic. 
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CHAPTER 8 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Dons and Donmanship – Outlaw Governance in 
Civil Society 
8.1  INTRODUCTION 
Where citizens will not act, bureaucrats and finally thugs rush in…. 
When citizens are dispossessed of their power, or offer it up willingly, who will 
be left to rule but savants or thugs? And who can be surprised if the savants 
quickly come to act like thugs, or if the thugs claim they are wise men? 
      (Barber, 1984:111) 
 
In this classic quotation, noted civil society theorist Benjamin Barber declares that where 
a vacuum exists within the arena of civic engagement, that is, when citizens decline to 
participate in real ways in the governance and conduct of their lives and communities, 
dubious actors with problematic goals will assume responsibility for governance. In this 
case, positive social capital formation will take a backseat to negative social and cultural 
norms while uncivil society will take precedence over civil society. This is the situation 
that Jamaica presently confronts. Although there are vast numbers of civic groups and 
community organizations in Jamaica (see chapter 1), structured civic groups engaged in 
organised political participation have, by and large, taken leave of this role, thereby 
giving way to loose episodic mobilisations of citizens violently demanding justice. This 
widespread withdrawal of official civic groups from popular participation means that 
Jamaican citizens are not only dispossessed of their power but, in Barber’s most fitting 
expression, ‘thugs claim they are wise men’.  Indeed, for close to fifty years, cunning 
figures called dons have positioned themselves as civic leaders, gaining both acceptance 
among Jamaica’s poor urban communities and political recognition in the wider society. 
These dons have promulgated a systematic, coercive organization of the inner city 
community and installed a counter-hegemonic, executive-style bureaucracy and culture, 
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eclipsing any notion of civil community, civil politics, civil discourse or civil society in 
this spatial domain.  
 
In this vein, social science scholars in Jamaica have been increasingly preoccupied with 
the emergence of dons and their significance for the public safety and security dilemma 
confronting the Jamaican State (Price, 2004; Harriot, 2003; Harriot, 2000; Rapley, 2003; 
Charles, 2002). Jamaica’s dons are considered to be a prime example of ‘rogue leadership’ 
in the civil sphere. Rogue leaders in civil society evolve where and when the state is too 
weak, or too involved with other priorities to control the monopoly of violence and 
ensure good governance, safety and public order in everyday life (Johnson & Soeters, 
forthcoming). Within the global context, Jamaican dons are therefore not unique. In fact, 
powerful ‘alternate authorities’ exist within subcultures with their own norms and 
systems of governance in which they use illegitimate violence to gain power and exercise 
control of the everyday life and politics in their communities worldwide (see Mason, 
2005; Soeters, 2005, Collins, 2004; Kaplan 2000; Strange 1996). These networks of outlaws 
are also naturally affecting aspects of statehood such as authority and legitimacy. 
However, the growing threat of the dons to the creation of a truly participatory, 
functioning civil society has, until now, been given negligible scholarly attention. In this 
chapter, I elaborate on the culture and political significance of dons and argue that the 
character of the social organization over which they preside handicaps civil leadership at 
the local community level, foregrounds rogue leadership and frustrates the development 
of civil norms and civil politics.  
 
8.2  DEFINING A DON. CHARACTERIZING DONMANSHIP. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, several Jamaican artistes, including ‘Tiger’ (Norman 
Jackson), ‘NinjaMan’ (Desmond Ballentyne) and ‘Supercat’ (Wayne Maragh) released 
songs carrying catch phrase references to dons. Tiger, in ‘Don is Don’, paid homage to 
egocentric Jamaican males, embellishing them as uncontested leaders in their individual 
circles and masters of various calling. In characteristic hubris, Supercat proclaimed 
himself a ‘Don Dada’, a direct response-challenge to NinjaMan who had earlier declared 
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himself ‘the original gold-teeth, front-teeth Don Gorgon’. Culturally embedded in the 
everyday Jamaican vernacular, the term don became a comedic reference point among 
citizen-patrons of the Jamaican dancehall helped along by its widespread usage and 
constant citation in the popular press. Like many other slang coined by Jamaican deejays, 
the terms ‘don’ and ‘donmanship’ quickly crept into the national political lexicon. It is 
now widely established that the term ‘don’ was immortalized by Edward Seaga, former 
leader of Jamaica’s main opposition, the Jamaica Labour Party. After reports of mutinous 
disaffection among some members of his party in the mid-1980s and paranoid about 
internal challenges to his leadership, Seaga publicly proclaimed himself the ‘one don’ of 
the Labour Party73.  
 
Today, however, the word ‘don’ is no longer the verbal narcissistic sparring of lyrical 
gladiators of the Jamaican dancehall. Instead, its current linguistic hegemony derives 
from its intersection with Jamaican politics and the shadowy figures prominent in the 
local urban community. Drawing explicitly on the idea of the Italian Mafia don or mob 
boss (affectionately called ‘the godfather’), the concept ‘don’ in local Jamaican parlance is 
synonymous with masculine designations such as ‘big man’ or ‘fada’ (father). (In other 
parts of the Third World, the term used is ‘dada’ or ‘bhai’ such as in the Indian 
underworld and popularized in Bollywood films). These endearing titles are used to refer 
to individuals possessed of material wealth, popularity and influence such as entertainers, 
politicians, and drug lords. Although denoting affluence, rank and authority, a don is, 
however, not merely ‘a person in charge’. According to Price (2004:79): 
He is a self-styled, politically connected local leader who wields power, status and 
prestige derived from multiple sources and activities, legal and illegal and who 
                                                 
73 This paranoia about internal challenges to the leadership of the Jamaica Labour Party created an 
infamous rift between prominent party officials and the JLP’s top hierarchy in the 1980s. The 
members who were deemed to have been disloyal to party leader Edward Seaga were later 
classified as the ‘Gang of Five’. It is to be noted that the People’s National Party also faced internal 
problems in the 1950s when party leader, Norman Manley expelled four of its members. For a 
detailed discussion, see Stone, C. (1992) The Jamaican Party System and Political Culture. Paper 
presented at Jamaica’s 30th anniversary Conference. University of the West Indies, October 6-7.  
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assumes leadership over specific geographical areas called garrisons hence the 
current popularity of the title ‘area leader’.  
 
It is worthy of note that the appellations ‘area leader’ and ‘don’ are used interchangeably 
by Jamaican intellectuals, media pundits and citizens alike. Although the roles of each 
often collapse and become blurred, it is conceptually inaccurate to classify all area leaders 
as dons. It can neither be presupposed that all dons perform or even possess the 
capabilities to perform all the functions of an area leader. Indeed, some communities 
retain both an area leader’ and a don, separate individuals who share governor-ship over 
the same area. Using the analogy of a Republic, the don, in such a case, is the ‘President’ 
while the area leader assumes a ‘Prime Ministerial’ role and is essentially charged with 
running the area’s day to day political and ‘diplomatic’ agenda. A generally loose 
deployment of the nomenclature ‘area leader’ also presents both definitional and political 
problems.  
 
Unmasking these analytic distinctions is significant in coming to terms with the nature of 
governance at this level. This is because area leaders were typically charismatic 
community residents with organizational capability and political savvy (Price, 2004). My 
research (interviewees) confirms that historically, area leaders were central participants 
and leaders in a wider structure of power within the urban area comprising a gamut of 
community-based organizations – youth groups, sport clubs, church groups, school and 
youth initiatives, neighbourhood watches, citizen associations and a multiplicity of 
informal networks and relationships.  Their leadership was hands-on and voluntary. For 
example, my interviewees identified as ‘community leaders’ individuals (such as school 
principals, pastors, policemen, elders, teachers, outstanding youths) who busied 
themselves helping to organize community activities, facilitate development projects, 
resolve citizen matters by giving advice, write letters to MPs, and complete application 
forms for government-assisted initiatives and, viz. a. viz. party officials and/or the 
Member of Parliament, make representations on behalf of the community to the state 
bureaucracy.  
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In other words, the emergence and prominence of an area leader required active 
participation in the community. On this account, these individuals engendered the 
respect of members of their community and, at times, wider recognition among civil 
society. Take, for example, this characterization of an area leader by this police officer: 
PN16: When I was growing up, there was a little man called ‘Corpie’ [alias for 
Corporal] who was the man in charge of the local police station. In fact, 
he was in charge of the whole area. What I observed was that the parson, 
the head teacher, the Mayor, the MP, the nurse, the teachers, all the 
prominent persons, including ordinary people, were respectful to this 
man and whatever he said, people accepted his recommendations. He was 
the type of man people would have gone to for advise in a particular area, 
whether they were going to get married, if they wanted to buy a car, if 
they had problems with selling their farm produce, they would have 
asked the policeman. I also observed he was well-spoken, his IQ was high, 
he was well-associated and so people sought him out.  
 
Some of these traditional area leaders remain locally recognized and continue to play vital 
roles in citizen activities and initiatives. Their previous political influence and capacity to 
engage with and impact on the community have, however, diminished substantially, 
having been outstripped by a new kind of leader who is equally legitimate in the eyes of 
many in the community. It is this new area leader who is called ‘don’. According to 
Charles (2002: 41): 
He is extremely wealthy and has a welfare system, is politically connected and 
protected, has the organized support of a large section of the community and a 
security structure, comprising gangsters, robbers and shottas (shooters) to defend 
his turf and power.  
 
At work, then, at the citizen level, particularly in urban Jamaica, there appears to be a 
pair of competing community-based political systems. The first of these governance 
systems is headed by traditional community leaders and may be classified as a 
‘government of the civil community’ (GCC). The second system of community 
governance, by virtue of being run by dons and outfitted by gangsters and robbers, can be 
regarded as an ‘uncivil community government’ (UCG). I look first at the GCC (See 
Figure 8.1 below): 
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This governance structure, which I label ‘Government of the Civil Community’, is 
characterized by a fairly horizontal distribution of citizen groups and loose networks of 
citizens. A quick survey of this type of community will reveal large networks of citizens 
involved in sports associations such as football, basketball and netball clubs, religious 
groups, charitable organizations, cultural groups, vendors and consumer groups as well as 
a range of civic organisations. Indeed, research confirms a density of some 5,700 such 
community-based organizations, most of which are located in rural communities (See Box 
1.1, chapter 1). It is important to note that it is among these horizontal groupings that the 
politically efficacious and civic-minded individuals that people view as the area leaders 
usually emerge and within which their civic activities are most visible. It is also crucial to 
note that in the GCC, political representatives and political party officials are positioned 
at the centre, indicating its (mediating) link between the community and the state 
bureaucracy. The state is located hierarchically to citizens in this figure in order to 
demonstrate what Orr (2004) calls the top-down approach to governance (see chapter 5, 
section, 5.1). However, eclipsing this political system, particularly within the urban 
slums, is an ‘Uncivil Community Government’ (UCG) headed by dons. Figure 8.2 below 
illustrates the pecking order here. 
Ordinary Citizens / 
Community 
Leaders 
Civic Groups / 
Community 
Leaders 
 
 
State
Political 
Party Officials 
Figure 8.1. 
Government of 
the Civil 
Community(GCC) 
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In this ‘Uncivil Community Government’, it is outlaws and rogues which dominate the 
structure of power. It is to be noted, however, that gangsters, robbers and ‘shottas’ 
(shooters), although crucial members of the don’s vast governing network, fall at the 
lower end of a rigid hierarchical chain of command. Recent estimates suggest that there 
are some 85 active criminal gangs operating in inner city communities across Jamaica, a 
considerable climb up from 35 in 1994 (The Jamaica Gleaner, 2004, October 20). These 
shottas and gangsters are also not to be misconstrued as dons because they engage solely 
in acts of urban crime and generally do not possess the enormous wealth, political clout 
and other trappings of the don. Many ambitious shottas, however, aspire to occupy the 
envied role of don or area leader, leading at times to infighting and power struggles 
within the zones under their control. In the case of the death of a don and vacancy in the 
leadership structure, a new command structure displaying fundamental changes is likely 
to occur74. The state, rather than hierarchically positioned above this power structure, is 
located alongside dons. As I will illustrate in the following sections, the Jamaican state is 
both a contending and intersecting force viz. a. viz. the dons. Indeed, it is the symbiotic 
relationship which the Jamaican state has historically fostered with outlaw authorities 
which has informed the development of donmanship and ensures its persistence. 
                                                 
74 See Mills, C. (2001) ‘Death of a Don’. In The Jamaica Gleaner, May 20. Available at: 
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20010520/news/news2.html See also Charles, 2002; 
Radio Interview, HOT 102 FM, 2004, April 16.  
 
Independent Hustlers; Robbers Networks of Ordinary Citizens Civic Groups 
Deputy General 
Gangsters; Shottas 
 
Figure 8.2. 
Uncivil Community Government (UCG) 
Dons / Area 
Leaders
State
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It is this latter structure of leadership, the UGC, which has commanding influence and 
control of many slum communities in urban Jamaica. The analytical distinction between 
these contending citizen-type political systems is therefore significant because it 
demonstrates the radical transmogrification that has taken place in the structure of civil 
leadership at the community level, particularly in urban Jamaica. The spirit of this 
dilemma is captured here by a social commentator who grew up and still resides in the 
inner city:  
PN29: You always have somebody [in the community] where if you have 
problem, a dem you go to, country, town, everywhere and is usually with 
the backing of the people because that person usually deal with justice. 
Now we giving people title that they neither earn nor qualify for. Is not 
every little hurry come up fellow who bad up some old ooman or some 
jubby in a community is don, how don reach deh so? So is foolishness that 
we unto now where we say don fe every likkle bway who run up dem 
mouth. So you have man who a don and him control one light post pon a 
corner. Rubbish! Talk bout a likkle #@@@!!!* bwoy who go jail two time 
and talk bout don, don what? This caption of the don is fraudulent. It is 
put out there to abuse genuine community leaders.  
 
(There is always some one in the community in the event that if you have a 
problem, you consult them, whether it is in a rural area or the city and it is 
usually with the support of the people because that person will treat all situations 
fairly. Now we are giving people title that they neither earn nor are qualified for. 
It is not every immature man who bully or assault elders or females in a 
community are dons. How did donmanship become like that? So it is foolishness 
that we are unto when we call every little boy who displays intimidation and 
toughness a don. So there are now men who are dons who only control an 
electricity pole on a corner. That is rubbish. You are talking about a boy who 
have gone to jail two times and he calls himself don, don what?). 
 
The angst of this resident is accordingly over the waning importance and recognition of 
the original and bona fide area leader as well as dismay at the foregrounding and growing 
appeal of petty bullies in the local community. While, as I will argue in this chapter, 
there is an unmistakable distaste for dons and their reign among significant sections of 
the Jamaican citizenry, this tacit acknowledgement and acceptance of them, especially 
among poorer groups, illustrates the extent to which outlaw modes of governance and 
uncivil politics have been institutionalized in the urban slum. This development itself 
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signals a fundamental departure from the contemporary normative notions of the role of 
community in governance. This nature of community is crucial because it is, after all, the 
starting point of any polis. Stone (2002) argues that a community must have a 
membership and some way of defining who is a member of the community and who is 
not. In this sense, membership definitions and rules determine who is allowed to 
participate in community and who is governed by community rules and authority (cf. 
Hay, 2003; Whitehead, 1997).  
 
Stone maintains that since neighbourhoods have no formal rules limiting who may 
become a member, the determination rests with the extent of mutual aid among 
members, that is, whether they share bounty and pool resources. She also establishes a 
model of the polis in which communities have ‘some stake in preserving its own sense of 
order and fair play’ and ‘a general interest in having some governing processes and some 
means of resolving disputes without violence’ (2002:21). Although Stone here is properly 
referring to the larger political community, these characterisations can also easily apply to 
the politics of the more localised districts and neighbourhoods where citizens reside. 
Stone’s (2002) thesis appreciates the importance of citizen governance as embodied in the 
local community. However, in order to understand the nature and enormous political 
significance of this new community leadership installed in Jamaica, which I have labelled 
‘rogue’, and how it has come to occupy such a central place within civilian politics, it is 
important to examine its earliest trajectory.  
 
8.3   JAMAICAN DONMANSHIP – EARLY BEGINNINGS. 
Prevailing political scholarship (Price 2004; Rapley 2003; Figueroa, 1996; Charles, 2002; 
Stone, 1980) links the advent of a culture of donmanship to Jamaica’s volatile 1980 
General Elections, thereby assigning it a life span of some twenty-five years. However, 
long before the watershed national elections of 1980 catapulted members of Jamaica’s 
criminal underworld into political significance, cunning figures were already building 
political alliances, positioning themselves as civic leaders and cementing their place 
among the structure of leadership of local urban communities. Obika Gray (2003), in an 
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intriguing historical account of the careers of some of Jamaica’s most notorious gang 
leaders, identifies Claude Massop, George ‘Feathermop’ Spence, Winston ‘Burry Boy’ 
Blake and Dennis ‘Copper’ Barth as among many professional criminals who rose to 
prominence in the slums in the early 1960s. On the basis of their individual pursuit of 
social honour, material betterment, and attainment of political clout, heroic status and 
folk following among the so-called lumpens in the slums, these extra-legal actors are the 
most evident precursors to the present cohort of dons and the entrenchment of a new 
kind of leadership and organization in urban Jamaica.  
 
It is worthy of note that all this was happening within the context of international 
developments such as the American civil rights movement and the rise of ‘Black Power’, 
intense student protests and other social movements. The era also coincided with 
nationalist movements at home and across the Afro-Caribbean diaspora, which 
culminated with Jamaica’s independence in 1962 as well as the increasing popularity of 
Rastafarian culture and religion as well as reggae. Reggae itself was disseminating a 
message of hope and resistance to oppression as embodied in the institutions of ‘Babylon’ 
(Chevannes, 1995). Independence in 1962 symbolized a significant break from a colonial 
past and prompted the search for political identity and self-actualization. It was also a 
time when new economic expectations clashed with political reality. Despite sustained 
economic growth between 1962-1972 unemployment, poor housing and extreme poverty 
characterized the life of the majority at the bottom end of the Jamaican society (Kaufman, 
1985; Stone, 1980; Manley, 1974). Crime thus became instrumental to the survival of the 
poorest. Indeed, the term ‘rude bwoy’ (boy) came to characterize members of the 
Jamaican lower class who were totally disenchanted with the ruling system and who 
resorted to criminality for economic survival. Brandishing ratchet knives, machetes and 
later guns and explosives, the rude bwoys created large and small gang networks and 
participated in extreme acts of violence and banditry.  
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Their deprived social status not only justified their bitterness and fury against the social 
system but elevated them as (extra-legal) symbols of emerging subaltern power 
throughout Kingston’s ghettoes in the 1960s (Gray, 2003)75. The immortalization of a 
‘rudie culture’ throughout the 1960s and 1970s, however, saw violence also being 
employed as an instrument of political protest. In this sense, criminality jelled with 
politics as thugs became political enforcers and contractors and in the process gave new 
shape and definition to post-independence political organization in Jamaica’s poor urban 
communities. For example, slum dwellers closed ranks around either poles of the 
Jamaica’s political divide – the socialist-oriented People’s National Party (PNP) or the 
right wing Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and behind politically-recruited rebel leaders 
(Gray, 2004; 2003; Rapley, 2003; Charles, 2002; Figueroa, 1996).  
 
This ‘tribal’ politics encouraged in the slums a sort of ‘top ranking’ leadership comprising 
those who were able to gain promotion to the ranks of political enforcer and acquire the 
requisite political clout and protection. Gray (2003; 2004) argues that popular gunmen 
such as Claudie Massop and Winston Blake became distributors of state largess, hold 
contracts on state construction projects while remaining brutal partisans in political wars 
and staunch defenders of clearly delineated sections of the urban landscape. While they 
were clearly tied to the political party structure, these political mercenaries did not 
belong to a centralized community leadership structure. Indeed, the absence of a 
centralized community structure within Jamaican slums for 20 years (1960-1980) 
promulgated a sort of ‘clan-based’ structure of power run by different gang leaders as 
discussed below.  
 
                                                 
75 The ‘rude bwoy’ networks of this era included gangs such as Vikings, Culbert, Spanglers and Salt 
City. The ‘rudie’ culture was however entrenched and popularised through the lyrics of Jamaican 
musicians. For example, Prince Busta’s ‘Al Capone’, 1967, Derrick Morgan’s ‘Rudies Doan (Don’t)  
Fear’, 1967, Desmond Decker’s, ‘Shanty Town 007’, 1967 and Supercat’s ‘Ghetto Red Hot’, released 
as recently as 1992, reflected an explicit awareness of the rude bowy reign and, in instances, a 
celebration of rude bwoy justice (murder, banditry). For a detailed commentary on ‘rudie culture’, 
see White, Garth (1967) ‘Rudie Oh Rudie’. In Caribbean Quarterly 13 (3). 
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In a fascinating discussion on the logic of clan politics, Collins (2004:226) maintains that 
as informal social organizations, clans usually affect social conflict and order in 
developing societies because they ‘vie for power to set rules’. Although there are 
distinctive and fundamental theoretical and political differences between clans and 
criminal networks (such as Mafias), they both foster dynamic interdependent relationship 
with the political system which allows them access to institutional channels of survival 
and political clout. They also assume patron-client relationships within their sphere of 
influence which legitimizes and consolidates their power. It is this sort of arrangement 
which confer Jamaican dons with much credibility and power within the local urban 
community. Of course, the gangs’ capacity for murderous brutality and enduring 
reputation as (political) mercenaries also cemented their authority within the social space 
of the ghetto and their hold on civil society. It is this metamorphosis in the socio-political 
dynamic of local community governance which paved the way for the consolidation of a 
notorious dynasty of dons, markedly altered the notion of civil leadership and ruptured 
the basis for the contemporary proposition of ‘governing through community’. I now look 
more closely at the current existing manifestations of rogue rule in urban Jamaica.  
   
8.4  THE ‘PRESIDENTIAL’76 RULE OF GARRISONS  
 
Willie77 [Haggart] was a Godfather to the youths in the area. He helped to send a 
lot of kids to school, he had businesses, him employ youths from the area, and he 
was involved in contract work which helped nuff (a lot of) unemployed man get 
jobs [my emphasis]. 
     (Mills, The Jamaica Gleaner, 2001, May 20 ). 
 
 
                                                 
76 I use the term ‘Presidential’ here to make reference to the style of leadership installed by rogue 
actors within the Jamaican slums, the level of political clout which they possess and the nature of 
the authority they wield in this domain. I also use it here as a pun to play on the designation used 
to refer to the current don of Tivoli Gardens in Western Kingston. 
 
77 Willie is in reference to William ‘Willie Haggart’ Moore, the deceased area leader of Lincoln 
Crescent, a community located in the political constituency of South St. Andrew. Haggart was 
attached to an inner city clique called ‘Black Roses Crew’. He was murdered on April 18, 2001, 
reputedly by members of rival gangs. 
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A don really and truly is the government around here. Take for example Tivoli 
[referring to a West Kingston community] and Dudus [reputed don of Tivoli] – 
rape, no, we don’t work with that around here; robbery, no, we don’t work with 
that, those kinds of things. Everybody just meet under one order and those who 
come to upset that order – well, you have to make up your mind. The sheriff 
[referring to Dudus] is in town (emphases are mine) (PN31). 
 
Not unlike the Godfather of Mafia culture, Willie Haggart (alongside his counterparts 
Zeeks and Dudus – a.k.a. ‘The President’) exemplifies the cadre of prominent citizens 
who emerged after 1980 with menacing authority in several Jamaican inner city 
communities, some of which have acquired the notorious label ‘garrisons’. To fully 
comprehend the new style of community governance they enacted in the context of 
Jamaica’s highly charged political culture, one must first come to grips with the 
emergence of alternate sovereign spaces or autocratic sites of socio-political action as 
embedded in the whole garrison phenomenon: 
A garrison is a political stronghold, a veritable fortress completely controlled by 
the dominant [political] party. Any significant social, political, economic or 
cultural development within the garrison can only take place with the tacit 
approval of the leadership (local or national) of the dominant party. The garrison 
is therefore in its extreme form a totalitarian social space in which the lives of 
those who live within its boundaries are effectively controlled. Indeed, the core 
garrisons exhibit an element of extra-territoriality, they are states within a state 
(Figueroa, 1996:05)78. 
 
According to Gray (2003:13), these rigidly defined geographical zones, popular among 
them Jungle, Tivoli Gardens, Rema, Payne Land, Jones Town, Grants Pen and Backbush, 
had their fateful beginnings as early as the 1940s when Jamaica’s two principal political 
parties, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP) ‘recruited 
ruffians, worthies and other notables from the ghetto as partisans for their [electoral] 
                                                 
78 Figueroa (1996; 2003) makes a useful analytic distinction between communities which are 
becoming increasingly ‘garrisoned’ and constituencies which have become less ‘garrisoned’. Here, 
he highlights the distinction between a garrison community and a garrison constituency, where 
the objective is to control electoral outcomes and not so much the social space. For a more detailed 
explication of these distinctions, see Figueroa (1996) ‘Garrison Communities in Jamaica 1962-1993: 
Their Growth and Impact on Political Culture’. Paper Presented at the symposium, Democracy 
and Democratization in Jamaica: Fifty Years of Adult Suffrage. University of the West Indies. 1994, 
December 6-7. 
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cause’. The presence of dons and the impact of garrisons on Jamaica’s political culture, 
however, intensified (and was ‘officially’ acknowledged) nearly 50 years later, after the 
volatile 1980 general elections left 800 Jamaican citizens dead during the campaign period 
alone. Current scholarship (Gray, 2004; Price, 2004; Rapley, 2003; Charles, 2002; cf. 
National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997) openly links the formation and 
institutionalization of garrison communities to the drive by politicians assigned to these 
belts to win elections and guarantee the continued electoral loyalty of voters. According 
to the dynamics of the politics of patron-clientelism (Stone, 1980), the construction of 
large scale housing solutions was the irresistible offer to inner city residents as barter for 
their electoral and political support. This vote-seeking through resource distributions 
became an ingrained aspect of Jamaica’s political culture, driven by the systematic and 
strategic dispersal of state-sponsored largesse (money, contracts, land and jobs) in a 
discriminatory and politically partisan fashion within the inner city.  
 
This political strategy, usually employed by the Member of Parliament to augment his or 
her party’s support base and mass appeal, was designed to keep party supporters faithful 
and/or entice rival supporters to switch allegiances. Of course, it was to area leaders 
(dons), who had, by this time, formed themselves into the core political leadership and 
organization at the community level (and hence the civic liaison between citizens and the 
state) that Jamaican politicians delegated the functions of encouraging voter loyalty and 
unseating opponents. In explicating how the system works, Price (2004) and Charles 
(2002) argue that state funds are often discharged to dons under the guise of initiating 
development projects such as house building, restoring derelict state properties, school 
repairs, renovating sidewalks, drainage and gully cleaning and sometimes the staging of 
‘community’ events such as dances. In other words, to ensure that their respective parties 
‘hold the cash cow over the next few years’ (Rapley, 2003:26), dons enforce territorial, 
electoral and political allegiance on those domiciled within garrisons by employing 
violence, intimidation and fraud.  
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In return for constructing communities and constituencies which are essentially 
homogenous in their overt political behaviour, a don secures for himself legitimacy, 
prestige, status, wealth, and assurance from his political patron of protection from the law 
(cf. National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997; Stone, 1980; Figueroa, 1996). 
Indeed, so intertwined within the fabric of Jamaican politics and society had rogue actors 
become that, in recent years, high-ranking Ministers and political officials were to be 
seen in attendance at the funerals of prominent dons, some of whose memorial services 
received official state authorization to be held at the National Arena, a recognized venue 
ordinarily reserved for public events (Ritch, 2001).  
 
Many scholars today fasten the garrison phenomenon to political factionalism, radical 
changes in the nature of electoral contestation and, in recent years, to the transformation 
of the structure of crime in Jamaica. In the latter case, the local police are reputed to be in 
collusion with dons and thus turn a blind eye to banditry and narcotics trafficking 
(Rapley, 2003; Figueroa & Sives, 2003; Harriot, 2001; Figueroa, 1996). Donmanship and 
garrisonization, however, hold a more far-reaching consequence. They have ushered in a 
new quality of local governance and an entirely new character to citizen engagement and 
interaction at the community level. This is because while access to state power and social 
recognition conferred dons with enormous influence in the ghetto community, it was 
their financial independence, brought about by global capitalism, which heightened their 
hegemony over the social space, allowed them room and resources to posture as ‘civic’ 
leaders and the power to impact on the tenor and conduct of civilian politics and 
consequently on the possibility of civil society. In other words, the story of the 
ascendancy of rogue actors to the ranks of political and economic elites must necessarily 
begin with global economic liberalization and the economic policies of Structural 
Adjustment imposed on Third World governments. As I argued in chapter 5, these 
policies, which demanded strict fiscal discipline, led to a severe contraction of the 
Jamaican State, particularly after 1980, drying up the funds used as purchasing power by 
political patrons (see Rapley 2003; Charles, 2002).  
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Criminal exploits, particularly within the context of an emerging ‘informal or hustle 
economy’79 became a viable option for many area leaders. By also employing similar 
economic organization and effectively replicating the criminal tactics of the globalised 
Mafia, Jamaican dons are today multi-millionaires, accumulating significant wealth from 
three broad streams of organized crime: a) illicit trafficking in narcotics, guns and 
contraband, b) money laundering, fraud and reinvestment of illicit profits into the formal 
economy, and c) extortion, especially the skimming of public works contracts, illegal 
gambling and burglary (see Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Soeters, forthcoming). Like the 
Mafia, extortion is big business for Jamaican dons. It is a critical mainstay of their capital 
base, pulling in an estimated yearly income of up to J$400 million [4,787,175.23 EUR; 
6,066,580.72 USD], and it provides steady employment and income for the generals and 
shottas (shooters) in the structure of command (Mills, 2000; Henry, 2000; cf. Johnson & 
Soeters, forthcoming).  
 
The politics of extortion is analytically significant as it provides a window to the dons’ 
economic power and makes clear the fundamental role it plays in their control of the 
social space. The highly organized and flourishing extortion scheme in urban Jamaica is 
most acute in the Red Hills Road and business district areas of Downtown Kingston. 
Extortion is often disguised as a form of civic enterprise, a ‘charity’ or ‘community 
development effort’ where monies are demanded ‘to assist the youths in the area’ or 
youths who are in prison, but ultimately it involves the collection of ‘taxes’ (cash or 
merchandise) from merchants, market higglers and street vendors. Street vendors are 
forced to pay up to J$500 [6 EUR; 8 USD] weekly while larger retailers can be charged as 
much J$40,000 - $50,000 [479 – 598.23 EUR; 607- 758.23 USD] monthly (Mills, 2000, 
                                                 
79 My discussion in chapter 6 explores the informal economy at work in Jamaica. In conceptual 
terms, the ‘informal economy’ represents the whole complex of income-generating activities that 
are under-regulated/ unregulated by the institutions of society in a legal and social framework in 
which similar activities are regulated. (cf. Portes, A. et al., (Eds.) (1989) The Urban Caribbean: 
Transition to a New Global Economy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press). 
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Jamaica Gleaner, September 1). It is also masked as an ‘unofficial’ security industry, 
whereby money is paid for the protection of municipal buildings and private businesses 
by higglers wishing to lessen the propensity of being robbed. The depredations of the 
dons within some sections of the urban landscape is directly connected to the viability of 
such extra-legal enterprises as extortion and drug trafficking. Conversely, extortion 
remains lucrative as a result of an amalgam of political realities. 
 
In a fascinating exploratory piece on business ethics and the problem of extortion in 
Jamaica, Charles (2003) argues that the extortion industry has the tacit support of 
Jamaican State and business persons, from whom monies are being solicited. His research 
shows that the Jamaican government, through the established municipal authority, 
Kingston and St Andrew Corporation (KSAC), often disbursed hefty sums of up to J$3.1m 
[35,912.78 EUR; 45,499.36 USD] to dons in 2001, to undertake the refurbishing of 
markets in the Downtown business district. In other instances, they are contracted to 
arrange the security detail for the markets, construction sites of development projects 
and/or assist with the relocation of vendors in the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) at 
a bi-weekly cost of half a million dollars. Local council revenue such as that accrued from 
the ‘rent’ paid by motorists for public parking spaces also rests in the pockets of dons (see, 
Charles, 2003). These illicit practices have become entrenched because the dons ensure 
compliance by vandalizing, burglaring or killing those unwilling to abide by the rules of 
this extra-legal economic system. A total of ten business men were killed between 1993 
and 2003 for refusing to comply with the demands of extortionists (see Charles, 2003; 
Mills, 2000, Jamaica Gleaner, September 1; Henry, 2000, Jamaica Gleaner, 2000 January 
31)80. That some business owners therefore see ‘paying protection fee’ as a minor sacrifice 
to secure their livelihood and life underscores the stranglehold that dons have over the 
local economy and an implicit acceptance of the rule of the don (see Henry, 2000, The 
Jamaica Gleaner, January 31).  
                                                 
80 For detailed analysis on the politics of extortion and its impact on the business community in 
Kingston, see Charles, C. (2003) ‘Business Ethics in Jamaica and the Problem of Extortion by 
Counter-Societies’. Unpublished Paper. City University of New York. 
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These developments are crucial because they represent the circumstances upon which 
dons capitalized to consolidate their fortune and form a critical watershed in their rise to 
the ranks of the ‘landed gentry’ in the ghetto and uncontested power holders within the 
civil sphere. In other words, with extortion and narcotics trafficking reaping billions of 
dollars for dons and state resources and patronage experiencing severe decline, Jamaica 
has, over time, witnessed the progressive rise of dons and a corresponding shrinking of 
the relevance of the state and the rule of law within the balkanised innercity (see Rapley 
2006; 2003; Gray, 2004; Munroe, 1999). Within the context of this kind of garrisonization 
of the urban neighbourhood, one is in effect, a prisoner, a hostage to the don.  I look 
briefly at how this system of (outlaw) governance works in the following section. 
 
8.5   IN THE COURTYARD OF DONS   
Having established that the hierarchical structure of governance installed in garrison 
communities mirror the highly centralized nature of state power, I now go further to 
argue that the sketch of the patron leader under the Jamaican state/party system also goes 
a long way in understanding the type of leadership being unmasked by Mafia dons. In an 
elaboration of Stone’s (1980) thesis on patron-style leadership Meeks (2000:108) asserts 
that: 
The party boss or maximum leader is like a feudal monarch surrounded by a 
nobility who grow or diminish on a scale of elite power depending on how he 
chooses to bestow favour. The maximum leader is able to keep the party together 
only if he exerts personal authority over the party. The effective maximum leader 
can never be openly challenged, has the final word on the most critical decisions 
(unless he chooses not to exercise that power), and is entrusted with the power to 
determine policy and the overall direction in the party. Maximum leaders who 
show signs of indecisiveness, weaknesses and lack of control invite challenges and 
lose credibility because the role of maximum leader is defined in the political 
culture as demanding strength, appearances of personal domination and 
decisiveness. 
 
Community donmanship represents the ghetto’s version of a feudal monarchy. Here, the 
maximum leader (monarch) is the don who is surrounded by a handpicked band of elite 
generals and shottas (see figure 8.2 above). The exception, which carries significant 
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purchase in the conceptualization of ‘rogue leadership’, is that unlike the party boss, the 
don is neither bounded by legality, human rights or the rules of democratic participation. 
He may instead traverse between the realms of legality and extra-legality according to his 
own whim. Like the global mafia boss or Meek’s (2000) party boss or maximum leader, it 
is the don who takes critical decisions concerning the running of the community. These 
include its guiding principles, laws and rules and the penalties for breach of those rules; 
the staging of events and implementation of development projects. Retaining control over 
ready militias and large criminal organizations, dons usually have a personal stake in 
successfully defending the community from rival political or criminal gangs and 
protecting its members from the police and punishment from legitimate state authority 
(Rapley, 2003; Charles, 2002; cf. Johnson & Soeters, forthcoming).  
 
By recycling some of the proceeds of their criminal work, dons have also effectively 
delegated to themselves the state functions of ‘welfare’ within garrison communities. 
From organizing ‘bashment’ bus rides and beach trips, dancehall sessions and kids’ treats 
to paying tuition fees, buying school uniforms and books as well as providing 
employment to youths, the civic-charity of the Jamaican don is undeniable. The benefits 
of living under the rule of don are not necessarily manifested individually. One gains 
simply by being a member of a particular community, participating in its activities and 
accepting its norms. These benefits include living in a government house rent/mortgage 
free or without a registered title to the premises and never having to pay electricity or 
water bills (Price, 2004; Rapley, 2003; Charles, 2002; cf. Johnson & Soeters, forthcoming). 
The dons’ legitimacy also derives from constructing and maintaining strong community 
bonds and affective ties among the membership of this sphere. Indeed, the violent 
protests staged on behalf of Mathew’s Lane area leader, Donald Phipps (a.k.a. ‘Zeeks’) in 
September 2001 were motivated, in part, by the strong emotional attachments and 
sentiment that residents felt towards him. This was expressed in genuine fear of his 
potential mistreatment in detention by the police (see chapter 6, section 6.6.1).  
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The strong affinity and support for dons is depicted in the following image, which shows 
two inner city women at the post-riot preliminary hearing trial of Zeeks wearing T-shirts 
carrying the phrase ‘Zeeks Experience Makes the Difference, Father of the Inner city’: 
    
   Source: The Jamaica Observer, 1999, October 7, p. 3 
 
Undoubtedly, a part of this affinity stems from the don’s personal affluence and his 
capacity to extend welfare to members of his community. It is to be noted that conditions 
of squalor, unemployment and profound material deprivation characterize garrison 
communities, thus intensifying the needs of residents for protection and economic 
security. An awareness that these benefits may only be derived from their patron-client 
contract with dons forces some slum dwellers to exclusively depend on handouts and to 
become fiercely loyal to the proverbial hand that feeds them (Charles, 2002; Johnson, 
2005; cf. Gray 2004). Undeniably, the dons’ establishment of a social safety net within 
garrison communities has widespread support among poor and dependent marginals as 
well as within some section of the wider civil community. This remark from a popular 
player in Jamaica’s music industry, in fact, extols the social welfarism of dons: 
PN14: There is a place for them [dons]. I am not condoning illegal activity but if 
a man finds himself with some money through whatever means and is 
prepared to help the less fortunate, I would encourage that. There is a lot 
of poverty around and when one lends a hand, we should say thank you 
to them. 
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I maintain, however, that an account which focuses on a sort of ‘Robinhood’-style 
dispersal of largess by dons within the inner city is analytically lopsided. This is because 
the don’s wealth is largely for his own material betterment and is a powerful tool for 
buying loyalty and support (cf. Charles, 2002). The impoverishment of the garrison 
resident in this sense counter-poses with the wealth of the don, creating a political 
friction where the capacity to provide some form of welfare is employed as a powerful 
strategy of keeping the marginalised in check. Since this wealth is accrued through illegal 
means, a don also has a personal stake in defending the community from rival political 
and criminal gangs. They also place a high premium on protecting their members from 
capture and punishment from the police as well as from the inquisitive rummaging of 
journalists and researchers. Indeed, even the attempt to interview garrison residents for 
this study came with a forewarning to seek the approval of the leadership. Through this 
remarkable coalescing of circumstances, dons inevitably assume a more comprehensive 
and all-encompassing role in the spaces they inhabit. The state is seen as an enemy 
encroacher whereas justice, security of person and property and the preservation of order, 
(central elements of a strong state), have become crucial obligations of the garrison 
leadership. Foremost on the political roster of this alternative government is social 
arbitration and/or dispute settlement. Rather than to the legitimate state authority, 
embodied in the police, crimes are reported directly to the don. Disputes over social 
interactions, financial transactions and domestic relationships are mediated and settled 
personally and according to the entrenched norms and rules of the community. For 
example, as one insider of the inner city told me: 
PN24: If you check Jones Town, Tivoli Gardens, Arnett Gardens, Hannah Town, 
you find that if a resident dies, then there might be some sort of a raffle 
held to determine who should get the house which is left behind. There 
are times when the dons arbitrate in this matter. If there is a family 
member living in the community and he has children, naturally the house 
will be given to the children but if he alone lives there, the house will be 
handed down, whether you like it or not, to anyone who need it more. So 
sometimes there is a jostling for tenancy. The community often respects 
the decision and the decision is final (cf. Rapley, 2003; Charles, 2002). 
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Unlike the slowness of law enforcement and the elusiveness of justice in mainstream 
society, justice in the garrison is swift. My findings coincide with those of Rapley (2003) 
and Charles (2002), which suggest that a sort of ‘street corner court’ (otherwise called a 
kangaroo court) is usually established in which dons assume twin roles of judge and jury. 
In this fabricated judicial system, a chicken coop is used as a holding cell where the 
accused is detained while the don adopts the police function of investigator. The 
individual is then tried and invariably found guilty. Punishment is the task of the lower 
command of shottas. Severe infractions such as theft, rape and disobeying or ‘dissing’ 
(disrespecting) the don often attract a severe beating or the death penalty. Although 
manifestly tasteless and extra-legal, it may be ill-advised to proclaim that this kind of 
vigilantism does not offer some form of justice to the community. Indeed, for some 
residents, community dons are instrumental people in engendering ‘civility’ (PN15) 
amongst the people. The self-styled gangsters I interviewed for instance maintain that: 
PN31: Everybody just meet under one order and those who come to upset that 
order – well, you have to make up your mind. The sheriff [referring to the 
don] is in town (emphases are mine).  
 
It is this kind of recognition of the rule of law as implemented by dons, a ready 
acceptance of their extra-judicial rulings and the widespread perception among subaltern 
groups of the effectiveness of dons at maintaining order and dispensing justice that some 
scholars draw on to make debatable claims that ‘garrisons are among the safest 
communities in the country’ and that ‘life for most garrison residents are refreshingly 
crime free’ (Rapley 2003:28). Inner city women undeniably champion this alternate 
judicial system because they tend to the most vulnerable to criminals and rapists and are 
often spared the lengthy investigations and trauma that attends the formal legal system 
(cf. Rapley, 2003; Charles 2002; Radio Interview, HOT 102 FM, 2004, April 16). It is 
worth reiterating here that high levels of corruption within the Jamaica Constabulary 
Force as well as persistent reports of police brutality and excessive use of force has not 
only sullied the credibility of the police in the eyes of the Jamaican public but 
consolidated the rule of dons.  
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For example, some constables have become major players in the international drug 
trafficking industry while an implicit, sinister covenant appears to have developed in 
some urban communities between the police and dons (Johnson, 2005; cf. Harriot, 2000). 
Former Senior Superintendent of Police, Reneto Adams, acknowledged this extraordinary 
situation when he argued that ‘every police station has a don in close proximity as if they 
are a contending force. Some have control over the particular stations and its members 
and I have problems executing my job consistent with the law in these in these 
circumstances’ (Henry, 2002, Jamaica Gleaner, January 31). Indeed, it is now established 
that ‘provided the dons preserve order within the community, the police will turn a blind 
eye to the drug trade’ (Rapley, 2003, p. 28).  
 
This brand of community leadership, however, disguises a more ambivalent and 
menacing reality. Although it retains the confidence of some constituents, this type of 
‘jungle justice’ is not always equitably distributed or executed. For example, it does not 
apply to the dons or his generals. Our research reveals that although the dons, in the 
main, protect women from rapists, they can and do arbitrarily select women for sexual 
relations and, in some cases, oblige mothers to tacitly barter their daughters during 
negotiations of economic assistance. Further, communities such as Tivoli Gardens, headed 
by self-styled don, ‘Duddus’ (a.k.a. ‘the President’), may therefore appear crime-free only 
because it is run under a contrived style of community bureaucracy which the shottas I 
interviewed label ‘one order’. I say contrived because the term ‘one order’ or ‘oneness’ is 
customarily used by the Jamaican Rastafarian sect to refer to an atmosphere of ‘peace, 
love and unity’. One order is, however, transliterated in the context of the garrison to 
suggest the military-like imposition upon the community of a similar kind of pact. 
According to the unwritten, non-verbalized rules of this ‘peace pact’, acts of deviance are 
perceived to be an affront to the don and his governorship and are hence avoided. In this 
sense, the reverence in which community members hold the don serves as a ready 
deterrent to crime and maintains order. Residents, in other words, respect the don and 
largely display a willingness to abide by the community’s rules because behaviour is 
regulated through force and the threat of force (see Johnson & Soeters, forthcoming).  
 299
Additionally, the long-standing phenomenon which I describe as Informer Phobia (IP) 
ensures that the community remains hostage to the rule of the don. Operating in like 
fashion to the Italian Mafia’s ‘omerta’ (silence), IP is a less visible but a most potent 
governing tool in the arsenal of the Jamaican don. Informer-phobia is a fear of providing 
or being perceived as providing information to state authority, particularly the police and 
increasingly to journalists. Extra-legal activities often go unreported because there is a 
real fear of reprisals against persons who provide information to the police. Being 
murdered or ‘burnt out’ through acts of arson are the manifest consequences of choosing 
to ‘inform’. Abetted by the cultural censure of the act of ‘informing’, embodied in the 
lyrical output of many Jamaican entertainers81, informer-phobia covers conversing 
(personally or via telephone) with a police or visiting a police station as well as the very 
act of getting involved in the legal system. This can range from being a witness to a crime, 
giving statements to the police, pressing charges, assuming jury duty or attending court to 
give testimony (Johnson & Soeters, forthcoming; cf. Phillips, 2004). Given the deep and 
abiding mistrust of the police by poorer groups within the innercity, the refusal to 
provide crucial information to the police may also be viewed as a powerful weapon of 
resistance by the poor and disadvantaged sectors against an oppressive state order, 
embodied in the security forces.  
 
Of course, informer-phobia can equally be viewed as a collective resistance by a 
significant segment of the Jamaican society to the institution of law and order as well as a 
defiance of civil society. That some citizens are finding covert and creative ways of giving 
information to legitimate authorities and sometimes openly demonstrate an opposition to 
extra-legality suggests that informer-phobia may not find enduring roots in this context. 
This passive and/or everyday form of resistance being undertaken by some garrison 
                                                 
81 Jamaican artistes have helped to sustain the negative connotation attached to the act of 
‘informing’. Lyrical refrains such as ‘through (because) you chatty chatty, me cyaan (I cannot) live 
in peace, every little thing you run gone to police’,  ‘All who no like informer, put up oonu (your) 
hand, all a (of) de gunman dem’ and ‘Man fe dead, we nah save no lead, gunshot fe buss up in a 
informer head’ [A man should die, we are not sparing any bullets; gunshots must burst an 
informer’s head] reflect the cultural distaste for and hostility towards ‘informers’. 
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dwellers suggests that not all residents subscribe to or are committed to the so-called 
‘one-order’ theme and some admit that it does not extend to all communities. My own 
visit to a garrison community during fieldwork and my informal (unrecorded) 
conversations with garrison residents confirm that the principle of ‘one order’ is installed 
and adhered to selectively. For example, in order to alleviate my misgivings about my 
safety in the area, garrison members offered me firm assurances of personal safety and the 
security of my property. However, when I inquired as to the safety of property and 
persons of citizen-residents of rival communities, no similarly explicit assurances or 
pledges were forthcoming. It seemed clear that the local leadership forbade deviant acts 
in the community but tacitly allowed its perpetration in rival communities. My 
interviewees, including those who verbally champion the strength of the ‘one order’ rule, 
suggest that there is clear evidence of duplicity and contradiction in the modalities of 
community government installed by rogue actors in Jamaican urban communities. These 
perspectives are embodied in the remark of this University student: 
PN20: From my view, its [donmanship] kind of two-way. One, you hear bout a 
don man and you think say boy him is de one anyhow a community shot 
up another community, he has got to be the one instrumental in that 
incident. That is what you think because he is supposed to be running the 
area. At the same time, if there is peace and civility, then you also think 
that he is the one responsible fe all a dat. Me don’t know how to separate 
them.  
 
In well-publicized instances of upsurges in criminal activity, deviant actions are 
perpetrated by guardians of the (imposed) ‘one order’ system in rival communities and by 
those mounting strong resistance to it within their own communities (PN31). Many 
gangsters and shottas operate independently (carrying out small acts of robbery, pick-
pocketing etc). Their non-alignment to particular camps or their fluid movement 
between different gangs therefore predispose these communities to intense conflict. In 
these instances, gang warfare between rival communities can become so intense that it 
destabilises the area and so dons are called upon to broker peace and ensure political 
stability. For example, in 2002, after outbreaks of violence, PNP-allied Mathew’s Lane 
area leader, Donald Phipps (‘Zeeks’) along with his counterpart from the JLP-aligned 
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Tivoli Garden’s, Justin O’Gilvie, (‘Dudus’) jointly declared a cessation of violence and 
offered guarantees that ‘nothing more would disrupt commercial activities in Downtown 
Kingston for the rest of the year’82.  
 
Together, these circumstances suggest that the ‘refreshingly crime-free’ social climate 
that scholars such as Rapley (2003; 2006) speak so highly of is, in reality, engineered, 
precarious and for all intents and purposes, transient. Governance, as well as civil society, 
presupposes and requires the activity and freedom of the governed (see Table 2.1, chapter 
2). With the extraordinary power of these alternate (lesser) authorities and the quotient 
of fear (of the don) at molten levels within the garrison, one gets the sense of a 
community in which behaviour is managed, directed and conducted in such a way that 
the ‘governed’ effectively becomes ‘passive objects of a physical determination’ (Burchell, 
Gordon & Miller, 1991:119). How does this level of control and manipulation of large 
segments of the urban community by rogue actors intersect with the otherwise expressive 
and dynamic nature of citizen mobilisations and protest? I answer this question in the 
following section.  
 
8.6   ROGUE INFLUENCE IN POPULAR PROTEST  
The problematic presence and encroachment of dons within the informal sphere, 
particularly their menacing authority and totalitarian governance of many urban 
communities, hints at the powerful hand that they also wield in the management and 
performance of civilian politics in this context. Indeed, the argument has been made 
throughout this chapter of the powerful influence of dons in the electoral process – their 
long-standing capacity, through fraud, intimidation and violence, to construct politically 
homogenous communities where residents vote en bloc for (and remain loyal for life to) 
the same political party. The role of rogue actors in popular grassroots mobilisations and 
protest is no different. In fact, one of the central threads running through grievance 
                                                 
82 For a full report on this peace agreement, see Jamaica Gleaner (2002) ‘Dons vow to maintain 
peace’. November 19. Available at http://www.jamaica-
gleaner.com/gleaner/20021119/lead/lead2.html 
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politics in Jamaica is the uncompromising deployment of violence and other extremist 
tactics, which in many instances, (though not always) are associated with the troubling 
participation of rogue actors – gangsters, robbers and shottas. I highlighted in chapters 6 
and 7 the highly publicised instances in which these extra-legal orders, as a part of their 
contributions to everyday protest and resistance campaigns, engage in open clashes and 
warfare with the security forces. The 1999 Gas riots and the 2005 nationwide consumer 
price protests, for example, featured extensive incidents in which criminal actors 
exchanged gunfire with the police, set ablaze police stations as well as military and police 
vehicles.  Likewise, during protests in 2004 (February 14) over an alleged ‘police killing’, a 
two- hour gun battle ensued between the security forces and armed criminals. The 
presence of rogues in civil protest in these circumstances is problematic because of their 
deleterious impact on the temper and tone of popular citizen action. The following 
quotation is a recollection from a journalist covering this February 14, 2004 protest event: 
PN24: The situation was extremely frightening to say the least. I covered that 
demonstration and the police had to stay 200 feet away and watched, 
effectively allowing the people to torch police vehicles, destroy the 
[Denham Town] police station and to vent. How did that demonstration 
end? Two persons came – the Member of Parliament for West Kingston 
and the don for Tivoli Gardens – Dudus. This is known, this is public, 
within minutes of being spoken to by Dudus first and then Mr. Seaga, the 
crowd disappeared. Scores of students were out, practically the entire 
school. The Ministry of Education was silent on the matter and no student 
was made accountable for the actions that day. 
 
It is the intense manipulation of citizen-residents of the slums by dons, particularly the 
strategic use of this incredible sway to ‘buy’ alliances and support for contradictory causes 
as well as coerce aggressive citizen mobilisations which is my focus here. In order to 
come to terms with the politics of donmanship, specifically as it relates to the abuse of the 
democratic tools of citizen mobilisation and protest in Jamaica, it is important to reiterate 
that dons preside over whole communities which effectively live beyond the state and 
the law and, as such, participate in a range of extra-legal and clandestine activities that 
require community complicity, consent, cooperation and cover. Popular protest has 
emerged as an important apparatus in this regard.  
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How do dons influence popular protest in these contexts? My interviewees (reporters and 
gangsters) confirm the working of what I will refer to as the ‘buy a crowd’ phenomenon 
in social protest. This is where dons orchestrate or contrive a protest action with the 
assistance of a ‘rented’ crowd. Their overall objective in citizen mobilisations is often to 
shield themselves against state (police-military) incursions on their turf, to mount 
resistance against rival gangs or political adversaries and to defend persons who run afoul 
of the law. Paradoxically, far from what the term ‘buy’ or ‘rent’ suggests, potential 
protestors are not in actuality paid. They are instead rounded up and ordered to come 
onto the streets in protest. In many of these cases, protestors are forced to display 
manufactured hostility against police on behalf of fellow generals or shottas who may 
have been detained, shot or killed. According to one interviewee with inside knowledge 
of the workings of garrisons: 
PN24: These people who are shot are no angels. The truth is that they are known 
gunmen and known criminals in their areas but they are members of their 
areas and usually the persons who round up the people to go out and 
protest are usually cronies of the gunmen and these are the persons who 
are feared in the communities. Residents therefore have no choice but to 
go out and protest. A lot of times, they are not in support of the gunmen 
but they are doing it out of fear.  
   
The dons in these instances become invisible but coordinate the action through a deputy 
or a hireling on the lower rung of the command structure. By his absence, the don not 
only escapes the public spotlight and eludes punishment but the impression is given that 
the protest is a legitimate disquiet by residents over, for example, controversial police 
action. It would also appear that the protests are operating without organization or 
leadership when, in actuality, it possesses a distinct leadership with an unmistakable 
agenda. The dons, through their generals and hirelings, in other words, know when the 
protest will start, how it will proceed and when it will end. The violent street protests 
often carried out by slum residents over police brutality and by informal traders in 
resistance to the state’s vendor relocation exercises (see chapter 6) contained instances 
where citizens are driven to act in defiance of the state and to contribute to non-
purposive and uncivil collective action (see Johnson, 2006; 2005). Such is the powerful 
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impact of dons in determining the tenor of popular citizen action that members of the 
state, in April 1999, reputedly called upon the dons allegiant to the ruling government 
(People’s National Party) to ensure that the nationwide demonstrations over fuel taxes 
did not engulf the garrisons of Downtown Kingston. They did not. The dons had 
apparently offered the state that guarantee. They kept their word (see Jamaica Gleaner, 
1999, April 27).  
 
This is not to say that everyone protests reluctantly. My interviewees suggest that while 
many residents are coerced, there are instances where it would appear that the citizen-
residents of garrison communities are willing participants in hostile mobilisations and 
protest. These residents, according to one journalist with extensive experience covering 
incidents within the inner city, ‘do not have to be forced as strongly’ given the distinct 
contempt for the police in this context and because ‘they are willing to live with the fear 
[of the don] once they become a beneficiary of the don’ (PN 24). The September 1998 
protest over the arrest of Mathew’s Lane don, ‘Zeeks’, is one instance which saw citizen-
protestors of the ghetto in ostensible and calculated alliance with shottas armed with AK 
47 and M-16 rifles. Likewise, during the July 7-10 police operation in West Kingston, 
shottas were reportedly able to both attack and elude the security forces thanks to the 
cooperation of these urban marginals, a strategic coalition which saw women and 
children using their bodies as shields, to protect rogue actors from the law and aiding 
their escape (West Kingston Commission of Enquiry, 2001; cf. Johnson, 2005; Charles, 
2002).  Similarly, the citizen protests over police brutality which followed this joint 
police-military operation were largely seen to be orchestrated by dons with the seeming 
complicity of citizen-supporters of the Jamaica Labour Party, who felt that the state, 
through its police force, had singled out for attack a JLP-aligned constituency (see chapter 
6 for the details and perspectives on this incident).  Nonetheless, it is worth noting that 
there is a significant cluster of persons who live within the spatial milieu of dons and 
criminal gangs who are genuinely and strenuously opposed to any form of criminality and 
are generally not supportive of dons or donmanship.  
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These persons come out in protest, in part, out of fear for their lives. Significantly, viz. a. 
viz. this set of citizens, Jamaica may be witnessing the emergence of a new dimension to 
this kind of protest politics, perhaps a new style of resistance. This is embodied in the 
ingenious ways in which certain groups are taking tiny steps to resist and confront the 
hegemonic order of fear imposed by dons. My discussion with the police (PN16) and 
some senior journalists (PN24) reveals that, like everyone else, some residents come out 
to protest when ordered and behave as emotional as the next person but often discretely 
beckon to the police that the person on whose behalf they protest is in fact a criminal. 
Protest in such instances becomes a foil, a unique technique of combating informer-
phobia and to assist lawful slum residents to reclaim dominance over their collective 
body. But such cases are rare and cannot stack up against the mountain of hostility that 
still abides for the police among large contingents of the disadvantaged class. Indeed, as I 
noted above, very few people are still prepared to give official statements to the police in 
the capacity as eyewitnesses to crimes and, in the cases that they do, going to court and 
delivering evidence formally is incredibly problematic.  
 
Of course significant elements of the wider Jamaican working and disadvantaged classes 
are huge supporters of efforts to rid their communities of extra-legal actors. Whether 
embodied in civic initiatives such as marches, prayer vigils and crusades organized by the 
Church, covert attempts to provide information to the police or the lyrical output of 
reggae and dancehall entertainers, there are always people who try to escape the don’s 
reach and power. Moreover, Jamaican women (especially within the context of the 
historically-significant accession of Jamaica’s first female Prime Minister, Portia Simpson-
Miller) are becoming a force in themselves, raising their voices, also against criminality 
and injustice, and gaining power in popular street mobilizations as well as in the political 
arena (see Myers, The Jamaica Gleaner, 2004; Johnson, 2006; Johnson & Soeters, 
forthcoming). While impoverishment and fear keep some women trapped in the situation 
of being economic clients of patron-dons and filial bonds prevent others from assuming 
the much desired anti-don stance, the evident courage of women in the face of real 
danger may contribute to real changes in the status and authority of dons in the country.  
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8.7  ‘TO BE OR NOT TO BE’? – A PLACE FOR DONS IN CIVIL SOCIETY 
Based on the evidence presented so far on the power and influence of dons within the 
local community, it is fair to argue that an approach to community governance which de-
emphasizes freedom and which runs counter to the rule of law negates the real meaning 
of civil politics and does not advance civil society. At the same time, dons are no ordinary 
citizens. That masses of people, including Ministers of Government, popular entertainers 
and other celebrities turn up at National venues for their funerals when they die and that 
they are able to provide welfare, broker peace and control citizen mobilisations speaks 
volumes about their standing and status. But whereas a considerable segment of the 
Jamaican citizenry acknowledge (albeit reluctantly) that on this basis, Jamaican dons have 
become active participants in civic and community life, they also concur that these 
alternative authorities are not legitimate civic actors and therefore cannot retain real 
membership in civil society. The following represents the observations from a female 
entertainer (PN28), Jamaican Minister of Justice (PN8); a male radio deejay (PN 14) and a 
police officer (PN16) on the issue: 
PN28: Community dons need to stop believe the hype that dem get. Me nuh rate 
no don because my idea of a don or an area leader is one who supposed to 
set an example in him community where youths a pick up a gun, him tell 
them to put it down, where youths a follow him because him a set an 
example, not an example to say him is a thug and you can kill and rape a 
Mandeville but you don’t do it in Spanish Town because Spanish Town is 
your turf. So if an area don a go tell me say his idea of being a don is to 
cause no war  to go on in his area but war [going on] around a next man 
area, him can go way [bugger off] as far as me is concerned. Him not 
contributing positively. 
 
PN8: No, they [dons] are not a part of civil society, no, no. They are part of the 
citizenry. No, no. If they are dealing with criminal activity, they are 
abhorrent to the very spirit of togetherness in the society. Of course, it 
may very well be that in community development, they can play a part in 
the sense that, if they are willing to use the community process to get 
away from what they are doing, then I can support it. But if they are 
going to be out there on the other side of the law dealing in gangs and 
drugs and pushing protest, I cannot agree. 
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PN14: There are involved in extreme cases of wrongdoing and that cannot be 
encouraged. A don to me is not a person who kills people but that 
definition has changed.  
 
PN16: No sir, there is no place in civil society for them. The only place for them 
as far as I am concerned is in jail. 
 
Civil society scholarship must therefore confront the following questions: Can dons really 
belong in a classification of civil society which demands attention to legality, non-
violence and positive social capital? Are rogue actors to be accepted as legitimate 
purveyors of civil leadership as few of my interviewees suggest (PN14 in previous section; 
PN15 and PN31)? Part of the challenge with reconciling the politics of donmanship and 
the desire for civil society in Jamaica (which is reproduced in the perspectives above) is 
that dons have assumed a dual role in the society. In many cases, they demonstrate 
important leadership qualities and engage in a variety of useful civic ventures (sports, 
cultural activities and community development projects) which, ostensibly, foster 
community cohesion, spirit and improvement.  Since they also live among fellow citizens 
in communities and are, at times, equally affected by the problems plaguing the 
inhabitants, dons may be inclined to take on the same causes and concerns. However, 
rather than influence the grievance process and lobby for causes that are in the interests 
of the wider society and community, they more often than not give voice and action to 
protect their own narrow self-interests and largely in a manner which assumes violence 
as a natural route and remedy to the community’s concerns.  
 
At the same time, most dons engage in and/or undertake activities (extortion, drug 
trafficking, murder-for-hire) which are categorically criminal, the proceeds of which are 
used to extend benevolent activities as social welfare to the community. They also 
indulge in dubious politicking and employ crude mechanisms in order to enforce the 
rules of the community over which they preside. In this sense, dons attempt to traverse 
the boundaries between legality and extra-legality even while they interweave within 
civic spaces and install superficial elements of responsible leadership. In so doing, they 
contribute to the building of both positive and negative social capital. As I argue in 
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chapter 2, the positive attributes of social capital are those elements that strengthen 
community ties, facilitate collective action and civic engagement and promote social 
values of trust and norms of reciprocity. On the other hand, the negative attributes of 
social capital refer to social problems such as crime and anti-social behaviour (Paldam & 
Svensden, 1999). This renders the assumption of a (civic) role by rogue actors inconsistent 
and hence suspect. In this regard, they must be considered peripheral to civil society. In 
short, to be civic actors and to proclaim civil leadership, there must be a perception or 
affectation of legitimacy and no intersection with crime. 
 
8.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter underscored the point I first made in chapter 5 that the very presence of 
rogue actors in society poses severe challenges to the authority of contemporary 
(developed and developing) states. The nature of their activities underscores the present 
national security and personal safety dilemma many now confront. Based on the 
preceding discussion, it is also apparent that the encroachment of these actors on 
communities, their capacity to interweave themselves within social spaces and traverse 
easily between the boundaries of legality and extra-legality is also now a fundamental 
anxiety for civil society. In the case of Jamaica, local community governance structures 
and authority systems remain crucial to bolstering civil society and providing a ready base 
from which civic interaction, engagement and negotiation at the grassroots level can be 
encouraged. Indeed, a tight communal solidarity and inter-community cohesion is 
already evident in many of this country’s urban areas, a boon for the building of a truly 
functional and participatory civil society (see table 2.1, chapter 2). At present, however, 
this communal solidarity appears to be highly strategic and situation-dependent. For 
example, whereas it offers the opportunity for the poor to act collectively in situations 
that they seem unjust, inter-community cohesion also serves, at times, to rally support for 
defiant dons and area leaders and to provide shotta commanders safe havens against the 
police. Residents also live in circumstances where it is impossible to have a neighbour 
with a different political affiliation, stage social events without the consent of dons and 
interact normally with the police, therefore mocking the real meaning of solidarity.  
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Since the presence of civil liberties (freedom of assembly, expression and movement) as 
well as citizens being respectful, trustful and tolerant is fundamental attributes of a civil 
context (see Table 2.1, chapter 2), the feudal submissiveness and fear which is engendered 
in the domain of dons betrays the very meaning of civil governance. The kind of 
authority encouraged within civil societies and in support of grassroots democracy is not 
imposed top-down which consenting behaviour then ratifies. It is a socio-political 
relationship based on shared interests, norms, identities and ideas, continually being 
produced and modified through the everyday actions, shared expectations and causal 
logics of individuals and communities (Mason, 2005:48). Based on the empirical evidence 
presented, the political atmosphere in which dons reign does not allow for this. Instead, it 
attracts hostility, fosters extremism and nullifies genuine attempts at collective 
deliberation, negotiation and the autonomous engagement of citizens for common, non-
partisan action.  
 
It is important to reiterate that this does not to ignore or undermine relevant phenomena 
such as renegade popular action undertaken by residents to express alienation, anger and 
frustration with the condition of their lives (Gray, 2004). But by virtue of the often 
‘manufactured’ emotion of some ghetto protest and its execution on a foundation of fear 
(of the don), it makes for fraudulent civic action. It is for this reason that despite 
possessing an obvious leader/negotiator (dons) and a political agenda (daily survival, 
employment, proper housing), residents of the militarized garrison communities lack the 
opportunity for genuine civic engagement through which to collectively and legitimately 
voice and resolve their dilemmas at a political level. By retreating from (and in many 
cases forcibly denied) the values, norms and authority systems of the wider state structure 
and trading them for those of lesser authorities, a large contingent of garrison dwellers 
have shelved their political rights and misused their civic power. The result has been a 
widespread normalizing and acceptance of a range of negative attitudes, values and 
behaviour norms, including the gamut of extra-legal activities, aggression and a belief in 
the right to live free of accountability to laws and norms and other trappings of modern 
social control. These developments therefore give justification to Benjamin Barber’s 
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(1984:111) powerful observation quoted at the beginning of this chapter. In Jamaica, the 
vacuum left by a retreating state, which often wilfully and short-sightedly courted 
‘thugs’, has resulted in the entrenchment of extra-legal authorities in the form of dons. 
These dons exemplify the failure of civil society in Jamaica. Left unchecked, donmanship 
will ultimately de-legitimise the institutions of the state, thereby leading to anarchy and 
collapse. The response of the state to this spectre of chaos is crucial83.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Of significance in recent times has been the arrest, imprisonment and successful conviction of 
some of Jamaica’s most notorious ‘mob bosses’ and warlords. For example, in 2005, leader of the 
infamous Gideon Warriors Gang, Joel Andem, who held prominent status on the police’s ‘most 
wanted’ list for over a decade for numerous crimes, including murder, was sentenced to thirty 
years in prison. This is while his co-leader, Kevin Tyndale was condemned to 90 years 
imprisonment. Likewise, in 2006, Donald ‘Zeeks’ Phipps - don of the Mathew’s Lane community 
and a high-flying henchman of the ruling People’s National Party – was tried for murder, found 
guilty and sentenced to thirty years in jail. At the time of writing, extradition proceedings were 
also underway for two other Jamaican crime lords, named by the US Government as major ‘drug 
trafficking kingpins’. Also noteworthy is that of a total of twelve criminal organizations targeted 
by crime fighting organ, ‘Operation Kingfish’, seven have been completely dismantled – the 
Klansman and Mathew’s Lane gangs, traditionally allied to the People’s National Party; the One 
Order Gang associated with the main opposition, the Jamaica Labour Party as well as the One Ten, 
Top Road, Ryan Richards and the Steve ‘Mop Head’ Halliman gangs based in Kingston. Other 
gangs have experienced severe disruptions in their operations due to successful policing (Jamaica 
Observer, 2005, November 13). These are positive developments, giving new fillip to the desire to 
reduce the hold of donmanship in the Jamaican society. For a detailed analysis of these recent 
developments, see Johnson, H. & Soeters, J. ‘Jamaican Dons, Italian Godfathers and the chances of 
a ‘reversible destiny’. Forthcoming, Political Studies. 
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CHAPTER  9 
___________________________________________________ 
Protest Politics: Assessing Response, Impact and 
Outcomes 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Are belligerent protests, embodied in the Jamaican roadblock-demonstration effective? 
This question is a fundamental one which must inevitably be posed and answered because 
it collides with what we learned (seemingly conclusively) in chapters 6 and 7 – that 
Jamaican citizens protest in largely hostile ways or are likely to favour extremist tactics 
on account of their perceived effectiveness in eliciting the attention of an otherwise 
unresponsive, aloof and neglectful state. The answer depends fundamentally on what 
constitutes an effective protest action. In the context of this study, it would appear that to 
be considered effective, popular protest action is obliged to successfully solicit attention, 
provoke the desired interventions and/or wrest concessions from the state. Do 
antagonistic protests elicit desired outcomes for the protesting groups? Is a protest action 
necessarily effective once it achieves these positive outcomes? Put another way, ought 
citizen’ protest that is deemed effective hold benefits only for the protesting group and 
not be concerned with the implications for civil politics and civil society more broadly?  
 
Questions concerning the efficacy of the existing model and the social, economic and 
political costs it exacts must be raised and answered if citizen action is not to be 
discounted as merely anomic disorder requiring suppression. This chapter thus aims to 
examine the possibilities and limits of the existing model of protest politics in Jamaica. 
This will include an examination of the existing response of the state to popular protest 
using specific case examples, the role and impact of politicians and political activists on 
the tenor of popular protest as well as the worth of the existing approach to citizen 
protest and political negotiation. Since protest here cannot be uncoupled from the 
performance of the Jamaican state, it is important to briefly reiterate the intersection 
between the state and collective action, including popular protest. 
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9.2 THE STATE AND POPULAR PROTEST: TARGET (AND ALLY).  
In chapter 5, I discussed the interdependency between the state and civil society. The 
centrality of the state in popular citizen protest and resistance campaigns is nothing new 
but historically linked to the process of state building. Tarrow (1994:72) explains that ‘as 
the activities of national states expanded and penetrated society, they also caused the 
targets of collective action to shift from private and local actors to national centres of 
decision-making’. The national state, in other words, not only centralized the targets of 
collective action, it involuntarily provided a fulcrum for pressure on the state. Hence, 
through petitions, public meetings and demonstrations aimed at the state, disaffected 
groups with claims against others had an alternative to attacking their enemies directly. 
They could use the state to mediate conflicts with those they opposed. In both developed 
societies and especially in little known places in the periphery, it is, however, the state 
which remains the predominant target for citizens’ claims. This is because it is the state, 
through its legal, fiscal and regulatory environment, which establishes the broad 
parameters in which civil society and can exist and operate. It is the state which lays 
down the rules of the game within which protestors manoeuvre, so much so that if they 
choose to break those rules they are likely to encounter punitive action from the police or 
the armed forces (Jasper & Goodwin, 2003:257; Mbogori & Chigudu, 1999). It is also 
through elected representatives that some citizens organise their protests, filter 
grievances and make demands upon the state. That the state, in this sense, is both a target 
and an ‘ally’ of collective action has enormous implications with regard to the possibilities 
and limits of collective protests. For Piven & Cloward (1977:27): 
It is not the impact of disruptions on particular institutions that finally tests the 
power of the poor; it is the political impact of these disruptions. At this level, 
however, a new set of structuring mechanisms intervenes, for the political impact 
of institutional disruptions is mediated by the electoral-representative system. 
 
This raises questions about the extent to which the character of popular protest is defined 
by the responses offered by the electoral representative and with how far a shift in 
response by the state may alter the existing nature of and approach to citizen politics. It 
may be in the quality of such responses that we may find the mechanisms for the creation 
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of more civil protest and/or a more civil engagement of citizens within a structured, 
functioning and participatory civil society. It is with this in mind that I now focus more 
closely on the official responses to popular protest in Jamaica.  
 
9.3 POPULAR PROTEST IN JAMAICA: THE POLITICS OF RESPONSE  
To get a sense of the nature of state response to protest activity in Jamaica, I asked 
interviewees to rate the state’s response to citizen protest. For the purposes of not 
influencing or distorting their views, I allowed the interviewees to interpret the concept 
response in their own terms and to generalize or be specific in reference to incidents of 
protest activity in Jamaica. The following are some of the observations: 
PN11: I don’t think it [protest] necessarily garners a response from them [the 
state] all the time. Like the Prime Minister, he is very stubborn, you can’t 
force his hand. If he does not believe in what you are protesting about, it 
is dead. 
 
PN3: In terms of just responding, I rate the government highly because they 
respond but whether or not they should respond in terms of the character 
of that response, I think I would give them a low grade because I think 
they encourage demonstration [my emphasis].  
 
PN7: Inadequate is one word I would say, reactive, heavy-handed for example 
in Western Kingston and in other instances, appropriate. 
 
PN27: Very humane in most instances. I know the instructions [from the state to 
the police] have been, don’t go into confrontation [with protestors]. I 
know the most the police does is fire tear gas and tear gas increases 
people’s anger because nobody likes being tear gassed even though they 
are participating in an illegal operation. Because social protest is our way 
of doing things, you have to make sure that you are not becoming a police 
state but, in most instances, there has not been the heavy-hand, even 
when they [protestors] are embarrassing the government. 
 
The contrasting viewpoints suggest that the Jamaican state responds to popular protest in 
a variety of ways depending on the particular situation. The empirical evidence suggests 
the response of the Jamaican State to popular protest runs the entire political gamut from 
positive to negative reactions. Positive here suggests that the state responds affirmatively. 
Political representatives arrive at the site of the demonstrations, give ear to protestors’ 
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concerns and/or protestors get their demands met on the basis of ameliorative action 
taken by the state. The state’s response to citizen protest is seen as ‘fair’, ‘humane’ and 
‘adequate’ (PN27). The negative end of the continuum connotes a state response that is 
‘unsatisfactory’, ‘inadequate’ or ‘repressive’ (PN11; PN7). Protestors do not get their 
demands met, political representatives fail to appear on the scene; the state neglects to 
acknowledge their concerns and/or offers a response. In short, protestors do not get 
attention, are not able to wrest concessions from the state and therefore their problems 
remain unresolved. Negative here also implies that the state responds in a coercive 
manner meant to suppress popular protest. Of course, in between these two points are 
perceptions that the state’s response is ‘uneven’ or ‘confused’ (PN3).  
 
These perspectives suggest that the response of the Jamaican State to protest activity is 
inconsistent and variable, depending on the demands of the particular situation. Whereas 
this implies a failing, an important question to answer in this study is whether this 
variability is an indication of a flexible state that responds, perhaps according to the merit 
of the issues. What are the kinds of responses open to states when they are confronted by 
forceful protest campaigns from their citizenry? In their seminal work entitled ‘Poor 
People’s Movements: Why They Succeed and How They Fail’, Piven & Cloward (1977:28) 
attempt to answer this question. They argue that while responses to disruption vary 
according to electoral conditions, during periods of stability, governmental leaders have 
three obvious options: 
They may ignore it; they may employ punitive measures against the disruptors; or 
they may attempt to conciliate them. If the disruptive group has little political 
leverage in its own right, as is true of lower class groups, it will be ignored or 
repressed. It is more likely to be ignored when the disrupted institution is not 
central to the society as a whole or other more important groups. Thus if men and 
women run amok, disrupting the fabric of their own communities … the 
spectacle may be frightening but it can be contained within the slums; it will not 
necessarily have much impact on the society as a whole or for important groups. 
Repression is more likely to be employed when central institutions are affected. 
Either way, to be ignored or punished is what the poor ordinarily expect from 
their government because these are the responses they ordinarily evoke.  
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This is a very persuasive argument. Since subaltern groups are often isolated from 
institutional mechanisms and constrained by the imperatives of their social class, the 
strategy of protest that they deploy is to withhold what Piven & Cloward (1977:25) call 
the ‘quiescence in civil life: they can riot’. State response to popular mobilizations of the 
poor runs on a continuum of response from disregard and repression to basic 
appeasement. It is important to acknowledge, however, that in some political contexts, 
the politics of response/non-response is a much more complex and imprecise 
phenomenon as the above perspectives (PN3; PN27; PN7; PN11) elucidate. The quality of 
state response is, in fact, linked to a multiplicity of issues, not the least of which is the 
manner and context in which protest demands are put forward by protest campaigners84. 
In the Jamaican context, there have been moments when quick, aggressive action on the 
part of citizens has had a big effect and garnered positive responses from the state. These 
kinds of ‘political opportunities’ come in different forms. The media, for example, may 
suddenly notice a cause on account of a crisis or an accident or because the event was 
organized (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003). In such cases, as I illustrate in chapter 7, the 
pressure generated by popular protest is so inescapable as to galvanize the state into 
action and compel a swift and positive response. It is this combination of crisis, media 
attention and (mostly spontaneous) citizen action which often compel responses from the 
Jamaican State. The point here is that the character of protest behaviour and/or the 
strategies employed by citizens to achieve protest demands are important determinants of 
the kinds of responses the state will offer.  
                                                 
84 Goodwin & Jasper (2003:257-259), for example, give explanatory importance to the working of 
three kinds of opportunities. The first is structural in which they posit that large changes occur in 
the conduct of peoples’ lives and in society without much intervention by social movements or 
protest campaigns. The second kind of opportunity occurs where social movements are looking for 
openings (‘opportunity windows’) in the state as well as for sympathetic politicians. Of course, in 
the authors’ view, ‘many of these windows of opportunity can hurt as well as help to reshape, 
curtail or channel movement demands’ (2003:258). In this sense ‘opportunities’ are also 
‘constraints’. The third way that they envision opportunity is as relatively permanent features of a 
country’s political landscape such as the administrative structures, legal systems, electoral rules 
and even constitutions which all constrain what social movements can achieve. These are however 
seen as ‘horizons’ of opportunity, since they define what is possible within that system, in contrast 
to ‘windows of opportunity’ that open and shut quickly. 
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It is also important to acknowledge that the capacity and willingness of the state to 
acknowledge and accept the demands made upon it are also crucial to the success of 
protest campaigns. By Tarrow’s (1994:89-90) thesis:  
Strong states have the capacity to implement the policies they choose to support; 
when these policies are favourable to the claims of movements, the latter will 
gravitate to conventional forms of protest; but when they are negative, violence 
or confrontation ensues.  
 
At the same time, the generalized weaknesses tied to many Third World states suggests 
that it is the interaction between opportunities and constraints which conditions the 
political response to protest campaigns. For instance, although a state’s economic 
capability is rarely accounted for in the characterization of ‘opportunity’ (or constraint), it 
is unquestionable that availability of resources weighs heavily on the kinds of responses 
the state bureaucracy is able to offer. The ability of states, in other words, to respond to 
social protests over the inadequate provision of public commodities – water, electricity 
and roads - depends, in part, on the structural capability of the state to do so. Piven & 
Cloward are correct in suggesting that ‘at times of rapid economic and social change 
[when protests tend to increase in frequency], political leaders are far less free either to 
ignore disturbances or to employ punitive measures because the relationship of political 
leaders to their constituents is likely to become uncertain’ (1977:28).  
 
But the point is that the quality of those responses is still likely to depend on the 
(economic and political/institutional) strength or weakness of a state. Indeed, the roots of 
much of the social protest which occurs in Jamaica are to be found in the generalized 
climate of economic decline, rising inflation, unemployment and an indebted state. These 
economic circumstances, as I argue in chapter 5, are not divorced from the overarching 
global project of economic liberalization and marketization which incapacitated many 
Third World governments and robbed them of their ability to properly service the needs 
of their poorer classes. The rapid rise in roadblocks and demonstrations in Jamaica (see 
Table 6.1) is the most blatant citizen response to this situation. The system’s 
unresponsiveness is linked to a chronic inadequacy of capital resources, even while it is 
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also associated with the improper management of these resources (Franklyn, 2001; 
Munroe, 1999). This can be observed by considering the state's response to popular 
protest over the inadequate supply of essential public utilities. Protest about inadequate 
public utilities has focussed on the longstanding unreliability of water supply (the trigger 
of the 1997 Hopewell demonstration), the absence of a home-based telephone service, 
poor road conditions and a dilapidated public transport service, and an irregular and 
unreliable supply of electricity. The character of this protest activity is similar to that 
described earlier, that is, it has typically involved roadblocks, violent clashes with the 
police, and aggressively stated demands for change. The focus here is on the state's 
response to those demands. 
 
The state's response has been mixed and inconsistent, at some times repressive, negative 
and unconstructive, and at other times positive and ameliorative. For instance, in 
response to the 1997 Hopewell demonstrations, the state initially sent in the police to 
forcefully clear the roadblocks, an action that at the time was seen as inflammatory and 
excessive85, but later followed this with administrative reform through the establishment 
of the Ministry of Water and the granting of additional funds ($3.1m) to augment the 
supply of potable water, these being actions widely perceived as positive. Government 
restructuring of the telecommunications sector has, in part, been in response to pressure 
by the citizenry demanding improved coverage and service, and improvements in this 
sector have, by and large, been successful in silencing protest over telephones. There was 
a majority opinion among my interviewees that, despite years of delay, the Jamaican state 
has offered a strong and positive response to the public transport sector, and it is 
addressing the poor state of many roads, although poor road conditions continue to be a 
                                                 
85 See for example, news reports, articles, commentaries and ‘Letters to the Editor’ of the main 
newspapers on the days following the water protests. Worthy of note are: Walsh, J. (1997) ‘A 
Counter-Productive Course’. In Daily Gleaner, April 11. p. 4A; Jamaica Gleaner. (1997) ‘Damn 
Asses, Stupid’ April 10, p. 1A; Jamaica Gleaner. (1997) ‘Parties Criticise Government’s Handling of 
Hopewell’. April 10, p. 3; Jamaica Gleaner. (1997) ‘Parties in Blame Game’. April 9. p. 1A; Jamaica 
Gleaner. (1997) ‘Police Activity in Hopewell Demonstration Sharply Criticised’. April 23, p. C3; 
Smith, A. (1997) ‘Protest, Courage, Morality, Change’ in Jamaica Gleaner. April 19. p. 7B. 
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trigger of roadblock demonstrations86. The state response to the poor road conditions, 
though, is widely perceived to favor middle class communities at the expense of poor and 
rural communities. Finally, there was a similar perception that the state's response 
to inadequate electricity supply is, at times, characterised by partiality and inequitable 
treatment of different communities. One political party official explains the politics 
behind the operation and (potential) institutionalization of this (covert) complaint-
response policy:  
Water Commission, when they see that water bill has not been paid, they not in 
any rush to fix a pump or whatever wrong. If they know they are losing revenue, 
they will deal with it. But JPS [Jamaica Public Service Company] will say them 
not rushing to fix street light in a particular community because when they have 
war, dem shoot dem out [when there is gang warfare, the street lights are 
destroyed] and nobody not paying no light bill in that community. They [utility 
providers] don’t say it officially or publicly but that is what in effect happens. If it 
was in another community that the transformer lick out and dem revenue secure, 
they fix it immediately because everybody pay dem light bill but elsewhere when 
dem don’t put it [faulty transformer] up for three days, dem save three days of 
electricity (PN27). 
  
The profound social and economic crisis facing the country cannot be discounted in any 
analysis of citizen action and the official responses to it here. Indeed, because income 
levels, which have remained low or stationary, have not matched rapidly rising standards 
of living, an increasing number of Jamaican citizens, including middle-income groups are 
finding it difficult to pay the high costs attached to some public commodities. It should 
therefore come as no surprise then that the controversial increases in the cost of public 
commodities (water, electricity, transportation and telephone rates) in mid 2005, as well 
as the inflationary prices of basic consumer goods, created ample trigger for another 
round of nationwide protests in Jamaica. These September protests hold important 
theoretical purchase since they not only highlight some of the emerging issues in the 
                                                 
86 It is noteworthy that the number of citizen roadblock-demonstrations in Jamaica over ‘bad road 
conditions’ doubled in a one-year period, making a massive jump from 25 (of a total 208) in 2004 
to 44 (of a total 236) in 2005. This may be explained, in part, by the extensive damage caused to 
the island’s road network during the destructive hurricane season of 2004. 
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politics of response but potentially represent a watershed in the culture and practice of 
oppositional protest in Jamaica.  
 
9.4  THE CONSUMER PRICE PROTESTS AND THE POLITICS OF RESPONSE 
On 6 September 2005, following weeks of complaints about rising consumer prices 
through the newspapers and radio talk back programmes, the country’s main political 
opposition, the Jamaica Labour Party, led the people to the streets in protest about high 
living costs. Although billed as ‘peaceful protests’, the demonstrations were anything but 
peaceful. The blocking of major roadways with old cars, tree trunks, burning tyres and 
other debris was the predominant feature of the demonstrations. This had the desired 
effect – a severe disruption of traffic flow, nationwide cessation of public transportation, 
which itself resulted in the closure of schools and businesses. While there were elements 
of peaceful protest such as marches and placard-bearing - the ritual of violent clashes 
between protestors and the police was the dominant charge in some areas (Jamaica 
Gleaner, 2005, September 7). Despite the combination of concerns brought to the table, 
‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’ for the protestors was the government’s backing of 
a massive rise in electricity rates by the power providers, Jamaica Public Service 
Company, and by extension other utility providers – Cable & Wireless and The National 
Water Commission. At issue was that increased public utility costs were at variance with 
the quality of service provided, in this case the local power company, JPS87, 80 percent of 
                                                 
87 The Jamaica Public Service Company (JPS), for example, faces heavy criticism for its failure to 
adequately meet the needs of citizens for reliable power supply. The complaints are mainly linked 
to the company’s street light installation programme. For example, based on (verbal) indications 
from the local government leadership of the parish of St. Elizabeth, (both JLP and PNP Parish 
Councillors), poor maintenance and neglect by the JPS has left several divisions effectively in 
darkness. For example, it is reported that some fifty percent of the street lights installed in the 
Myersville, Division is faulty. Councilors for the divisions of Malvern, Balaclava, Southfield, 
Mountainside, Siloah and Brompton also express similar sentiments. The Balaclava Division 
reports that seven of twenty-three street lights installed there have been defective for periods up 
to two months without repairs. The poor quality service of the JPS – inadequate maintenance of 
street lights, power outages - is replicated in other parishes, as confirmed by Councillors in the 
Bensonton, Borobridge and Alexandria divisions of the parish of St. Ann. Source: Jamaica Gleaner 
(2005), September 12 ‘Street Light Woes Irk St. Elizabeth Councillors’. Available at 
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20050912/news/news6.html; ‘St. Ann PC Lashes JPS’. 
Available at http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20050912/news/news4.html  
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which is, paradoxically, owned by the United States-based transnational firm, Mirant 
Corporation. Jamaican citizens directed their protest not only against the government but 
powerfully against ‘big business’.  
 
 
This image shows Jamaican protestors bearing placards in protest against rising cost of consumer 
products on September 6, 2005. Some of the placards read ‘PNP MUST GO’, ‘PNP GOVT PUT 
THEMSELVES FIRST’, EMERGENCY, WI A SUFFA ROUN HERE’, ‘P.J., GO AWAY’ and ‘PIT 
TOILET GOVERNMENT’. Source: The Jamaica Gleaner and The Jamaica Observer, 2005, 
September 7. 
 
 
This image is of a female protestor during the September 2005 consumer price protests.  
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The image above shows a lone female protestor during the September 2005 consumer 
price protest bearing a placard which reads ‘JPS sold to former slave owners; PJ sold us 
back into slavery’. The placard implies that the divestment of the power supply company, 
Jamaica Public Service Company, to a foreign corporation, had reduced the population to 
a state of enslavement. In the context of a difficult state-society intercourse, embodied 
during these protests in a battle between citizen-consumers and the Jamaican state, it 
depicts the government as conniving with large foreign corporations and failing to 
protect its citizens from their profit hunt. In this case, the privatisation of public utilities 
was interpreted as seriously undermining the level and quality of the services provided 
(while securing high profit margins for foreign investors).88 Rising commodity prices 
coupled with inflationary costs are problematic for the disadvantaged sectors. The 
majority of the consumers who participated in these protests saw it as a continuation of a 
larger project of opposition to a negligent and inept government which persistently failed 
to address these concerns.  
 
Globalization has as one of its consequences, the vulnerability of (especially small Third 
World) states to volatility or disruption on the international economic scene. 
International economic developments such as the 2005 oil shocks, which provoked rapid 
spikes in world energy prices, have resulted in a massive jump in domestic energy costs in 
both developed and developing countries. For Jamaica, this meant large increases in the 
prices for fuel, electricity (power), public transportation and basic consumer goods. The 
impact of this development on the standard of living and quality of life for the poor was 
enormous. Similarly, in 1999, the government’s deliberate decision to add a substantial 
tax to the price of gasoline, a move which inevitably inflated commodity and energy 
costs, leading to large numbers picketing, mounting  roadblocks and causing a halt to 
                                                 
88 This situation is not exclusive to Jamaica but increasingly a concern across developing countries. 
For example, the boycott of Nigerian mobile phone operators in September 2003 was directed 
primarily at the international and national phone providers who were criticised for inefficient and 
overpriced services. The protests were also directed at the state which was seen as partly culpable 
and weak for not keeping the (foreign) corporations in check. For details, see Obadare, E. (2006) 
‘Playing Politics with the Mobile Phone in Nigeria: Civil Society, Big Business and the State’. In  
Review of African Political Economy. No. 107. pp. 93-111. 
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economic activity in critical sections of the country. Although the organizers of the 2005 
consumer price protests, the Jamaica Labour Party, claimed success, the demonstrations 
were strongly condemned by large segments of the Jamaican public. This was reflected in 
the torrent of commentary and letters to the newspapers in the aftermath of the protests. 
The following is an excerpt from a letter to the The Jamaica Gleaner, (2005, September 7):   
I do not understand what the Jamaica Labour Party wants to accomplish from this 
protest. I understand that the People’s National Party is not listening to the cries 
of the people. But does that warrant a protest? I agree that the price increases will 
severely affect the poor. However, will the poor benefit from this protest after the 
protest is over? In addition, how long after the protest will they be able to reap 
the benefits from the protest? 
 
Also writing in The Jamaica Gleaner, (2005, September 18), noted Jamaican political 
commentator, Robert Buddan argues against the rationale for protest on the basis that 
they were not only economically-damaging and insensitive but driven by partisan 
political imperatives on the part of the opposition, Jamaica Labour Party: 
The irony of the JLP’s protest is that it has never directed one on behalf of the 
thousands of sugar and banana workers subject to WTO decisions that threaten 
their industries, livelihoods, and parish economies. The JLP prefers to narrowly 
and conveniently blame national institutions like the Sugar Corporation of 
Jamaica, the Jamaica Public Service, and the Government of Jamaica, and its 
solution is to ‘fire them’. How would that change oil prices and global trading 
rules? The JLP’s protest, deliberately planned on the occasion of the PetroCaribe 
Summit, was, therefore, insensitive, to say the least. The JLP could spend its time 
joining lobbies to get the oil marketing multinationals that are making whirlwind 
profits to reduce their margins like the French are doing. It could support the 
British government’s call for OPEC countries to step up oil production so that 
prices can go down. The JLP could join Cuba and the Dominican Republic, 
countries that have been plagued by frequent blackouts to produce energy saving 
plans…Organizing a protest on the eve of the People’s National Party’s (PNP) 
annual conference and on the occasion of the PetroCaribe Summit was clearly 
political. To have disrupted the start of the new school year and national life 
shows how far the JLP will go. 
 
Significant segments of the Jamaican citizenry also took affront to the extraordinary 
violence and extra-legality that attended the protests, particularly as they occurred under 
the patronage of the government-in-waiting. News Editor Byron Buckley, writing in the 
September 11, 2005 edition of The Jamaica Gleaner remarked: 
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The last thing we expected was to prevent our children from going to 
school…but apparently nobody in the JLP War Room was sensitive to 
these concerns. The strategy according to JLP spokesman Dwight Nelson 
was to send the government a message no matter the collateral damage to 
the education system. Couldn’t the JLP war cabinet organise rolling 
demonstrations across the country at Jamaica Public Service Offices or the 
relevant government ministries. Couldn’t the party organise marches in 
main town? What about mass meetings at Emancipation Park and Sam 
Sharpe Square? And why isn’t the JLP advocating the mass boycotting of 
paying light bills? These are forms of protests that lift us out of the realm 
of gutter politics. These are the ways rational leaders and people protest 
across the world.  
 
That there was widespread censure of the September 2005 consumer price protests from 
an otherwise angry and disenchanted population points to the possibility of new 
expressions of popular dissent in Jamaica. Indeed, this activism, which may be seen as 
dissenting to (the act of) dissent. This is revealed in the following perspectives from 
several interviewees – politician (PN13), former student activist (PN25), broadcasting 
regulator/attorney (PN21) and young Rastafarian entertainer (PN4):  
PN13: It [protest] is abused and the threat of it even more so. It comes from the 
inadequacy of the channels but it also comes from all sort of selfish 
impulses like impatience. We have come to overdo it I think.  
 
PN25: You cannot have a society ruled by civil disorder. People cannot feel like 
they have a right to engage in civil disorder because they are frustrated by 
something. They wake up on the wrong side of the bed and decide that 
they are going to have a roadblock. This is the 21st century. We cannot 
have our society ruled by civil disorder. 
 
PN21: I do not support blocking roads, cutting down trees and vandalising public 
and private property. I think in a democratic society especially of you say 
you are civil and it is civil protest, you should also appreciate that it is 
civil not to protest in the manner we do [emphasis are the speaker’s]. 
 
PN4: Protest is to make your voice be hear if you are disgruntled about a 
situation or you coming together to vent your feelings on a certain issue. 
To me, that is protest because I truly don’t believe in this roadblock and 
placard thing. That is well organised [read as manipulated] and can only 
have one result – media frenzy and no future %*@%@#!!!%@ outcome. 
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These perspectives reveal: (a)  A growing exhaustion and disillusionment with uncivil 
brands of citizen activism, particularly as a first and only resort to contentious public 
issues from significant segments of the Jamaican population. (b) An increasing disdain 
among the Jamaican public for overtly partisan political party involvement in citizen 
politics, tied to a current resistance to partisan politics and partisan-motivated violence. 
The watershed Gas Riots of April 1999 further illuminate the importance of these 
developments and illustrate the extent to which state response, especially during intense 
moments of conflict with its citizenry, carries critical purchase in appraising the quality 
of state response and the nature of governance in the Jamaican context. They allow the 
examination of the extent to which the actions (and/or inaction) of political actors 
(Members of Parliament, political party officials, agents and activists) have a causative 
impact on the tone and style of citizen politics and civil society and install impediments 
to the opening of new, more civil vistas of citizen protestation, negotiation and political 
settlement. 
 
9.5 RESPONDING TO VIOLENT PROTEST: PITFALLS AND LESSONS FOR THE 
JAMAICAN STATE. 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that official response to popular protestation in 
Jamaica depends considerably on the specific matter in contention, the array of issues and 
concerns surrounding the subject, and how it is put forward by protestors. Eliciting 
affirmative state responses also appear to depend heavily on the overall impact of a 
protest action on the government at a particular juncture. Whereas direct citizen action 
such as the September 2005 protests did not result in either a reduction of people’s power 
bills or any appreciable change in their economic circumstances or quality of life, popular 
discontent may create disorder in a society in such a fundamental way that it is difficult 
for a government to ignore (see Piven & Cloward, 1977). The nationwide Gas Riots in 
Jamaica from 19-21 April 1999 represent a powerful instance of such a scenario. Indeed, it 
is this dramatic three-day long protest that many of my interviewees drew upon to assess 
the performance and response of the Jamaican State during popular protest cycles.  
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The Gas protests represented a catalytic moment in Jamaican citizen politics and political 
governance where, for perhaps the first time in Jamaica’s contemporary political history, 
protestors by the sheer mass of their numbers acquired power over the state for three 
consecutive days89. This power forced the government to concede to large-scale demands 
(against its preference) seemingly just to keep the peace such as a full-scale rollback of the 
tax on fuel. In order to fully make sense of the response of the Jamaican State to these 
protests, it is critical to acknowledge that the temperament of the Gas protests (featuring 
intense physical violence, open warfare between police and armed citizens and 
widespread vandalism) was such that it had managed to promulgate an unusually intense 
and generalized feeling of dread both within the government and throughout the entire 
Jamaican society. The Jamaican State was taken by surprise and it was unprepared and 
perhaps unaware of how to react effectively, at least without resort to repressive force. 
The Jamaican State, in other words, was seemingly trapped in a state of momentary 
paralysis, confused as to how to respond. The leaders of the state released conflicting 
official messages and appeared to be unable to act. One interviewee, who participated as a 
student protest leader in the 1999 Gas demonstrations, puts it well with the following 
remark: 
PN25: I find that the state has this kind of reflex, this panic reflex to huge riots 
and to most protests and I think between the media and the hype, they 
feel in a sense that they must make some response but many times, they 
don’t follow through on what they say. 
 
                                                 
89 I do not here discount the significance of the 1979 nationwide Gas protests, in which citizens 
held reign on the government by participating in intensely hostile demonstrations, which resulted 
in the virtual lock down of the country or the all-island strike of 1985 in which public sector 
workers participated in a large scale work stoppage. The point is that although the People’s 
National Party–led government was forced to make some concessions in 1979, it is difficult to 
argue that the state buckled under ‘people power’. Indeed, in the all-island strikes of 1985, the 
Jamaica Labour Party government, led by then Prime Minister Edward Seaga refused to budge, 
effectively ignored concerns of the protestors and is reputed to have activated a project to 
terminate the employment of workers who walked off the job. The state, on both occasions, 
effectively retained its hegemony but compromised its legitimacy and right to rule, resulting in 
their comprehensive defeat at the polls. (It maybe worth noting that following the 1979 protests, 
the PNP lost the 1980 General Elections. Likewise, subsequent to the 1985 all-island strikes, the 
JLP was defeated at the polls in 1989).  
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The view that the government often panics in the face of violent demonstrations and fails 
to respond adequately helps to explain, in part, the quality of state response to direct 
citizen action and the persistence of hostile protest politics in Jamaica. In the case of the 
1999 Gas protests, the political authority in Jamaica was caught between a sense of an 
obligation to respond and its unwillingness to lose legitimacy and electoral support by 
responding coercively. Nevertheless, from my own observation and personal experience 
of these protests as well as the perspectives of my interviewees, for at least two full days, 
the state had lost total command, effectively ceding control of the governance of the 
country to a lesser, illegitimate authority. This was composed of loosely organized bands 
of protestors, some of whom controlled access to communities (such as Duhaney Park in 
St. Andrew where I lived at the time) and used their newly-acquired power to dictate the 
movement of traffic and people. In some areas, the standoff between rioters and the 
government was only resolved by the placating efforts of the state, manifested in some 
instances through the negotiated intervention of powerful extra-legal actors with 
controlling influence in some communities (The Jamaica Gleaner, 1999, April 27).  
 
Repression was clearly an unlikely option for the Jamaican state since the protests had 
aroused the sympathy of groups that were supporters of the government. It attracted the 
physical and the symbolic support of middle class citizens, who are normally less affected 
by increases in consumer prices, as well as of the unemployed, including armed criminal 
gangs. Piven & Cloward’s (1977:29) remark here is apt: 
Unless insurgent groups are virtually of outcast status, permitting leaders of the 
regime to mobilise popular hatred against them, politically unstable conditions 
make the use of force risky, since the reactions of the aroused groups cannot 
safely be predicted. When government is either unable to ignore insurgents and is 
unwilling to risk the uncertain repercussions of the use of force, it will make 
efforts to conciliate and disarm the protestors.  
 
That the state, in some instances, is seemingly uncertain, hesitant, or worse, unable to act, 
may lead it to (re)act in ways which are unconstructive and which serves to further 
alienate an already disaffected citizenry. It is, therefore, this moment of political 
complexity which underscores citizen pessimism about the quality of the state response to 
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popular citizen protests in Jamaica. This is embodied in observations such as the following 
by a Jamaican university communications student: 
PN30: I was very annoyed at the Prime Minister’s lack of response. I was disgusted by 
his delayed response because I felt that as the leader of the state, he should have 
made a more public presence. I felt he was hiding behind his spokespersons. He 
sent them out as a buffer and it did not appear that he wanted to take any 
responsibility. I found it very condescending that he didn’t come to dialogue with 
the people. I thought it was being reduced to partisan politics. I felt he was just 
being a ‘politician’ rather than a leader of a state. I felt he wanted to make his 
party come out looking good.  
 
Despite the delay and inadequacy of the government’s response, which angered citizens, 
the overwhelming consensus of the interviewees was that the government’s response to 
Gas protests was ultimately ‘appropriate’ (PN27) and ‘reasonable’ (PN21). As Dr. Hopeton 
Dunn (PN7), a communications expert commented:  
I feel, in the main, that the present leader of the PNP [People’s National Party], 
Mr. Patterson, is someone who responds to negotiation and is conciliatory in his 
personal style. He is not confrontational and even how he responded in the Gas 
Riots by asking the President of the Private Sector Organization of Jamaica [Peter 
Moses] to conduct an investigation was an appropriate response which sought to 
get a broad public view to bear on what actions or decisions to flow from these 
things. He took a while but he did eventually respond in an appropriate way in 
the end by setting up an enquiry and respond to it by pulling back on the tax on 
gasoline (PN7). 
 
In the words of Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Most Hon. A.J. Nicholson: 
The response of the government was not only borne of the idea that we want the 
riot to stop. It was also seeking a way of bringing another answer to the problem 
that was there. What that taught the government was that when you are 
considering your [budgetary] options, don’t think in a blinkered or one-sided way 
but pull all your options together because in those circumstances another way 
was found [besides raising the tax on gasoline]. Since then you would have 
noticed that the government does not wait on time to respond. They are more 
proactive (PN8). 
 
The response to which the Minister refers was the hastily constructed and temporarily 
outfitted civic group known as the Moses Committee to which the government turned to 
find an alternate means of filling the budget deficit caused by its rescinding of the tax on 
fuel. Beyond economic calculations, the Moses Committee also focused on what they 
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deemed as the fundamental problem of the political authority’s disconnection between 
from the economic and social plight of the Jamaican people (see chapter 6, Section 6.4.1). 
The 1999 Gas demonstrations appeared to represent a timely wake up call for the 
Jamaican State. According to then Prime Minister, PJ Patterson, ‘there can be no return 
to business as usual’ (Patterson, 2004). Today, some seven years after the Gas protests, it is 
instructive to review the extent to which the state has altered its approach to governance. 
 
Respondents suggested that following the devastating consequences of its fiscal taxation 
policy in 1999, the Jamaican State has learned to be a lot more prudent, particularly on 
revenue matters. It has been more careful about the potential effects (and consequences) 
of its policy decisions. In the presentation of successive budgets, post 1999, it has declined 
to impose a tax on fuel in recent years (although the prices of fuel have nevertheless 
increased progressively due to fluctuations in the world oil market). It has also activated 
its local ‘feeler’ systems (local body officials and activists) to determine the mood of the 
citizenry (explosive or sombre) in relation to its fiscal tax plans. In the words of a senior 
journalist:  
PN23: I think that to a certain extent the government has evolved and is more 
aware of its responsibility to citizens. At the same time, when faced with 
a number of choices, I think they will try to get away with certain things 
because if they slip it by the people, then they will do so because it makes 
life less difficult for them.  
 
On account of the inventive (and peaceful) interventions, negotiation and protest utilised 
by formal civil society groups, such as the noted Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ) to challenge 
the state on behalf of the poor as well as violent protests, the Jamaican State is 
increasingly recognising that it cannot govern in isolation. As a result, as part of a broader 
international trend which began in the 1990s, the Jamaican state has been allowing more 
space for the participation of these bodies. This is being reflected in the deliberations of 
the Committees of Parliament, in which civil society now plays a critical role. Indeed, in 
the view of one senior parliamentary reporter and talkback host (PN23), there is scarcely 
any piece of legislation that is tabled in the House of Representatives that does not have 
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the critical input of civil society90. Notwithstanding this, these reforms, which promise 
more participation and communication between political representatives and their 
constituents, continues to be perceived as inadequate (PN23). This continues to present a 
threat to the Jamaican state, as indicated in the following perspective from 
communications specialist and academic, Dr. Hopeton Dunn: 
PN7: The people have learned that they can lock down the country at strategic 
points in time and they can get concessions [from the state] so they have 
learned their lesson. In my view, if the set of circumstances converge 
again providing sufficient pressure, the people will do it again. 
 
In other words, the circumstances of poor quality services, rising consumer prices and 
state neglect, which precipitated the September 2005 protests and many other citizen 
mobilisations, powerfully indicate that despite some (minor) concessions from and shift 
in the state’s approach to governance, the triggers for violent demonstrations are still 
present in the Jamaican society.  
 
9.6 POLITICIANS AND POPULAR PROTEST: A PROBLEMATIC ALLIANCE? 
 
What right does the Jamaica Labour Party think it can have to so disrupt the lives 
of the [Jamaican] people and put them at risk? If the people spontaneously 
demonstrate that is one thing; if a political party demonstrates, it is quite another 
matter and it is inevitable that it will ignite opposition and open an opportunity 
for criminal elements to get involved. As the alternative government, the JLP 
does not appear to understand the greater good. As a parliamentary party, it 
should use Parliament to oppose the government and raise there the issues it is 
now taking to the streets (The Jamaica Gleaner, 2005, September 7). 
 
                                                 
90 The human rights lobby group, Jamaicans for Justice (JFJ), perhaps more than any other groups 
has made full use of this opportunity for political negotiation, lobby and debate. Their forceful 
contributions to public debate as well as the deliberations of the Jamaican Parliament on various 
proposed legislations are well-known. Some of the legislative measures that it has considered 
(balanced the provisions and their implications against the interests of the society and bringing 
them forcefully to public attention) include the ‘Terrorism Prevention Bill’, ‘The Charter of 
Rights’, ‘The Corruption Prevention Bill’, ‘The Proposed Caribbean Court of Justice’ and ‘The 
Access to Information Bill’. For a more expansive account of the work and achievements of the JFJ, 
see http://www.jamaicansforjustice.org/archives/achievements.htm 
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This above remark by a frustrated Jamaican citizen, in a letter to The Jamaica Gleaner, in 
the aftermath of the September 2005 consumer protests, underscores the political 
importance of exploring the intersection between politicians and popular protest. Any 
assessment of the performance of the Jamaican State and its response to popular protest 
(whether attitudinally or in practice) though must take into account the following 
historically-evolved reality: The Jamaican State resides and functions at the centre of a 
heavily factionalized and highly-charged political culture involving intense political 
violence and patron-client politics (see Gray 2004 for an explicit discussion of this 
phenomenon). That this political milieu is so polarized and often violent means that (1) 
citizen politics, including popular protest, also operate with an intense emotional and 
often partisan charge and (2) the state itself, through its political actors may, in instances, 
become implicated (and ultimately indicted) in the production of uncivil protest. 
Locating an appropriate role for political representatives at the site of demonstrations may 
also be a pre-condition for the construction of civil protest and civil society in Jamaica.  
 
This discussion seeks to clarify a number of related issues. First, are politicians and 
political parties to be included in the scheme of associations that constitute civil society? 
Second, as Foley & Edwards (1996:39) ask, ‘if civil society’s chief virtue is its ability to act 
as an organized counterweight to the state, to what extent can this happen without the 
help of political parties and other political orders’? Third, do political actors, by their 
action/inaction, thwart or aid the performance of civil protest and the construction of 
civil society? Surprisingly, the vast scholarly literature on civil society pays only 
microscopic attention to political parties. Rosenblum (2000:813) remarks that ‘we might 
expect that civil society theory, concerned as it is with associations that mediate between 
the individual or family and the state, would focus on parties [and politicians]. The fact 
that they are rarely mentioned is therefore a remarkable lacuna’. Whereas recent 
scholarly writings explore the concentrated involvement of Jamaican political parties and 
politicians within the domain of citizen politics (Gray, 2004, Rapley, 2003; Charles, 2002; 
cf. Stone, 1980), the role of political parties and politicians within civil society and their 
impact on the character of protest is yet to be comprehensively addressed. 
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So, in response to the first question, are politicians and political parties to be included in 
the scheme of associations that constitute civil society, I draw on the work of Rosenblum 
(2000) who makes a case for ‘political parties as membership groups’91 and hence as part 
and parcel of civil society. She defines political parties as essentially voluntary 
associations principally committed to making democracy work: 
Parties raise and define public issues, engage in political education, choose 
officers, enact rules for process and representation, and decide on their purposes 
and policies as well as their strategies. They are distinctive sources of information 
and of experience in forming political judgments. They are forums for reasonably 
deliberative collective decision-making about public life. Potentially, they are the 
most important agenda-setting institution for the public interests of society as a 
whole (2000:283). 
 
It is the fact that political parties perform these civic roles and operate in such a largely 
public way in the name of society, which render them crucial, mobilizing elements of a 
functioning civil society. This is because the job of a party or representative includes 
providing a bridge between citizens and the state by taking on board community 
concerns and making representations to central government on behalf of the citizenry, 
with a view to addressing those concerns. In response to the second question posed by 
Foley & Edwards (1996) above – ‘can civil society act as an effective counterweight to the 
state without the assistance of political parties?’ The answer is, in the Jamaican context, a 
                                                 
91 Rosenblum identifies several defining characteristics of political parties, which confirm these 
observations. For one thing, she observes that political parties, in the main, can claim (historical) 
continuity. This means that they are permanent, enduring organizations with deep connections of 
identity and linkages with the community. She uses the example of the Republican and 
Democratic Parties in the United States, which have confronted each other since the 1860s. (In the 
Jamaican context, the People’s National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) have been 
challenging each other and establishing broad-based linkages with an array of social groups since 
their formation in the late 1930s and early 1940s).  Second, because political parties can pull 
together a large and diverse segment of a population, they are seen to embody the democratic 
norms of ‘integrativeness and inclusiveness’. She also attributes to political parties the quality of 
‘comprehensiveness’ (emphases in the original). This means that unlike interest and advocacy 
groups whose agendas are often restricted to a single principle or policy, or candidate-centred 
campaign organizations attuned to immediate issues that promise short-term political benefits, 
political parties can identify and attend to longer-term problems. In other words, the rationale is 
that interest groups cannot do what parties can do in a diverse society – bring together the claims 
of groups and formulate issues in a comprehensive and comprehensible way. For a more explicit 
discussion of the unique democracy-building role of political parties, see Rosenblum, N. L. (2000) 
‘Political Parties as Membership Groups’. In Colombia Law Review, 100 (3) pp. 813-844.  
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definitive no. Although many developing and developed societies (United States, India, 
Mexico and Peru) boast a gamut of well-organized civic groups, including advocacy, 
lobby and interest networks, with enormous influence, ‘only parties routinely, 
pervasively and legitimately exercise influence from within government’ (Rosenblum, 
2000:815). What I am implying here is that the interest-mediation often undertaken by 
lobby, advocacy and interest groups can only go so far. In contrast, political parties, as 
agenda-setters and negotiators, are able, more often than not, to yield rewards and/or 
ensure more positive outcomes. In political contexts such as Jamaica where formal civil 
society associations, including advocacy and lobby groups, are much more sedate and 
there is a historical dependence and pressure on the state for the resolution of problems, 
more demands are placed on political parties and individual political representatives to 
access and wrest concessions from the state on behalf of citizens. The presence of political 
activists and political representatives at the site of citizen protest and street 
demonstrations is therefore unsurprising.  
 
Of course, one of the difficulties of locating political parties within the ambit of civil 
society is that parties are essentially trapped between their obligations as a constitutive 
element of the state and their roles as facilitators and/or mediators between citizens and 
the state. In short political parties and politicians retain a function both within the ambit 
of the state and within civil society. The competing pressures of these two functions are 
problematic because the fundamental goal of political parties is to capture state power. 
According to Rosenblum (2000:823): 
[Political] parties are principally concerned with candidates and elections. The 
goal of parties is not to maximize the number of people who express an attitudinal 
preference for it but to contest elections effectively.  
 
Unlike other political groupings, only political parties are solidly engaged in recruiting 
and nominating candidates as well as canvassing votes as a means to ensure electoral 
success. Conversely, although civil society relates to the state (my emphasis) in some way, 
[it] does not aim to win formal power or office in the state (Diamond, 1994). This 
observation has enormous implications for the role and impact of politicians in popular 
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protest, particularly in contexts such as Jamaica with highly violent and partisan political 
cultures. The fact that political parties retain a fundamental electoral objective, it 
effectively muddles their role as civic facilitators, interest-mediators and political 
negotiators. It is the potential negative impact of political parties and politicians on the 
tenor and quality of citizen politics which is my focus here.   
 
9.6.1 How Politicians Impact Civil Protest 
PN5: Every time I see people protesting, there is a politician running to the 
scene in a reactive way to appease and promise.  
 
PN24: They [politicians] are always trying to appease the voting element. They 
realize that demonstrating is a line they can take. Any protest you see out 
there, some opposition politician is going to come and attach themselves 
to it - every demonstration, blocking roads and whatever else. 
 
Political parties and political representatives respond to and influence protest campaigns 
in a variety of ways. They offer official structural assistance and resources as well as 
political support to citizen action. Political representatives may, as was the case of the 
September 2005 consumer protests, actively participate in protest campaigns through 
planning, organizing and facilitating the action, as well as negotiating and mediating on 
behalf of citizens during and after demonstrations. Politicians also affect popular protest 
via their influence on the mass media. This is because politicians are a form of celebrity. 
When they call a press conference, reporters come and so protestors are able to use that 
power to promote their cause (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003). It is my argument, however, that 
the participation of parties and elected representatives in protest campaigns is a far more 
complex phenomenon than stated here. Within the context of Jamaica’s intensely 
charged political culture, featuring partisan alignment to either of the two main political 
parties – the Jamaica Labour Party and the People’s National Party – the participation of 
politicians in popular protest requires analysis.  
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There is a widely held view that protests in Jamaica are ‘politicized’. The term ‘politicized’ 
is not employed here in the Foucauldian sense of ‘everything is political’ but more in line 
with the notion of ‘partisanship’ – a political party intervention in citizen action in a 
manner which consolidates partisan divisiveness and conflict among the citizenry. In 
short, Is there is a problematic degree of ‘politicization’ of protest activity in Jamaica? Due 
to its catalytic nature, the 1999 Gas protests became the pointer around which many of 
the interviewees framed their responses to this issue. The following quotations represent 
the views of a former Member of Parliament (PN8) and a University student (PN30):  
PN8: I know for a fact that the 1999 Gas protest was pushed. It was not only 
politicized [read as partisan]. It was conceptualized in [party] politics so it 
was a political exercise through and through. As far as I am concerned, 
the NDM [National Democratic Movement, political party] pushed it 
more than the Jamaica Labour Party and I know this for a fact.  
 
PN30: The people who started the [Gas] protest did not start it as a political [read 
as partisan] action but then the politicians quickly saw to it that they did 
because immediately the opposition [Jamaica Labour Party] came out and 
used the opportunity to start demonizing the PNP and to definitely give it 
a political tone. It did not start like that but it was manipulated to seem as 
if it was. I was very annoyed and very disgusted with Mr. Seaga [then 
opposition Leader] and the Labour Party because they were using the 
Jamaican people. At a time like that when people were really crying out, 
crying out to the state, I don’t think it would have mattered which 
government – JLP or PNP – it made no difference. They were crying out. 
I thought it was so callous. They [politicians] were using this very obvious 
distress to gain some political mileage and at that point I tell you – you 
ask me how I feel – I lost total faith in politics. I just saw there was no 
governance. There was no opposition to put anything in any reasonable 
perspective and the government was ‘playing politics’ [colloquial 
expression suggesting the use of diversion tactics]. 
 
These responses reflect a collective misgiving at not so much the involvement of political 
actors but a distinct mistrust of such interventions. Given that the nature of political 
communities presupposes a struggle between different groups and political parties, the 
contestations described above is not extraordinary. Should theorists of civil society then 
be overly concerned with it?  Posner (2004), drawing on the Chilean case, argues that 
whether parties merely facilitate popular sector access and participation depends entirely 
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on the kind of linkage they assume with networks in civil society. He identifies the 
different approaches that parties take in their relationship with civil society:  
Parties that adopt a participatory form of linkage attempt to serve as an agency 
through which citizens can themselves participate in government, and tend to be 
closely linked with organizations in civil society; they have strong grassroots 
organizations and are internally democratic. In contrast, electoralist parties are 
primarily concerned with mobilizing an electoral constituency rather than 
organizing and mobilizing groups in civil society. Their primary objective is to 
develop the broadest possible base of support, which requires attracting 
unorganized and often independent voters and developing a multi-class 
constituency.  To the extent that grassroots party structures exist, party leaders 
typically control them and mobilize party activists only for electoral purposes 
such as canvassing, getting out the vote, registering new voters (Posner, 
2004:58)92.  
 
For more than half a century, Jamaican political parties have interacted with loosely 
organized networks of civil society in a way which has served to expand popular 
participation in governance and establish important linkages with civil society (see Gray, 
2004; Munroe, 1999; Manley, 1991). Both the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s 
National Party (PNP) have, at different periods, organized, mobilized and encouraged 
segments of the poor and the marginalized to demand greater responsiveness and 
resources from the state. From the violent Labour Riots over substandard working 
conditions and poor wages in the 1930s and 1940s to the Gas protests of 1979, all-island 
strikes of 1985, the 1999 Gas demonstrations and the 2005 consumer protest, political 
party activism has been central to citizen protest in Jamaica. In short, acting as 
facilitators, organizers and/or catalysts, the participation of the JLP and PNP in popular 
struggles has been vital to citizen politics and civil society in Jamaica. Partisan violence 
has, however, been an important feature of some of these events (see Gray, 2004:258, 
285).   
                                                 
92 Other writers maintain that while political parties are only one of the many vehicles for the 
representation of interests and have become weak and discredited, they remain essential for 
recruiting leaders, structuring electoral choice and organizing government. For a more extensive 
and critical discussion of the contemporary role and impact of political parties in democracies,  see 
Diamond, L & Gunther, R. (2001) Political Parties and Democracy. Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press 
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The Gas protests of 1979, for example, occurred within the context of a period of global 
oil shocks, worsening economic conditions at home and intense political and ideological 
rivalry between the ruling PNP and the opposition JLP. General elections were set for the 
following year, 1980. By this juncture, the PNP and JLP were in campaign mode and 
factions loyal to either side had already begun to filter onto the streets of urban Kingston 
to engage in what Jamaican scholars later describe as bloody political party ‘civil wars’ 
(see Gray, 2004). It was also within this context that other social actors, including massive 
numbers of unemployed took to the streets in violent protest (see Gary, 2004:256-259). 
Many of my interviewees, some of whom were activists, journalists or spectators during 
these events, however, saw the 1979 protests as merely one more salvo by the opposition, 
Jamaica Labour Party, on a People’s National Party government already beleaguered by 
the pressures of the IMF-imposed Structural Adjustment and swirling rumours of the 
‘Communist threat’ posed to the country by the imposition of the Democratic Socialist 
ideas of then PNP leader and Prime Minister, Michael Manley (PN12; PN24; PN23; 
PN29). 
 
It is noteworthy that a curious silence still veils this period of Jamaica’s political history 
and the details are rarely discussed openly or recorded objectively. However, writing in 
The Jamaica Gleaner (2005), former Government Minister and PNP activist, Arnold 
Bertram, states that it was the combination of pending General Elections and a fear of the 
economic implications of communism by the merchant class which created the context 
for the now infamous warning issued by former Jamaican Opposition Leader, Edward 
Seaga, that he would ‘lock down the country tighter than a sardine tin’ by instigating 
nationwide social protests. It was a bonafide warning. According to Bertram (2005): 
[Edward]Seaga was able to bring into the streets a broad-based alliance of social 
classes with the clear objective of forcing [Prime Michael] Manley to call an 
election, which in their estimation, he could win (The Jamaica Gleaner, 2005, 
September 11).  
 
In short, the social protests were designed to have a powerful negative effect on the 
government in power, thereby enhancing the prospects of the opposition coming to 
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power. Indeed, according to Gray (2004:260) ‘the Prime Minister not only condemned 
the protest as an instance of JLP manipulation, but denounced it as an expression of “raw-
naked fascism” that sought the PNP’s ouster’. Edward Seaga and the Jamaica Labour Party 
did, in fact, comprehensively win the General Elections of 1980. Such was the intensity of 
this political contestation that an unprecedented 800 Jamaican citizens were killed in 
election campaign violence alone (see National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997). 
Bertram (2005) links this historical memory with the failure of the 2005 protests to 
generate popular citizen support. Indeed, despite the real economic hardships generated 
by rising costs of transportation, electricity and transportation in 2005, many citizens, by 
their unwillingness to participate, seemed to concur with Bertram’s view that the 
consumer protests, led by Opposition Leader, Bruce Golding was intended ‘to promote 
disruptions similar to the lockdown of 1979 and the Gas riots of 1999 with the aim of 
reviving his lagging political fortunes and reasserting his leadership within the JLP’ 
(Bertram, The Jamaica Gleaner, 2005, September 11) (see image of politicians at protest 
sites below).  
 
 
This image shows Opposition Leader (second left), Bruce Golding and Mayor of Kingston, 
Desmond McKenzie addressing crowds of protestors during the consumer price protests on 6 
September, 2005. See The Jamaica Gleaner (2005) ‘We’ll do it again – GOLDING PROMISES 
MORE PROTESTS’. September 7. p. A1 
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Evidently, the historical deployment of crude political tactics (reflected in damaging 
street protests and illegal roadblocks) by political parties to win electoral support is losing 
favour with some segments of the Jamaican population. The wariness and cynicism which 
attends the presence and involvement of politicians in citizen protest is linked to the 
historical participation of Jamaican political parties in the assumption, consolidation and 
institutionalization of violence as a tool in electoral contest (see Gray, 2004).  Based on 
the evidence presented thus far in this study, popular citizen protest is laden with and 
constantly reproduces the remnants of this historical use of violence. Jamaican political 
parties have, in instances, helped to distort citizen action either by assuming violence as a 
tool or by failing to engender the type of civil discourse and political action in which 
violence and uncivil behaviour has no place. Hence, when there is any kind of social 
mobilisation, that residual relationship of violence and political hostility spills into the 
action to such an extent that the protest campaign takes on a partisan hue, and as on 
automatic pilot, drives itself. The consequence, sometimes, is that very legitimate and 
genuine protests become tainted by partisanship93.  
 
The rejection (if not of the intent but the execution) of the September 2005 protests 
suggest that significant groups in the Jamaican society wish to migrate beyond old style 
political leadership and action that do not solve their central problems. Indeed, rather 
than old style opportunistic protests, some commentators called on the country’s 
opposition ‘to articulate an alternative economic policy and show that it is responsible 
                                                 
93 The protests over human rights abuses following the 7-10 July, 2001 police operation in Western 
Kingston (details in chapter 6) was one instance where citizen action had become enmeshed in 
political party hostility and assumed such a violent, partisan tinge that the genuine and critical 
issues of human rights abuses were misplaced. Although twenty-seven civilians had died at the 
hands of the police in this incident, many of my interviewees (PN24; PN12; PN11 and PN27) 
dismissed the protests as little more than political party ‘one-upmanship’. Further, the opportunity 
for civil discourse and engagement, embodied in the West Kingston Commission of Enquiry, 
established by the government to investigate the incident (or perhaps more accurately to appease 
human rights lobby groups), was also subordinated to political party hostility. Some members of 
the citizenry who were called upon to testify, including political actors, not only boycotted the 
proceedings but were seen to engage with the inquiry according to political party allegiance (see 
The Jamaica Gleaner, 2002, January 6).   
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enough to govern’ (see Buddan, 2005; Buckley, 2005). This situation exposes but still does 
not resolve the tremendous theoretical lacuna in discussions regarding the appropriate 
role for political parties and politicians at protest sites. Within a context of historic 
political factionalism and violence, can Jamaican political parties and politicians 
effectively execute this role?  I answer this question in the following way.  
 
The very nature of citizen politics, particularly protests and demonstrations, invites the 
participation of the politician. Indeed, some citizens even tend to gauge the success of 
their protest, in part, based on their ability to attract the attention of politicians. Much 
more than that, liberal democratic and civil society theories require political parties and 
politicians to represent people’s interest and so we expect that they have (or ought to 
have) a legitimate interest in people’s concerns. Following this line of reasoning, 
politicians do have an obligation to be present at protest and have a legitimate role to play 
during and/or after protest.  One of the central tasks of the politician at the scene of the 
protest, especially if he/she is the elected representative, is to assist with the articulation 
of the issues. This role is a critical requirement of citizen action in some developing 
contexts as the attempt by particularly poor and marginalized constituencies to articulate 
their concerns are sometimes stifled by poor eloquence, education and literacy levels.  
 
My own observation of protest performance in Jamaica reveals that high doses of anger 
and frustration also impinge on the capacity of some citizens to effectively articulate their 
concerns especially via the media. The political party representatives should, in other 
words, be able to clearly and objectively express the concerns of those citizens on behalf 
of whom they speak. Politicians, particularly those of opposition parties, are also obliged 
to organize, facilitate and/or guide the actions of protestors both on the streets and at the 
negotiation table. In this case, they are required to channel the anger and grievance of 
protestors into more legitimate and less disruptive and illegal ways. The view of some 
observers is that the Jamaican political opposition has failed wholesale in this regard and 
has lost sight of its real role within popular protest politics (see Buddan, 2005; Buckley, 
2005). There is also a perception among some interviewees that when the Jamaican 
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people are protesting about injustice or are demanding justice, rarely are political leaders 
‘there with them’ (PN21), responding empathetically to their concerns as distinct from 
merely operating in a manipulative way to the protest. These observations clearly have 
less to do with who occupies the corridors of power but more about how people’s 
concerns are addressed and within what time frame.  
 
To say, however, that there will not be elements of political opportunism at protest is to 
misunderstand the nature of politics and the power of the protest tool. Conversely, to 
argue that Jamaican politicians are only present at popular protest action in order to 
capitalize on people’s pain for self-interested pursuits is perhaps to be overly cynical. The 
following quotations from two former Jamaican Members of Parliament capture the 
essence of the political dilemma present in the Jamaican context: 
PN13: There is politicization [read as ‘partisanization’] of protest, absolutely. 
There is no doubt about that. I am under no illusions whatsoever. 
Politicians can be highly opportunistic but they look at it in reverse. The 
political representative has to be there. I mean there is no way that the 
people in my constituency could be protesting about something, and 
especially in a forceful manner, and I am not there. It is extremely 
important to be a part of something like that, both in solidarity with a 
cause when the cause is right and to try and explain, mollify in instances 
where, whether right or wrong, the protest is getting beyond any useful 
purpose. 
 
PN8: It could impact the spirit of the protest when politicians attach themselves 
to it in a purely partisan way. Given how our political arrangements have 
evolved over time, partisan political arrangements – because people doubt 
the sincerity of politicians in that context, it is not a good thing for 
politicians or political parties to try to embrace or ‘buy out’ the protest. 
Sometimes, it is better that we leave it to the communities.  
 
It is evident from the preceding discussion that, under particular circumstances, political 
parties and politicians at a protest site automatically give it a character and can 
unquestionably alter the existing mood of a protest in particular situations. It is however 
difficult to argue that their overarching presence at the site of a demonstration impinges 
on the authenticity of the claims being made. In fact, only when politicians misrepresent 
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the nature of the protest or neglect to use their influence to present its uncivil 
manifestations such as violence that political actors can affect the character and tenor of a 
protest action. I end this section by reiterating that although the majority of the protests 
which occur in Jamaica are not driven by party politics, the Jamaican political culture, 
nonetheless, continues to express remnants of political party hostilities and factionalism.  
Inevitably, this sometimes filters into popular citizen action. Since the character of 
protest politics has a great deal to do with the quality of civil society, the adoption by 
political parties and politicians of a more participatory form of linkage with civil society 
and citizen action (as opposed to electoralist, clientelist forms) may be a constructive 
move. This means facilitating the concerns of grassroots constituents through organized 
civil society groups and community networks. This would, in turn, make localized 
protests, particularly in slum areas, less susceptible to partisan divisiveness and offer the 
poorer classes more viable opportunities to make demands about collective concerns. 
 
9.7 SUMMARY 
It is evident from chapters 6 and 7 that there has sometimes been a disproportionate 
attention given to obtaining attention and appeasement (to pacify) as opposed to 
amelioration (to make better) in the practice of protest by Jamaican citizens as well as in 
the politics of response engaged in by the Jamaican state. As a result, part of what citizens 
view as effective protest involves an identifiable cycle from built-up frustration and rage 
to violent venting through roadblocks, demonstration and police-citizen clashes, and then 
to appeasement and pacification from official (state) sources with some minor 
concessions. In other words, missing from the political discourse and practice of grievance 
politics in Jamaica is the ameliorative aspects of citizen action – how to comprehensively 
make better the conditions that have caused an upset. In this chapter, I explored the 
politics of state response, including the impact and outcomes as well as the worth of the 
existing modalities of protest. I also looked at the effectiveness of hostile demonstrations 
by critically examining the response of the Jamaican State to specific protest campaigns 
and the potential impact of such interventions on civil protest and civil society. Based on 
these findings, I draw the following conclusions.  
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Overall, the empirical data indicates a trend towards a decline in the levels of protest over 
inadequate public utilities in Jamaica. This is linked, in part, to positive steps taken by the 
Jamaican state to increase the availability and access to public goods to more of its 
citizens. There is now greater telephone coverage thanks to the introduction of mobile 
competitors in the telecommunications market. The work of the Rural Electrification 
Programme in extending the access to power supply to all parishes has also proved to be a 
definite disincentive to protest and the continuing efforts of the National Water 
Commission to bring potable water to more communities through its ‘Rapid Response and 
‘Black Tank’ programmes appear to have lessened the number of protests in this regard. 
On this basis of this, it would appear that citizen protest, though largely violent, have 
been effectual in as far as it draws attention to otherwise neglected problem areas.  
 
Given, however, that there is an enormous disparity between the number of social 
protests recorded per year in Jamaica and the number of cases that result in adequate and 
systematic amelioration, it is doubtful whether citizen protests in this context, compel the 
sort of comprehensive responses required from the state to address the wide range of 
social ills that plague the Jamaican citizenry. In other words, on balance, of the under 300 
social protests recorded annually in Jamaica over bad road conditions, lack of water and 
police misconduct, only very few (selected cases) have resulted in the amelioration of the 
grievance to the satisfaction of citizens. This is even while the state may have responded 
to many protests, albeit by paying lip service to the concern. Indeed, based on the 
evidence of this chapter, I suggest that poor quality responses, embodied in either non-
response, delayed response, sham response or partial response has come to represent the 
main official response to popular protest in this context. That the annual number of 
protests over ‘lack of water’ nearly doubled in the space of a year – from a low of 14 in 
2003 to a high of 27 in 2004 (Police National Computer Centre, 2005) and there is 
increasing concerns over the cost of public utilities suggests that comprehensive, 
meaningful state responses to citizens needs are still not available from the Jamaican state.  
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Giving attention to the tenor of civilian politics and the desire to build a truly civil 
society, the outcomes of popular protest must also account for the levels of violence 
engaged in by citizen-protestors and whether the project of civil society, including social 
capital formation, civic participation and civil discourse, is advanced by these models of 
activism. Certainly, my research reveals a distinct rejection for the existing paradigm of 
popular protest on account of its deleterious consequences on the economy, political 
order and civil society. That the state almost always responds affirmatively to violent 
protest, embodied in illegal roadblocks and vandalism, forcefully suggests that uncivil 
protest has been given credence in the Jamaican context. Based on the empirical evidence 
uncovered in this study, it would appear that the Jamaican state has managed to sustain 
the impression in the minds of a huge section of the public that it responds slowly and 
less willingly to civil forms of negotiation and more readily when forced to by violent 
confrontation and disruption. In fact, the more violent a protest, the more comprehensive 
the state response appears. The Jamaican State thus finds itself in a vicious circle – a no-
win situation where, on the one hand, some sectors of the political community act in the 
firm belief that they cannot be heard any other way except through violent negotiation, 
and on the other, where political representatives respond positively or affirmatively to 
violent demands or attach themselves (sometimes opportunistically) to unconstructive 
protests, thereby feeding into and effectively normalizing negative expressions and 
modalities of citizen activism.  
 
Poor quality state response exposes two interconnected (albeit unfortunate) 
developments, which condition the character of popular citizen politics in this context. 
Primarily, it illustrates the fundamental and problematic divorce between popular 
aspirations and state policy in Jamaica. This dilemma rests with a failure on the part of the 
Jamaican State to address in a comprehensive and meaningful way localized problems 
and, on a more structural level, to strengthen the complaint mechanisms and 
communicative structures to correspond better with citizens about their problems. It is 
therefore this sustained neglect of conversation, communication and connection by 
Jamaican political representatives with their constituents and the wider citizenry and the 
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failure to resolve their concerns in meaningful ways which trigger violent disruptive 
protests and ensure its persistence (and possible institutionalization) as an accepted model 
of citizen negotiation. A paradigmatic shift in state responses may therefore compel 
alternative approaches to citizen mobilization and action, and wrest open spaces for the 
organized engagement and participation by networks of citizens, more in line with the 
civil discourse and action and the normative agenda of civil society.  
 
There is, however, something to be said about the weight of state non-response. Although 
a non-response under specific circumstances may be read as contempt for citizens, not 
responding sometimes is likely to have the effect of discouraging the sort of protestation 
which is illegal, excessive and disruptive. Jamaica has begun to witness some examples of 
this where some political representatives are refusing to respond to protestors who engage 
in violent protest or who deploy browbeating tactics in their efforts to draw attention to 
their problems. That the government is seen by a wide cross section of the population to 
be more conciliatory and a lot more receptive and amenable to citizen activism (including 
protests) and political participation means that there is political opportunity for networks 
of citizens to manoeuvre within and impact on the political system in more constructive 
ways. This is not to say that compelling the state to address community concerns through 
broad-based popular pressure will soon fade away – and neither is this desirable.  
 
This chapter is not arguing for a halt to the democratic exercise of civil protest. Indeed, 
civil protest has proved itself time and again in Jamaica as a viable and effective weapon 
to solicit attention and generate more encompassing remedies to local problems than 
conventional means. What this chapter and, indeed the study, suggests is that violence 
cannot eclipse or be seen as a legitimate and more useful option of generating state 
response than modalities of peaceful protestation and civil negotiation. This is because, 
however fashionable, the employment of radicalized and/or extremist forms of protest is 
evidence of the increasing rupturing or shattering of a civil way of life and the retreat of 
civil politics.  
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CHAPTER 10 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Conclusion 
 
10.1  INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental goal of this thesis was to examine the nature and tenor of contemporary 
popular protest in Jamaica through the theoretical lens of civil (and uncivil) society. It is 
therefore through an in-depth exploration of popular protest – its paroxysms, dynamics, 
complexities, contradictions, the socio-economic and political framework which 
underlines it, the moral economy which energizes it, the vocabulary of emotions which 
both engenders and sustains, it as well as its existing mood, mandate, impact and 
outcomes – that I have attempted to resolve questions about the character of citizen 
politics and the quality of civil society in Jamaica. Assessing the quality of civil society 
viz. a. viz. civic engagement, voluntarism, community organizing and social capital 
formation is not novel. The plethora of recent work on the subject (Boyd, 2004; Putnam, 
2002; 1993; 1995; Deaken, 2001; Barber, 1998; 1984; Foweraker, 1995; Guha, 1997; 
Etzioni, 1996; 1995; Tarrow, 1994) attests to this. This thesis however, has gone further. It 
has stretched the conceptual definitions of citizen politics and civil society to incorporate 
into academic analysis not only the specific ways in which citizens engage collectively to 
defend their interests and make claims upon the state, but also to account for the brand 
and character of that engagement, particularly the extent to which it serves or 
undermines the otherwise normative agenda of civil society of which it is a part (see 
chapter 2). 
 
Why was this expanded conceptual approach to looking at and understanding citizen 
politics and civil society necessary? For one, the peculiarities in political culture, 
historical development and socio-economic conditions as well as everyday grievance 
politics among other aspects of citizen politics in Jamaica expose, in explicit ways, the 
limitations and shortcomings of the term civil society. For example, as I outlined in 
chapter 2, the established idea of civil society is that of a dense network of civil 
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associations that promote stability and the effectiveness of the democratic polity both 
through the effects of so-called ‘habits of the heart’ (tolerance, moderation, a willingness 
to compromise, respect for opposing viewpoints and the rule of law) and the ability of 
associations to mobilize citizens on behalf of public causes (Foley & Edwards, 1997; 
Putnam, 1995; 1993; Diamond, 1994; Shils, 1992). At the same time, although rarely given 
analytic prominence in current scholarship on civil society, it is becoming ever more 
apparent that not all political behaviours and/or networks of citizens contribute to 
effective democratic governance and, at times, they may even become the basis of civil 
strife. These networks often include criminal gangs, extremist organizations and hate 
groups. Outside this frame, the scholarly evidence suggests that groups of ordinary 
citizens may also participate in activities that skirt the boundaries of legality; blur the 
lines or traverse between the realms of legality and illegality. This is while still others 
attempt to usurp the legitimate authority of the state and establish their own counter-
governments or, depending on the circumstance, display outright rejection of the rule of 
law (Johnson, 2005; Boyd, 2004; Swift, 1999; Munroe, 1999; Whitehead, 1997; Diamond, 
1994).  
 
In short, underlying this study is the assumption that civil society is a crucial arena for 
democracy, development and citizenship but if it is to serve any useful purpose, we are 
obliged to acknowledge its potential for self-destruction and disintegration. Indeed, civil 
society is as much about a set of non-state institutions whose members associate and 
facilitate various patterns of collective action as an arena for cultivating moral attributes 
and responsible behaviour. That the concept has hitherto rarely departed in any radical 
way from its normative standing in the scholarship disallows objective analyses of citizen 
politics in contexts such as Jamaica. In this regard, rather than simply fortify the 
presumption in the contemporary scholarship of civil society as a liberal and tolerant 
order, this thesis challenges this interpretation by acknowledging and deliberately 
foregrounding the possibility and reality of incivility within the theoretical and political 
domains of civil society. By the same token, the thesis recognizes the influence of uncivil 
actors, political practices and unconstructive patterns of citizen engagement and 
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negotiation embodied in popular protest which, albeit liberatory, may cause real 
disruptions to the building and/or transformation of citizen politics and civil society in 
Jamaica.  
 
Of course, the challenges confronting civilian politics in Jamaica could not be divorced 
from the performance of the state, measured in political decision-making, political will, 
political representation, political accountability, political inclusion and political 
sensitivity. This thesis illustrates the disjuncture between perceived government under-
performance and the manner in which citizens elect to express their discontent. The 
study therefore offered an analytic framework based on qualitative interpretivism and 
social constructionism to illuminate our understanding of the way in which citizens 
mobilize and participate in the system and how they view and interpret their 
involvement. In so doing, the analytical approach recognizes the influential role of 
structure – political and social institutions as well as patterns of political representation – 
in shaping political behaviour. It, however, extends beyond structure to take stock of 
individual agency and the responsibility of citizens in determining the character of 
citizen politics and civil society. This process of establishing how macro forces impact on 
micro-level motivations and vice versa is part of a process called ‘structuration’ (Giddens, 
1979) - how structure influences behaviour as much as how behaviour impacts on 
structure forcing it to change (see chapter 3).  
 
In this sense, the case study of Jamaica facilitated an examination of whether the 
increasing discontent of citizens with the performance of their (representative) 
government was giving rise to unconventional and alternative modes of political 
engagement such as violent protest and demonstrations. It explored the nature of these 
unconventional political practices and examined the extent to which violent protest is 
effective in securing for the especially disadvantaged classes their political demands. On 
this basis, the study examined how protest is inescapably performed within the spotlight 
of the mass media, particularly television, how demands are filtered through the mass 
media and the extent to which media coverage and treatment, in part, determines the 
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tenor of protest in the Jamaican context. It also facilitated an examination of the alternate 
forms of citizen governance at the community level, the influence and impact of rogue 
citizens on civic life, including popular citizen mobilizations and community 
organisation. A review of state response to protest and the impact of politician 
involvement on protest politics were also undertaken. All this was with a view to 
ascertaining whether popular protests and demonstrations represent a rebirth of 
reinvigorated citizens in Jamaica or a retreat of norms of civil discourse, engagement and 
negotiation and a descent into uncivil society. 
 
What does this empirical case study of contemporary popular protest in Jamaica reveal? 
Based on the examination of the broad themes outlined above, several theoretical 
deductions stood out which forms the basis for understanding the nature of citizen 
politics and civil society in Jamaica. These are: (1) poor representation, including feelings 
of political exclusion and injustice among the citizenry, underscores the emergence of 
roadblock democracy in Jamaica, (2) disruptive demonstrations, including violence, forms 
the basis of civil protest in Jamaica, (3) the media affects protest performance and 
outcomes while talk radio’s potential as a civic conduit is obscured by limits to full 
participation and a problematic discourse, (4) rogue actors masquerading as civic leaders 
and stage-managing protest endangers civil society, (5) although violence has emerged as 
a viable protest tool in the Jamaican context, the poor benefit the least from employing 
such negative sanctions, and (6) the quality of state response to popular protest influences 
the tenor of civilian politics in Jamaica. I elaborate on these and examine their 
implications in the following sections.  
 
10.2.  THE CONSOLIDATION OF ROADBLOCK DEMOCRACY IN JAMAICA.  
The hypothesis here is that poor political representation, including feelings of political 
exclusion and injustice among the Jamaican citizenry, has managed to consolidate a sort 
of ‘roadblock democracy’ in Jamaica. This assumption finds theoretical origins in the 
work of scholars such as Norris (1999) who proposed that declining performance of 
representative democracy had not only resulted in voter down-turn but triggered 
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unconventional forms of political participation such as protest politics.  Munroe (1999) 
made similar suppositions in relation to Jamaica. Having had deep roots in the centuries-
old resistance movements against slavery and colonialism (see chapter 4), it is not 
surprising that popular protest is the principal weapon employed for large segments of the 
marginalized population in Jamaica in response to what they perceive as government 
neglect. Although having a more recent history, the roadblock-demonstration has 
become a ubiquitous apparatus in grievance politics in this context. Usually, this mode of 
protest is deployed by citizens to expose a condition that does not serve their interest, to 
lodge a complaint or criticism or to illustrate that a situation does not meet with their 
satisfaction.  
 
On the basis of the evidence presented in this study, Jamaican citizens are responding to 
the many faces of poverty – unemployment, low-income, crime and dilapidated social 
amenities. Since together these are fundamental to basic survival and the quality of life, 
the study confirms a strong association between perceptions of government 
underperformance and the frequency of unconventional forms of popular protest in this 
context. The increased expectations of citizens, their awareness of government’s 
obligation to provide (good) governance and the perceived elusiveness of justice (social, 
political, economic and judicial) therefore compel contentious citizen politics in Jamaica. 
For example, deficient delivery of collective consumption and social services – water, 
proper roads, sewerage and electrification – and the prohibitive costs for telephone 
service, water and power usage and public transportation trigger frequent mobilizations 
and roadblock-demonstrations. Issues of justice, security and representation, embodied in 
human rights violations (police killings and abuse), inadequate and untrustworthy 
mechanisms of redress for grievances, insufficient protection against crime and the right 
to ply their trade also regularly drive large numbers of citizens out into the streets 
mounting roadblocks and engaging in disorderly demonstrations. The research thus 
confirms Baker’s (2001:56) proposition that ‘[Jamaican] citizens have no sense of being 
able to exercise effective control over the direction of the state except through vigorous 
and sometimes violent protest’. 
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10.3 ‘MAXIMUM DISRUPTION FORMS THE BASIS OF CIVIL PROTEST IN 
JAMAICA. 
In the face of widespread perception of state neglect among considerable segments of the 
citizenry, grassroots activism in Jamaica tends to be linked to an ingrained moral 
economy built on the desire of the poor to survive, subsist, better their lives and assert 
their rights to justice and, in some instances, to claim autonomy for themselves and their 
community (see chapters 6 and 8). The empirical evidence however suggests that peaceful 
forms have, in the main, taken a backseat to intimidation, mayhem and violence in the 
models of popular protest institutionalized in Jamaica. These violent strategies are 
embodied in fiery roadblocks, disruptive street demonstrations and, in extreme cases, 
police–citizen clashes and gunfire exchanges, arson (burning police vehicles; public and 
private property), mob activity (looting and vandalism) as well as out and out war with 
the police.  Aggressive negotiation, including violence, have therefore become a workable 
modus operandi in wresting justice from the state, that is, collective consumption, the 
right to subsist and, in instances, even freedom from official (police) surveillance and 
other norms of modern social control. Violence helps to raise the visibility of their 
demands through its coverage on the mass media and the perception that more forceful 
strategies elicit more immediate responses from state bureaucracy. In the context of 
Jamaica where donmanship and criminality is increasingly normalized and political party 
competition historically assumes violence as a tool of contestation (Gray, 2004; Charles, 
2002; Harriot, 2000; 2003; Stone, 1980) violence as an apparatus in civilian politics is not 
all that extraordinary. In other words, given that violence has always been imported into 
the political mix, popular citizen politics necessarily exhibits residual elements of extra-
legality and violence. Indeed, the research reveals a lack of concern on the part of some 
citizens for alternative (read as peaceful) methods. Recall the perspective of interviewees 
PN18b - ‘the easiest way to announce that you are unhappy is to get into these negative 
behaviours’ and PN1 - ‘if we feel we naah get [not getting] justice, we will bun dung 
[burn down] the place’.  
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It is therefore the argument of this thesis that grassroots activism (and civilian politics 
more broadly) in Jamaica contains multiple elements, both legal and extra-legal. It is not 
always guided by the rules which inform civil discourse, civil action and civil negotiation 
which connote a sense of law-abidingness, orderliness and peacefulness. In fact, ‘to be 
civil is to refrain from lawless behaviour likely to disrupt the political community’ (Boyd, 
2004:26; cf. Diamond, 1994) and there is also a requirement of public civility (Shils, 
1992:5), especially from ‘those remote peripheries towards the centres of society’ which 
makes a considerable difference to the political order and functions to sustain civil 
society. It is for this reason that violence-as-strategy is indefensible in accepted modalities 
of civil protest (see Table 2.1, chapter 2).  
 
10.3.1 Violence-as-Strategy is Untenable in Models of Civil Protest.  
Whereas disruptive demonstrations, including fiery roadblocks, rigid barricades and 
burning tyres, are triggered by genuine grievances and injustice and whereas the 
government’s seemingly ritualized inaction humiliates and angers citizens, the moral 
economy of the poor is not a sufficient explanation for the extremity and destructiveness 
dominant in the protestation models currently in force in Jamaica. This brand of demand-
making rebellion is problematic because (1) genuine citizen mobilizations, when executed 
in antagonistic ways, run the risk of being hijacked by persons with contradictory or 
outright criminal intentions, (2) legitimate forces of activism (community groups, student 
groups; youth movements) will potentially co-opt these so-called ‘weapons of the weak’ 
and thereby perpetuate the normalization of destructive mobilization and political 
negotiation tactics rather than advance strategies that can build a truly participatory and 
functioning civil society, and (3) the deployment of combative protestation styles gives 
the impression of instability and a departure from the rule of law and hence invites 
repression by the state in the name of order.  
 
These developments not only serve to alienate possible supporters but instead perpetuate 
the further marginalization of the marginal sector and undermine the cause and goals for 
which they protest. An impression is also being formed in the political culture that 
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protest cannot take the form of civil discourse and organized civil action. This is not to 
say that civility does not allow room for overt acts of resistance or criticism of unjust laws 
and practices. Indeed, roadblock politics, in certain circumstances for example, to protest 
against bad road conditions, is sometimes a necessary and positive action. However, from 
the point of view of civility and civil politics properly understood, fiery roadblocks and 
other forms of violent protest presume superiority to the rule of law as well as disrespect 
to others who feel differently or actively object to the action (see Boyd, 2004; chapter 6, 
section 6.1, Table 2.1, chapter 2).   
 
10.3.2 Why Employing Negative Sanctions is a Costly Strategy for the Poor 
I wish to reiterate Piven & Cloward’s (1977:25) theoretical perspective on this issue here 
because it finds basis in the Jamaica context. They argue persuasively that the amount of 
leverage that protestors gain by applying negative sanctions (violent tactics) is dependent 
on: (a) whether the contribution withheld is crucial to others, (b) whether or not those 
affected by the disruption have resources to concede and (c) whether the obstructionist 
group can protect itself adequately from reprisals or consequences. How does this thesis 
relate to the Jamaican context? First, as I argue in this study, unlike factory workers or 
students, the marginals such as the unemployed usually operate in non-institutional 
settings and thereby do not have contributions such as labour to withdraw. The poor in 
Jamaica, as elsewhere, in other words, cannot strike so their only recourse is usually to 
riot or block roads in order to create maximum disruption of others (see Piven & 
Cloward, 1977:24). Second, the economic constraints facing the Jamaican state largely 
determines its capacity to concede resources. Thirdly, in some instances, unless a protest 
has managed to galvanize the support of powerful groups (politicians, business sector, 
media etc.), it is very easy for the state to repress or ignore these campaigns and the 
demands of protestors. 
 
Once these criteria are stated, it becomes evident that it is the poor who are usually in the 
least strategic position to benefit from this kind of defiance. Blocking roads, barricading 
schools, burning and looting, as well as exchanging gunfire with the police are no doubt 
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powerful forms of direct citizen action. However, they impact not just the source of 
citizens’ discontent (the government) but everyone. Schools are shut, transportation is 
halted, productivity is diminished and food supply is disrupted. The political 
reverberations are, in other words, enormous. This may of course force the state to act, as 
I illustrate with examples in Chapter 9, but the disadvantage appears to fall more to the 
protestor and less so to the state and other powerful interests. While not objecting to 
protests and the need for citizens with genuine concerns to mount protests, it is 
problematic when almost all protests operate in breach of the law and depart from the 
dispositions and tenets of civil politics. Scholarship must therefore decide whether it is 
justifiable for citizen-protestors to assume a stance of bullying (as opposed to lobbying) in 
order to achieve results. It is for this reason that, following this study, I have reached a 
similar conclusion to that of a former student activist: 
PN3: People don’t have to loot and burn down the place for government to 
respond. They really don’t have to – but I believe it is a fundamental 
failure on the part of the government in bringing these people to book [to 
prosecute them], to send a message that says we don’t have any problems 
with you demonstrating, it is a free society – as long as you don’t block 
roads and burn tyres in the streets, burn buildings and destroy the public 
infrastructure that will cost you more than you trying to get from the 
government.  
 
The study suggests that violence cannot eclipse or be seen as a legitimate and more 
constructive option for generating a state response than peaceful protest and civil 
negotiation, properly executed. This is because the employment of extremist forms of 
protest is evidence of the negation of the rule of law in Jamaica, an increasing rupturing 
of a civil way of life and the retreat of civil politics.  
 
10.4 THE (NEWS) MEDIA INFLUENCES PROTEST PERFORMANCE AND 
OUTCOMES.  
Popular protest and popular media (television, radio, newspapers) in Jamaica are mutually 
constitutive. Each depends upon, and influences, the other in dramatic ways. The study 
reveals that there is a sharp attention by protestors to the effect of their struggle on the 
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news media. This is because the media is able to expand their concerns beyond the 
limited spatial environment of their local communities to a wider national context, 
generate a stir of public opinion, particularly through the popular radio talk back medium 
and provoke a swift response from the state. Based on the evidence presented in the 
study, it is the less educated and affluent citizens who most rely on and need the reach 
and clout of television and radio to access their political representatives and to hold them 
to account. Yet, regrettably, it is this disadvantaged group which suffers from restricted 
access to and unconstructive utilization of this domain.  This is due, in part, to the unique 
mix of genuine grievance and pure exhibitionism operative within Jamaican protest 
politics. Since a commercially-driven media locate themselves at this intersection, they 
become the platform upon which all of these protest performances (both civil and 
uncivil) are played out. By virtue of this, the (news) media have a direct contributory 
impact on the nature and tone of popular protest in the Jamaican context.  
 
The perspectives of many interviewees as well as the audio-visual examination of protests 
suggest that while the media allow protestors to vent in cathartic fashion and act as a 
ready channel to access their representatives, they also present an opportunity for 
protestors to act and to entertain. As a result, animation and hyperbole, including 
violence, is part of a combination of strategies which a considerable segment of the 
Jamaican underclass views as effective protest. In short, there is an issue of credibility that 
plagues protest politics in this context. Conversely, poor coverage and treatment of 
protest incidents by the media such as foregrounding dramatic and spectacular episodes 
rather than communicating a community’s concern makes a mockery of protestors, 
diminishes the integrity of the protest, dilutes the authority of the message and distracts 
from the real goal of the democratic exercise. It is this inescapable interaction between 
citizen politics and media practice in this context which implicates the media in the 
theoretical collision between civil protests and the normative demands of civil society.  
 
This situation is even more apparent within the arena of talk radio. The radio talk show is 
being used inventively in Jamaica as a valve to filter complaint, criticism and debate. It is 
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proving to be a workable check on government. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that 
its own inherent weakness as a potential civic conduit bridging the communicative gap 
between citizens and elected representatives and as a model of civil discourse is 
increasingly apparent. For one thing, it is monopolized by the more educated and affluent 
citizens and so most of the disadvantaged who depend on its facility participate merely as 
spectator-listeners of this medium. Second, whether the radio ‘call-in’ shows can engage 
in ‘strong democratic talk’ (Barber, 1984) embodied in democratic negotiation and 
political bargaining rather than malicious political banter and political partisanship is, at 
present, doubtful. Their imposing presence and unique function in civil politics is 
however worthy of serious scholarly investigation. Overall, the study suggests that since 
Jamaican media is so integrated within citizen politics, they must be seen not as detached 
bystanders but as central actors in the constitution of civil society. In short, the notions of 
‘media accountability’ and ‘media responsibility’ (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2004) are not 
hollow theoretical terms but powerfully dictate the manner in which the media should 
consider and treat the public. They also speak to the obligations and expectations that 
society has regarding the media. At the same time, as Lippman (1922) asserts, civil society 
cannot live by ‘the press’ alone. In short, the media cannot be expected to become 
surrogates for civic institutions and enlightened, active and engaged citizens. 
 
10.5 OUTLAW GOVERNANCE MASQUERADING AS CIVIC LEADERSHIP 
ENDANGERS CIVIL SOCIETY 
The study was also concerned with the presence and embeddedness of rogue actors in the 
local community because of their longstanding civic leadership and influence within 
many local urban communities in Jamaica.  This discussion was based on the theoretical 
premise that civil society does not only comprise of dense associations and relational 
networks of citizens working together for the common good and fostering positive social 
capital. It also includes uncivil actors – criminals, hate groups, fanatics, terrorists, dons 
and sundry lumpens – who enjoy the rights and privileges of citizenship but who are not 
prepared to abide by the normative principles governing civil society such as a 
presumption of legality, tolerance and inclusion. In this regard, the research recognizes 
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that civil society also has the potential to produce and transmit negative social capital 
(Boyd, 2004; Swift, 1999; Munroe, 1999; Whitehead, 1997; Barber, 1998; Putnam, 2002; 
1995). Based on the empirical evidence presented in the preceding chapters, rogue 
citizens such as dons and criminal gangs oversee the most extreme form of incivility – 
crime and violence (Keane, 1996). Their very presence, occupation and encroachment on 
the civil sphere pose a direct challenge to the legitimate governance of the Jamaican state 
and underscore the security dilemma it confronts. Moreover, their capacity to interweave 
themselves within otherwise civic initiatives and bodies and traverse easily between the 
boundaries of legality and extra-legality represents a fundamental setback for civil society 
anywhere. This development is even more problematic in contexts such as Jamaica 
because local community governance structures and authority systems are usually the 
starting point crucial to bolstering civil society and a ready base from which civic 
interaction, engagement and negotiation at the grassroots level are encouraged.  
 
Donmanship complicates the promise of communal solidarity and inter-relational 
cohesion that civil society engenders. For one, the existing basis of commonality and 
collaboration in many urban neighbourhoods revolves around defiant dons and area 
leaders who utilize it to pursue extra-legal actions in the pursuit of wealth, power and 
prestige. Second, these communities serve as the headquarters of organized criminal 
organizations and safety zones against police action. Third, since citizen-residents of 
social spaces controlled by rogue actors live under rigid totalitarian circumstances, it 
negates the normative assumption of civil society as a free and charitable space and 
betrays the very meaning of civil governance. Fourth, based on the perspectives from the 
interviewee data, it is fair to conclude that the presence of rogue orders and their 
incursions into the civic life of urban neighbourhoods, including the stage-management 
of protest, nullifies genuine attempts at collective deliberation, negotiation and the 
autonomous engagement of citizens for common action. In other words, despite an 
apparent political agenda – to survive poverty, secure public goods essential to 
meaningful living – and leaders (dons), many marginalized citizens are unable to utilize 
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the bargaining power acquired through forceful protest to collectively and legitimately 
voice and resolve their dilemmas at a political level.  
 
10.6 STATE RESPONSE INFLUENCES THE CHARACTER AND TONE OF 
PROTEST. 
The response of the Jamaican State to various protest campaigns was examined in order to 
gauge the effectiveness of disruptive demonstrations and whether or not the quality of 
the state’s response to popular protest had any effect on its existing character. Based on 
the analysis of a variety of selected case examples as well as the interviewee data (see 
chapter 9), I draw the conclusion that capricious state responses to citizen protest 
contribute to the normalization and institutionalization of uncivil protestation models in 
Jamaica. There is no set or predictable response by the Jamaican state to protest.  State 
response is, in the main, inconsistent and largely depends on such factors as the 
magnitude of the protest, whether it involves a considerable number of protestors, 
whether it has broad-based support from powerful groups such as politicians, the 
merchant class, intellectuals and other members of the middle and upper classes as well as 
popular entertainers. State response to popular demonstrations also depends on whether 
the media provides it with sustained attention and the extent of violence attending it (cf. 
Piven & Cloward, 1977). In fact, the more violent the protest, the more comprehensive 
and immediate is the response of the Jamaican state.   
 
The examples show that positive steps have been taken by the Jamaican state to increase 
the availability and access to public goods to more of its citizens, some only after the 
deployment of massive mobilisations and protest and others, as part of the execution of 
public policy and state initiatives. Examples of this include the opening up of the 
telecommunications market which led to increased access to mobile telephony and 
landline telephone service to citizens, the Rural Electrification Programme which 
extended power supply to all parishes and the introduction of several water supply 
initiatives. The most recent statistical data of roadblock-demonstrations (2000-2005) 
shows a downward trend with regard to protests over inadequate public utilities in 
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Jamaica. On the strength of these findings, it is fair to conclude that some citizen protest, 
particularly those that involve heavy mobilisations and violence, have some impact in as 
far as they direct the state’s attention viz. a viz. the media to otherwise neglected problem 
areas. Other issues, however, arise such as the prohibitive costs for these services, which 
triggered the September 2005 consumer price protests.  
 
At the same time, the high number of social protests recorded per year in Jamaica (200-
300) and the limited number of cases that result in adequate and systematic amelioration 
does not augur well for citizen perceptions of state performance. When acting in response 
to vigorous protest action, the quality of the response is, in many instances, poor. This is 
not to say that the state may not respond, but many interviewees believe that nature of 
the response is designed to appease protestors rather than to ameliorate their concerns. 
Poor quality response, embodied as either non-response, delayed response, sham response 
or partial response thus largely represents the official response of the Jamaican state to 
popular protest. To force comprehensive, meaningful state responses, citizens therefore 
feel compelled to activate less peaceful protest strategies.  
 
10.6.1 Inconsistent State Response to Protest Undermines Public Confidence in the 
System 
Poor quality state responses point to a problematic gap between popular aspirations and 
state policy in Jamaica. The failure on the part of the Jamaican State to address localized 
problems and, on a more structural level, to strengthen the complaint mechanisms and 
communicative structures to correspond better with citizens about their problems 
necessitates disruptive protests and ensures its endurance as an accepted model of citizen 
negotiation. To break this cycle, a paradigmatic shift in the quality of state responses is 
required. While neglecting citizen concern is inexcusable, the interviewee perspectives 
suggest that, in specific circumstances, a non-response by the state has weight. In other 
words, in circumstances where protestors deploy tactics that negate the very idea of civil 
politics, political representatives who decline conference with protestors may effectively 
discourage protestation which is illegal, excessive and disruptive. The argument is not to 
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discount and diminish the relevance and need for broad-based popular pressure, quite the 
opposite. Indeed, if the government is seen by a wide cross-section of the population to be 
largely conciliatory, receptive and tolerant of citizen activism, there is political 
opportunity for networks of citizens to manoeuvre within and impact on the political 
system in more constructive ways.  
 
At the same time, poor quality state responses also condition the character of popular 
citizen politics, particularly when political officials such as Members of Parliament 
assume a curious stance within protest politics. Such political actors establish linkages 
with civil society – either as vote- seekers or as the agency through which citizens can 
access or participate in governance (Posner, 2004; Diamond & Gunther, 2001; Rosenblum, 
2000; Diamond, 1994). As I noted in chapter 9, depending on the nature of those linkages, 
their relationship with civil politics can be dubious. The research shows that through 
Jamaica’s entrenched history of patron-clientelism and the historical relationship of the 
political parties with grassroots people and politics, the linkage with civil society is 
ambivalent. It is the argument of this study that political representatives, particularly 
MPs, are obliged to operate within citizen protest with integrity. This is because the types 
of issues over which Jamaican citizens protest rise sufficiently above partisan interests and 
so the forms protest take must be freely determined and not guided by partisan agendas. 
 
10.7  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This empirical study, first and foremost, challenges civil society’s traditionally normative 
principles by foregrounding the possibility of negative norms such as violence, 
intolerance, discord, and incivility in its participatory (and discursive) aspects. With a few 
exceptions (Boyd, 2004; Barber, 1998; 1984; Whitehead, 1997; Keane, 1996; Shils, 1992) 
civil society literature tends to focus on its more positive features as a liberal and tolerant 
order. This research addresses this gap in the scholarship by delineating the experiences 
of incivility in the Jamaican context. In the process, it has contributed to providing a 
fuller account of the nature of civil society and the place of civil norms in popular citizen 
action. Second, the study contributes to the scholarship on Jamaica which has, so far, not 
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sufficiently addressed the implications of popular protest politics for civil society in 
Jamaica. Third, it also contributes to ongoing discussions about what or who constitutes 
civil society by arguing for active participation by structured groups as well as loose 
networks and relationships which may or may not crystallise into formal groups. In this 
regard, the study also foregrounds the definition of civil society as a social value in which 
norms of legality, respect and tolerance are fundamental. 
 
Since the study was concerned with the nature and character of popular protest in 
Jamaica, it was obliged to uncover not only how and why citizens protest but delve into 
the ethos, attitudes and emotions urging this type of political behaviour as well as the 
perspectives on the conduct of citizen politics within the broader framework of the 
requirements of civil society. As a result, the study was necessarily qualitative. I therefore 
employed the case study method. This approach to generating the data was useful because 
it allowed me to pull together a range of empirical sources – interviewees, audio-visual 
material, documents as well as (participant) observation – in order to derive the best 
possible explanations and drawing sound theoretical conclusions. This qualitative 
framework, grounded in the philosophical framework of interpretivism and social 
constructionism as well as the analytic tool of discourse analysis, generated insights into 
the nature and tone of popular protest in Jamaica. As I noted in chapter 3, interpretation 
allows for multiple meanings of an event because the research begins with the assumption 
that the character of popular protest cannot exist independently of the meanings people 
attach to it or the way it is socially constructed. The idea was therefore to solicit the 
participants’ perspectives about protest and civil society in Jamaica based on their own 
interpretations and the various meanings that they attach to these issues. In short, the 
approach was successful as it represented the efforts of ordinary citizens to make sense of 
their own politics based on their own (normative) notions of how it ought to be.  
 
These empirical findings about Jamaican popular protest facilitate an understanding of the 
practice, character and impact of uncivil politics across the developing and developed 
world as well as extend existing generalizations about the nature of civil society in its 
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broader context94. Indeed, there is much to be learned from the Jamaican case in terms of 
our understanding of the fabric of civil society in a democratic context. For example, 
future research may draw pertinent comparisons between the uncivil protest of farmers 
in India who burned genetically modified crops and protest campaigners who threatened 
to burn down the McDonalds fast food restaurant and the Jamaican case.  The use of the 
mobile phone in citizen activism in Nigeria also provides enormous parallels with 
Jamaica. In addition, theoretically, in terms of development and social justice issues, the 
findings case study on Jamaica provides a richer account of what is likely to be the 
experience in a range of societies, particularly those in the Third World whose 
governments face similar socio-economic conditions and whose citizens employ popular 
protest models to confront their perceived underperformance.  
 
Locating popular protest within the context of current debates on civil (and uncivil) 
society and governance is also novel. Usually, popular protest finds analytic space only 
within the theories of collective action, social movements, street politics as well as 
discussions on democracy which emphasize its liberatory aspects (Jasper & Goodwin, 
2003; Bayat 2000; 1997; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Norris, 1999; Dalton, 1996; Foweraker, 
1995; Tarrow, 1994; Scott, 1990; 1985). In this regard, the thesis provides a fresh 
conceptual framework and new theoretical vistas in which to examine and understand 
citizen political participation in governance. At the same time, although the case study 
method was useful, the scope and goal of the research did not allow me to fully explore in 
detail several dimensions of citizen politics in Jamaica. I outline some of these 
considerations below.  
 
 
                                                 
94 For example, the generalizability of these findings is already evidenced in a comparative study of 
the politics of donmanship and uncivility in Italy and Jamaica carried out by myself and Joseph 
Soeters. Here, we attempt to expose the emergence and decline of the Mafia by efforts from the 
state and civil society, in order to determine whether such a destiny was possible in Jamaica. See 
Johnson, H. & Soeters, J “Jamaican Dons, Italian Godfathers and the chances of a ‘reversible 
destiny’. Forthcoming, Political Studies.  
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10.8. FUTURE RESEARCH 
10.8.1  The Significance of the Liberatory Expressions of Protest 
Frequent disruptive outbursts of popular mobilizations and protest (some 200 plus 
annually) by the marginalized classes in Jamaica has substantially expanded the benefits 
to them. Although I alluded to the liberatory aspects of protests in chapters 6 and 7, a 
more substantive separate discussion of this issue is warranted. The street demonstration, 
for example, has raised the political consciousness of the Jamaican poor by offering them 
real weapons by which to challenge the shortcomings of the state and enforce their 
demands. I have argued elsewhere that higglers in the informal economy utilize the 
political and economic arena of the street to materially and symbolically struggle against 
the efforts of the state to deny them right to a way of life (Johnson, forthcoming). In fact, 
rather than passive victims, they are recognized as empowered actors who are using 
(violent) protest to realize success and social betterment within the otherwise confining 
socio-economic structures of the Jamaican society. Many marginals are now unafraid to 
defy the law, challenge the police and, at times, accept the assistance and commanding 
influence of extra-legal actors – criminal gangs and dons (ibid). Further research may 
explore the possibility of alternate strategies of political negotiation which may serve the 
interests of urban informals and Jamaican state.  
 
10.8.2   The Requirement of a Reformed State and Active, Responsible Citizenship 
A related issue is that protests are operating in a fairly democratic Jamaican environment 
and at a time when the political climate is very tolerant of protests. For many poor, this 
means that a momentum of resistance can be maintained even in the face of sporadic state 
repression. The deliberately offensive tactics that they employ not only illustrate the 
poor’s imposing presence in the public sphere but asserts their right to inclusion and 
participation. Indeed, the Jamaican case is stark proof that citizens’ sense of injustice and 
discontent must find proper expression through politics. This is because when it does not, 
it turns to anger which eventually erupts into disruption and violence (Blunkett, 2005; 
Munroe, 1999). Chapters 6-9 explored the failings of the Jamaican state to install and/or 
reform localized community structures to improve communication between government 
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and its constituents by opening more (effective) avenues for citizen participation. Indeed, 
much of the literature in this regard demand heavy state responsibility in implementing 
institutional reforms and ensuring that the mechanisms of representation, redress and 
accountability are adequate, accessible, and transparent, and generally function 
sufficiently to inspire the confidence of the citizenry (Diamond & Morlino, 2005; 
Blunkett, 2005; Munroe, 2000; 1999).  
 
Although the study is citizen-centred, it does not address how citizens may make room in 
the conduct of their politics for these potential participatory options. This notion of 
‘renewing democracy’ (Munroe, 1999) through installing effective deliberative 
democratic procedures and practices ought also to call into account the practice of politics 
at the citizen level. Whereas the reform of the state is critical to renewing democracy and 
a precondition for building and/or transforming civil society, the renewal of democracy 
must also, of necessity, involve not only the state but the active participation of the 
citizen and/or the community in governance. Further research might therefore 
investigate and explore how this may be achieved. Too much energy is placed on the 
street aspect of the collective action and not enough on the political negotiation and 
lobbying at an organized community and institutional level. The fact is that the Jamaican 
government can and does facilitate political and pressure group activity and at times, 
attempt to empower citizens to take action on issues of concern to them. The largely 
successful work of human rights lobby group, Jamaicans for Justice, attests to this. The 
state is even credited by many citizens for being conciliatory and welcoming of citizen 
participation and dialogue (see chapter 9; PN7; cf. Franklyn, 2002). Citizens must 
however be prepared to assume and exercise power in transparent and responsible ways 
for themselves. The rationale is evident and fittingly summed up by British politician, 
David Blunkett (2005:240) when he remarked that: 
Democracy has to be learned and practised. It is difficult to trust or influence 
political change without any real understanding of the workings of political 
systems. Citizens need skills of negotiation, persuasion, open-mindedness and 
self-organization to engage with complex issues [and negotiate effectively and 
successfully with the political system]. 
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It is within a strong civic culture that these skills have to be acquired, not on the street 
during mob activity and other manifestations of uncivil political action and discourse.  
 
10.8.3  Protest Planning and Organization – Possibilities and Challenges 
Based on the research findings, the trend towards low level organization of street protests 
needs to be examined in greater detail. This is evidenced by their episodic and 
spontaneous nature, a clear contributory element in its disruptive character. To block a 
local road or a major thoroughfare as a first and sometimes only strategy of protest is 
problematic and unsustainable, at least within the context of civil society, properly 
understood. I am not proposing a solid institutionalization of protest or a building of 
membership organizations. Indeed, Piven & Cloward (1977) identified the attempt to 
construct long-term organizations out of popular protest action as one of the failures of 
the American Welfare Rights movements of the mid-to late twentieth century. There is, 
however, something to be said for the value of identifying, selecting and having 
spokespersons from among protesting groups. Future research may explore how small 
networks of citizens, particularly in rural neighbourhoods can be supported to articulate 
their concerns effectively during protest cycles. I alluded to the role of political actors 
such as Members of Parliament in chapter 9 as having a role to play in this regard. 
Political representatives can and do provide demonstrations with a more meaningful 
outlook thereby protecting protestors from repressive state tactics while helping to 
articulate the issues viz. a. viz. the media. An investigation which explores the 
comprehensive role of other actors such as youth groups and community leaders as well 
as state agents in creating coalitions around thematic protest issues such as consumer 
issues and collective goods is worthwhile.  
 
In addition, the interview data suggested the risk of ‘roadblock democracy’ becoming 
antiquated, futile and hackneyed and the possibility of burnout for the ‘roadblock 
democrats’ who are constantly on the frontlines. Although interest in the issues of 
concern is usually high, energy levels are rarely able to be maintained over long periods 
of time. Indeed, the interviewees suggest that Jamaican protests are unlikely to last for 
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more than three days because of people’s unwillingness to be mobilized over extended 
periods of time. Given also the dispositions of impatience, indiscipline and the desire for 
immediacy of solutions, it maybe important to include in assessments of political 
behaviour in this context the extent to which the Jamaican personality predetermines the 
models of political action undertaken. This study has, after all, already underscored the 
political, economic, social, cultural and historical factors which drive certain types of 
protestation models. Some interviewees drew attention to the Jamaican penchant for 
exaggeration, spectacle and drama (see chapters 6 and 7). It is undeniable that the 
Jamaican personality summons attention. Recent scholarly work (Hope, 2006; 2004) 
locates this predisposition for the spectacular in the Jamaican personality as part of the 
inventive ways that oppressed and marginalised people navigate, negotiate and project 
their identities within a restricted colour, class, race and gender-coded postcolonial 
society.  
 
10.8.4  Employing Technology as Tool in Democratic Activism 
The increasing proliferation of new information and communication technologies – 
mobile telephones, internet chat rooms, email, instant messaging and text messaging – 
suggests its utility for socio-political change, particularly within the context of the geo-
political south. The benefits to civic culture in terms of relationship building, networking 
and citizen engagement are already observable. There is talk in some quarters that the 
virtual communities created on the worldwide web build social capital and civic 
collaboration in locales such as neighbourhoods by reinforcing relationships that already 
exist (Barber, 1998). Of course, where the relationships and networks are weak, it is 
argued that new technology can increase social isolation and fragmentation (Blunkett, 
2005; Obadare, 2005). Political science scholarship is also giving growing attention to 
technology for democracy and development (Obadare, 2005; Rafael, 2003; Castells, 2002; 
Myerson, 2001, Adebanwe, 2001; Caldwell, 2000; Myerson, 2001; Tsagarousianou, 1998). 
Mobile technology has indeed expanded horizontal relationships and networking within 
such groups as rural farmers, teachers, students, street vendors, entertainers and even 
criminal gangs in Jamaica.  The real extent of this engagement and whether mobile 
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connections may be used to create new networks of engagement across groups – Putnam’s 
(1993) idea of ‘bridging social capital’ – warrants empirical exploration. This is because 
within the context of the country’s historical oppositional culture and increasing 
relevance of grievance politics, the importance of telecommunications technology, 
particularly mobile telephony, as a tool of democratic citizen activism and agitation is 
already apparent. 
 
This study explored in some detail the use of mobile phones by citizens to make claims 
upon the state, level criticisms or participate in public discussions through ‘call-in’ radio 
programmes. The study also discussed the importance of mobile phones in alerting the 
media to citizen protest.  Among the challenges mentioned as impacting on citizen 
participation and activism via technology were prohibitive costs and the persistence of 
unequal access to the economically-marginalised classes. Given Jamaica’s largely oral 
culture, a comprehensive examination of the possibilities and challenges to deploying 
technology for social development, political participation, social capital building, citizen 
engagement and activism in Jamaica is desirable. For one, the so-called ‘digital divide’ – 
the gap in availability and accessibility of technology between the countries of the global 
North and the peripheral South is often reproduced in developing societies such as 
Jamaica with huge consequences for citizen politics. In addition, developments such as 
the use of media in citizen politics and participation have increased the importance of 
local community cable networks. A liberalized telecommunications market is facilitating 
the development of local programming but at present it is geared only towards 
entertainment and rather than education. It functions as a sort of ‘spectator sport’ and 
therefore its potential civic uses remain unexplored. The potential to strengthen civil 
society through this medium, along with the government’s proposed introduction of 
Public Service Broadcasting, thus warrants further research.  
 
10.8.5  Renewing Civic Organizations 
At the outset of this research, I noted that part of the reason disruptive protests occur 
with such frequency and assume the forms they do, is due to the perceived 
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ineffectiveness of the official organs of civil society. Although Munroe’s (1999) research 
confirms a density of up to 5,000 community-based organizations, it is clear that that civil 
society in Jamaica is terribly weak in its ability to organize itself for collective action and 
in its ability to address the needs and demands of its citizens (see Chapter 1; cf. Baker, 
2001).  For example, criticism is levelled at the Church for its ‘lame duck’ approach to 
civil activism while human rights lobby, Jamaicans for Justice, is accused of creating 
divisiveness rather than societal cohesion where its approach to human rights advocacy is 
concerned (Hope, 2000). The fact that the recently installed Jamaican Prime Minister, 
Portia Simpson-Miller is actively creating space for the active participation of the Church 
in governance, underscores the urgency and relevance for real research into the activities, 
functioning and nature of official organs of civil society and their capacity as agents for 
transformations in citizen-led politics. Whether or not these groups are able to bring 
about the kind of structural change in society or offer any real alternatives to the 
alienated sections of the urban, lawless poor or even lawful informals to get access to 
social goods which are tied to larger structures and processes, depend on the types of 
activism in which they engage. In other words, further research may determine whether 
these civic organs can represent real hope for the wider political community by becoming 
part of the process of teaching the disenfranchised to become mobilized on a collective 
basis and that the struggles of loosely organized disruptive protesting networks are linked 
to broader reform initiatives.  
 
Jamaican music has also come under harsh criticism (see Johnson, 2004; Boyne, 2003; 
Munroe, 1999). The country’s music product has always been a reaction to society and 
reggae artistes have helped to articulate the concerns and grievances of the poor and often 
mount a lyrical counter-war against an oppressive power structure. Indeed, the enormous 
pecuniary resources and status recognition generated by music industry players also 
define them as sources of economic and social capital and asserts their identity as 
potential power brokers within civil society. However, Jamaica’s contemporary (reggae 
versus dancehall) music culture transmits intensely violent and antagonistic values and 
norms, leading to the development of an ambiguous social language inimical to civility 
 368
(Johnson, 2004; Boyne, 2003). Current research into this arena (Hope, 2006; Stolzoff, 
2000; Cooper, 1995) only renders passing commentary on this development and so it is 
worthy of critical exploration. 
 
Finally, it bears repeating that the culture of civility in Jamaica, as elsewhere will remain 
vulnerable and imperfect unless it is also premised on state transformation. As I have 
noted previously (see chapters 2 and 5), civil society is not at war with the state but 
deeply depends on its efficient performance and accountability. The relationship between 
the state and civil society is mutually-supporting and inter-dependent. This suggests that 
the state not only create opportunities and mechanisms for wider public involvement in 
governance but form coalitions with different interests to improve its communication and 
linkages with citizens. At the same time, civil society must be empowered to take real and 
responsible action when, as is inescapably the case in Jamaica, some ‘roadblock 
democrats’ or political official tries to replace a democratic event with wanton violence. 
Without doubt, some legitimate protests will be hijacked by rogue elements, and they so 
often remind us that not all groups in society are civil. In other words, whereas the state 
is obliged to act as a guardian of public civility as well as a vehicle for the popular will, 
the measure of its legitimacy rests as much on its economic performance as on its capacity 
to maintain social order and the rule of law. While there is a firmly entrenched culture of 
resistance to oppression, Jamaica runs the risk of anarchy and disintegrating in what 
Keane (1996:14) calls a ‘totally uncivil society’ if citizen politics only serves to browbeat, 
disrupt and ignite violent participation. As Jamaican journalist Ian Boyne, so poignantly 
asks in an article in The Jamaica Gleaner in 2002, ‘Do we wait until the state has provided 
a basic standard of living for our poor before we demand of them socially acceptable 
behaviour’ (Boyne, 2002)?  
 
10.9  SUMMARY 
 
This empirical investigation into grievance politics and popular protest in Jamaica exposes 
the counter political force that sections of the disadvantaged class have become by virtue 
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of trying to survive poverty and confront state abuse, social injustice and exclusion, while 
seeking to improve their lives. At the same time, new developments within the civil 
sphere, particularly the political evolution and increasing influence of informal groups 
such as dons and criminal gangs as well as the extant uncivil practices of other citizens 
exposes the moral ambivalence of civil society and the complexities and contradictions 
that are inherent in current understandings of the term.  For example, whereas the 
marginalized classes often suffer the absence or poor quality delivery of essential goods 
and services vital to meaningful existence, and inflationary standards of living impinge 
most of these sectors, they sometimes engage in activities that are highly destructive, 
criminal and constitutive of everything that civility is not. This increasingly pressing 
reality in Jamaica, as elsewhere in many other Third World democracies demands that 
traditional civil society perspectives be expanded or subjected to greater scrutiny.  
 
In short, current civil society theorizing needs to be re-examined and re-shaped. Such a 
refashioning is important because it allows the scholarship to consider not just the 
existence of a plethora of civic groups in a society, the membership levels of these civic 
associations and lament about ‘bowling alone’, but also take into account the practices 
and politics of both structured groupings and loosely organized networks of citizens as 
well as the events in the informal sphere which are impacting on the nature and 
functioning of civil society. It is true that the actions and practices of citizens are not 
always benevolent and may not always contribute to the ‘common good’. It is however 
within this variegated domain called civil society, populated by both virtuous and 
unscrupulous citizens, that we have to locate and/or construct real civil societies. In doing 
so, we are obliged to shift our concern, as Deaken (2001) advises, to the fertility of the 
subsoil of civil society and the nature of what grows in it. In other words, it compels more 
critical attention to be given to civil society’s uncivil manifestations, and charts a 
theoretical and political context through which this hurrah term can best serve the 
normative obligations cast upon it.  
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In terms of the practical significance of this study, I wish to draw attention to what I call 
‘target’ areas which I believe require mandatory rethinking and transformation if Jamaica 
is to experience any kind of social reconstruction.  The first two fall within a structural 
and institutional dimension as they concern (1) the economic dependence of the state and 
(2) the misuse of state power. The third has more to do with ‘culture’ and regards the 
uncivil elements within Jamaican civil society. It is noteworthy that the study shows that 
the source of uncivil politics in Jamaica is to be found both in social institutions as well as 
in human behaviour, and that both have  contributed in considerable measure to the 
existing calamity of governance that Jamaica confronts. For example, the study reveals 
that perceived poor state performance in adequately addressing community plight, 
particularly citizens’ rights to proper amenities, and to reliable delivery of other collective 
goods, as well as its failure to respond satisfactorily to citizen grievance and improve 
available means of redress, drive, justify and consolidate uncivil politics in Jamaica.  In 
addition, it is without doubt that the economic dependence and subservience of the 
Jamaican state within a context of global capitalism, manifested in the resource 
constraints that define the political economy, have hampered its ability to adequately 
respond to the public demand for goods, and increased the propensity for uncivil 
demand-making politics among the Jamaican citizenry.  
 
The repressive character of the Jamaican state, manifested through its police force, also 
speaks loudly to misuse and/or abuse of state power in this context, and therefore 
underscores the present violent responses from the citizenry. There is therefore an 
overwhelmingly clear need for the state not to act in ways that provokes such behaviours. 
Indeed, it is crucial for those of us working for a more civil society to recognize that 
violence is the antithesis of civil society and ‘authoritarian law and order strategies are 
rendered redundant unless cultures of civility are cultivated at the level of civil society’ 
[as well as the state] (Keane, 1996:164). The Jamaican state must, in other words, assume 
some culpability for the current temperament of civilian politics in this context. In this 
regard, it is required to pay due attention to its historically embedded and continuing role 
in accommodating, fostering and otherwise becoming complicit in uncivil behaviour. I 
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reiterate here that the reasons uncivil politics, including uncivil actors and elements, have 
persisted and found consolidated place in Jamaica are powerfully connected to those that 
informed its development, that is, a compromised Jamaican State, which continues to 
foster a symbiotic co-dependent relationship with alternate, outlaw authorities, and 
informal practices by public officials which constitute de facto approval their 
independent authority and uncivil norms.  
 
Yet, a civil society cannot exist without civil values and attitudes because civility depends 
on behaviour, attitudes and institutions that only civil society can create (Boyd, 2004; 
Barber, 1998; Diamond, 1994; Shils, 1992). Indeed, it is now widely agreed that the 
‘quality and stability of both contemporary neo-democracies and long standing 
democracies are likely to be affected by the solidity and structure of civil society’ 
(Whitehead, 1997:96-97; cf. Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Diamond, 1994). These 
characteristics are, however, heavily conditioned by the challenges arising from the 
uncivil interstices. The conspicuous absence of a culture of civility and positive civic 
leadership within crucial social domains in the Jamaican context means that lawlessness, 
anarchy and incivility have become dominant norms here. The idea here is that the 
requirements of a good society and good governance cannot rest with the state alone. 
Civil society is also a fundamental part of the desire to have a civil society. In short, the 
compromised politics of the Jamaican state and its manifest shortcomings are not entirely 
responsible for the character of Jamaican civil society and the tenor of citizen politics.  
 
After all, citizens’ behaviour is influenced by far more than institutions such as the state. 
Their collective or shared meanings, subjective consciousness, emotions, culture and lived 
experiences also shape the norms and values they uphold as well as determine and 
constrain their behaviour. In other words, Jamaican citizens and communities have a role 
to play in determining the quality of their civil society and in giving effect to citizenship. 
This will mean deploying more imaginative strategies and models of participation to 
engage with the state to secure their demands and defend their interests. The 
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fundamental question now is whether there is sufficient social and moral capital existing 
in Jamaican civil society to effect a paradigmatic shift from uncivil politics?  
 
Although recent research (see Powell, Waller & Bourne, 2007) would appear to indicate 
that social capital is dangerously low in Jamaica, the empirical findings of this research 
suggest otherwise. This study reveals an extraordinary amount of social cohesion and 
trust among those involved in aggressive demand politics, a manifest awareness about the 
distinctions between civil and uncivil participation modalities and a genuine desire to act 
civilly and to sustain a civic culture. Of course, there are substantial segments among the 
Jamaican citizenry who retain powerful intrinsic satisfaction from participation in uncivil 
politics and a willingness to continue to exhibit contrary norms. Gray (2004) maintains 
that it is this etiquette of badness which gives this rebellious contingent social honour and 
status within the limits of a socially hierarchicalised society. Yet, the dilemma that 
Jamaica faces is that otherwise civil segments are adopting and absorbing the uncivil 
norms, strategies and politics of the uncivil sectors. It would indeed appear, as Munroe 
(1999) declared at the outset of this study, that ‘the competing forces of deepening 
democracy and anarchic disorder are struggling for dominance in Jamaica”. The shift 
away from uncivil politics will rely on the latter not being allowed to predominate by a 
renewed focus on not just the shortcomings of the state, but also the failings of the 
citizens and how they elect to conduct their politics. 
 
11. POSTSCRIPT 
Like much similar work which elects to take stock of the very loaded concepts of civility 
and incivility, this project may seem controversial. Indeed, within the context of post-
slavery and postcolonial Jamaica, it may sound loud bells in some quarters about 
discourses of power embedded in the use of the language of hierarchy, exclusion, 
conservatism and condescension. Others may think it tenuous to link debates on civility 
with contentious democratic politics. Yet, in the face of increasing incivility – of violence 
masquerading as emancipatory politics – it seems imperative to reclaim the ethos of civil 
society in order to ensure a move towards empowerment of the most marginalised.  
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APPENDIX A 
____________________________________________________________________ 
INFORMATION PACK 
THE RESEARCHER 
Hume Nicola Johnson is a Doctor of Philosophy student in Political Science & Public Policy at the 
University of Waikato in Hamilton, New Zealand. She holds a Masters of Science Degree in 
Government (International Relations) and a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Media and 
Communications from the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, Kingston, Jamaica. She 
previously worked as a television and radio broadcaster at Radio Jamaica and the Television 
Department of the Jamaica Information Service (JIS). 
__________________________________________________________________ 
WHAT IS THE STUDY ABOUT? 
This research examines popular protests (riots, demonstrations) in Jamaica as an accepted and 
widespread (unconventional) political tool used by citizens to access the state and seek redress for 
perceived ‘injustices’ and the provision of social goods (roads, water, telephones etc.). My main 
concern is: 
(1) The nature and tenor of popular protest in Jamaica. 
(2)  The impact of these protests on the quality of citizen politics and civil society   
(3) Whether the country’s civic sphere can break free of ‘uncivil practices’ and find modes of 
struggle and expression within improved mechanisms of political representation and revived 
civil society structures. 
 
CONTACT RESEARCHER: 
Feel free to contact this researcher about any issues, comments, questions or concerns about the 
study and /or its procedures at the following address: 
Hume N. Johnson 
9 Thetford Avenue,  Patrick City 
Kingston 20, Jamaica West Indies 
Tel: (876) 933-3813; 340-1977; 398-5859 
Email: nhj2@waikato.ac.nz; hnjohnsn@hotmail.com 
 
Or you may contact the supervisors: Dr. Priya Kurian: pkurian@waikato.ac.nz; Dr. Alan Simpson: 
poli0219@waikato.ac.nz; Dr. Patrick Barrett: pbarrett@waikato.ac.nz 
WHO ARE THE PARTICIPANTS? 
Members of Jamaica’s civil society - taxi-drivers, vendors, students, entertainers, vendors, the 
unemployed, students, activists, human rights advocates, entertainers, church leaders, members of 
community organizations, media practitioners, talk show hosts, academics and the police as well as 
representatives of the state – Members of Parliament. 
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WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE PARTICIPANT? 
Your participation will involve taking part in focus group discussions or face to face in-depth 
interviews with the above named researcher for approximately 1 - 2 hours at a mutually agreeable 
place and time. My aim is to get your perspective on the nature and character of Jamaica’s protest 
movement/civil society, the values at work in the society today and its impact on civil society.  
 
HOW WILL THE INFORMATION BE USED? 
The data collected for this study will be analyzed, compiled and published in fulfilment of the 
requirements of a Doctor of Philosophy Degree at the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New 
Zealand. It will also be used as presentation material for academic conferences; consultations and 
seminars as well as for publications in academic journals, books and other publications. 
 
WHAT ARE YOUR RIGHTS AS A PARTICIPANT? 
The Right to Privacy, Non- Participation and Withdrawal 
• You reserve the right not to participate in this research, to discontinue or to withdraw your 
participation. In the case where you choose to withdraw from the study during the data 
collection phase, your raw data will be returned to you or destroyed. 
 
The Right to Retract Statement or Contribution  
• You reserve the right, within one month of the date of your interview, to request a transcript 
of the material relating to you and to retract or withdraw, within one month of the date of the 
receipt of that transcript, any statement and /or your contribution to the research.  
The Right to Anonymity 
• You reserve the right (if you choose) to remain anonymous [nameless]. This means that your 
identity will not be revealed or directly used when the collected data is being compiled and 
analyzed. 
 
• In the event that you agree to be quoted and/or named, you will be advised in order to give 
you an opportunity to consent to the attribution. 
 
The Right to Confidentiality 
• You reserve the right to examine and amend the data you have provided during your 
interview. 
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APPENDIX B 
__________________________________________________________________ 
RESEARCH CONSENT FORM 
 
I,   …………………………………………………………… agree to be a voluntary participant in 
this research and am aware of the nature and purpose of the study and its intended publication as a 
Doctor of Philosophy thesis at the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand. 
 
I am aware of my right to: 
 
• clarify any issues or ask further questions of the researcher 
• decline to be interviewed or to participate in focus group sessions/interviews 
• refuse to answer particular questions and to withdraw from the research 
• examine, amend or withdraw information provided within a period not exceeding eight weeks 
of being interviewed. 
 
I am aware that all information derived from my interview will be held securely; confidentiality is 
assured and my identity will not be disclosed without my consent. 
 
I confirm that I have not been coerced into participating nor led to believe that any financial 
rewards will be offered. 
 
Please indicate with a tick one of the following 
 
• I wish to remain anonymous  
 
• I consent to being named and quoted 
 
 
Participant [Print Name] 
 
_______________________    _________________________ 
Signature      Date 
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APPENDIX C 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTERVIEW LETTER TO INTERVIEWEES 
(Date) 
 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
 
I am a student at the University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand pursuing a Doctor of 
Philosophy Degree in Political Science & Public Policy. I invite your kind participation in the 
fieldwork aspect of my thesis entitled: When Citizen Politics becomes Uncivil: Between Popular 
Protest, Civil Society and Governance in Jamaica.  
 
This phase of my research involves interviews with ordinary citizens, politicians, academic 
commentators, civil society groups, media practitioners and members of the Security Forces. The 
discussion will embrace issues of civility, governance, popular protest and political participation. 
 
Please find attached an information pack, which outlines in greater detail the objectives, 
justification and procedures involved in this study as well as your rights as a participant. Each 
interview session is expected to last between 1 – 2 hours.  
 
Please feel free to contact me at 933-3813 or 340-1977 if there are any issues, questions or 
concerns that require clarification. I look forward to talking with you. 
 
Respectfully, 
 
HUME N. JOHNSON 
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APPENDIX D 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
• When you think of protest/riot/demonstrations, what comes to mind/What is your general 
feeling regarding street demonstrations and the forms that protest take in Jamaica? 
 
• Were you involved in any way in the 1999 Gas riots and what was the extent of your 
participation? 
 
• Did you feel that this riot deserved your involvement? 
 
• What is your most vivid memory of those three days / By using single words/adjectives, how 
would you describe the gas riots? 
 
• When politicians attach themselves to protest action, does it affect the legitimacy or the spirit 
of the action? Does the involvement of opposition forces assist or detract from a resolution of 
the issues of the protestors?  
 
• What is the difference between this riot and other demonstrations/protest and civil 
disturbances (roadblocks for water, phone, police brutality) that you felt you would refrain 
from participating in? 
 
• Did you approve or disapprove of the actions by citizens on those days? / Five years has 
elapsed since the Gas riots, to what extent has your feeling/perception about those events 
changed? 
 
• The riots which followed the July 2001 police operation in Western Kingston appeared to 
have been politically driven. Were citizens aware that such protest was against the State for a 
legitimate police action? 
 
• Would you say that Jamaicans are confused about their role as citizens first as opposed to 
political animals tied to issues based on their allegiance to a particular political party? 
 
• How would you rate the state’s response or the political action taken in light of the riots you 
have seen? 
• (What would have been an appropriate state response)? 
• Is the state’s ‘positive’ response to this type of civil disturbance fuelling it? 
• Based on your observation of successive riots and demonstrations over time, how does protest 
benefit the protestors / society? 
• To what extent can this type of protest be harmful to the society? 
• To what extent are protests and riots successful ways of ‘lobbying’ government or seeking 
redress against perceived injustices? 
The Media and Popular Protest 
• How do protestors respond to the media’s presence at the site of a demonstration?  
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• Based on your coverage of successive riots and demonstrations over time, what are the kinds 
of behaviour usually displayed by protestors? 
 
• What is your perspective on this type of behaviour?  
 
• Some people say we have a culture of riots? Does this minimize its impact and the premium 
placed on it?  
 
• Is ‘protest’ as this great tool to complain or to force the hand of the state abused? 
 
• What are the likely benefits that protestors derive from having media coverage? 
 
• In what ways do you think media coverage takes away from the effectiveness of protests or to 
the potential advantages to be derived from protests? 
 
• What do you think should the media’s role be during instances of protest and riots? 
 
• Based on your knowledge of riots and demonstrations in Jamaica, what are the kinds of 
behaviour usually displayed by protestors? 
 
• What is your opinion on this type of behaviour?  
 
• In what ways can acts of criminality and indiscipline during demonstrations and riots help or 
hinder the cause? 
 
• Do you think protests and riots are successful ways of ‘lobbying’ government or seeking 
redress against perceived injustices? 
 
• Five years after the Gas riots and having witnessed many other demonstrations and acts of 
protest after that, have we learned how to participate differently? 
 
• Are you satisfied with how the media acts in its civil society role?  
 
• How should the media execute this duty?  
 
• Talk shows appear to be the new MP/ What can media do to improve its mediating/ advocacy 
role? 
 
• Do you think the media exploit the political divisions between Jamaican citizens? 
Civil Society in Jamaica 
 
• When we speak of ‘civil’ society, what do you take it to mean? What are its 
strengths/limitations in the Jamaican context? 
 
• Would criminal gangs, drug lords, community Dons be included in this civil society? 
 
• How would you like to see civil society functioning ideally? 
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• As a part of civil society, how do networks of vendors, squatters, the unemployed, inner city 
residents to be represented? 
 
• In what ways does Jamaica’s social cleavage impact civil society development and functioning 
in Jamaica? 
 
• How do Jamaicans generally respond in a conflict situation? (do they attempt to pacify the 
situation or is conflict ignored) 
 
• Would you describe Jamaica as a ‘civil’ society? 
 
• How would you describe current behaviour norms of Jamaica? Source of it?  
 
• Provide some examples of what would constitute incivility, undisciplined and badmanism? 
 
• What changes, if any, do you detect in our value system? 
 
• What are people striving for in Jamaica/ rank their priorities in terms of importance/ what is 
important to them, what are some of the things we value or place premium on today? 
 
• What are some of the values that you think the society ought to espouse and share? 
 
• Commentators say Jamaica is in a social crisis. Is this claim exaggerated?  
 
• What responsibility do you place on the state as against civil society in transforming negative 
behaviours and norms?  
 
• Do you believe the government is doing enough to bolster civil society and various groupings 
of ordinary citizens? 
 
 
State-Sponsored Citizen Initiatives 
 
• How do you rate the government’s values and attitudes programme? 
 
• Do you think it is necessary to train people on proper attitudes and values? 
 
• What do you think would be the main difficulties in implementing and then sustaining values 
–based training programmes? 
 
• How could these challenges be addressed? 
 
• Do you believe that initiatives such as the values and attitudes programme can directly help to 
restore civil relations in Jamaica? 
 
• What are your impressions of the Church; Jamaicans for Justice, Office of the Political 
Ombudsman, PMI as civil society actors? 
 
• How relevant are these citizen initiatives to civic engagement in Jamaica? 
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• To what extent are the activities of these groups, in your opinion, at risk of being subverted by 
the inclination to riots and demonstrations? 
 
• How can the effectiveness of citizen initiatives be improved? 
 
 
Additional Questions 
 
• Women involvement in riots 
• Women in leadership position in riots 
• gender relations in protest. 
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APPENDIX E 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
LIST OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
(PN – Participant Number) 
 
PN1: Taxi Driver/Ex- Resident of the Inner city                                 (2004 May 4)   
PN2: Music Selector/ Disc Jockey                                              (2004, February 3) 
PN3: Former University Student Leader/Political Activist               (2004, January 20) 
PN4: Rastafarian Entertainer                                                               (2004, January 28) 
PN5: Radio Talk Show Host/Producer/Reporter                               (2004, February, 3) 
PN6: Entertainment Manager                                                            (2003, January 3) 
PN7: Communications Consultant/Academic                               (2004, January 27) 
PN8: Attorney General/Minister of Justice                               (2004, April 28) 
PN9: News Editor/Media Manager, Radio (Female)               (2004, February 13) 
PN10: Sportswriter                                                                        (2003, January 13) 
PN11: Focus Group Participants – Farmer, Lawyer, Urban Planner, Graphic Designer, 
Member of Disabled Community                                                         (2004, January 31) 
PN12: Cultural Anthropologist                                                        (2004, January 26) 
PN13: Roman Catholic Priest/ Talk Show Host/Attorney, Member of Parliament/Coffee 
Farmer                                                                                                    (2004, March 16) 
PN14: Radio Disc Jockey                                                      (2004, March 11) 
PN15: Innercity Residents                                                      (2004, February 2) 
PN16: Police Officer                                                                    (2004, February 3) 
PN17: Deacon; Youth Leader                                                        (2003, January 9) 
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PN18: Focus Group participants – Public Relations Executive; former student leaders; 
Teacher                                                                                                     (2004, January 30) 
PN19: Music Promoter /Entertainer                                           (2004, February 10) 
PN20: (Focus Group) - University Students (ages 19-24)                  (2004, February 2) 
PN21: Media Regulator/Attorney                                          (2004, March 25) 
PN22: Member – Human Rights Lobby                                            (2004, March 26) 
PN23: News Reporter                                            (2004, February 7) 
PN24: Reporter/Inner city Source                                          (2004, June 27) 
PN25: Former Student Activist/Dancehall Researcher                     (2003, December 2) 
PN26: Media Manager, Newspaper (Male)                             (2004, February 24) 
PN27: Political Activist/Innercity resident                            (2004, March 8) 
PN28: Female Rastafarian/ Entertainer                                           (2004, March 16) 
PN29: Cultural Commentator/Innercity Resident                                 (2004, February 14) 
PN30: University Communications Student                             (2003, December 19) 
PN31:    Self-styled Shottas                                                                     (2004, April) 
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